

THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA

THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA

STUDIES IN HISTORY, LITERATURE
AND PHILOSOPHY

BY

THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK

Sometime Professor of Philosophy at the Czech University of
Prague; Member of the Austrian Parliament; Lecturer
at the School for Slavonic Studies at London
University, King's College

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN ORIGINAL

BY

EDEN AND CEDAR PAUL

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

First published in 1919

(All rights reserved)

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: REALISM AND NIHILISM. ČERNYŠEVSKII AND DOBROLJUBOV. PISAREV.

PAGE

I.

§ 95. Černyševskii's philosophical Development.—Realism (Nihilism); Feuerbach, Positivism, Utilitarianism.—The "anthropological Principle."—Philosophy of the Enlightenment in the Sense of Peter the Great and that of Lessing.—Černyševskii versus Kant	1
§ 96. Černyševskii's Utilitarianism.—The Problem of the Will.—His Ethic social and socialistic; Love and Egoism upon a materialistic Basis necessitate Communism as a System of Equality and Equal Rights.— <i>What is to be done</i> as a Description of the materialistic and positivist Utilitarians, the Realists or Nihilists.—The Woman's Question.—Černyševskii versus Self-Sacrifice	8
§ 97. Utilitarian Realism in Aesthetics.—Beauty is Life	17
§ 98. Dobroljubov continues Černyševskii's literary Criticism	19
§ 99. Černyševskii's Philosophy of History.—History and Science in general do not exclude Convictions.—The hypothetical Method	25
§ 100. Černyševskii and Marx; Heroes of the Spirit as primal Sources of Energy.—Lessing.—Černyševskii versus Darwin and the Struggle for Existence	28
§ 101. Černyševskii's Socialism is ethical.—He favours the Liberation of the Peasantry and the Assignment of Land to the Peasants.—Economics.—The Mir and the social Order of the Future; Russia can overleap Stages of Development	30
§ 102. Černyševskii's Sociology and Politics.—Anarchist Elements.—The Opposition between Aristocracy and Democracy.—The Conflict with Herzen.—Černyševskii and Dobroljubov as Representatives of the Rasnočinec, as "Children" against "Fathers."—The Question of Nationality from the materialist Outlook	35
§ 103. Černyševskii's Participation in the practical Work of Revolution	39
§ 104. Černyševskii's philosophical and literary Activities in Siberia	43
§ 105. The true Significance of Černyševskii's Materialism; the philosophical Revolution against the Theocracy	48

	PAGE
§ 106. Černyševskii's Influence.—Černyševskii prepares the Ground for Marxism.—Černyševskii and the Narodničestvo	50
II.	
§ 107. Pisarev's Realism.—The Realist as a consistent Individualist, Egoist, and Hedonist; Aesthetics and Principles in general are annihilated.—The Realist might murder and rob, and is withheld from doing so only by his subjective Taste.—Pisarev's Exaggerations (Pisarev, Stirner, and Nietzsche).—Pisarev's Utilitarianism, naturalist Materialism, and Positivism	53
§ 108. The Realist becomes a "thoughtful Realist."—Pisarev's Interpretation of Turgenev's Bazarov.—The absolute Negation of Russia; Stupidity and Poverty.—Matters must be thought to a Finish; Salvation by natural Science	58
§ 109. The Problem of the Hungry and the Insufficiently clad; the "thoughtful Realist" becomes the "thoughtful Proletarian."—The thoughtful Realist not a Faust.—The Nihilist even recognises the old morality.—Pisarev's Influence; the Nihilist as Intellectual	63
III.	
§ 110. Nihilism	69
i. Realism as Nihilism in Art, Aesthetics, and literary Criticism; Naturalism: Realism versus Romanticism	69
ii. Positivism and Materialism; Facts, not Philosophy; Practice, not Theory	70
iii. Nihilism as destructive Criticism and socio-political Negation of the Uvarovian Trinity; Atheism and Materialism; Nihilist Disillusionment versus Mysticism.—Nihilism is not Pessimism and Indifferentism.—The Nihilist is a believing Unbeliever	72
iv. Ethics the leading nihilist Discipline.—Empiricist and practical Ethics.—Nihilist Industry versus aristocratic Tedium.—Irony and Cynicism versus romanticist Sentimentality.—Nihilist Democracy takes the Form of the Movement "towards the People."—Nihilists in social Intercourse and nihilist Phraseology.—The nihilist Community; Friendship and Love.—Nihilism inevitably becomes political and revolutionary	74
v. Nihilism versus Aristocracy and Liberalism.—Nihilism as Radicalism, Democracy, Socialism.—Nihilism as Anarchism; all Things are lawful.—The Problem of Crime	78
vi. The manifold Types, Kinds, and Degrees of Nihilism.— <i>Fathers and Children</i> ; Questions put by the "Children" to the "Fathers."—Nihilism as the leading Problem of the day; Dostoevskii; Nietzsche	79
IV.	
§ 111. Nihilism and Terrorism.—The Program of the revolutionary Movement	81

CONTENTS

vii

	PAGE
i. The secret Society Zemlja i Volja, 1862; Velikorus'; the "Organisation" of the Karakozovcy (1865).—The first Attempt on the life of Alexander II, made by Karakozov in 1866.—The first revolutionary Proclamations: Young Russia, 1862; To the Younger Generation, 1861.—The Addresses	81
ii. The Bakuninist Program of 1868	85
iii. Nečaev's <i>Catechism of Revolution</i> and the Program of the Narodnaja Rasprava, 1869	86
iv. The Program of the Čaikovcy, 1871	89
v. The Program of the Lavrovists, 1873	89
vi. Tkačev's Jacobinism; Nabat, 1875-1877	92
vii. Program of the new Zemlja i Volja, 1877	94
viii. The terrorist Narodnaja Volja, 1879	95
ix. Party of the Černyi Pereděl, 1879, as the Beginning of Social Democracy.	97
§ 112. Nature and Development of the political Radicalism of the Sixties and Seventies.—The Socialism of the Day mainly agrarian; the Narodničestvo.—Terror without Mass Movement.—Individualism and Terrorism; Terrorism and Social Revolution.—Marxism and Bakuninism; nihilist Utilitarianism versus Bakuninist Revolutionism.—Socialism and Politism.—Increasing Significance of the urban Workers; the Movement not a Students' Movement	98
§ 113. Nihilism and Terrorism are not identical in Nature.—Stepniak's ethical Theory of Terror as a Means of Self-defence, a Theory based on natural Right; a Life for a Life!—The Bourgeois is the Enemy, but we strike down the Gendarme.—The philosophical Problem of Nihilism as Atheism	102
V.	
§ 114. Psychology of the Russian Terrorists of the Seventies; the Lamb becomes a Tiger	105

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE SO-CALLED SOCIOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVISTS; LAVROV AND MIHAILOVSKII.

I.

§ 115. Lavrov as Philosopher of History and Theorist of Subjectivism; Comte and Kant.—Lavrov's "Historical Realism" and his Conception of History; Consciousness versus Nature	115
§ 116. Lavrov accepts the Comtist developmental Scheme, but modifies it in a socialist and Darwinist Sense.—Universal History as a World Assize; History and Ethics.—The Illusion of Freedom.—The critically-thinking Individuality as the motive Force in History; Criticism and Faith.—Lavrov's Formula of Progress and his progressive Imperative.—The three Duties of the "more definite" Individual: Propaganda; Organisation of the socialist Party; a progressive Example.—The Duty of working for Progress as a Duty to promote Revolution; Lavrov's revolutionary Scepticism.—Lavrov's Concessions to Terrorism	121

	PAGE
§ 117. Lavrov's Socialism ethical and humanist.—Lavrov opposed to Marx's historical Materialism.—Humanity.—State and Nation.—Minimum of the State; the State as a Contract.—This Contract is no longer binding.—Lavrov and his Russian Contemporaries and Predecessors	128
§ 118. Lavrov's Significance.—Was he the first Russian Sociologist?—Kant reduced to the Level of Ruge and Bruno Bauer.—The Problem of Individualism left unsolved.—Lavrov's negative Philosophy of Religion.—Lavrov as Politician; the political Utopian	131

II.

§ 119. Mihailovskii an Empiricist and Positivist; denies the Existence of innate Ideas and apriorist Axioms.—Agnosticism and Relativism.—No Naturalism.—Utilitarianism versus Kant	136
§ 120. Mihailovskii's Sociology, the Question of the subjective Method; the Impassivity of positivist Historism rejected.—Society not an Organism.—Work the essential Attribute of Individuality.—Cooperation the Essence of Sociality	140
§ 121. Mihailovskii's Philosophy of History.—The three Stages of Development: the objective anthropocentric, the eccentric, and the subjective anthropocentric.—Evolutionary Type and evolutionary Stage.—The Development of Cooperation	146
§ 122. Criticism of Darwinism from the Outlook of the Philosophy of History; the Darwinian Struggle for Existence invalid for human Society.—The Struggle between the Rich and the Poor.—Physiological and social Division of Labour.—Darwinism in the Service of Liberalism.—Socialism versus Liberalism and Darwinism; Liberty corrected by Equality.—Alleged democratic Spirit of the natural Sciences.—The Struggle for Individuality: the Harmony of Individualism and Socialism.—The evolutionary Explanation of Consciousness.—Mihailovskii's Formula of human Progress	148
§ 123. The Defects of Mihailovskii's History of Philosophy	152
§ 124. The modern Age as an Epoch of Transition; Replacement of medieval Catholicism and Feudalism by false Individualism, Scepticism, and Subjectivism.—The eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the Revolution.—Does the Comtist Classification of Epochs apply to Russia?—The Revolution engenders the Liberalism of the Bourgeoisie.—The social Question (the Bread Question) of the Forties.—"Aristocrats doing Penance" and the Raznočincy. The new Woman.—Love and Marriage	154
§ 125. Liberal political Economy, professorial Socialism, and Marxism.—Sociology and political Economy.—Socialism and consistent Individualism are not mutually exclusive.—Mihailovskii and the Narodniki	156
§ 126. Mihailovskii and the political Problem.—Unity of Theory and Practice, of Truth and Justice.—Ethics necessarily social; there is no ethical formula "upon, in, over, and under itself."—The Right of Judging involves the Duty to act.—The Ethics	

CONTENTS

ix

PAGE

of Conscience and of the Sentiment of Honour.—Law; Revenge.—Ethics and Politics.—In 1873 Mihailovskii unable to join Lavrov; "I am not a Revolutionary."—Mihailovskii as a Socialist. His Explanation of the terrorist Act of Věra Zasulič in 1878.—Mihailovskii favours the political Struggle but is opposed to Terrorism.—It is the Idea of Autocracy that is to be slain.—The Theory of Retribution too narrow.—The Revolutionists must combine with the Liberals.—The Assassination of Alexander II.—Mihailovskii's political Views during the Eighties and the Nineties	160
§ 127. Mihailovskii's Philosophy of Religion; Religion as a coherent Outlook on the Universe; the religious Spirit equivalent to Definiteness of Character.—The early Christian Martyrs and Štedrin's "Devourers."—Modern Disharmony of Reason and Sentiment; Weakness of Will; Bourget's <i>Le Disciple</i>	167
§ 128. Mihailovskii's Analysis of the present Epoch of Transition; Suicide.—Lack of Religion the Cause of Suicide.—Goethe's Faust.—Philosophical Significance of the Increase in Suicide	172
§ 129. The Faust Problem in Goethe and Voltaire.—The Faust Problem and the Suicide Problem; Irreligion of the Age of Transition	174
§ 130. Mihailovskii's Analysis of the Chaos of the present Day; the enlightened and wealthy Bourgeois.—Indefiniteness and Dilettantism; Pornography and Decadence; War of All against All.—Nationalism of the Slavophiles and the Narodniki; Darwinism; Nietzsche and Stirner; Tolstoi and Dostoevskii; Marxism; Mysticism and Idealism of converted Materialists.—Religion versus Mysticism	177
§ 131. Mihailovskii as Author and Critic.—Nature and Function of Art and Criticism.—Mihailovskii's judgments concerning his Contemporaries and his Predecessors.—Definitive Judgment of Mihailovskii's Philosophy.—Mihailovskii and Marxism	181

CHAPTER SIXTEEN : THE THEORISTS OF THE OFFICIAL THEOCRACY : KATKOV ; POBĚDONOSCEV ; LEONT'EV.

I.

§ 132. Katkov, philosophising Journalist and hack Politician for the Theocracy	191
§ 133. Pobědonoscev, Bureaucrat and official State Philosopher for the Theocracy	197
§ 134. The Religion of the Theocracy; K. N. Leont'ev; Religion is Fear of the Lord.—The Struggle against Liberalism.—The Law of Evolution; the Idea of Progress disastrous; Russia must be preserved in cold Storage.—Leont'ev and the Slavophiles; Nationalism is revolutionary.—Leont'ev opposed to Pan Slavism for Austria.—Russians akin to Asiatics.—The Conquest of Constantinople and of Asia	207
§ 135. The Church, not Christ!—Caesaropapism and Papism.—Dostoevskii's grand Inquisitor approved.—Morality without Religion is valueless; Politics is devoid of Morality but not	

devoid of Religion.—Leont'ev and Nietzsche; Amoralism.—
A Word on behalf of the Revolution.—Tsarism and Aristoc-
racy.—The Disintegration in Leont'ev's Mind; Faith and
Unfaith.—Timor Dei essential.—Theistic Nihilism and
Terrorism.—Leont'ev confirms Feuerbach; God and the Tsar.
—The "Constraint to believe" 214

II.

- § 136. Comparison between the Theocrats and their Opponents; the
Theocrats are quantitatively and qualitatively inferior.—
Struggle against the nineteenth Century as a Whole.—The
Clergy is the main Prop of the Throne.—Theology as the
Russian State Philosophy.—The Struggle between Faith
and Unfaith a political Struggle.—Feuerbach's Significance
for the Russian Revolution; Atheism and Materialism are
Crimes against the State and treason to the Country; the
Monk versus Feuerbach.—Not Conservatism but Reaction;
Tsarism is in Conflict with Peter and with itself.—Theocratic
Negation.—The Theocrats, too, are Sceptics; Theocratic
Jesuitry.—The corpse-like Obedience of the converted Revo-
lutionary (Tihomirov); a skilled and vigorous Police as an
infallible Authority.—The Theocrats are Westernisers; De
Maistre's Executioner 220

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: VLADIMIR SOLOV'EV; RELIGION AS MYSTICISM.

- § 137. Vladimir S. Solov'ev; free Theocracy 225
- § 138. Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion; the Good is equivalent
to the Godhead.—The ascetic Principle of Shame is the Root
of Morality and Religion; Shame as Conscience, Sympathy,
and Veneration 228
- § 139. The Individual and Society; Solov'ev opposed to Egoism and
Individualism, to Eudemonism and Utilitarianism.—Morality
is organised Morality.—Agriculture and the State.—Op-
posed to Privilege as manifested in Despotism, Aristocracy,
and Democracy.—The Church as the Organisation of Piety.
—Significance of Dogma and the Sacraments; Theurgy.—
"Russian Socialism" as Church universal.—The three
functions of moral Organisation: High-Priesthood, King-
ship, and Prophetship.—Need for the Renascence of the
prophetic Function; the essential Nature of the true Prophet 233
- § 140. The Schism of the Churches must be healed by a Union of the
Churches.—Nature and History of the Schism.—Relationship
of the State to the three leading Churches, Catholicism,
Orthodoxy, and Protestantism.—The Russian Church and the
State.—Free Theocracy will be inaugurated by a Union of
Pope and Tsar.—Significance of the Poles and the Jews in
Relation to the Union of the Churches 236
- § 141. Solov'ev and the Slavophiles.—Catholicism and Orthodoxy.—
Nationalism and Nationality; Russian Messianism 241

CONTENTS

xi

	PAGE
§ 142. Eduard von Hartmann's Philosophy as the Culmination of western Philosophy.—Transition to the Theosophy of the East.—The historical Manifestation of the God-man; the cosmological and historical Process as the Aspiration of the Finite towards Immortality	245
§ 143. Epistemological Foundations of free Theosophy.—Absolute Cognition versus Subjection and Scepticism.—Revelation.—Religious or mystical Cognition.—Solov'ev and Kant	250
§ 144. Philosophy and Revelation as free Theosophy.—The Idea of Catholicity.—Solov'ev's Scholasticism as his Life Tragedy; the inward Struggle between Kant and Plato.—Solov'ev takes refuge in Anselm and Origen.—Solov'ev's Doctrine of Ideas and his free Theurgy	254
§ 145. Solov'ev's Mysticism.—Epistemological and historical Examination of Mysticism.—Mysticism and Religion.—Solov'ev opposed to the One-sidedness of oriental Mysticism; advocates an active "Christian Policy."—Mystical States in Solov'ev. Mysticism and the Mysterious.—Mysticism is aristocratic and conservative; the Catholicising Tendency	259
§ 146. Symptoms of Decadence in secularised Europe and Russia.—This Secularisation is Atheism, atheistic Subjectivism, and Individualism.—Solov'ev is opposed to the Reforms suggested by Atheism, is opposed to Revolution.—Theism is Life, Atheism is Death; Atheism leads to Murder or Suicide	266
§ 147. Solov'ev's Aesthetics.—Solov'ev upon Puškin, Lermontov, and Aleksēi Tolstoi.—Solov'ev, Lev Tolstoi, and Dostoevskii.—Solov'ev and the decadent Movement	269
§ 148. The apocalyptic Vision: Tolstoi as Antichrist.—Dostoevskii the Russian Prophet.—Solov'ev abandons free Theocracy; his Campaign for Kant and Plato	274
§ 149. Significance of Solov'ev to Russia; he recognised the Value of Criticism	281

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: MODERN SOCIALISM; MARXISM AND THE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; MARXISM AND THE NARODNIČESTVO. THE CRISIS WITHIN THE MARXIST MOVEMENT. THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM. THE SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES.

I.

§ 150. Socialism in Russia and "Russian Socialism."—Russian Socialism preeminently a Philosophy.—Positivism, Materialism, and Atheism.—The ethical Foundation of Socialism, its new Ethic, the new Man, the new Society.—The social Revolution and Terrorism.—"Russian Socialism" manifests itself as the Narodničestvo.—Marxism turns its Attention to the Operatives	287
§ 151. The outward History of Marxism in Russia	289
§ 152. A Sketch of the History of Russian Social Democracy (1883–1912)	291

II.

- § 153. Marxism in Russia has to solve peculiar Problems determined by Russian Evolution.—The Problem of Tactics; the historico-philosophical Explanation of Russia; the Struggle upon the philosophical Plane (Materialism and historical Materialism, Subjectivism versus Objectivism) . . . 300
- § 154. Nature and Development of the Narodničestvo . . . 303
- § 155. The Doctrine of the Narodniki; its philosophical Basis and its economic Outlook.—The Problem of the Communism of the Russian Mir and Artel and of Russian Capitalism; the Question whether Russia can pass directly to Communism of a higher Order without, as a Preliminary, passing through the Stage of Capitalism . . . 306
- § 156. The Peculiarities of Russian agricultural Development do not justify the Doctrine of the Narodničestvo.—The Mužik cannot be regarded as a social and moral Ideal.—The Mužik, too, is a Bourgeois. . . 309

III.

- § 157. The Crisis within the European Marxist Movement.—The Nature of Marx's historical Materialism as the philosophic Basis of communist Socialism.—The philosophical Inadequacy of Materialism and Positivism.—Objectivistic amoralist Historism does not suffice for the Foundation of Socialism.—There is no collective Consciousness.—Justification for the individual Consciousness; Socialism can have no other than an ethical Foundation.—Return to Kant? . . . 317
- § 158. The first social democratic Program (1884); Plehanov, the "Father of Russian Marxism" . . . 325
- § 159. The Cleavage in Plehanov's Views; the revolutionary Politism of the Communist Manifesto and the comparative Apolitism of the subsequent Doctrine of historical Materialism . . . 328
- § 160. Marx's Theory of Revolution.—No more than Outlines of a philosophic Theory of Revolution as Dialectic.—Revolution and Evolution; gradual Evolution or Evolution by Leaps? —Marx (and Engels) more and more inclined to stress the utilitarian Aspect of the Problem.—Distinction between definitive and temporary Revolution.—Mass Revolution versus Stirner and Bakunin; Socialism versus Anarchism.—The amoral Valuation of the Revolution.—Marx favours legal Purchase in lieu of forcible Expropriation.—Even Engels renounces Street Fighting for Germany.—Communism abandoned.—The most recent Discussion among German Marxists concerning the Problem of Revolution; Revolutionism versus Reformism.—The Cleavage in Revolutionism: definitive Revolution, continued Mass Action . . . 331

CONTENTS

xiii

PAGE

- § 161. The Indefiniteness of German Marxism characterises Russian Marxism as well.—The Dispute over the Question of Politism.—What may the Duma signify for Socialism?—The Organisation of the Masses versus the Oligarchy of secret Societies.—Věra Zasulič opposed to Terrorism.—Is a Republic possible in Russia?—Struve's Reformism versus Revolutionism.—Bogdanov's Philosophy of Revolution . . . 338

- § 162. The Marxist Estimate of the Revolution of 1905-6 . . . 345

IV.

- § 163. Russian Marxism is philosophical, its Province being the Philosophy of Religion.—Plehanov favours the naïve Realism of Engels, but likewise favours Spinozism; he is opposed to Kant and to Solipsism.—Subjectivism as Scepticism.—Scepticism as an Expression of the Degeneration of the Aristocracy and the Bourgeoisie.—The Proletarian is free from Scepticism . . . 348

- § 164. The Contrast between the orthodox Marxists and the Revisionists as a Contrast between Objectivism and Subjectivism.—Struve's Transition from Marxism to idealistic Metaphysics, Religion, and Mysticism.—The orthodox Marxists, too, seek new philosophical Foundations (Empirio-Criticism, Mach, etc.).—The ethical Problem in the Foreground of the Discussion; materialist Objectivism guarantees Revolutionism . . . 351

- § 165. The Relationship of Socialism, Marxism, and the Social Democracy, to Religion.—The Lack of Christian Socialism in Russia.—Plehanov's and Lunačarskii's Philosophy of Religion.—From Feuerbach to Solov'ev and Dostoevskii . . . 354

- § 166. Significance of Marxism for Russia.—Marxism and Art; Marxism opposed to the decadent Movement . . . 359

V.

- § 167. Development of the Social Revolutionary Party since 1902.—The terrorist Revolution its leading Aim.—Attempts at the Revival of Terrorism after the Unmasking of Azev (the Burcev Wing).—The Maximalists; "economic Terrorism" as the Beginning of socialist Expropriation . . . 362

- § 168. The ethical Foundations of the Revolution and in particular of the social Revolution, as conceived by the Maximalists; Nestroev's Diary . . . 368

- § 169. The philosophical Foundations of the social revolutionary Movement; Lavrov and Mihailovskii.—Černov; from Marxism to the Empirio-Criticism of Avenarius and Mach.—The Unity of Theory and Practice; "active Realism" as a Philosophy of Reality and Activity.—This Activity is Revolution.—"Active Realism" as an "active-dynamic" School of Sociology.—The new "dynamic" Ethic.—Revolution as an ethical Problem.—Ethical Maximalism and Minimalism; the Need for Compromise.—The Right of the Majority and majority Rule.—The Majority as a party Majority . . . 372

CHAPTER NINETEEN : MODERN ANARCHISM. KROPOTKIN. ANARCHISM AND SOCIALISM.

I.

- § 170. Kropotkin's Anarchism a clarified Bakuninism.—Kropotkin opposed to the State and to Authority in general.—Anarchism as Method and Science; the new Man and the new Faith.—Anarchism is Socialism; anarchising Socialism (Communism) in contradistinction to social Democracy.—Federalism versus Centralism.—Kropotkin opposed to Individualism (Nietzsche), but likewise opposed to social Democracy.—Ethics without Sanction or Obligation.—The Ethic of Liberty; Equality leads to mere Justice and Mediocrity.—Equality the Death of Society.—Be strong!—Kropotkin's Theory of Revolution and Terrorism; the Tyrant slaughtered ■ ■ Viper!—Kropotkin's Russian and European Teachers; Kropotkin as Narodnik.—Criticism of Kropotkin's System . 378

II.

- § 171. The modern anarchist Movement in Europe and in Russia.—Increasing Strength of Russian Anarchism since 1901; the Revolution of 1905 and the Counter-Revolution.—Anarchism gathers Strength in Europe as well; the anarchistic labour Movement and literary and philosophic Anarchism.—Influence of this Movement upon Russia 389
- § 172. Anarchism as Astatism and Apolitism.—Anarchism opposed to Authority in general.—Liberty more important than Equality and Fraternity.—Anarchist Individualism and Subjectivism; the ethico-political and psychologico-epistemological Standpoint.—Extreme Individualism and Subjectivism (Solipsism); anarchistic Aristocracy.—The Individual and social Organisation in general.—Centralism versus Federalism (Autonomism).—Aims and Means; Disorganisation and Reorganisation.—Revolution with or without Bloodshed; ethical Anarchism.—Anarchist individual Outrages.—The general Strike.—Revolutionism.—Anarchism, Nationality, Church.—Scientific Organisation; Communism and Collectivism.—The Division of Labour.—The new Man and the new Ethic.—Can Peace be attained through Force?—The Problem of Revolution and Terrorism; is it right to kill?—Are all Things lawful?—Ordinary Crime.—Free Love and Marriage.—Anarchism metaphysical and religious; ni Dieu ni Maître.—Atheism and Astatism.—Anarchist Atheism and Auto-apotheosis.—The Anarchy of Anarchism; anarchistic Indeterminism; Chaos and Miracle.—Anarchism assumes artistic Forms; the decadent Movement 393
- § 173. Comparison of Anarchism with Socialism and in particular with Marxism 400
- § 174. Marx and Anarchism 406
- § 175. Anarchism, or at least communist Anarchism, is a socialist System; but the extreme Type of individualist Anarchism is unsocialist 408
- § 176. Territorial Varieties of Anarchism and Socialism; Spain, Italy, France, and Russia, are the leading anarchist Countries.—How far is Russia anarchist? 409

CONTENTS

XV

PAGE

CHAPTER TWENTY : LIBERALISM.

I.

- § 177. Liberalism as a universalised Struggle to secure Freedom ; a Struggle waged against the theocratic social Order ; a Struggle waged against the Church, at first on behalf of the State, but subsequently against the State as well.—In the theoretical Field, Liberalism is Aspiration for Enlightenment (Locke, Voltaire) ; in the ethical Field, it is an Aspiration for Humanitarianism and Individualism.—Natural Law.—The Rights of Man and popular Sovereignty ; Democracy.—The Achievements of the older Liberalism 413
- § 178. The Restoration versus the Revolution.—Romanticism ; Re-catholicisation.—Positivism the main Prop of the liberal Laodiceans.—Historical Right versus natural Right.—Legitimacy versus Revolution ; Order and aristocratic Inequality.—Peace with Church and State (Strauss and Constant) ; the State infallible.—Governmental Efficiency at any Price.—Imperialism.—The Bourgeoisie becomes capitalistic ; the industrial State.—Organisation of the fourth Estate.—After 1848 Liberalism opposed to Socialism and to socialist Democracy.—Liberal Chauvinism in favour of official Patriotism and opposed to the democratic Idea of Nationality.—The Negation of Liberalism ; its Half-Measures and its Love of Compromise (Tolerance).—Liberalism as transitional Trend 416
- § 179. Liberalism as Offspring of Protestantism and Parent of Socialism and Anarchism.—Renaissance of Liberalism ?—Democratisation and Socialisation.—Is Cooperation of Liberalism with Social Democracy possible ?—Marxist Repudiation of Liberalism as Anarchism 421

II.

- § 180. Herzen upon Liberalism.—Russian Liberalism and its Development 423
- § 181. Why the Author gives no detailed Account of representative Liberals.—Lukewarmness and Indecisiveness of recent Russian Liberalism.—Renaissance of Liberalism after Novgorodcev ; Democratisation and Socialisation.—Russian Liberalism akin to Socialism.—The moral and religious Question to be faced by the Democracy 428

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE : THE CRISIS IN REVOLUTIONISM ; THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION.

I.

- § 182. *Signposts*, 1909 ; the Ex-Marxists versus the nihilistic Atheism of the Intelligentsia and versus the Revolution ; back to Christ and to the Church.—Liberal Defence of the Intelligentsia (Miljukov and his Associates) 435

§ 183. Defects of Liberalism in religious Questions.—One-sided Rationalism and Romanticism.—From Romanticism to ecclesiastical Reaction.—Political Appraisalment of the Church and of Religion; Witte versus Pobédonoscev.—The Elections to the fourth Duma and the Authors of <i>Signposts</i> .—Liberalism as Indifferentism	439
--	-----

II.

§ 184. Social revolutionary Scepticism.—Ropšin's <i>The Pale Horse</i> ; the Right to Revolution and the Right to kill.—Ropšin accepts Dostoevskii's Analysis of terrorist Nihilism; Feuerbach's and Stirner's Autoapothecosis leads to Murder and Suicide.—The old and the new Revolutionist as typical of the Contrast between Faith and Scepticism.—Subjectivism and Ultra-individualism; "I am with No one!"—The revolutionary Subjectivist as a decadent Faust—Ivan and Don Juan—Sanin.—The Terrorist who would gladly pray.—The Revolver as last Resort	444
§ 185. Ropšin's second Novel, <i>The Tale of What was Not</i> .—Černov and Plehanov versus Ropšin.—Russian Revolutionism at the Parting of the Ways	456

PART THREE (A Summary)

DEMOCRACY VERSUS THEOCRACY; THE
PROBLEM OF REVOLUTIONCHAPTER TWENTY-TWO: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY.

§ 186. The Summary attempts an Explanation of the facts that have been adduced.—Russian Philosophy is preeminently Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Religion; its Connection with Politics and especially with the Revolution	465
§ 187. Russian Philosophy devoid of epistemological Foundation; Kant has had less Influence in Russia than Kant's German Successors	467
§ 188. World-Historical Importance of the Kantian Criticism; critical Reflection in the Contest of Scepticism against ecclesiastical Religion.—Philosophy versus Mythology and Theology.—Russian Thought more steeped in Myth than European Thought.—Russian Negation lacks critical Force.—Russian Longing for Faith.—Bélinskii is archetypal of believing Negation	468
189. Kant's Criticism not directed against Empiricism, but against mythical and mystical Extravagance.—Herzen's "Disillusionment."—Kant and Plato, Platonism and Nihilism	471

CONTENTS

xvii

	PAGE
§ 190. The Russian Thinkers are epistemological Passivists, adverse to Criticism regarded as subjectivist Activism; they reject Subjectivism as Solipsism	472
§ 191. Bělininskii's ethical Analysis of extreme Subjectivism and Objectivism; Crime and Superstition (Myth).—Solipsism as ethical and metaphysical Isolation; Murder or Suicide as a Consequence of Solipsism? (Bakunin, Bělininskii, Dostoevskii, Mihailovskii)	473
§ 192. The ethical Imperative plays a Part in Russian Philosophy despite Empiricism and Utilitarianism; Russian Philosophy, too, is a moral Outlook on the World.—Ethics versus Historicism	474

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE: THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY.

I.

§ 193. The Analysis of Religion in Russian Philosophy	477
§ 194. The religious Disunion of Russia; ecclesiastical Religion and the rationalistic Philosophy of the Enlightenment; Nihilism and its Negation of Religion in general.—Atheism and Materialism.—Russia's sudden and unbridged Acquaintance with the European Philosophy of the Enlightenment; Feuerbach.—Moral and pathological Consequences; the Problem of Murder and Suicide in Russian Philosophy	481

II.

§ 195. Nature and Defects of Orthodoxy; Passivism and Stationarism. (Byzantinism).	487
--	-----

III.

§ 196. Development of Theocracy in the three leading Christian Churches.—Comparative Considerations.—The Reformation and modern Changes in our Outlook on Life and the Universe.—Attempts at the Separation of Church and State; the historic Process of Disestablishment.—The Anti-ecclesiasticism of Catholic Countries is especially radical	491
---	-----

IV.

§ 197. Christianity and Christian Passivism favour the Development of Theocracy	497
---	-----

V.

§ 198. Historico-philosophical Significance of the three leading Christian Churches, and the Development of the anti-theocratic and antireligious Radicalism of Russian Philosophy	500
--	-----

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR : DEMOCRACY VERSUS THEOCRACY.

I.

- § 199. Opposition between Democracy and theocratic Aristocracy : the democratic Spirit of Industry as contrasted with the aristocratic Desire to rule.—The democratic Characteristics of Science, Philosophy, and Art.—Criticism as Determinant of Democracy 506
- § 200. Democracy and Religion.—Democracy has an ethical, not a religious foundation : it is founded upon Justice.—The Right of Initiative.—Democratic Catholicity (popular Sovereignty) . . . 514

II.

- § 201. Catholicism and Protestantism in Relation to Democracy.—Protestantism positively demands Democracy.—General Inferiority of Catholic Countries.—Catholicism more radical and revolutionary 517
- § 202. Inferiority of Orthodox Catholicism.—Russians are comparatively revolutionary, but comparatively undemocratic . . . 523

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE : DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION.

- § 203. The concept of Revolution ; modern Revolutionism.—Its Evolution.—Distinction between Catholic and Protestant Peoples as regards the Degree of Revolutionism 528
- § 204. The ethical Problem of Revolution ; is Revolution attended by Bloodshed permissible ? 533
- § 205. The jurist Defenders and Opponents of Revolution.—Natural Law versus historical Law 538
- § 206. Thomas Paine as a typical democratic Revolutionary.—The Russian Revolution anarchistic, nihilistic, but comparatively undemocratic 541
- § 207. Bakuninism and Blanquism ; Russian Revolutionism akin to French.—Western Catholicism and Orthodox Catholicism the Nurseries of Revolutionism of this Type 546

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX : HOLY RUSSIA ; THE RUSSIAN MONK AND FEUERBACH.

- § 208. Russian Catholicism (Orthodoxy) disintegrated by (German) Protestantism.—Feuerbach's materialistic Anthropologism and the Russian Monk with his third Century Orthodoxy.—Sudden Exposure to the Influences of a higher Civilisation.—Russian Passivism revolutionised by European Activism.—Russian philosophico-historical and philosophico-religious Analysis of this historical Process ; the Problem of Solipsism and of Crime ; Murder and Suicide.—Impulse to Suicide and the Revolutionary Spirit from the eighteenth Century onwards 553

CONTENTS

xix

	PAGE
209. Significance of evolutionary Stages; epistemologically considered there is no Superman.—World-historical Importance of the eighteenth Century; Hume, Kant, the great Revolution.—Medieval Russia drawn without Transition into the new developmental Process	555
§ 210. The Explanation of Russia in Terms of Race and Nationality (national Character) is inadmissible.—Economic and natural Conditions are equally inadequate as Explanations	556
§ 211. Religion as the central spiritual Force.—Ecclesiastical Religion and its educative Influence.—The Russian Church	557
§ 212. Goethe's philosophico-historical Formula; the Struggle of Belief with Unbelief	558
§ 213. The Question of Russian Independence and Originality.—Russian Philosophy of History and its creative Mission; the Overcoming of Nihilism; Revolution and Imitativeness; the Trend towards Hume and Kant	559
§ 214. Defects and Dangers of Europe; in Europe, too, there is an Aspiration towards Rebirth	562
§ 215. The political and philosophical Interest which Europe takes in Russia.—The philosophico-historical Problem of Russian Development; the Russian Revolution	564
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX	567
INDEX OF NAMES	575

THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

REALISM AND NIHILISM. ČERNYŠEVSKII AND
DOBROLJUBOV. PISAREV

§ 95.

IN Europe, Herzen was carrying on Bëlsinskii's work, and from 1850 onwards, unaffected by the censorship, was exercising a literary influence on progressive and radical Russia; in Russia, simultaneously, Bëlsinskii found a successor in Nikolai Gavrilovič Černyševskii. This writer made his literary debut in 1853. In 1854, he became a collaborator on the "Sovremennik" (Contemporary), a periodical founded by Puškin, and after 1847 edited by the poet Nekrasov. Soon he became the most active spirit in the production of this periodical, and during the responsible and difficult time that followed the Crimean defeat he was literary and political leader of the younger generation. The young writer was not slow to avail himself of the comparative freedom of authorship during the first years of Alexander's reign. His literary essays from 1853 to 1863 fill eleven large volumes, although the year of the liberation of the serfs and the subsequent epoch of reforms did not bring enhanced freedom to Černyševskii and his organ. On the contrary, to the government and even to many liberals his trend seemed dangerous, for a political ferment, largely due to Černyševskii's influence, now became apparent, and manifested itself in 1861 in the disturbances that broke out among the students and were directed against the reactionary policy in education. The first victim of repression (1861) was Černyševskii's fellow worker on the "Sovremennik," M. J. Mihailov, translator and poet.¹ Next

¹ As the reputed author of the proclamation, To the Younger Generation, he was sent to Siberia, where he died in 1865.

year the "Sovremennik" was suppressed for eight months and its editor was arrested, for during the days of the Polish rising, reaction could not be long delayed. After two years of preliminary imprisonment, Černyševskii, now in his thirty-fifth year, was sentenced to fourteen years in the Siberian mines, and to exile for life to Siberia—the scaffold comedy then customary in such cases, the ceremony of civil death, being first played. The reasons for the sentence are still unknown. All Černyševskii's extant works were passed by the censor, so it can only be supposed that he was condemned for some illegal publication, or for secret revolutionary propaganda. The police did in fact bring forward evidence bearing on such a charge, producing two depraved individuals (one being a nephew of Kostomarov) to testify that Černyševskii had written secret proclamations and had had these printed. The minister for justice submitted to the court a memorial *Concerning Černyševskii's Literary Activities*, and thereupon sentence followed.¹

¹ There is no good biography of Černyševskii, and we know little of him as a man and in his intimate personal relationships with friends and family. We even lack details concerning his labours as author and politician. He was born at Saratov in 1828, and passed the earlier years of his life in this town. Sprung from a non-aristocratic clerical family, he was at first trained by his father for the priesthood, but since he showed unmistakable talent for literature and science he was entered in 1846 at the historico-philological faculty of the St. Petersburg university. In boyhood, Černyševskii was already a great reader and practical philologist, acquainted with many languages both ancient and modern. Apart from poetry and the Bible, the young man was chiefly interested in historical writings, the works of Raumer, Schlosser, etc. In St. Petersburg, Černyševskii joined a literary circle, whose leader, Irinarh Ivanovič Vvedenskii, introduced him to the study of Bělinskii. He also read German philosophy, and became acquainted with the works of the French socialists. In 1850, Černyševskii returned to his native town as teacher at the gymnasia, and there met Kostomarov, the historian, who had been sent to Saratov. In 1853, Černyševskii married and returned to St. Petersburg, to join the staff of the *Sovremennik* in 1854, and to devote all his energies to that periodical. Little is known regarding his life in Siberia. He was visited by friends in 1871, 1873, and 1875; but for nearly twenty years all attempts to secure his liberation were fruitless. At length, in 1883, he was permitted to return to Russia. Through the intermediation of the liberal journalist Nikoladze the government entered into negotiations with the committee of the revolutionary society Narodnaja Volja, in order to secure that there should be no disturbances at the coronation of Alexander III, and one of the revolutionists' conditions was that Černyševskii should be set at liberty. In 1883, therefore, he was sent to Astrakhan, although a promise had been given to permit his immediate return to Saratov. Not until 1889 was he allowed to revisit his native place, and he died there a few months later at the age of sixty-one.—Consult G. Plechanow, N. G. Tschernischewsky *eine Literar-Historische Studie*, Dietz, Stuttgart, 1894.

Černyševskii's philosophical development closely resembled that of Herzen and Bakunin, for like both these writers he was a student of Hegel and Feuerbach. To him, however, Hegel was less congenial than to Herzen, and Černyševskii became far more definitely Feuerbachian. All that he took from Hegel was the idea of development, whereas Feuerbach's influence upon his mind was decisive. Once more, like Herzen and Bakunin, Černyševskii learned from Comte and the French socialists, his views being formed in especial by those of Louis Blanc, Fourier, and Proudhon. But far more than Herzen or Bakunin, Černyševskii had recourse to English writers, studying philosophers as well as socialists and political economists. His readings of Bentham and Mill confirmed him in his positivist outlook and made him a utilitarian; he was familiar with the writings of Owen; in economics, he recognised the authority of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus, and in addition that of John Stuart Mill. It must further be mentioned that Černyševskii was intimately acquainted with the works of Buckle, one of the writers on historico-philosophical topics by whom Černyševskii was ever greatly influenced. He had also read Vico, and many earlier and later historians and philosophers of history, among whom Guizot deserves special mention.

Černyševskii devoted more attention than did either Herzen or Bakunin to the literature of his native land, especially when still quite young. At the university he immersed himself in Bělinskii's writings, and Herzen's work likewise affected him during the years when his mind was still eminently receptive. Thus Černyševskii's mental physiognomy became very different from that of either Herzen or Bakunin. Russian literature (Gogol as well as Bělinskii and Herzen), English impressions, and the main derivation of his thought direct from Feuerbach instead of from Hegel, give Černyševskii his characteristic philosophical stamp. Far more than Herzen or even than Bakunin, he was a positivist in the Comtist sense, a "realist" as the term is used in Russia. He consistently carried out the disillusionment postulated by Herzen, turning away from German ideas to Russian facts. With Bělinskii he conceived realism as the opposite of romanticism, and he fought sentimentalism in all its forms, demanding an accurate interpretation of human motives. We have further to remember that Černyševskii remained in Russia, where

as publicist he was in uninterrupted contact with Russian friends and opponents. For this reason Černyševskii was, if the expression be permissible, more Russian than Herzen or Bakunin. Russian questions of the day and Russian conditions, were his chief concern.

In further contrast with Herzen, Černyševskii was in philosophical matters more consistent and more stable. At the university and during the first years of his study of Feuerbach he was still a believer; but in the end Feuerbach got the better of faith, and thenceforward, from about 1850, Černyševskii remained a consistent positivist and materialist. He exhibited no trace of the metaphysical struggles which affected Herzen and which Herzen repeatedly described. Černyševskii, like Herzen, had to pass through the process of disillusionment, but as soon as it had been completed, this chapter of development was closed for ever.

This is a mere outline sketch of Černyševskii, which must now be filled in, so far as a study of his writings renders that possible. Let me repeat, however, that in the case of Černyševskii, the man who makes so few direct references to himself and who far less than most other writers furnishes us with indirect disclosures of his personality, the lack of an adequate biography is peculiarly unfortunate.

Let us begin with an account of Černyševskii's philosophy. In doing so we can justify ourselves by quoting the author in person, for he contended that a man's practical life and all his other activities are largely determined by his general philosophical outlook.

The very title of his leading philosophical study, *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* (1860), suggests Feuerbach to our minds. In view of the censorship Černyševskii did not mention Feuerbach by name, but the contents of the book show clearly enough that, as he once wrote from Siberia, he knew Feuerbach almost by heart.

Alike epistemologically and metaphysically Černyševskii adopts Feuerbach's anthropologism. Man as a sentient organism is for Černyševskii the arch-reality. Like Feuerbach, Černyševskii combines rationalism with sensualism, and like his German exemplar (whom in this point he outdoes) he utterly ignores epistemological criticism.

A special study of the subject would enable us to display the many points of contact between pupil and

teacher ;¹ at the same time there are differences, which are largely referable to Černyševskii's lack of criticism. But the question of which we are chiefly concerned is how we are to classify Černyševskii from the epistemological and metaphysical outlook.

Černyševskii speaks of himself as a materialist, and, by friends and foes alike, his doctrines are termed materialistic. He writes : " Philosophy sees in man what medicine, physiology, and chemistry see in him. These sciences prove that in man no dualism is discoverable ; but philosophy adds that if man had a second nature in addition to his real [material] nature, the second nature would necessarily manifest itself in some way. But since no such second nature displays itself, since all human conduct and all human manifestations conform solely to his real [material] nature, it follows that he has no second nature." I select this passage because Černyševskii's materialism and his philosophical method are thereby presented in a nutshell. Černyševskii is a materialist sans phrase, materialist after the manner of Herzen and Bakunin, and therefore preeminently one who denies the existence of an immortal soul. Černyševskii recognises the distinction between the so-called material and the moral² phenomena in man, but contends that the difference between these phenomena does not conflict with the unity of nature. Černyševskii believes that this unity of the physiological and the psychological can be illustrated and explained by the analogy with the three states of aggregation of water. " In these three states, one and the same quality is manifested in a threefold series of quite distinct phenomena, so that a single quality assumes the form of three distinct qualities ; it is distinguished as three qualities simply in accordance with differences in quantitative manifestation ; a quantitative difference is transformed into a qualitative difference." Here we see once more that Černyševskii's materialism is what may be termed " common sense " materialism. He stresses always the single nature of man. Every activity of the one and undivided human being is the activity, either of the entire organism

¹ Take, for example, the well-known saying, Man is what he eats. In Černyševskii this runs : " Nutrition and sensation are so intimately associated, that the character of one determines the character of the other."

² Černyševskii here follows the French terminology, " moral " meaning " mental " or " spiritual." This terminology has important bearings upon his ethical ideas.

"from top to toe," or of the activity of a special organ, and this organ must be studied in its natural associations with the entire organism. For Černyševskii, psychology is a branch of physiology.

Consistently with his materialism, Černyševskii teaches that egoism is the true motive of every action, however sublime.

Let us pause, first, to consider the metaphysical and epistemological problem.

Feuerbach, when he abandoned his primitive Spinozism, conceived monism in a less materialistic sense than Černyševskii and at least did not, as a positivist, come to a definitive decision upon the problem. Černyševskii had a great esteem for Spinoza as well as for Feuerbach. Accepting Spinoza's monism, he conceived it in a purely materialistic sense, and did this most emphatically, for he would not agree that positivism is metaphysically vague. For Černyševskii, the laws of nature apply equally in the domain of the psyche. Psychical processes are organic processes, and organic processes are no more than partial manifestations of nature, one and undivided.

I shall not undertake a refutation of materialism, nor shall I attempt to test Černyševskii's reasoning, for its weakness is obvious. Černyševskii had never thought out philosophical problems; his psychology and epistemology lacked precision; his work displayed numerous contradictions, the individual thoughts conflicting one with another and with the general principle. Materialism was for him an article of faith and a political program, and this is why his *Anthropological Principle* became the program of radical youth. Relentless daring, a sovereign tone, the energy of conviction in the name of science and not in that of any official metaphysic, ensured for Černyševskii a literary and political victory in the debates that ensued.

Černyševskii's outlook became the basis of the realism of the sixties, for which Turgenev introduced the name of "nihilism." Liberals as well as conservatives took the field against this realism. Jurkevič, professor at the Kiev seminary, writing as an expert, had little difficulty in indicating the weaknesses of extreme sensualism and materialism, and he was able to point out a number of by no means inconsiderable errors in matters of detail. Moreover, Jurkevič had good reason for his protest against the general tone of Černyševskii's essay. Vladimir Solov'ev endeavoured, though with scant

success, to revive Jurkevič's memory and to make the most of his attack on Černyševskii. It was all too plain that Jurkevič was merely defending theology and theocracy, and that even if Černyševskii's psychology and epistemology were defective, this did not prove that Jurkevič's ideas in the same domains were correct. It was doubtless through Katkov's influence that Jurkevič was now appointed professor at the university of Moscow, but the latter's sentimentalities about the heart, and similar romanticist survivals, did not suffice to stem the rising tide of nihilism. Katkov's own onslaught on Černyševskii, and the attacks made by the liberals, were definitely political and literary in nature; as regards the general trend, Černyševskii carried heavier metal than his opponents, and his rejoinders afforded proof of this superiority. It is true that he failed to secure a better philosophical foundation, but the controversy made plain the untenability of the opposing arguments and aims, while in the struggle against the aims Černyševskii had the best of the dispute—and had right on his side.

Černyševskii's philosophy and his literary endeavours bear the stamp of the enlightenment, and it is that of the enlightenment in its aggressive phase prior to the French revolution. Černyševskii knew that his thought was revolutionary, for he desired to continue and to strengthen the revolution of Peter the Great. As far as Russia was concerned, Peter was for him the ideal. Whilst the French enlightenment and French materialism were his philosophical and political models, he found his literary guide in Lessing.

It was Černyševskii's ambition to be a modern Aristotle, one who should instruct, not Russia alone, but all mankind. Quite in the spirit of the enlightenment, he planned several encyclopædic works in which the ideas and the material and mental development of humanity were to be jointly presented as in a codex or in the Bible. A definitive encyclopædia of "knowledge and life," published in the French tongue, was to serve the needs of all mankind.

In Černyševskii's view, the enlightenment was necessary above all for Russia, of whose culture he, like Čaadaev, took a low estimate. Russia, he said, had an army of one and a half million soldiers, and could conquer Europe as the Huns or the Mongols had done of old, but that was all. For him, as for Čaadaev, it seemed the climax of patriotism to follow

Peter's example in pushing the work of enlightenment; the west needed knowledge, but Russia needed enlightenment; Černyševskii felt that his own mission was that of publicist, and a publicist is "not a professor, but a tribune or advocate."

Černyševskii does not conceive the enlightenment as the propagation of a civilisation taken bodily from the west, and he accuses Herzen of a desire for such "civilisation snatching." Enlightenment signifies the getting rid of a false outlook on the universe, signifies a new civilisation on a materialistic basis. The German [Feuerbach] had indeed laid the foundations of this materialism, but the Russian would be its universal Aristotle. Realism notwithstanding, we discern here a species of popular messianism, even though it be only in the sense of Hegel or Feuerbach, each of whom proclaimed his philosophy the terminus of human thought.

Černyševskii frequently speaks of himself as a rationalist. Following the French usage, he employs the term with the connotation of reasonableness, but he also has in mind rationalism in the eighteenth-century sense of an unrestricted belief in reason, so that he deliberately attacks (in theory!) the life of feeling and emotion as "romanticism" and "sentimentalism." Černyševskii's rationalism is dogmatic in the sense in which that word was used by Kant; Černyševskii accepts Feuerbach's philosophy quite uncritically, he believes in Feuerbach.

Černyševskii takes Kant's subjectivism less to heart than his Russian predecessors had done. Putting this "metaphysical nonsense" aside, he passes directly to the order of the day. But in thus rejecting subjectivism, he rejects criticism as well. I mean that his belief in Feuerbach is not objectivist merely, but uncritically objectivist.

§ 96.

FOR Černyševskii the ethical consequence of the "anthropological principle" is the recognition of determinism as valid alike for the life of the individual and for society and history, and in the second place the proclamation of egoism as the basis of ethics.

In 1860 these doctrines were no novelty in philosophy and ethics, but nevertheless Černyševskii's use of them exercised a profoundly stirring influence upon his Russian contem-

poraries. He made no investigation of the problem of the freedom of the will nor of that of egoism, and it is indeed evident that these problems were positively alien to his mind. Since Mill's *Utilitarianism* was first published in 1861, this treatise was not available to Černyševskii when he wrote in 1860, but he could have instructed himself regarding the difficulties from the works of Bentham, to say nothing of Kant and other ethical writers, including Feuerbach. Moreover, at a much earlier date Hume had effected so luminous a psychological analysis of egoism, and in particular of the "rational egoism" which was the peculiar recommendation of Černyševskii, that from the scientific outlook the theory of extreme egoism was in 1860 an anachronism. (Be it noted, I make my appeal here to such ultra empiricists and sceptics as Hume and Mill, and not to a man like Jurkevič!)

As far as concerns the psychological and epistemological foundation of the ethical principle, the doctrine that man's actions are determined solely by egoism, we find passages even in Černyševskii wherein this contention is modified by the assertion that love also is natural to man, that unegoistic, disinterested, direct love for his fellows is one of man's inborn characteristics. The essays concerning Bëlinskii (*Sketches dealing with the Period of Gogol*, 1855) contain an explicit and severe condemnation of egoism. It is true that even in this account of the matter, egoism is treated as an inborn characteristic, but love and benevolence are likewise regarded as inborn, and the human being who acts upon exclusively egoistic calculations is positively stigmatised as an unnatural monster.

We read: "Positive is he alone who desires to be a complete human being. Inasmuch as he labours for his own advantage, he also loves others, for there is no such thing as isolated happiness. He renounces thoughts and plans which are disharmonious with the laws of nature, but he does not renounce useful labour." Following Bentham, Černyševskii takes as his standard the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which it is the business of the individual to promote. The general human interest seems to him to rank higher than the interest of an individual nation; the general interest of the entire nation ranks higher than the interest of any particular class; and, finally, the interest of the state is measured in accordance with the number of its members.

But all this fails to give us a clear insight into the relationship between altruism and egoism.

As regards the problem of freedom, Černyševskii's materialistic determinism leads him to deny the freedom of the will, and this denial is based upon a general denial of the existence of the will (or rather of "willing," for on this occasion Černyševskii uses more concrete language). In earlier days, we read in *The Anthropological Principle*, man's actions were explained as the outcome of his "will"; he was said to "will" to do good or to do evil. But the anthropological principle teaches us that evil behaviour and good behaviour are not brought about by any moral (i.e. psychical) or material fact or combination of facts. "Willing is a mere subjective impression which in our consciousness accompanies the origination of thoughts, actions, or external phenomena."

I am well aware that, before Černyševskii wrote, the attempt had been made to refer will to the sphere of the intellect (Herbart), but Černyševskii does not make this endeavour deliberately. For him, the intrusion of the will into the affairs of the world of which the organism is a part seems inconvenient, for it disturbs his determinism, and will therefore become for him no more than a subjective "impression," a species of illusory epiphenomenon of the intellect, but an epiphenomenon also of actions and of external phenomena. Yet how, we must ask, do the thoughts and the actions arise, and how does willing accompany the "external phenomena"? Such questions as these, such questions as are inseparably associated with the problem of consciousness in general and with the problem of the separate psychical activities, are simply ignored by Černyševskii. Moreover, his materialism goes but half way. It is only the will which is a puzzle to him, and there is no difficulty about the determined intelligence! His teacher Mill, at least, was more consistent and thoroughgoing; so was Schopenhauer; so were all who have discussed the problem with full understanding.

To establish the principles of ethics upon firm foundations, to do this in the theoretical field with the aid of accurate epistemological criticism, is one thing; to live morally and to work practically on behalf of one's fellows is another. It has often been said of Černyševskii and of all the egoists of the sixties, that these men who were egoists in theory were the greatest idealists in practice. This is perfectly true. When

we watch Černyševskii at work, when we contemplate his labours by day and by night, we can have no doubt concerning the true nature of his "very useful utility" (thus does he formulate his view in *The Anthropological Principle*), and we understand why his egoism is to be "rational." Černyševskii's opponents marshalled all the old arguments which have from the first been adduced against hedonism, and yet Černyševskii was anything other than hedonist and epicurean in the sense of their accusations. Černyševskii detested moral sermonising and the inert sentimentality of the altruists. He simply wanted people to do something for their neighbours, to work on their behalf. His "neighbour" was for him no abstraction, but the extant social organisations, graded in the way that has been previously described; and for these and with these the individual was to work. Černyševskii's ethic was eo ipso social. For him useful labour was the goal of all activity, and this implied for him the demand that each man should work for himself, and should never make another work for him and in his place. Černyševskii's ethic is not social merely, but socialistic; his conception of practical and active love is communistic, for he sets out from the naturally given equality of all men (or, as he would put it, of all the organisms of humanity). Materialism is ethical and socio-political communism; it is the equality of rights of organised human beings, who by nature lead gregarious lives. The love for his fellows, and the self-love which are inborn to man, lead, upon a materialistic basis, to an equality of rights; but this equality of rights is by Černyševskii carried to its logical term, is conceived by him socialistically or communistically in its applications to all departments of social life. His communism does not halt before family life and marriage. "My linen your linen; my pipe-stem your pipe-stem; my wife your wife": thus speaks Rahmetov in *What is to be Done*.

While imprisoned in St. Petersburg, Černyševskii wrote his first novel, *What is to be Done?*¹ The work was published in 1863, and became the program of the younger radical generation, the program of the sons against their fathers. In *Fathers and Children*, Turgenev had analysed nihilism, then in its inception; in *What is to be Done*, Černyševskii wrote the gospel of nihilism, which was already at work. Kropotkin,

¹ An English translation by Nathan Haskell Dole, has been published in New York under the title, *A Vital Question or What is to be Done?*

and all who have an intimate knowledge of the sixties, recognise this. The young men of that day were less concerned with the philosophical foundations of the book than with following the positive example set them in *What is to be Done*.

It is easy for us to understand the powerful influence exercised by this novel. The mere fact that it was written and circulated during the author's prosecution could not fail to make its effects powerful upon young men of advanced views. But even Černyševskii's opponents could not close their eyes to the fact that in writing his book the captive had done a great deed. "This," he said in effect, "shows you what I want!" It would have been impossible for Černyševskii to give his official and unofficial inquisitors a more energetic or prouder answer than was given in this work.

The realists of nihilists (the latter name was given them by Turgenev, and was adopted by them) are in *What is to be Done* the consistent positivists, materialists, and egoists whose abstract principles Černyševskii, following Feuerbach, had previously expounded in his literary essays. The characters in the novel are guided by these principles. They are not learned, but they think scientifically; they are persons who feel it incumbent upon them to think scientifically and philosophically; they are accurate observers, and they draw logical conclusions from what they observe. The truth of actual fact and of positive knowledge is applied by them in the moral sphere. They have consistently carried out the "process of disillusionment" demanded by Herzen, not excepting the emotional life from its operations; pose of any kind is repugnant to them; naturalness, simplicity, directness, straightforwardness, are their watchwords, and characterise their lives. They therefore speak little, and would rather act or learn; but they debate much with one another, discussing chiefly philosophical and socio-political principles. One or another of them may carry his realism to an extreme, but on the whole they are persons who work for themselves and for their fellows, to whom the best which has hitherto been demanded as a great exception by the church and by society seems a mere matter of course, by which they are to guide their lives. They are at ease and self-possessed amid the most difficult problems and in the most difficult situations. Everything is so obvious.

What then is to be done? Society must be organised

upon a socialistic and communistic basis; its institutions must conform to the ideals of Fourier; these ideals are to be realised through cooperative organisations à la Louis Blanc, and by the education of men, not only as suggested by Fourier, but also in accordance with the designs of Owen.

Věra, Lopuhov's wife, takes delight in organising productive cooperatives of sempstresses. Not merely does her husband assist Věra in these social endeavours, but when he learns that his wife loves the philosopher Kirsanov, and is loved in return, he voluntarily retires from the field. Having arranged the details of a pretended suicide, he betakes himself to America. His wife, now legally free, but privately informed as to Lopuhov's place of residence and designs, marries Kirsanov. As soon as Lopuhov is convinced that he has overcome his love for Věra he returns to St. Petersburg to marry a friend of his former wife. The two families live thenceforward on the most cordial terms.

The construction of the novel is not merely simple, but weak. In conflict with the principle of realism, there is little action, but a great deal of discussion. The most important psychical processes are not subjected to analysis—and this indeed is not to be expected from a realist. The socialistic institutions of society are presented to us in dreams. Many other criticisms might be made from the aesthetic outlook. The main interest of the novel is concentrated upon elective affinities (to use Goethe's phrase), and upon the description of the realists or nihilists. Persons of the younger generation were enthralled with the book; those of the older generation, and not conservatives alone, were angered by it. Even Saltykov used very ambiguous language about it, writing on the subject in Černyševskii's review, and comparing nihilist women with demi-mondaines, and nihilist men with the minor recipients of official distinctions. The literary debate concerning nihilism gathered strength to become an open fight.

The woman's question, and above all the problem of the relationship between husband and wife, has long exercised men's minds. Indeed, we might almost say that the whole of modern literature is devoted to the subject. Rousseau, Lessing, Goethe, and Byron, did not merely discuss it as a topic, but lived it in their personal lives. In Russia, during the forties, George Sand was the fashion, but Puškin treated the subject boldly and independently in the character of

Tatjana. Družinin's Polin'ka will not accept the sacrifice which her husband offers to make, and remains with him; the husband, aware of her love for the young, ardent, and romantic Galickii, condones it; but in the end dies of consumption. Similarly, Herzen makes his unhappy husband die of drink. Turgenev, Gončarov, and Ostrovskii, all treated the problem prior to Černyševskii. Thus the last-named had before him numerous attempts at its solution. Moreover, as a socialist, it was natural that he should devote serious attention to the subject, being impelled thereto by socialist authorities and by the members of his own circle. Mihailov early began to write seriously upon the woman's problem and Černyševskii followed in his footsteps.

Russian history contains records, not only of learned women like Daškova, but also of the valiant wives of the decabrists. Under Nicholas, wives and mothers suffered from political oppression no less than husbands and fathers; women shared men's political aspirations, and bravely played their parts in the revolutionary movement that followed 1861. The social position of the middle class, and above all that of the *rasnočinec*, was rendered acutely difficult by the liberation of the peasantry, and the woman's question consequently became more pressing. As a result of this, liberals and radicals busied themselves in securing the admission of women to the sources of education and to the means of independent livelihood. Even the government took some steps forward, and women's schools were founded as early as 1858.

The reproach of immorality which has been made against Černyševskii's novel, the reproach that the author is an advocate of "free love," may be unhesitatingly dismissed. Even those who refuse to accept Černyševskii's solution must admit that after separation and remarriage the two couples lived far more morally than many wedded pairs in liberal and conservative circles of the day—not to speak of court life. In youth, Černyševskii had made up his mind to remain continent before marriage, and kept his resolution. Writing in 1858 a review of Turgenev's *Asja*, he said: "Away with erotic problems. The modern reader takes no pleasure in them, for he is concerned with the question of perfecting the administration and the judicial system, with questions of finance, and with the problem of liberating the peasantry." This was and remained the dominant mood of the nihilists. Černyševskii

was far from being an epicurean, and indeed as regards this department of life we must rather look upon him as a stoic.

Černyševskii desired to liberate woman from the Old Russian atmosphere, from the yoke of so-called patriarchy, and to make her into a "thinking being." With this end in view, utilitarianism seemed to him to offer the best guiding principle where the love of man and wife was concerned, just as it offered the best guiding principle elsewhere. In the days of their courtship, Věra reproached Lopuhov for his theory of rational egoism. It was, she said, cold, prosaic, and harsh. The utilitarian egoist answered his wife as follows: "This theory is cold, but it teaches men how to create warmth. A match is cold, the side of the matchbox on which you strike it is cold, but in them is fire, which prepares warm food for man and warms his body. This theory is harsh, but if men will follow it they will cease to be the tragic sport of futile sympathies. The hand that holds the lancet must not flinch, for mere sympathy will not do the patient any good. This theory is prosaic, but it reveals the true motive of life, and only in the truth of life is poetry found."

Through the personality of his hero, Černyševskii expressed his detestation for the theory of self-sacrifice, which was always being held up against him. "The word and the concept are false," says Lopuhov. "Nobody ever sacrifices himself, for everyone does what he likes best. Sacrifice is mere fustian."

Černyševskii is perfectly right in his animadversions against sacrifice. His ethic in general is a serious and noble-minded attempt; but its foundation is unsound, and it is impossible to accept the solution suggested in *What is to be Done*.

Self-sacrifice? It is true that genuine self-sacrifice is a rarity. Such sacrifice is as a rule purely imaginary. But it exists. There is such a thing as self-sacrifice utterly devoid of egoism and utterly free from the spirit of mercenary calculation. This is where Černyševskii errs; there are feelings and impulses of a quite unegoistic order; and Černyševskii simply does not understand—himself! But from the days of Aristippus and Epicurus down to those of Bentham and Mill the same mistake has been made by more than one philosopher, by more than one of the best and noblest among mankind. They all desired an empirical and practical system of ethics, and believed they could base such a system upon the doctrine of egoism. Unquestionably society ought to be

so organised as to render self-sacrifice superfluous, for as long as men exist who are ready and willing to make sacrifices, so long will egoists take advantage of these sacrifices. And seldom indeed have men any right to demand sacrifices from their fellows!

In America, Lopuhov overcomes his love for Věra. How does he effect this? Apart from the consideration that by the year 1863 a flight to America was already a somewhat trite expedient, we feel impelled to ask how Lopuhov could succeed in extirpating his first passion so radically as to be able, not merely to love a second time, but to live tranquilly in close association with his former wife. The author tells us how Věra finds Kirsanov and why she loves him; we understand that an inexperienced girl may delude herself concerning the depth and genuineness of her affection. But Lopuhov, a thinker, a man of wide experience and quite exceptional intelligence, was he also self-deluded when he married Věra? This can hardly have been the case, or he would not have had to journey to America in search of a cure. But the main point is this, that a man or a woman may resolve to love once and once only during a lifetime. What is to be done then? "I will love but once in all my life," is the entry we find in Černyševskii's own diary. What would Černyševskii have said had Lopuhov elected to follow this rede? Would he tell us that it was a needless sacrifice? All honour to utilitarianism, but there are times when it seems narrow and petty.

Černyševskii continued to ponder the problem in Siberia. In a comedy (this writer loved to convey his serious thoughts in paradoxes, jests, and shafts of irony) he shows us a woman who loves two men with an equally strong affection, and the way out of the difficulty is discovered in a marriage à trois. The development of the plot is as follows. First of all the heroine decides between the two men by lot. When the die is cast, she marries one, and the other disappears. The wife falls ill, and, acting on medical advice, goes upon a sea voyage, accompanied by her husband. A storm ends in a shipwreck, and the two are saved by being cast up on a lonely islet and rescued from drowning by the vanished friend and third member of the trio. Recapitulation of the earlier troubles follows, in an aggravated form. Jealousy, despair, thoughts of murder. It seems as if the affair must end in the destruction

of all three. But why need this be so? The conflict terminates in a union à trois, and hell is transmuted into paradise. The "triple" now goes to Europe, and in England the unconventional relationship leads to a prosecution, but the jury acquits the accused after a brilliant speech from the wife. In America they are received with open arms.

§ 97.

AFTER the death of Bělinskii, Russian literature and criticism in St. Petersburg and Moscow were under the dominion of the police-aesthetics inaugurated by Nicholas' henchmen, who had been quite thrown off their balance by the revolution of 1848. Družinin and Annenkov, with their philosophy of moderation, their liberalism in politics, and their system of aesthetics which was tantamount to the advocacy of art for art's sake and desired to immerse itself in memories of the days before Puškin, had little influence on the rising generation, on the young people who had read Herzen. Annenkov had much that was informative and interesting to bring back from Europe. Družinin made a name for himself with the publication of his novel *Polin'ka Saks* (1847). His critical and literary essays were instructive, while his studies in English literature and his translations from the English tongue were of value as a supplement to the French and German trends; but Nicholasian Russia, faced by the catastrophe of Sevastopol, looked for other pabulum than was provided by articles on Samuel Johnson and by the polemics waged by the English Tories in the name of aesthetics against "the didactics," that is to say against writers on social topics and writers with a purpose.

Černyševskii's criticism satisfied the philosophical and political needs of his day. As we have learned, he made his literary debut in 1853, and shortly afterwards he took the field as champion of Bělinskii and continuer of that author's work. He secured general recognition for the forbidden name of Bělinskii (*Sketches dealing with the Period of Gogol*, 1855); and in his thesis for the degree of master of arts, *The Aesthetic Relationship of Art to Reality* (1855), he applied Feuerbachian principles to aesthetics.

Černyševskii feels the lack of beauty in life, in reality. He demands that art shall not merely represent life, but shall

interpret it ; it is the artist's function to embody imaginatively the development of mankind. "Beauty is life." But for this very reason, beauty, as beauty is defined by idealist aesthetics, is not the sole content of art. "All that has a general bearing on life, is the subject matter of art." Aesthetics becomes an ancillary science to ethics, to the utilitarian principle of the greatest good of the greatest number, and thus to the policy of social regeneration. From this point of view, we see that the doctrine of art for art's sake must be utterly rejected as epicureanism. To Černyševskii the work of art becomes the work of labour ; labour with the axe is the starting-point of all art ; Shakespeare and all poets and artists are judged by him in virtue of the utilities they have contributed and continue to contribute to society.

It is true that the artist does not work with his understanding, as does the thinker. The artist works with his imagination ; but precisely for this reason he must keep all the closer to reality, seeing that imagination cannot attain to reality. But inasmuch as the artist reproduces life in his work, inasmuch as he endeavours to solve the problems set to him by life, willy-nilly (even while remaining an artist) he is compelled also to think, to become a thinker, and his work thus "acquires scientific significance." Art and science are handbooks for the beginner in practical life, and they are works of reference for the experienced.

Černyševskii wages war against false art, against romanticism and idealism, employing the latter term to denote German philosophy since the days of Kant ; also against romanticist art, likewise condemned as characteristically German.

It is readily comprehensible that, from his outlook, Černyševskii should esteem poesy (imaginative literature) as the loftiest of the arts, for poesy seemed to him to have an especially close relationship to life, to be the most generally comprehensible of all the arts, and to be capable of exercising the widest possible influence through the instrumentality of the written and printed word. He does not admit that architecture can properly speaking rank as an art, and he has the same low estimate of music, at any rate in the form of song, which he regards, like speech, as a means of social expression. Painting and sculpture he esteems devoid of action, too rigid. It is natural, therefore, that he should give his full approval to imaginative literature alone, for this directly reflects and

interprets life, socio-political life above all. In *What is to be Done* he furnishes a practical example of his theory. Hence we can understand his definition of poesy as "Life, activity, and passion." It may be pointed out that the despised romanticists would be warranted in claiming this device as their own!

In his socio-political estimate of art and the artist, Černyševskii is thus in agreement with Plato, the ultra-materialist with the ultra-idealist—with the romanticist as Černyševskii would have to term him. Plato in his *Republic* subordinates art to "life," and this would be the course taken by Černyševskii. He, the socialist, would not allot to artists any material compensation for their artistic labours, and he would not permit the enjoyment of works of art until the individual could no longer busy himself upon the useful (1861).

It is from this standpoint that Černyševskii classifies particular artists, and especially poets. Like his teacher Bělinskii, he rates Schiller exceedingly high. Among Russian poets he is far fonder of Gogol than of Puškin. He considers Puškin rather a pure poet than a thinker; his work lacks body; and he has no definite outlook on life. Gogol, on the other hand, in his analysis of Russian life, gives expression to the most definite ethical aspiration, and this must be included among the influences proper to the poet. Černyševskii condemns Turgenev's *Asja* as an example of unpractical romanticism.

The aesthetic conceptions of Černyševskii and his school were unjustly censured as hostile to art by the opponents of this school, who were animated by a dread of materialism and utilitarianism. Černyševskii wrote several novels, and it was to elucidate the questions which seemed to him of most moment that he had recourse to art.

§ 98

^v
ČERNYŠEVSKII abandoned his work as literary critic as soon as his disciple and friend Dobroljubov was able to take over this department in his periodical. An exposition must be given of the little that Černyševskii wrote concerning Dobroljubov as aestheticist and critic, and this not merely apropos of the friendly relationship between teacher and

pupil and of their joint work on behalf of their literary organ and its supporters. The account will further be of interest because it will serve admirably to complete our knowledge of the teacher's own trend of thought. Since Dobroljubov was exclusively a critic, he was typical of the new realistic tendency especially from this aspect.

Dobroljubov's activities were not of long duration, but they gave a rich yield. He was animated with an enthusiastic and inspiring love for intellectual liberty, and he fought to introduce the light into the Old Russian "realm of darkness" (his analysis of Ostrovskii's dramas depicting the mercantile classes). Writing of Gončarov's *Oblomov*, he described Oblomovism as the issue of this darkness and as characteristic of the Russians in general; but the errors, he said, were those of one already struggling towards the light. Oblomov was the representative of the liberal nobles, inactive but longing for activity, "superfluous persons." The effect of Dobroljubov's essays was all the greater because he had a closer and more realistic knowledge of Russian conditions than was possessed by his friend and teacher and because, too, he had in the highest degree the gift of satire.

Dobroljubov turned away from the "phantasmagorias of the orientalist imagination"; he turned to Béliinskii (of the last phase) and to Herzen; in this way, like Černyševskii and his radical contemporaries in general, he came to Feuerbach and the Hegelian left. He now adopted the political views of Černyševskii, and in the latter's review secured a free platform for the expression of his ideas. To Černyševskii we owe a biography of his young friend and disciple, who, in turn, exercised considerable influence upon the teacher.¹

As materialist and utilitarian, Dobroljubov could not fail to ask himself the question whether there was any justification

¹ Dobroljubov was born in 1836 and died in 1861. His father was a priest of Nijni-Novgorod, and he was educated in the ecclesiastical seminary of that town. Since his parents were unable to maintain him at the university, on leaving the seminary he entered the Pedagogical Institute in St. Petersburg. His parents died next year, so that while still a student he had to maintain his brothers and sisters, which he did by translations and private tuition. He made Černyševskii's acquaintance in 1855, Černyševskii refusing to accept a short story by Dobroljubov and advising the latter to leave literature alone. Černyševskii's influence upon Dobroljubov was decisive. In 1856, Dobroljubov became critic on the staff of *Sovremennik*, and from 1858 onwards he was editor in chief of the critical and bibliographical department, editing likewise the satirical supplement, *Svistok* (Whistle).

for art in general and for literary criticism in particular, to ask himself whether literary criticism was "work" in the sense in which work was demanded by Černyševskii. In Dobroljubov's critical writings we often feel that this question is troubling him, and his answer does not always set doubts at rest. Whereas at first his judgment of Puškin coincided with that of Černyševskii, who, despite his admiration for Puškin considered the latter's work lacking in realist content, Dobroljubov's later opinions concerning the utility of poets, and of Puškin in especial, have a harsher ring. But a closer examination of Dobroljubov's studies leads us to recognize that all he insisted upon was a clear distinction between art and pseudo-art. Only the genuine artist, the truly great artist, has a justified existence, for he alone in his creative work is so permeated with the truth of life that simply by his faithful reproduction of facts and relationships he furnishes for us a solution of the problems we are endeavouring to solve. According to Dobroljubov, persons of mediocre talent must be content with subordinate parts, must serve in the interests of propaganda. It is true that the question arises who is to decide concerning the quality of the talent; who is to decide when an artist is to be classed as mediocre and excluded from the circle of Dobroljubov's recognised great ones, from the company of Dante, Shakespeare, Byron, and Goethe. Of those named, Dobroljubov esteems Shakespeare most highly, considering that his work marks a new phase in human development.

This realistic valuation of art does not differ greatly from the views of the romanticists, who could not stress the greatness of the artist's influence more strongly than did these realists, the reputed enemies of art. In matters of detail, too, we can discover points of contact between the two schools. Dobroljubov, for instance, considers that the natural, that nature, is psychologically manifested in instinct, instinct being to him the all-powerful energy of nature. Similarly, he gives a psychological explanation of the suicide of Katerina in Ostrovskii's *The Storm*. I do not myself think that instinct as a blindly working force takes us very far in the way of explanation, and this apart from the consideration that the theory is out of harmony with the high valuation of reason and culture which Dobroljubov shares with Černyševskii. Manifestly here Feuerbach's philosophy, and the endeavour

to attain to a purely empirical and materialistic psychology, are at work.

According to Dobroljubov (and Černyševskii), the critic's task as propagandist mainly consists in a kind of reperception of artistic truth, and this led Dobroljubov to prize above all those works of art wherein the artist has revealed himself. It is continually urged against Dobroljubov that he was unjust to Puškin, but on the other side we must point out that he took delight in Gončarov. He admires Gončarov, not merely on account of the latter's creation of the Oblomov type, but he praises this writer's repose and objectivity and his superiority to the passions and influences of the moment. The desire to be swept along by the current "is Oblomovist, and arises from the wish always to have a leader even in matters of sentiment." As propagandist, Dobroljubov exhorts us to judge poets by their theories of life.

Dobroljubov is severe in his criticism of Turgenev, whose characters Rudin and Lavreckii have too much of the Oblomov in them; but the critic admires Inzarov, being perhaps here somewhat inconsistent with the theory above expounded. Personally Dobroljubov did not get on with Turgenev, finding him a dull companion, as Dobroljubov said openly to Turgenev. Turgenev, on his side, in *Fathers and Children*, inveighed against realists of the Dobroljubov type; but we cannot admit that Bazarov is a direct portrait of Dobroljubov, as was then maintained in literary circles. Subsequently, in *Virgin Soil*, Turgenev recognised the imaginative force of Dobroljubov's work, but spoke of the young critic's relentless onslaughts upon recognised authorities as "the attacks of a cobra." Marx compared Dobroljubov with Lessing and Diderot.

Following Černyševskii, Dobroljubov shows how the individual's merits and defects derive from the social environment. In his hands, aesthetic criticism becomes an analysis of the family, of classes (mercantile and aristocratic), and of social institutions in general. He condemns Russian patriarchalism, which enslaves the family and above all enslaves woman; and he endeavours in Katerina's suicide to discover a manifestation of the folk-soul unbemused by official morality. To selfish merchants and nobles he holds up the mužik, the folk, as models. In the political field he condemns as Oblomovism, not aristocracy alone, but liberalism as well, with its un-

practical culture. "None of the Oblomovians have transmuted into their own blood and marrow the principles that have been instilled into them; they have never carried them out to their ultimate logical consequences; they have never attained the boundary line where word becomes deed, where principle becomes fused with the innermost need of the soul, is dissolved into that need, and is transformed into the single energy that moves the man. This is why such persons never cease lying; this is why they are so inconsistent in the individual manifestations of their activity. This is why abstract opinions are dearer to them than living facts, why general principles seem more important to them than the simple truths of life. They read useful books to learn what is written therein; they write well-meaning essays in order to luxuriate in the logical constructions of their own phraseology; they utter bold speeches in order to enjoy the sound of their own periods and in order to secure applause. But all that lies beyond, all that is the goal of reading, writing, and oratory, if not utterly beyond their ken, is at least a matter about which they are little concerned."

The reader will not fail to recall Bakunin's analysis of the liberals. In Dobroljubov's characterisation, the liberals appear as "superfluous persons," who begin with Puškin's Onegin and are subsequently represented by Turgenev's types and by Gončarov's Oblomov—dragging out a miserable existence whether in literature or in real life. These cultured and hypercultured individuals are affected with the malady of Oblomovism, they suffer from the paralysis and morbidity of civilisation. Dobroljubov here succumbs to a paroxysm of Rousseauism, and accuses Puškin of remaining too much aloof from the folk. The peasant, says Dobroljubov, is physically and mentally vigorous and healthy, in contrast with the "superfluous" weaklings. Černyševskii by no means shared this favourable opinion of the *mužik*, and would have rejected it as romanticist. Nor do we find the theory consistently carried out by Dobroljubov; but we have to remember that the mercantile "kingdom of darkness" was peopled for him by "living corpses" (Katerina's husband being among the number), and that he looked upon these Russians of the mercantile classes as persons remote from civilisation.

In this criticism and analysis of literary and socio-political types, Dobroljubov is one-sided and lacking in precision.

Moreover, we can detect a certain vacillation, for despite his campaign against the Oblomovs and superfluous persons, he is almost mastered by an enthusiasm for Stankevič. If, he tells us, most of the members of human society were to resemble Stankevič, no struggles, no sufferings, and no privations, would be necessary—"those privations which unduly utilitarian persons are so fond of expecting from others." We here see the utilitarian discovering that the utilitarians are in the opposite camp.

Dobroljubov's pen, Dobroljubov's realistic criticism, became a political weapon. In his literary critiques the written word was actually transmuted into deeds—opponents declared, into deeds of violence. Doubtless much was said during the heat of battle which would better have been left unsaid, but we must not forget what weapons of word and deed the nihilists' opponents used! Dobroljubov was a fighter; this was his mission and this was the service we owe to him. In his study of Stankevič, he finely tells us upon what he is waging war, and it is, "the constrained and artificial virtue of inner falsehood towards oneself." Dobroljubov fought this fight honourably. We may perhaps note here and there in his polemic the seminarist's touch, that of the preacher or the professor. From his days as a theological student there had clung to him a tinge of the hermit spirit; yet his judgment and condemnation of the world, of society, was not religious but political. Though we learn from his diary that as a student he aspired in ethical matters to be guided by the stoics Cato and Zeno, he shows us often enough that he failed to adhere to his principles. Do we note in him, in fine, a touch of the Oblomov?

Dobroljubov never attempted a philosophical elaboration of his principles. He accepted Černyševskii's materialism without making any strict examination of its foundations. To him personally, since from childhood onwards and at school his education had been strictly theological and religious, materialism brought enfranchisement. Dobroljubov was nourished almost exclusively on Russian literature; European philosophers were practically unknown to him. Moreover, his interest lay rather in the direction of practical ethics than in those of abstract philosophy, as we may learn from his essay directed against the pedagogic principles of Pirogov.

Nor did Dobroljubov acquire his political and socialistic principles in the philosophic field. It is evident from the

essays against Cavour and in favour of Owen that he was here wholly dependent upon Černyševskii. Besides, his socialism was the fruit of personal experience. Dobroljubov was the embodiment of the poor *raznočinec*, was the man who in his own frame had had experience of the blessings of poverty.

Dobroljubov's opponents made malicious reference to a number of the critic's literary oversights, saying, for example, that in Béranger, for whom he had an enthusiasm, he had failed to detect the small-minded adherent of Napoleon. Dobroljubov did not contribute any strongly original ideas to the general stock, but he was an energetic literary propagandist, such as the time needed.

§ 99.

^v**ČERNYŠEVSKII** was a practical politician rather than a theoretical sociologist. From 1859 onwards he published in his review a monthly survey of political events, devoting himself to the questions of the hour, but always attempting to give the discussion a wide general bearing. This endeavour is extremely characteristic of Černyševskii. I am unable to determine whether it was simply a manifestation of his own philosophic trend, or whether he was influenced here by regard for the risks of the censorship.

He never wrote any connected account of his views concerning the philosophy of history. His fundamental outlook upon historical development was, that history is the unfolding of culture, of reason. Progress, the developmental process, is conceived by him as a growth of the organism of man and of humanity, a growth which follows a rigidly determined course in the individual and in the species. For him this idea of organic growth is so self-evident that he does not attempt any proof of its truth. After he had made acquaintance with the work of Buckle, the idea of progress (in Buckle's sense) was conceived by him as the history of enlightenment.

Černyševskii formulated as follows his thoughts concerning the general scheme of historical development. The aspirations of the best men, or at least some of their desires, are after prolonged and arduous labour understood by society at large. Society then works for a time at the realisation of

these wishes, but, becoming wearied, desists when half way towards the goal. A lengthy period of arrest ensues, until at length the "optimates" get to work once more. In a brief period of noble stimulation (this is Černyševskii's euphemism for the revolution), extensive transformations ensue. Since these changes are effected somewhat hurriedly, we cannot expect that the new constructions will be beautiful. During the subsequent epoch of stagnation, the optimates are at work anew, and there succeeds a fresh period of active labour, followed again by slumber—and so on unceasingly.

The significance of this developmental process is more definitely represented as progress towards collectivism. The mir, we are told, was the primitive form of the economic and social organisation of society; next came private ownership; this will be replaced by collectivism. The change will take place in accordance with the law of historical evolution that society in its development returns to the primitive form, but the later manifestation will have a richer content than had the early one.

We have previously learned that Černyševskii's attention was drawn by Hegel to the concept of evolution. In *What is to be Done* we are told that work to promote the development of the individual and of society is the only true happiness. The evolutionary law formulated above was also taken from Hegel, but was modified in the sense of Vico's "ricorsi." Development, as we have seen, is a slow and gradual process. Černyševskii does not accept the notion of a definitive revolution; he considers that we never get more than approximations to the ideal.

This outlook is admirably expressed in *What is to be Done*. Černyševskii's characters display different stages of progress towards perfection, and we see how in capitalist society socialistic plans are being realised in varying degrees. Černyševskii shows us an entire gradation of characters, these being in a position to realise the correct principles, some to a greater and some to a lesser extent. All meet with his approval, but he esteems most highly the ideal figure of Rahmetov.

From time to time Černyševskii discusses individual factors of evolution. For example, he shows, in opposition to Buckle, that climatic conditions have little effect upon development. In another place he refutes the idea that the influence of racial qualities is decisive.

The lack of a philosophy of history is partly the outcome of Černyševskii's rationalism. He followed Feuerbach rather than Hegel; he followed the rationalists generally, in whom the historical sense had not yet awakened. Černyševskii's whole dialectic is unhistorical; it is logical, rationalistic. Černyševskii adopts the prehegelian and precomtist outlook, the outlook of a day when the evolutionary idea had not become established. We can see that in part, too, he was influenced, in this connection, by the materialistic view of the individual and of the social organism, in accordance with which progress, history, is explained as organic or physiological growth. In his polemic against Čičerin (1859), we already find him defending the opinion that every really live man will and must, as a student of science, bring his conviction of what is right into play in his scientific work as well as elsewhere. "The only persons who will not display their convictions in this manner are those who have no convictions."

Černyševskii expressly condemns Roscher's historical method, and does so with much justice, for the method is utterly fallacious. He makes a distinction between "the theory of the object" and its history; he admits that the two branches of knowledge "are closely connected each with the other," but does not attempt a more precise study of the nature of the connection. He was perhaps thinking of Comte's distinction between sociological statics and dynamics. But all that his disquisition discloses is that he chiefly had in mind the "constantly" existing objects, and above all had in mind the present, which he did not think of as history, for he thought of history (wrongly, of course) rather as the study of remote times.

Nevertheless we find that Černyševskii expresses the view that history is the basis of theory, at least in the domain of art. "The history of art is the foundation of the theory of art."

For the elucidation of economic ideas, Černyševskii makes use of a "hypothetical method" which is tantamount to the resurrection of our old friend Robinson Crusoe, so familiar in economic disquisitions. He "hypothetically" assumes the existence of a social order wherein the phenomena under consideration are displayed in their essential simplicity. He fails to notice that his abstraction from existing facts may readily become most unrealistic.

§ 100.

AS an appendix to what has just been said we must discuss Černyševskii's relationship to Marx and to historical materialism.

From the Marxist side we learn that Černyševskii was a utopian socialist, and that he was an "idealist" notwithstanding his materialism in the explanation of social phenomena. Some Marxists tell us, however, that Černyševskii came nearer than any other man of his day to scientific socialism and historical materialism.

It has been shown above that Černyševskii's conception of history differed from that of Marx. But the main point is that the Russian considered the understanding to be the motive force of history and of human life in general—though he failed to explain how and in accordance with what laws the understanding or the brain undergoes modifications. The understanding, culture, science, opinion (Černyševskii's terminology lacks precision and uniformity), are the primary motive force, that which sets other forces at work. In *What is to be Done* the mission of Rahmetov, the ideal man of the new time, is described in the following terms: "Such persons are few in number, but through them the general life blossoms, and without them it would be choked; they are few in number, but they enable all other men to breathe, for without them these would be stifled. Honest and good men exist in plenty, but those of whom I am thinking are rare specimens. They are like theine in tea, like the bouquet in a fine wine, they are the source of the strength and the fragrance. They are the flower of the optimates; they are the primal sources of energy; they are the salt of the salt of the earth."

Thus it is Rahmetov and his kind who count, and not the methods of production! In his novel, Černyševskii presented us with no more than eight such primal sources of energy. In history he had found one, Lessing. With contagious enthusiasm, Černyševskii describes this hero of the spirit and his significance for the Germany of that day. "Though politics and industry may move noisily along in the foreground of history, history none the less bears witness to the fact that knowledge is the essential energy to which politics, industry, and all else in human life, are subordinated." In the same sense, in his historical disquisitions, it is Černyševskii's way

to draw special attention to individual forces when he is dealing with different countries and various times. Religion, science, literature and art, politics with journalism and parliamentarism, militarism, the economic or material conditions of social existence, may each in turn occupy "the foreground." But he insists that in all these forces the understanding is a factor, though he fails to show how and to what extent it operates, for here, as usual, precision of detail is lacking. He tells us more than once that all the evil in the world comes from the disorder in men's heads. He uses such expressions as the following: "The great facts of historic life give the tone to life." Criticise his want of precision as we may, at least we must admit that this is not the doctrine of historical materialism. Černyševskii does, indeed tell us that material conditions "perhaps play the leading role in life and may be the fundamental causes of almost all the happenings in other and higher spheres of life"; but the hypothetical formulation suffices to show that Černyševskii's doctrine was not historical materialism.

There are other proofs besides the admiration for Lessing, for we find that Černyševskii assigns to literature a role very different from that assigned to it in the work of Marx. For example, Černyševskii thinks that Gogol's influence was profoundly important for Russia; great, he says, was the work done by Byron for England and for humanity as a whole (Byron was a greater power than Napoleon).

After his return from Siberia, Černyševskii wrote an essay against Darwinism, and this aroused much hostility, for he represented the Darwinian theory as a bourgeois discovery intended to justify the exploitation of the workers. Černyševskii declared himself an adherent of Lamarck, and his essay was signed "Transformist." References have been made to the relationship between Černyševskii's ideas and the newer Lamarckism. I only refer to these matters because Marx and Engels were Darwinians. In my opinion, Černyševskii more correctly diagnosed the aristocratic character of Darwin's teaching than the Darwinian Marxists who interpreted Darwinism democratically. However this may be, I may point out that Černyševskii condemned the struggle for existence on moral grounds, and I may also recall Dobroljubov's repudiation of struggle. The class struggle, again, is regarded by Černyševskii, in so far as he describes it, as a deviation from the norm, whereas to Marx this struggle is natural and normal.

Finally a notable distinction between the two men is found in this, that Černyševskii employed the novel for the exposition of his most important theories, whereas Marx favoured a strictly scientific method and sought always for logical proof.¹

§ 101.

ČERNYŠEVSKII'S socialism is not Marxist. As we have shown in our discussion of *What is to be Done*, Černyševskii, like his predecessors, finds an ethical foundation for socialism. Moreover, Černyševskii adopted the pragmatistical trend of German philosophy, and was inclined to rate practice above theory. I have already drawn attention to his terminology, and have shown how he speaks of the sciences of the mind as "moral" sciences, and have pointed out that the moral aspects of his outlook are stressed in his mode of expression. Socialism is to him a matter of conviction; it is the categorical imperative of virile honesty; he is fond of using this latter expression to denote "the good" as he understands it in utilitarian fashion.

Černyševskii (and with him Dobroljubov, as we have seen) is far too strong an individualist to accept Marxist socialism. His best-known saying, which dates from 1859 and was frequently repeated, runs: "We perceive nothing on earth higher than human personality." He could not accept Marxist socialism because he had far too strong a belief in heroes of the spirit à la Lessing, too strong a belief in literature and in the powers of his own pen; and secondly, because he had far too little confidence in the masses. In the latter respect, Černyševskii may have vacillated; it is possible, as many of his exponents declare, that in later days he came to believe

¹ I have not been able to learn whether Černyševskii knew the work of Marx or that of Engels. Engels was quoted in the *Sovremennik*; in 1872 a copy of *Capital* was sent to Černyševskii in Siberia; but he never mentioned the book or its author. Rusanov who in 1910 gave an account of the contents of Černyševskii's Siberian letters, expresses surprise at Černyševskii's silence upon this matter. It is certainly remarkable, for Černyševskii was accustomed to write about the books sent to him even when these were of little importance. Yet more striking is it that before his exile to Siberia, Černyševskii should have failed to come across the writings of Marx: the newspapers; the Communist Manifesto; the first controversy with Bakunin; the Holy Family, 1845; the polemic against Proudhon, 1847; A Criticism of Political Economy, 1859. In the postscript to the second edition of *Capital*, Marx gave a word of praise to Černyševskii's work on Mill.

in the political, nay in the revolutionary, force of the broad masses of the people ; but on the whole he was far removed from Dobroljubov's Rousseauism. In his essay on Thierry he writes in an almost elegiac strain when he represents the crowd as incompetent to understand and to esteem work done on its behalf. He consequently recommends the great men whom he admires to seek the justification for their activities in these activities themselves, untroubled by the question whether the crowd (he constantly employs the word *tolpa*, which contemptuously denotes the unintelligent mob) can follow them ; and he writes, " to close one's career in bitter solitude of the understanding and of the heart, this is worthy of undying respect and admiration." The hero of a novel written by Černyševskii in 1889, after his return from Siberia and shortly before his death, says, " I love the people of my own nation, but I find myself out of touch with them."

In this mood, Černyševskii acclaimed the accounts of folk-life we owe to N. V. Uspenskii (not to be confounded with his nephew Glėb Uspenskii), for this writer scourged the misery and ignorance of the mužik. Uspenskii himself died poor and unknown.

Černyševskii's political activities began in the days when the liberation of the peasantry was being vigorously advocated. He energetically demanded that the peasants should be given land, and after the liberation he favoured the reforms necessitated by that step. His insistence that the peasant must have land was a logical deduction from his thesis that everyone must work for himself, on his own behalf. If the peasant were to be enabled to do this, he must own a plot of land. In this demand, says Černyševskii, are comprised all those contained in the so-called utopias, and the phrase shows how far Černyševskii himself was a utopian ; he was content, at any rate, with the formulation of this modest aim.

Such was Černyševskii's language before the liberation. At that time (1858) he dissented from the view of Haxthausen and the latter's Russian adherents, that in Russia a system of agriculture based upon the workers alone was an impossibility.

In conformity with Russian conditions, he conceived of classes rather as estates, or at times as (political) parties. He did not recognise the class struggle in the Marxist sense.

His leading demand was for a harmonious distribution of the product of labour. He thought here, above all, of Malthus

and his law of population, to which he had devoted much consideration, desiring to give it a better arithmetical formulation. He adopted from Malthus the latter's ideas on the relationship between the increase in population and the increase in the means of subsistence, but wished to correct the English economist's calculations, and it was typical of Černyševskii that he should fail to recognise how arbitrary is Malthus' mathematical formula. He placed Malthus beside Ricardo as one of the greatest of thinkers, and declared that a knowledge of Malthus was an essential precondition to accurate sociological thought.

In economics, Černyševskii followed the so-called classical economists, especially Adam Smith and Ricardo ; but he had a personal preference for John Stuart Mill, and in his translation of this writer's work he gave expression in notes to occasional dissent, voicing his own radical views. He doubtless selected Mill owing to the latter's intimate association with utilitarian ethics and sociology. Moreover, Mill's political individualism was congenial to Černyševskii. His own conception of economics was ethical. Political economy was for him the medicine, the hygiene, of economic life, and not merely its pathology ; the function of economic science was to teach what men must do in order to escape economic destruction. Competition and struggle were to be done away with.

His ethical outlook on economic relationships is conspicuously displayed in his valuation of labour. Following Fourier, Černyševskii maintains it to be a part of the very nature of work, that "almost" all varieties of it are agreeable or attractive ; if work be disagreeable, this is "almost" always due to "fortuitous external conditions." Labour is not a commodity.

Černyševskii formulates the customary arguments against excessive division of labour—although the classical economists derive them from the conventional economic view that labour is essentially distasteful and that labour is a commodity.

The crimes of capitalist production, the proletarianisation of previously independent industrial workers, the heaping up of wealth in the hands of a few, and so on, are depicted by Černyševskii in vivid colours, but he admits that capitalism has favoured individualism ; the fundamental evil of capitalism, he says, is free competition. He extols the growth of manufacturing industry and the modern spirit of enterprise which

has promoted that growth. He anticipates that the victory of manufacturers, engineers, merchants, and technicians will bring greater advantages to Russia than the victory of Napoleon brought to Spain and Germany. The growth of manufacturing industry necessitates the diffusion of science and culture, promotes the growth of improved legal conditions, etc.

Černyševskii follows Ricardo in his analysis of the process of production, recommending that the yield of the soil (rent), of capital (profit), and of labour (wages), should be weighed one against the others, and should be harmoniously distributed in accordance with the greatest good of the greatest number. It is obvious that he is thinking here of Proudhon's "dis-harmonies."

In *What is to be Done* Černyševskii introduces us to the new social order and to the "new men." This new order will rest, above all, upon a new morality, and he therefore describes for us the relationship between man and wife, and their views concerning love. It is plain that he has far less interest in the economic organisation of the new society. The formation of productive cooperative societies is recommended. These cooperatives are to be private, but it does not appear that Černyševskii regards their regulation by the state as inadmissible. His plans here are altogether vague. When circumstances make it necessary for him to discuss and advocate social reforms in connection with the concrete conditions of his day, as for example when he deals with the decay of silk-weaving in Lyons, his suggestions are extremely modest; the weavers, he tells us, must have their workshops outside the town; must cultivate a plot of land in addition to working at their looms; and so on. Černyševskii never made any practical attempt at the inauguration of cooperative production.

Important are Černyševskii's views concerning the Russian mir and its significance for the future organisation of society.

His opinions as to the social value of the mir were not consistent. In 1857 there appeared in Černyševskii's review an excerpt from Haxthausen discussing the mir, and it would appear that at first Černyševskii agreed with Haxthausen and the slavophiles. Subsequently, however, he recognised the weaknesses of the mir and its tendency to oppress the individual. He conceded, moreover, to the opponents of the mir that this institution is not specifically Russian or Slav, but a European

development ; and he even recognised that the mir represents a primitive stage of development. He believed, none the less, that Russia could be socialised upon the foundation of the mir and the artel.

The mir, however primitive, is for Černyševskii a means by which Russia is to be safeguarded from proletarianisation ; and despite his scepticism concerning the peasant and the latter's capabilities, he esteems the mir most highly. He believes that Siberia, where the populace in general is in comfortable circumstances, must by the "democrat" be ranked higher than England, where the poverty of the majority is extreme. Černyševskii pays little regard to the position of the industrial worker, the proletarian. To him the mužik is still the genuine man of the people. He continually employs the term *prostoljudin*, which signifies "man of the common people."

These views explain why at a later date Černyševskii continued to speak so warmly of the mir, saying in an apostrophe to youth in his letter to Herzen, "Give your lives to maintain equal rights in the soil, give your lives for the principle of the village community." He demanded that the state should protect the mir. In his later and more revolutionary phase, he was opposed to private ownership of any kind, not excepting private ownership of land, though he had previously expressed his gratification at the acquisition of land by the peasants.

Černyševskii subsequently came to regard the mir and its agrarian communism from the outlook of the associative designs of European socialists, just as he came to regard the artel as the basis of the future productive cooperatives. In these matters his views contrasted with those of the slavophiles and of Herzen.

Černyševskii's account of the transition from the primitive communism of the mir to the communism of the future society, resembles that given by Herzen. Society, like the individual, can overleap one or several stages of development, evolution being thus accelerated. Černyševskii appeals to a general law of evolution, in accordance with which the terminal stage is a return to the initial stage. He compares the primitive rope bridge with the modern suspension bridge. The latter is constructed upon the same principle as the former and is yet entirely different ; similar will it be with the communism of the future. Russia need not develop "organically," need

not, that is to say, traverse all the stages of European development ; Russia can take over as a heritage all the desirable acquirements of European evolution, just as Russia has introduced railways though she did not herself discover them. It must be admitted that the analogy is a lame one, and that it displays the mir in a light which makes that institution seem anything but suitable to the socialism of the future.

§ 102.

IN view of the censorship, Černyševskii was unable to attempt a direct exposition of his opinions on political science. He judged the state from a utilitarian standpoint. The function of the state, he considered, was to promote the interest of the individual, and he rejected as unrealistic the theory that the state exists to further justice, or for similar ends. All his efforts were directed against absolutism ; he fought against centralisation and tutelage, and favoured decentralisation and self-government.

Whilst still at the university he began to follow with close attention the course of political development in Europe ; he witnessed the fall of the French republic and the commencement of reaction ; and at this early stage he had decided in the interests of liberty to adopt a political and publicistic career. In accordance with the ideas of Guizot he had formulated a scheme of political evolution : primitive natural freedom had been restricted by the establishment of the state, of the aristocracy, and of society ; leading minds were striving to bring about the reinstatement of liberty, and with this end in view it was essential that the masses should be enlightened ; the more highly evolved human beings became, the less necessary was government, the less essential was governmental centralisation.

In 1848, as a republican and a socialist, Černyševskii had asked himself whether absolute monarchy were not after all preferable to a bourgeois republic. The hereditary monarch could maintain a neutral and just attitude, and could promote the advantage of the peasants and workers. At that time, too, Černyševskii was doubtful as to the benefits of universal suffrage. But before long he came to recognise (1850) that a monarch willing to look upon himself as means merely and not as end, a monarch prepared to retire of his own free will

as soon as the masses should become sufficiently enlightened, was not to be found; he saw that absolute monarchy was no more than the completion of aristocratic hierarchy, and that freedom can be established in no other way than from below upwards, democratically, by the democracy. Henceforward Černyševskii advocated the sound view that the opposition between democracy and aristocracy is fundamental to the political organisation of society, that monarchy is but a form of aristocracy. He refuted Čičerin when the latter pointed to instances in which monarchs had made common cause with the people against the aristocracy. With equal justice he considered that serfdom was the groundwork of aristocratic absolutism.

His individualism, the high value he placed upon culture, and his recognition that manufacturing industry is the leading motive force of the present time, frequently led him into a disapproval of and even a contempt for the state, and this gave his teaching a somewhat anarchistic flavour. Sometimes he displayed hostility to the word "government," and would at least hear nothing of "regulation." It is evident that he was greatly influenced by Proudhon.

His antipathy to absolutism led him, in the existing state of foreign affairs, to put his trust above all in France, "the European volcano." It was in France, in especial, that he studied the political evolution of the new age.

His opposition to Russian absolutism led him to approve the radical movement in Poland, heralded already by the events of the year 1863; and he desired complete independence, not for the Poles alone, but likewise for the Little Russians. He sympathised with the Magyars against Austria. Like Marx, he found it hard to forgive the Austrian Slavs for their reactionary and antirevolutionary conduct in 1848; and when the beginnings of constitutionalist freedom were manifest in the early sixties, it was his fear that the Austrian Slavs would become tools of the reaction.

Černyševskii openly declared himself in favour of "democracy," and occasionally spoke of his trend as "radical"; the political significance of these designations becomes clear in the light of the theory just expounded concerning the opposition between democracy and aristocracy (as a democrat Černyševskii was of course a republican); and it is further illuminated by his attacks upon the liberals or progressists.

His terminology reminds us of Bakunin's democratic program. Černyševskii does not attempt to provide any definite philosophical foundation for the opposition between democracy and liberalism, and is content to accept the empirical opposition as a historic datum.¹

Černyševskii's criticism of Russian liberalism is severe. He is specially adverse to Speranskii's plans of reform; among his contemporaries he attacks Čičerin, Kavelin, and last, not least, Herzen. In 1859 Herzen had written an article against Černyševskii and his adherents, speaking of the decay and even the "corruption of spirit" characteristic of the trend opposed to his own. Černyševskii went to see Herzen in London, hoping to put an end to the struggle, but was unsuccessful.

The conflict between the two tendencies went on developing. In his study on the fall of Rome, published in 1861, Černyševskii made a fresh attack on Herzen. But Černyševskii was already

¹ Černyševskii's hostility to liberalism is displayed in his judgments of Macaulay, Thiers, Ranke, Guizot, Cavour, etc. Černyševskii devoted special attention to the study of postrevolutionary France, discussing in carefully written essays the Bourbon restoration, the regime of Louis Philippe, and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. It is necessary here to make a specific allusion to his terminology. He is erroneously supposed, when he speaks of democracy, to think of socialism in contrast with liberalism, but this view is incorrect, for he speaks of Cavaignac as a democrat. True democracy is in any case social. The terminology shows that to Černyševskii the political seemed of greater importance than the social. He frequently spoke of the socialists as "reformers," but he also spoke of "reformatory parties"; this implies that nonsocialist parties aim at reform, including social reform. He distinguished the liberals from the democrats and from the radicals, and used the expression "radical-democratic." Radicalism was to him the name of a method, the revolutionary method; democracy was the substance of what that method would achieve, the regime of the masses of the population, hitherto subjugated; liberalism aimed at the dominion of the upper, cultured, and well-to-do classes. A comparison of Černyševskii's historical essays above enumerated with Marx's writings on the same subject confirms what has been said about the difference between the two men. Marx, although at this early date he had not yet formulated his doctrine of historical materialism, gave a far more thorough account of economic conditions, and looked upon the struggles of party as class struggles. Černyševskii, on the other hand, considered that party struggles sprang from erroneous judgments concerning the political situation, concerning the intentions of opponents, and concerning the tasks which the partisans themselves believed their respective parties had to perform. Moreover, Černyševskii paid much attention to individuals, and often to persons of subordinate importance, whereas Marx dealt only with the general situation in France and in Europe. It must be admitted that Černyševskii's essays do not furnish an adequate expression of the historical knowledge of the fifties. They contain, indeed, many surprising statements: for instance, that Napoleon, as an absolutist, was the first to introduce centralisation into France; that the monarchy acquired its strength in the struggle with ultramontanism; etc.

in Siberia when his disciple Serno-Solov'evič wrote the before-mentioned pamphlet against Herzen. By this time, as previously explained, the younger generation had turned away from Herzen.

In attacking the liberals, Černyševskii wished to hit the bourgeoisie, those whom Dobroljubov termed the Oblomovs. He reproached the Russian liberals for desiring to secure the dominion of the mercantile classes, for he himself would have preferred the dominion of the peasantry. On principle, in opposition to the liberals, he approved state interference in economic concerns.

Detailed investigation would be required to enable us to determine whether the fierce campaign against the liberals, whose best representatives were then endeavouring to secure political and administrative reforms, was invariably discreet. It is true that at this particular epoch Lassalle and others were likewise attacking the liberals, but we must bear in mind the differences between the countries. It may be true that in Europe the question of constitutional government is already of small importance, but in Russia its importance is now only beginning. In Černyševskii and in Dobroljubov, we discern the *rasnočincy*; we see the democratic "children" rising in complaint against their aristocratic "fathers."

For the same reason, Černyševskii's condemnation of the bourgeoisie has a different ring from that of Herzen; the latter writes rather as an aristocrat, the former as a democrat.

The liberals, in their turn, strongly opposed the trend of the "*Sovremennik*." It will suffice to mention that Kavelin, who had defended Herzen against Čičerin, did not hesitate to suspect Černyševskii's adherents of arson when great conflagrations took place in St. Petersburg in 1862.

In the question of nationality, which was an incessant topic of controversy between the westernisers and the easternisers, Černyševskii's view was that national character is conditioned, not by race, but rather by the degree of economic development or of division of labour; but he had not made a detailed study of the question either psychologically or sociologically. To some extent he threw light upon the problem by his view of the influence which a working life or an idle life has upon men. He considered the fact that the aristocracy and the well-to-do invariably live without working was a more potent cause of organic differences than any

distinction of race. Classes or estates, he said, differ organically more than do nationalities. National differences within the limits of a race are similarly explicable.

§ 103.

IN the before-mentioned controversy Herzen prophesied that Černyševskii and his adherents would receive the order of St. Stanislaus, which showed that even such a man as Herzen could misjudge the radical mood and could misunderstand the critics of liberalism.

The condemnation and exile of Černyševskii have not yet been fully explained. It was known already in 1862 that the government had long been afraid of Černyševskii on account of his influence, and it was not surprising that the third section should seize any chance that offered for getting rid of the dreaded tribune by sending him to Siberia. But from the legal point of view the grounds brought forward for the condemnation were insufficient, and it is fairly certain that false witnesses were employed against Černyševskii.

We do not know whether the government had at its disposal any true reports from its secret agents, or whether these latter possessed genuine information concerning Černyševskii's personal participation in the revolutionary movement. Such details as are furnished by those associated with this movement and by Černyševskii's acquaintances are indecisive and conflicting. Persons best acquainted with the available material can get no further than suppositions. During the trial, Černyševskii denied all the accusations made against him, and it does not appear that either before or after his arrest he ever said a word regarding his share in the revolutionary movement. His biographers are compelled to base their hypotheses upon his letters and other writings, those of presiberian days and those composed in exile.

During July to September in the year 1861 there were published in St. Petersburg three numbers of the secretly printed periodical "Velikorus" (Great Russia). We now know that the proclamation *To the Younger Generation* which appeared in its columns was composed by Šelgunov, a collaborator on Černyševskii's review, and we are informed by Dostoevskii and others that it was not approved by Černyševskii. But the political program of "Velikorus" was in

harmony with Černyševskii's views, and there are traces of his hand or of his editorship in the literary style.

In the beginning of 1862 the secret society *Zemlja i Volja* (Land and Freedom) was organised, probably by members of the staff of "Velikorus'," which ceased to exist after the issue of its third number.

It seems indubitable that Černyševskii participated in the secret revolutionary organisation 'Velikorus', and also that he was a member of *Zemlja i Volja*. This much, at least, is certain, that he was part author of the proclamation to the peasants.

The catastrophe that befell Černyševskii, his participation in revolutionary propaganda, seem to conflict with the views to which he gave expression in his writings. We might recall what he said concerning the futility of sacrifice, but this would hardly be relevant. Černyševskii did not make any sacrifice but was coerced by the powers of reaction under Alexander II, and no one is secure against the tactics of absolutism. More weighty is the circumstance that prior to 1861, when he discussed the question of secret revolutionary activities, he declared that these were not wholly to his liking. In *Lessing and his Time*, a work published in 1856, he declared himself opposed to secret societies, saying that great and truly useful ends can be secured only by straightforward and open procedures. He went further, and expressed opposition to revolutions in general, or at any rate was very sceptical as to the practicability of their doing any good. He had no belief in the possibility of a revolution to be effected by the Russian peasants, for he was disinclined to idealise the *mužik*, and was under no illusions regarding the extent of the latter's enlightenment. We are told, however, that by 1861 and 1862 he had abandoned or modified his scepticism, having noted the unrest and activity among the peasantry, and having decided therefore, though sceptical, to take part in secret revolutionary work. The conclusion of *What is to be Done* may certainly be quoted in favour of the belief that its author looked forward to the speedy success of the revolution.

Reference is sometimes made to Černyševskii's Siberian novel *The Prologue*, which is considered to contain autobiographical confessions, and the following passage is quoted, "Wait, wait, as long as possible and as quietly as possible." Quoted, again, is the passage wherein Černyševskii criticises

the participation of the French democrats in the February revolution, and refers to their action as utterly stupid owing to the lack of preparation. But he also tells us in this connection that circumstances may arise compelling us willy nilly to take part in such stupidity; that the rule "everything at the proper time" is an excellent one, but that we cannot always tell when the proper moment has arrived. When Černyševskii makes fun of those who expect a "thunderstorm in a bog," he may well be ironically condemning his own participation in the revolution.

If I am not mistaken, Černyševskii's adherents are much concerned because he made a mistaken diagnosis of the situation in 1861. It is considered comprehensible enough that Bakunin should have expected a rising of the Russian peasantry, but it is felt that Černyševskii's realism should have induced a different judgment of the then existing state of affairs, and should therefore have led to the formulation of a different policy.

I believe that Černyševskii did in fact make a mistake. He made many similar errors of judgment. In 1858, for example, he acclaimed Alexander II, no less warmly than had Herzen, as liberator and saviour of Russia; but the circumstances of the liberation of the peasantry wrought a change of mood, as is proved by the *Unaddressed Letters* (1862). These were published abroad and were directed to the tsar. It would not be anything extraordinary had Černyševskii changed his views regarding revolution. Moreover, a man may take part in an undertaking when he is extremely dubious about its results. To believe that all sceptics are persons with no capacity for action, is pure superstition.

I am of opinion, then, that Černyševskii had formed a false estimate of men and of conditions. I believe, further, that in Siberia Černyševskii came to recognise his mistake, and that this explains the peculiar passivity he displayed in Siberia in contrast with the activity that was typical of the days prior to his exile.

The poet Korolenko has written some reminiscences of Černyševskii, and these confirm my supposition. Černyševskii points out that practically all the political criminals atoning for their offences in Siberia are raw youths, and he says that he is ashamed to find himself in their company. The feeling, he continues, is all the more powerful since he recognises the

futility of revolution. My impression is that Černyševskii's biographers are extremely concerned because Černyševskii, the Siberian exile, and the Černyševskii who returned to Russia, was no more (as the phrase runs) than the shadow of his former self. It has even been affirmed that in Siberia, Černyševskii became mentally disordered.

The impression produced on my own mind by the available data is that Černyševskii's mental health was perfectly sound both in exile and afterwards, but that he was none the less broken by Siberia. Černyševskii was a publicist and politician, a man whose intellectual faculties were kept alive by a daily pabulum of new material. When he was isolated and cut off from the outer world, he lacked energy to enable him to busy himself with theoretical questions or solve theoretical problems. As theorist and thinker, he was not so great a man as has been contended. Not merely did he adopt Feuerbach's views quite uncritically, not merely did he fail to see through the weaknesses of materialism, but when he discussed important questions of detail he failed to deal with them in the exhaustive manner demanded by his own doctrine of the supremacy of positive science. It seems to me characteristic that he attempted no scientific discussion of the problems of socialism; he lacked power for the independent treatment of economic questions, and was content with writing notes on Mill.

An examination of his literary activities in Siberia confirms this judgment. Let us recall how some of the decabrists worked in Siberia, how they continued to cultivate their minds. Černyševskii produced a few belletristic pieces, but displayed no inclination to undertake any difficult literary task. Černyševskii was no more than thirty-six when his exile began, and I contend that had he possessed a really vigorous interest in science, that interest would not have been annulled by the unfavourable conditions of Siberia.

After his return, Černyševskii translated the fat tomes of Weber's *Universal History*, adding a comment here and there. The choice of this book is in itself an indication of weakness in the intellectual sphere, but we must not forget that it was made after more than twenty years in prison and in Siberia.

From the very opening of his career, Černyševskii was a man of practice, a politician, a revolutionary. Above all he was a revolutionary man of letters; his incessant polemic

was revolutionary in tone. His introduction to the practical revolutionary movement was by way of literature.

My final judgment is that by his participation in the revolution Černyševskii furnished a stimulating example to the radical generation of his day. Upon many, doubtless, his arrest and exile exercised an inhibitive and sobering influence; but conversely, energetic men were by his fate rendered more hostile to absolutism, and the revolutionary movement was thereby strengthened and accelerated. It is futile to enquire whether Černyševskii, even in exile, might not have written more and better. He was a fighter, and fell in battle without a word of complaint, and perhaps without a thought of repentance.

In 1874 the government attempted to induce Černyševskii to sue for pardon, but he rejected the suggestion with manly pride, and in the most decisive terms.

§ 104.

I MUST now say a few words concerning Černyševskii in Siberia. Since his literary activities before the days of his exile endured for barely half the number of years that he spent in Siberia, it will be interesting to consider his thoughts and his writings during banishment. This has been rendered possible by a report published in 1910 by Rusanov (Kudrin), a specialist upon Russian socialism in general and Černyševskii's work in particular, dealing with the latter's Siberian correspondence. We still await the publication of the actual letters, and there is other material that has yet to see the light—Černyševskii's diary, and his letters written before he was sent to Siberia.

My own views concerning Černyševskii were formed from my knowledge of the writings of the earlier phase, and I had hardly expected that these views would be confirmed as fully as they have been confirmed by the information that has now become available concerning Černyševskii's philosophical and literary occupations in Siberia.¹

¹ The first draft for this study of Černyševskii was based upon the older editions of his works, those published in Europe; it was completed after my examination of the edition of Černyševskii's writings undertaken by his son in 1906. The belletristic works composed in Siberia and the writings of Černyševskii after his return from exile, must now be taken into consideration. On the whole, however, I have been guided in my estimate of the man by the work he did before he was sent to Siberia.

Rusanov refuses to accept the idea that the man who returned from Siberia was but the shadow of the former Černyševskii. He considers that the Siberian letters furnish proof that the exile retained energy and independence of thought, but his "titanic logical apparatus" often worked in the void because he had no opportunity for busying himself practically with living social problems; because the great electric cable (I am paraphrasing Rusanov) which had connected him with his readers and disciples, had been severed, and it had become impossible for him to react directly upon real phenomena as writer and practitioner.

I am in agreement with Rusanov in holding that Černyševskii did not lose his intellectual powers in Siberia, but I differ in my estimate of these powers. Doubtless there was lacking to him in Siberia living contact with his reading public; but just as he had done in the St. Petersburg prison, he might have concentrated his mind upon some definite theme; and perhaps he might have found Siberia a better point of vantage than St. Petersburg from which to observe the evolution of Russia and of Europe. No one would expect him to produce in Siberia encyclopædic works of reference well supplied with citations and similar details, but so much material was sent to him that he might have produced a few monographs. At least he might have translated some scientific book by one of the thinkers he so greatly esteemed. But in Siberia, Černyševskii lived only upon his memories, and it is questionable whether and to what extent his belletristic works were the artistic elaboration of these memories. As far as philosophy and politics were concerned, his Siberian letters and other writings offer nothing new, and nowise contribute to the amplification of the ideas and arguments he had earlier put forward. But as intimate utterances the letters furnish a valuable commentary upon his philosophy and upon his mental development.

To come to a brief account of the matters treated in the letters, I will begin with family affairs. I am astounded to find that he counsels his wife to remarry. Černyševskii's letters to his sons have an educational purpose; his judgments concerning many leading men are often little more than crude depreciations, whilst he represents himself as a leading thinker and author.

It is noteworthy that in Siberia he breaks and casts aside

many of his earlier ideals and idols: Malthus has become a "charlatan"; Proudhon is a "blockhead"; Hume, Kant, and Berkeley are "those fellows"; Comte is a pure nobody.

Opinions are also given concerning the authors whose works had been sent to him. For example, he censures Hellwald (author of the *History of Civilisation*) and Bagehot as blind followers of Darwin. Darwin, and above all the Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for existence, are utterly condemned by him. This struggle for existence, carried out by mankind and applied to human history, will simply mean a surrender to nationalism; but exclusively nationalist struggles are invariably injurious. Thus Černyševskii's judgment of Darwinism is primarily ethical.

In political matters it is interesting to note that Černyševskii favours the peaceful spread of culture, and rejects revolution in all its forms. It is evidently in connection with his view of the gradual nature of evolution that he extols Lyell and Lamarck (the latter as contrasted with Darwin). He says also that he is and always has been weary of continual invective against the bourgeoisie, and that he is becoming tired of works upon the village community.

What he has to say about excessive division of labour and other matters is a mere recapitulation of views previously expressed.

Černyševskii's most vigorous utterances in Siberia deal with his fundamental views upon philosophy. Energetically does he assert the opinion strange in a materialist that alike in the individual and in the species all human activity has a moral, not a material explanation. Especially does he reprove the historians for their lack of convictions, and he recommends the study of moralists and jurists to those who wish to secure accurate conceptions of history. He writes: "The criteria of historical phenomena in all times and among all nations are conscience and a sense of honour."

Reason and uprightness are "the true laws of human nature," with reference to which history must be explained; events are determined by the general moral character of the time. Černyševskii dissents from those who propose to explain events as the outcome of so-called general national conditions. History is the record of great events and great men, and therefore the older historiography, that of a Herodotus or Thucydides down to that of Macaulay and Grote, of a

Niebuhr or Sismondi, is preferable to the modern history of civilisation.

His historical speculations recall those of Buckle, whose works he eagerly studied while in Siberia. For example, he considers that the cradle of the human race must have been in the equatorial regions, and suggests that it is a masked patriotism which induces various historians to contend that the climate of the temperate zones was once milder than it is to-day. However, the later stages of human development are determined, not by nutritive conditions, but by the political organisation of society.

Černyševskii gives a detailed exposition of his egoistic ethics, going so far as to equate good-rational-useful with bad-irrational-injurious. Černyševskii conceives the moral criterion as an imperative no less than does Kant; he is indeed positively apriorist when he declares that this criterion has an identical and absolute applicability, not to the inhabitants of this planet alone, but to the reputed dwellers on other worlds than ours. (We may compare the reserve which led Mill to say that the law of causality must be assumed as applicable only within the domain of the known solar system !)

In metaphysics, Černyševskii continues to profess materialism, and is faithful to his old love for Spinoza and Feuerbach. He has no fault to find with Feuerbach, but points out that the German discussed only the religious aspect of philosophy.

He tells us that his views are Newtonist, that the law of gravitation is universally valid, forgetting that he is here following in Comte's footsteps. Concerning Comte we read that the French philosopher had nothing to offer beyond a misreading of Kant; there had never been any theological stage of knowledge; nor will Černyševskii admit that there was a metaphysical stage such as was conceived by Comte.

Most energetically does he repudiate the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, writing: "Melancholia is not science." His rationalism leads him to protest against scepticism. Pascal, he says, was the last of the honest sceptics; as a rule, scepticism is no more than a mask for obscurantism. Quite consistently, he expresses his disapproval of the positivist "ignorabimus."

Noteworthy is the admission that after the age of twenty-two he had read no works on natural science.

Finally I may mention that he takes much trouble to show that the popes and also the Jesuits were of no account and were practically powerless. The middle ages, he says, were far less religious than is generally believed, and this explains the weakness of the popes.

I can say no more here regarding Černyševskii's Siberian phase. Upon certain points I reserve my definitive judgment until I have had an opportunity for studying all the correspondence and other material at first hand. But this much seems certain to me, that in any special study of Černyševskii, we should have in the case likewise of his Siberian exile to examine the various utterances in relation to the time and circumstances in which they were made, for in Siberia, too, Černyševskii's development was continuing.

Rusanov concludes his report by asking whether Černyševskii's socialistic opinions underwent any notable change in Siberia. "Of course not!" is his answer, but it is not unlikely, he says, that Černyševskii's views may have changed regarding the possibility of speedily effecting any thorough transformation in Russia. In the belief that an energetic attack upon the government and the great landowners was practicable, Černyševskii had sacrificed himself to the historical process; later he may have come to believe that, as a preliminary, reformist endeavours must be favoured, to secure the general diffusion of sound ideas, and that the rest would follow in due course.¹

Rusanov is himself in agreement with Volgen in Černyševskii's Siberian novel *The Prologue*, when Volgen tells his young interlocutors that the participation of the French democrats in the affair of 1848 came within the category of stupidity.

¹ Rusanov, too, asks why Černyševskii had nothing to say about Capital, though the book was sent him. It was impossible, says Rusanov, for Černyševskii to write anything about socialism owing to the supervision to which he was subjected; besides, Marx's work was unlikely to please Černyševskii. Marx's explanation of history was largely based upon the workings of the blind force of instinct, and to Černyševskii, Marx would seem a mere Ricardian, and a poor Ricardian at that, writing in an unpopular style. Even if both these suppositions were accurate, none the less, since Černyševskii looked upon Ricardo as a primary authority, this new presentation of Ricardian views could hardly fail to interest him, especially seeing that he found time to write at length about such authors as Hellwald. Besides, the authorities would not have objected to a criticism of Marx—if unfavourable.

§ 105.

^vCERNYŠEVSKII'S true significance for the mental development of Russia, and above all for philosophy, is found in his materialism. Materialism has frequently proved revolutionary. This was manifest in the materialism that preceded and followed the French revolution; the statement is especially applicable to German materialism before and after 1848; Russian materialism at the same epoch, and still more in the sixties, had like significance. In Russia as elsewhere, materialism was an ultraradical negation of the theocratic view of the universe and of life; in Russia it was a philosophical revolution against the oppression of Nicholas and Alexander. This philosophical revolution was all the more energetic inasmuch as after the Crimean catastrophe, and still more, after the liberation of the peasantry, hopes of thoroughgoing reforms had been awakened.

The objection may perhaps be made that in his writings Černyševskii had but little to say concerning or against religion and the church. It may even be asserted that he assigned small importance to religion.

It is true that in his philosophy of history Černyševskii ignored religion and church. He considered, for example; that the Thirty Years' war was not a war of religion, that its aims were secular. Similarly the role he ascribed in history to the papacy was insignificant, whilst his polemic had little direct concern with theology and the church. Striking, too, was the way in which he adopted Feuerbach's metaphysical materialism without making any exhaustive use of the anti-theological side of the German philosopher's doctrine, the reduction of religion to anthropomorphism. We have learned, moreover, that when in Siberia he accused Feuerbach of being one-sided, on the ground that the German had treated only of the philosophy of religion.

None the less, Černyševskii's materialism and materialist anthropologism were directed against theology and theocracy. Objectively considered, the reaction in Russia was a theocratic reaction, and for this reason the stress laid upon metaphysical materialism involved a direct attack, not merely upon the state, but also and above all upon the church. We must not fail to take into account this energetic insistence upon materialism, and we have to remember that Černyševskii was not a

refugee, that he wrote under the eyes of the censor. It was impossible for him to express his opinions as freely as did Herzen and Bakunin, who emphasised Feuerbach's anthropomorphic explanation of religion.

Again, it was no longer necessary for Černyševskii to stress this explanation, since Herzen and Feuerbach had done it before him. For the very reason that Černyševskii had so warmly recommended Feuerbach's philosophy, Feuerbach was read in the original, and translations of his principal writings were freely disseminated (*The Essence of Christianity* in 1861, and *The Essence of Religion* in 1862). The influence of Feuerbach's works was reinforced by that of Renan's *Life of Jesus*, published in 1863.

Černyševskii's antitheological trend was manifest subjectively as well as objectively. I refer to the fact that, like Feuerbach, he had been trained for a theological career, and that materialism was a weapon for personal use against the views in which he had been brought up. At the university, before he had become acquainted with Feuerbach's works, he was still a believer, or at any rate he still accepted the conventional ethics of the church. Dobroljubov, too, had a theological training; like Černyševskii he belonged to a family of priests; to him, likewise, materialism and atheism were weapons for personal use against theology and the church. This is why both these writers make so much of materialism. This is why they are so insistent in their preaching of egoism and utilitarianism; this is why Černyševskii rejects the idea of sacrifice, herein directly conflicting with church doctrine. Černyševskii frequently inveighed against passivity and humility, which Herzen had so vigorously attacked as typical Christian virtues. Černyševskii, in fact, was fully aware of the import of his materialism.

It was impossible for him to say much that was openly directed against the church, but we can feel his hatred for religious and theocratic oppression. Černyševskii's nature differed widely from that of Bakunin, who always trumpeted his hatred from the housetops. Černyševskii was cooler, more reserved, more cautious, but not therefore less effective.

Special reference must here be made to one development of his teaching. Černyševskii came to stress philosophic ethics in proportion as he rejected ecclesiastical religion and the ethics of the church. Hume and Kant took the same course ;

so did all notable philosophers of modern days ; so, above all, did the socialists, for these considered ethics and religion to be the essential foundations of socialistic reform. This is the true light in which to regard Černyševskii's utilitarianism and the ethical groundwork he provided for socialism. He desired to replace Christianity by utilitarian morality, and this morality was to be carried out consistently in practical, political, and social life.

It amounts to little to say that Černyševskii's socialism was utopian. Černyševskii expounded his own views upon the so-called utopianism of socialism and of all the newer social aspirations. In his analysis of the reign of Louis Philippe he described Saint-Simonism and spoke of it as "utopian." The first manifestations of new social aspirations are invariably tinged with enthusiasm, so that they seem to belong rather to the field of poesy than to that of science. Černyševskii's view of utopianism resembled that taken by Marx. Černyševskii, like Marx, claimed that his own doctrines were scientific ; and he based his science, once more like Marx, upon positivism. But whereas Marx subsequently discarded ethics and inculcated a positivist amorality, Černyševskii did not abandon morality, desiring rather to give ethics a "serious scientific foundation," and believing himself to have discovered this foundation in utilitarianism. I will not dispute about words, but I consider Černyševskii's standpoint more correct, and I do not think it utopian to retain ethics. Questions of a different order, however, are the respective values of Černyševskii's and Marx's contributions to science, and the influence which the two men respectively exercised upon the development of socialism.

§ 106.

^v
ČERNYŠEVSKII'S influence in the late fifties and early sixties was extensive, and this is why the government swept him out of its path. His influence was political, and consequently his banishment had strong political effects.

Černyševskii's influence was exercised through his peculiar intellectual trend. His energies were especially devoted to the elaboration of realism. He endeavoured on the philosophical plane and with the aid of Feuerbach's anthropologism to provide a stable foundation for the positivist disillusionment

and sobriety demanded by Herzen. Such was the main trend, such was the method of Černyševskii alike in individual questions and in the configuration of his general outlook. *What is to be Done* was an artistic embodiment of this trend and this method.

Černyševskii continued the literary work of Bëlinskii. Whereas Herzen and Bakunin supplied the younger generation with revolutionary ardour, Černyševskii made that generation aware of the decisive importance of rationalist preeminence and reasonable conviction. In the section on Saint-Simonism in his analysis of the July monarchy, he demonstrated with true realistic calm how natural is the occurrence of political persecution, saying that as long as society retains its existing structure, innovators will have to suffer, innovators in science and art as well as innovators in politics. "This is inevitable while the present state of society continues." What must be, must be—Černyševskii accepted his own destiny with a dash of fatalism, accepted it as a logical development. This is plainly shown in many of his letters from Siberia and from Astrakhan. Černyševskii's adherents took science and its conclusions as the ultimate and highest authority. In the name of science, they held that the same logical sequence proved the necessity for revolution.

Černyševskii highly esteemed and never failed to recommend logical and scientific consistency and unity of outlook. He disliked eclecticism (see his polemic against Lavrov), and unquestionably this strengthened his hold on the younger generation, since he did not display the cataclysmic variations typical of Herzen and Bakunin.

Černyševskii did little to further the solution of philosophical and scientific problems. His influence was educative, and the importance of his work lay in its general trend and not in particular doctrines. It is true, as we learn in the letters from Siberia and Astrakhan, that Černyševskii's own view was that his authority in the scientific field was extensive. He believed that his contributions to science were to be of far-reaching significance, not merely in Russia and for Russia, for he imagined that in their French rendering they would influence European thought. In this matter he was mistaken.

I have previously pointed out that divergent views prevail in Russian literature concerning Černyševskii's importance and concerning the effect of his writings. His adherents

transfer his political influence to the domain of science, and his opponents do the same thing, the former over-estimating and the latter under-estimating the value of his contributions to science and philosophy.

In actual fact, Černyševskii was a brilliant publicist and literary critic, but as far as scientific work is concerned, his views on political economy had the effect for years of turning the younger radical generation away from the study of economics. His novel *What is to be Done* was and remained the most influential of all his writings.

In *What is to be Done* Černyševskii described the actual life of his "new men." He gave, it is true, a somewhat vague sketch of socialist plans for the future. Far more important and far more influential was his elaboration of the characters in the book, and especially of Rahmetov, the idealist, an exceptional man among the "new men," a "primal source of energy," upon whom Černyševskii makes extremely exalted claims. What the monk had been for the church, Rahmetov was to be for the new society, a man of iron will, one who on his own behalf and on behalf of those among whom his lot was cast accepted the dictates of reason as self-evident truths.

The revolutionaries of the sixties and seventies were affected more by Černyševskii's example than by his precepts. Černyševskii in Siberia was for them a living memento, and he was this not to them only, but also to the government and to the reactionaries—for these, as Bakunin aptly diagnosed, were privileged persons in point of political blindness. At any rate they failed to understand that, as Poerio, the Italian statesman persecuted by the king of the Two Sicilies, phrased it, "il patire è anche operare."

Černyševskii's realism paved the way for Marxism and social democracy, but those Marxists err who contend that Černyševskii was a Russian Marx or something approaching this.

Nor is it right to assert that Černyševskii was founder or father of the narodničestvo. Černyševskii took a more realistic view of the mužik and the mir than Bakunin and Herzen had taken, and this enabled him to strengthen the more political and practical trends of the narodničestvo; but he conceived the mir to be an association in the European socialist sense and did not, like the later narodniki, ascribe exclusive importance to that institution. Nor did Černyševskii, as did the

slavophiles, regard Europe as decadent. In his view the European masses (the middle classes) had not yet entered into full activity. It must not be forgotten that we are writing about the beginning of the sixties, and that at that time there did not as yet exist a sharp distinction between socialism and narodničestvo, for the conceptual differentia of the two doctrines had not then been fully elaborated.

II

§ 107.

SHORTLY after his first appearance on the scene, Pisarev was branded by numerous opponents as the enfant terrible of the Černyševskian trend. Even to-day, "the annihilation of aesthetics," if not ascribed to him as a crime, is at least charged to his literary account.

Pisarev, like Dobroljubov, was a critic, and he carried on the work of Dobroljubov, but died in the flower of his youth.¹ While still a schoolboy Pisarev had begun to write upon the burning questions of the day. His mind had been stirred by Černyševskii and Dobroljubov; Herzen, to a lesser extent Bakunin, and Feuerbach who was the spiritual father of them all, influenced him. He knew of Stirner's work, but I believe at second hand. (Pisarev occasionally admits that his knowledge even of Russian literature was second hand.) He preached radical individualism, understanding by this term the struggle for the emancipation of the individuality, a struggle which for him embodied the essential meaning of civilisation. ("Every living being is for himself the centre and the meaning of the universe. For the most insignificant subject, his personal joys, vexations, aspirations, and cares, are more important than universal revolutions which take place without his participation and exercise no influence upon the destiny of his individuality.") Pisarev believed that the securest foundation for his individualism, for individualist doctrine, was to be found in declared egoism, but at an early stage he was cautious enough to recommend a "rational egoism." To Pisarev it seemed self-evident that the healthy human under-

¹ Pisarev was born in 1840; his first lengthy essays were published in 1861; from 1862 to 1864 he was a political prisoner; in 1868 he was drowned while bathing.

standing would make the same recommendation to every man. To Pisarev "the healthy human understanding" was ever a leading authority.

Freely following Stirner and Feuerbach, Pisarev negates all principles, all ethical aims, the concept of duty, ideals in general. He laughs the idealists to scorn, and conversely he extols the realists. Plato, for example, was merely a general of philosophy, just as others are generals of infantry. What pleases oneself, this is real, this is the real, and all the rest is idle chatter.

The realist has no need of philosophy to guide him in the observance of a reasonable measure. Pisarev likewise condemns specialisation, and has a word to say in favour of dilettantism. He will have nothing to do with philosophic pedagogics or with maxims of education. Children are to be fed and protected, and to be provided with thought-material on which they can exercise their own thinking processes.

His occupation with literature led him to write criticisms, but these were never anything more than the recapitulation of the subjective impression which the piece of literature or the work of art had made upon the realist.

Pisarev, like Stirner, denies the existence of crime. Only by their subjective taste are such men as Turgenev's Bazarov restrained from murder and robbery. It is nothing but subjective taste which incites men of similar type to make scientific discoveries.

Pisarev had a special fondness for new and vigorous expressions. It delighted him to term Puškin and Lermontov rhyme-sters of consumptive girls and lieutenants. "That's the sort of thing they like, whereas pastry is more to my taste."

To a certain extent Pisarev may be compared with Nietzsche, with whom he has ideas in common. Waging a rude and relentless war against the traditional and against recognised authorities, it is his wish to "reanswer" ¹ the questions that have already been answered; in this struggle he demands from his contemporaries steadfastness and hardness; ² like Nietzsche he is an adversary of historicism; ³ and so on.

¹ *Pererēšit'*, literally, to rehear a lawsuit.

² The Russian *tverdot'* has this double signification.

³ Pisarev's personal biography may to some extent be compared with Nietzsche's. Pisarev, too, suffered from mental disorder, and twice attempted suicide whilst in a state of morbid mental excitement. But Pisarev got through the struggle early in his career.

The strong emphasis upon evolution and renovation led Pisarev, before Nietzsche, to the same conclusions. For the creation of the new, for the creation of the new men, the old must be relentlessly destroyed: "What can be struck down, must be struck down unceasingly; whatever resists the onslaught, is fit for existence; whatever flies to pieces, is fit for the rubbish heap. Hew your way vigorously, for you can do no harm." In Pisarev's view there are no great men. As a materialist, his outlook upon the historical evolutionary process is decisively determinist, and he explains great men as the sport of circumstance. He does not recognise that he has a false conception of determinism and of the historical process.

Pisarev approves Turgenev's Bazarov, and would make Bazarov his model. In his essay on Bazarov, he compares with that character Pečorin and Rudin, Bazarov's predecessors in the imaginary world of literature, and comes to the following conclusion. In its views upon good and evil the older generation was merely giving itself unnecessary torment to find nothing and do nothing in the end. Rudin had knowledge without will; Pečorin had will without knowledge; Bazarov has both will and knowledge, he knows his weaknesses but knows also his strength, he understands the situation in which he is placed and adapts himself to it practically. His condition is "one of calm despair, which culminates in absolute indifferentism, but leads to a personal development which is the extremity of steadfastness and independence. Since men cannot act, they begin to think and to investigate. Since they find it impossible to transform life, their anger at their own impotence makes itself felt in the sphere of thought, where the destructive work of criticism proceeds unceasingly. Superstitious ideas and authorities are shivered to a thousand fragments, and the outlook becomes absolutely freed from every variety of spookish concept."

Such is Pisarev's psychological description of the realistic process of disillusionment, and his terminology, with the reference to spooks, recalls Feuerbach and Stirner.

It is not difficult to understand why Pisarev should have thus inclined to make too much of realism in his struggle against absolutism. A young fellow of twenty-two, who had been forced for mere nothings to spend nearly five years of his life in a fortress prison, could hardly be expected to write

without exaggeration. We must not in Pisarev's work mistake the envelope of style for the contents. I do not take the manifest exaggerations too seriously. Mihailovskii is doubtless right when he says that Pisarev's onslaught upon Puškin was a piece of vandalism; but the talk about the "annihilation of aesthetics" and similar extravagances indicate no more than that Pisarev was a literary protagonist at war with the abnormal political and social conditions of Russia in the epoch of the enfranchisement of the serfs. (Pisarev wrote from 1859 to 1868.) Such sayings as that a cigar is the realist's only happiness, that without which the realist (the "thoughtful realist"!) cannot think properly, and similar utterances, are in truth childish; but the saying is expressive of the mentality of a considerable proportion of young Russia, for Pisarev and his subjective outpourings were taken very seriously by the young.

Pisarev was even less concerned than Černyševskii to consider the philosophical foundations of his outlook and to excogitate the problems of principle. Just as Černyševskii adhered to Feuerbach or to Mill, so did Pisarev seek his teachers and authorities, expound their doctrines, popularise and disseminate them. Authoritatively he conducted the campaign against authority. There was no critical, epistemological reflection, or at least there was no determination of a course; his criticism did not deal with fundamentals but only with isolated doctrines and their consequences.

With him, as with his predecessors, the authority against which, on principle, he was campaigning was that of the theocracy, the state, and the church. Hence on the negative side he advocated atheism, and on the positive side positivism and materialism. From the first, no attempt was made to effect an epistemological and metaphysical settlement between positivism and materialism. The sources of his positivism were various, for he drew from Comte, Mill, and Buckle, as well as from Feuerbach. To Comte he was especially indebted, and he knew also the work of Taine.

Pisarev's materialism was derived from Feuerbach, but also from Vogt, Büchner, and Moleschott, whose views Pisarev popularised. He deliberately took his stand against the Hegelians, resolving the dialectical historical process into the physiological vital process, taking materialist sensualism as his starting point. Hence his preference for the natural

sciences and for naturalism in general; hence his positivist esteem for scientific sobriety as contrasted with imaginings, illusions, and the like. "Facts," is one of his favourite words, as it is a favourite word with the realists in general. "Dreams and illusions pass; facts remain." Pisarev fights superstition. Were it not for the censorship, he would tell us plainly that he fights orthodoxy. Not merely orthodox theology but also the official philosophy and science of his day, are rejected by him as "scholastics," and in connection with these statements it is only just to recall the disastrous condition of the Russian universities. Pisarev, Černyševskii, and most of the oppositional writers, though they had a university training, were in literary and scientific matters self-made men.

But Pisarev is quite uncritical in the formulation of his leading concepts. Consider, for instance, his use of the term "utilitarianism." The significance is nowhere precisely explained, not even when Pisarev expressly wishes to make us understand what use, real use, is. He does not get beyond a rough statement based on the work of Bentham, Mill, and the accepted authorities of hedonism. The furthest he goes is to tell us that the idea of utility must not be taken "in a narrow sense." There is a marked difference between Mill's teaching and Bentham's; Mill does not recognise every desire as useful, but distinguishes between qualities of desire; these shades do not, however, disturb Pisarev, who is satisfied with the "healthy materialist human understanding."

Similarly as regards "materialism." Nowhere is this concept distinguished from that of positivism, though here Pisarev errs in the company of European philosophers, as for instance in that of Taine, who was an authority to Pisarev and many others. But further, Pisarev does not test his foundations. He does not distinguish the epistemological from the metaphysical or the religious. Thus, at one time when he talks of materialism he will mean sensualism ("the philosophy of the obvious"); at another time consciousness will be materialistically explained; and so on. It was natural that Jurkevič's protest against materialism should make no impression on Pisarev.

The concept of "positivism" is likewise left undefined. Pisarev, though a positivist, recommends dilettantism and rejects specialisation.

§ 108.

PISAREV'S philosophic impressionism is, of course, quite inconsistent; he contradicts himself frequently and in almost all points; his rapid development is effected catastrophically and by leaps. The "Prometheus" of to-day was yesterday still a "sheep"; yesterday's darling has to-day become a *bête noire*. Thus did he treat Puškin and many others.

Nevertheless we discern that Pisarev became calmer as he grew older, and it may also be said that he became clearer. Many critics suggest that his prison experiences and the diligent reading of many books had a favourable effect upon his mind. Pisarev himself ascribed his green extemporisations (I speak *à la* Pisarev) to the liberating influence of Heine.

I cannot in this brief sketch give a detailed account of Pisarev's mental development, but I must refer to his later study of Turgenev's Bazarov, which is the best criticism of the Pisarev of the first epoch, the Pisarev I have just been characterising; it has moreover literary importance, for Pisarev's name has a peculiarly intimate association with the literary disputes concerning Turgenev's *Fathers and Children* and concerning nihilism. A consideration of his febrile activity in this matter will furnish an excellent opportunity for a philosophic study of the nature and significance of nihilism.

Turgenev's novel *Fathers and Children* appeared during 1862 in Katkov's review. In the figure of Bazarov, the young doctor, we have an analysis of realistic youth, its outlook on the world, and its aspirations, and realism is given the designation of nihilism. The type, though not the term was new in Russian literature.

An analysis of the Bazarov type, in so far as Turgenev himself provides it, will follow later. At present we are only concerned with grasping the essence of realism as nihilism in the sense wherein the realists of that day, the realistic critics, became clearly aware of their own principles through the study of Bazarov. For decades Bazarov and nihilism remained a general theme of literary, philosophic, and political discussion.¹

¹ Turgenev had already begun to deal with the problem in Dmitri Rudin. Rudin, whose character was conceived at the beginning of the liberal era of Alexander II (1855), was Onegin advancing to become a nihilist; Bakunin was the model for Rudin. But not until he came to write *Fathers and Children* did Turgenev provide in the figure of Bazarov a completed portrait of the nihilism of his day, whilst in *Smoke* (1867), and *Virgin Soil* (1877), he described

In March, Pisarev wrote his article *Bazarov*, accepting the type in the name of young Russia. Shortly afterwards, in the May issue of "Sovremennik," appeared Antonovič's criticism of the novel, wherein Bazarov was described as a worthless and vulgar fellow, who even in extremis desires to procure sensual pleasure and recuperation from the sight of Odincova. Antonovič regards Bazarov as an insult to realistic young Russia, as a caricature which has no correspondence with reality, as a caricature of something that does not exist. Antonovič therefore compared Turgenev with the notorious writer Askočenskii, author of *The Modern Asmodeus*; this distinctive and condemnatory title was borrowed by Antonovič for his essay.¹

the further development of nihilism and recorded his own personal experiences. I have previously pointed out that Černyševskii's *What is to be Done* (1863) had an even more powerful influence upon youthful radicals than had Turgenev's *Fathers and Children*, Černyševskii in particular pointing out the path which radical youth was to follow. All the great writers of that epoch, Gončarov, Dostoevskii, and Tolstoi, discussed the problem of nihilism. Dostoevskii, above all, dealt with it in his books and in numerous articles, returning to it again and again, and probing it to the depths.

In a sense, the entire Russian literature of these decades might be referred to in this connection. Saltykov (Ščedrin), Nekrasov, and Ostrovskii, also contributed to the analysis of the new trend. In addition to these men who are generally recognised as great writers, during the sixties and seventies many talented authors were busied with the problem of nihilism, of whom I may mention the following: Pisemskii (*The Unruly Sea*, 1863) and Lěskov (*Nowhither*, 1864). To the same category belong a number of books which were widely read at that time by progressively minded persons, such as Pomjailovskii's *Molotov* (1861) and Philistine *Happiness* (1861), Slěpcov's *Difficult Times* (1865), Fedorov's (*Omulevskii's*) *Step by Step* (1870, published in 1871 under the title *Světlov*), and the novels of Šellers-Mihailov, *Fetid Swamps* (1864) and many subsequent works. A novel by Sonja Kovalevskaja, the woman writer and mathematician, published posthumously in 1891, must also be mentioned; it was entitled *The Voroncov Family*; a German translation appeared in 1896 as *Die Nihilistin*. I may also refer to Andrei Kožuhov (1889), a novel written by the terrorist Stepniak (Kravčinskii), the man who killed Mezenecov, chief of the secret police. Most of the writers mentioned above were opponents of nihilism. The attacks of these philosophical adversaries were reinforced from the conservative and reactionary side by semi-official polemic and propaganda directed against nihilism. The following antinihilist novels were of this character. Kljušnikov's *Mirage* (1864—this work was fiercely attacked by Pisarev); Krestovskii, *The Sheep of Panurge* (1869), *Two Forces* (1874); Markevič, *Twenty-Five Years Ago* (1878), *The Revolution* (1880), *The Bottomless Abyss* (1883—unfinished); Avsěenko's *Gnashing of Teeth*, *The Evil Spirit*, etc. This type of literature was sedulously cultivated; the famous Prince Meščerskii wrote, *I Want to be a Russian Woman*, etc.; Ustrjalov introduced nihilism upon the stage in *Word and Deed* (1863).

¹ Askočenskii (1813-1879), as professor of patrology, a liberal who had abandoned theology (1846), was the official defender of obscurantism. From

Pisarev and his literary associates (Zaicev, and others) took the field against Antonovič. Whilst in prison in 1864 Pisarev wrote a more detailed essay on Bazarov. This was entitled *The Realists*, and even its dedication was intended to blunt the weapons of opponents; it was inscribed, "To my best Friend, my Mother."

At the very time when the dispute about Bazarov was flaming high, Černyševskii's novel was published, and the more radical among the realists were not slow to perceive that the characters of *What is to be Done* represented the true type. Above all, the figure of Rahmetov became the ideal of the nihilists. From Rahmetov, Pisarev, likewise, borrowed a few lineaments, but to him Turgenev's conception was (characteristically enough) more congenial than Černyševskii's, though Pisarev admits that Černyševskii had a profounder insight than Turgenev into Russian life.

Pisarev began his analysis of realism (he did not use the word nihilism) by explaining that it was the first independent manifestation of Russian thought. All previous trends had been foreign mental products which our good forefathers borrowed from abroad, simply because they were then the fashion abroad. Martinism, Byronism, Hegelianism, and all the other "isms" were to relieve the terrible tedium which then prevailed. After the Crimean war, there had been a rapid development of accusatory literature, but it was feeble and inefficacious and had brought about no notable changes; the various panaceas that had been recommended had failed to work a cure.

The Russians were faced by two great facts; they were poor and they were stupid—poor because they were stupid, and stupid because they were poor. This was not to say that the Russian was an idiot, but the strength of his brain was not displayed in the field of action. A way out of this charmed circle must be discovered. First of all it was the duty of the government to enact laws which would put an end to poverty by arranging that the products which now passed from the hands of the producers (the workers) into the hands of non-producers should remain in the hands of the former. A practical influence must also be exercised upon the non-

1858 onwards he published *Domašnaja Becėda* (The Family Journal), the instrument for his campaign against the progressive movement. The novel mentioned in the text was published in 1858.

workers not by beating the big moral drum, but by the diffusion of live ideas, so that the Russian brain might at length set to work.

This latter task must be initiated with extreme caution. The work must be rightly chosen and rightly assigned; it must be of such a nature that it will be of real use to society. Pisarev considered that a guarantee for the correct solution of the problem was found in this, that his contemporaries were at length beginning to realise the necessity of employing their intellectual powers. "The economics of mental forces consists wholly in strict and consistent realism."

From the standpoint of ethical utilitarianism, in the sense of a reasonable and deliberate hedonism, Pisarev approves Bazarov, and expounds Turgenev's novel in order to refute the objections levelled against Bazarov.

Social or general advantage is to be found in universal human solidarity; with hand and head the realist must work to establish this solidarity on a firm foundation. "The realist is the thoughtful worker, the man who loves his work." (Turgenev's Bazarov looks upon nature as a workshop!) The realist is a practical thinker and a practical worker, he will therefore take due care concerning the way in which he is to work for the community in accordance with the principle of solidarity, and how under the conditions that are quite peculiar to Russia he is to work for Russia whilst simultaneously working for the wider world community. All work, all practice, is based upon knowledge; Russia needs knowledge, needs science. Pisarev distinguishes the natural sciences, those in which research for the new is undertaken, from such sciences as history and economics (he is thinking here not of Černyševskii but of Kirěvskii!) which confine themselves to a calm analysis of human social relationships. To Pisarev, science is merely the energy which is competent "independently of historical events," to awaken public opinion and to educate the thoughtful leaders of the national work. This liberating science takes for Pisarev the form of natural science, and he rejects history ("Macaulayism"). He therefore demands of the literary critics that they shall become students of natural science. He is dissatisfied with Bělinskii, whose thought was too much confined to the aesthetic field, and who ought to have studied natural science. Lermontov's Pečorin, the type of an earlier

generation, was intelligent enough to escape from Macaulayism, but his chosen expedient, Don Juanism, is impossible in a society which lives, or is beginning to live, a full life.

Pisarev proves his thesis on Germany, on the very land decried for its philistinism, and adduces a whole catalogue of investigators of natural science whose example Russia would do well to follow—Liebig, Virchow, etc., etc.

The reader recalls how Bazarov in *Fathers and Children* undertakes physiological observations upon frogs, and recommends such observations to others. Pisarev pounces upon the motif, and for all his stylistic extravagance, he is essentially in earnest when he writes: "There you have it, in the frog you will find the rescue and the renewal of the Russian people."

In brief, says Pisarev, "matters must be thought to a finish . . . we must be honest with ourselves." The realist must be straightforward and truthful to himself, to all his fellows, and above all to women; he must enter into no relationships that are other than straightforward and truthful. The realist must put before himself a rational aim, and must not fail to attain it. But this rational aim will become clear to him alone who has been scientifically trained, and the ultimate essential therefore is to diffuse and to popularise science in Russia. The essay concludes with suggestions as to the right method of popularisation, and sums up the nature of realism in the dictum: "Love, Knowledge, and Work."

Is this all? Was it merely for this that Pisarev was denounced as a robber and an assassin? We have to remember that in the early sixties this negation of Russia seemed an extremely revolutionary doctrine. Besides, who was the new authority who permitted himself such a liberty? He was a man four-and-twenty years of age, an aristocrat, indeed, belonging to a wealthy family, but apart from this a man of no account, an arrogant upstart without even a university degree to his credit. His adversaries, on the other hand, could truthfully say that he had spent several months in a lunatic asylum, whilst the conservatives could point to the fact that he was under lock and key in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. But it was precisely this last consideration which commended Pisarev to his young contemporaries, and commends him to our own. This is why his words have been so eagerly read, and this is why people have been willing to

pay as much as fifty roubles for a collection of his writings—though cheaper editions are now available.

Pisarev jettisoned all the literary and critical works of his predecessors, not even excepting the writings of Bělinskii, Černyševskii, and Dobroljubov. Čadaev had at least retained approval for Peter, but Pisarev included in his iconoclasm Čadaev and all men of letters, together with the amiable Granovskii, whose writings and lectures were nothing but "futile Macaulayism." It is not surprising that even some of the radicals shared Antonovič's alarm; and as for the liberals, they were, on principle, opponents of Pisarev and his whole trend. Čadaev had attacked theology and orthodoxy, and was therefore congenial to the liberals, but Pisarev renounced the liberal adversaries of theology and orthodoxy. He continually returned to the attack upon liberalism. He regarded a liberal as a pygmy, as a dwarf, or as a cow trying to gallop like a cavalry horse.¹

At that time Saltykov agreed with Antonovič, and it was all the more natural that Katkov, the conservatives, and the reactionaries, should share Antonovič's views.

As a matter of course, the slavophiles were opposed to Pisarev and the realists, were opposed to the man who had the audacity to speak of Ivan Kirěevskii as a Don Quixote. The počvenniki, too, were strongly adverse to Pisarev and to nihilism; it was in the počvennik circle that Dostoevskii began his life work against nihilism. Nor was it likely that the narodniki and the socialists would be pleased by Pisarev's views upon economics and history.

Herzen, though he had himself interpreted Bazarov and nihilism in a Byronic sense, was opposed to Pisarev and to the nihilism of the sixties. There remained, therefore, to support Pisarev none but the most radical among the radicals:

Antonovič's essay split the radical camp.

§ 109.

JUST as Herzen endeavoured to harmonise his proud and contemptuous individualism with socialism and with love

¹ The following are mentioned by Pisarev among his liberal opponents: Gromeka (wrote a polemic against Herzen in 1862, and in the same year condemned Černyševskii and his teaching); Dudyškin, the real editor of *Otčestvennyja Zapiski*; Zarin (the translator of Byron's plays), who in the same periodical attacked Černyševskii, Dobroljubov, and Pisarev.

for Russia, so also did Pisarev advance from individualism and egoism to socialism. The question of "the hungry and the insufficiently clad" became to him the question of questions. Beside this, he exclaimed in 1865, there is nothing worth thinking or troubling about. Science and culture were the means by which the problem was to be solved and by which the goal was to be attained—not science as an amusement for wealthy and idle aristocrats and landowners, but the science that is the daily bread of every healthy human being and must therefore permeate the intelligence of manual workers, factory operatives, and peasants. Until this happened, the toiling masses would continue to languish in poverty and immorality.

In addition to these prescriptions, which remind us of Lassalle, of his utterances concerning science and its relationship to the workers, physical toil is recommended to members of the cultured class, for this alone "renders possible a genuine drawing near to the people." From this outlook a complete scheme was drafted for the reform of instruction and education, Comte's positivism being here combined with the experiences of Tolstoi as recorded in his works upon his childhood and youth.

Although Pisarev transformed the "thoughtful realist" into the "thoughtful proletarian," he did not advance beyond these plans for reform.

He felt assured that his socialism was only for the cultured. None but the most intelligent among the workers could respond to his demand that they should labour with love. For the time being, therefore, the manual workers were outside the domain of realism; were no realists, although theirs was the most real of all work. The manual workers could not as yet love labour; they were mere machines, though machines susceptible to fatigue. Consequently the realist must for the nonce leave the workers alone. Pisarev desired merely to train realistic leaders for the workers; the cultivation of the masses would be a subsequent task; meanwhile the realists were to turn to the peasants. Pisarev gave little or no thought to the factory hands, to the urban proletariat.

Pisarev's socialism may well be compared with that of Plato. Plato, too, demanded communism for the two higher classes alone, not for the peasants and operatives; the leaders of communist society were to govern the workpeople. Similarly

Pisarev insisted upon realism for the intellectual workers, and these were to lead the manual workers, who could not as yet become realists.

The destiny of the folk, said Pisarev, will be fulfilled in the universities, not in the elementary schools.

Pisarev appeals exclusively to the middle class. Only the middle class, he said as early as 1861, really lives and moves ; to the middle class belongs almost everybody capable of writing, reading, thinking, and developing. Though himself of aristocratic birth, Pisarev renounced the higher aristocracy as stagnant, but the people was likewise stagnant. It is true that when Pisarev referred to the middle class, he was thinking of those members of it who would accept his radicalism ; to the ordinary bourgeois Pisarev was no less hostile than Herzen, whose socialistic program of brain equality was thus reproduced by Pisarev.

In his account of the realists, Pisarev dealt with the problem of objectivism and subjectivism, and illustrated it by a reference to Goethe. Goethe had had his ego, his subjective fiction, namely, the establishment of a unitary organism, which he ranked higher than the actual drama of social life. Goethe had considered the world of individual experience not as a refuge but as a temple, the most beautiful and the holiest in the world. " To enable him to see in himself a temple of light and in the environing life a squalid market place, to enable him thus to forget the natural solidarity between his own ego and the surrounding stupidities and sorrows of other men, he found it necessary to corrupt his critical understanding systematically, and to lull it to sleep with the beauty of exquisite phrases. Petty thoughts and petty feelings must be transformed into the pearls of creation. Goethe performed this work of art, and down to the present day similar works have been regarded as the greatest achievements of art ; such hocus pocus takes place, however, not in the sphere of art alone, but likewise in all the other spheres of human activity."

Pisarev thus opposes extreme subjectivism and individualism in the name of social solidarity. He continues to strive for the independence of the ego, to strive like a titan, for these are the " titanic ideas " of which he speaks ; but he considers ludicrous the Goethe auto-apotheosis in *Faust*. To express the matter in materialistic terminology, no single

organism possesses the value of the massed organisms that constitute society.

In his first essay upon Bazarov, Pisarev found it the especial merit of Bazarov that he had refused to recognise any regulator, any moral law, any principle, whether above, external to, or within himself; but two years later, Pisarev's Bazarov has come to recognise a regulator and a moral law. We read that life must be built up upon an idea, and this idea is the general solidarity of mankind. Within a brief space, the realist à la Stirner has been transformed into the thoughtful realist.

At first he had endeavoured subjectivistically and egoistically to justify crime, but later, when he became a "thoughtful realist," he condemned bloodshed of any kind (see his account of Dostoevskii's *Crime and Punishment*, 1867-1868).

Pisarev's dissatisfaction with radical individualism toward the close of his career is further proved by the information recently made public that he desired to popularise the first volume of *Capital* (1867), for he had been charmed by the Marxist theory. But we must not forget that Pisarev's conception of socialism differed from that of Marx. In 1864 he had assigned to the individual a secondary role in the social and historical process, but in 1865 he exclaimed, "I, too, am a phenomenon."

Strong expressions are used in the essay entitled *The Annihilation of Aesthetics*, which appeared in 1865. Every man of artistic sensibilities must find it disagreeable to read that Dussiaux, a celebrated St. Petersburg chef, was worth just as much as Raphael; but when we go on to read that Pisarev would himself rather be a Russian cobbler or baker than a Russian Raphael or Grimm, it is not difficult to understand that this is the author's way of telling us that practical economic work is the greatest need of contemporary Russia. Doubtless Pisarev erred in looking upon Puškin's *Onëgin* as an apotheosis of the status quo, and in considering Puškin himself a colossal rudiment. Moreover, it was thoroughly unrealistic to dictate to Saltykov and Dobroljubov whether they should write verses or study natural science. All this was distorted and overstrained, but it did not signify that Pisarev rejected art in good earnest. In fact, he approved none but the genuine poets, the thought champions sans peur et sans reproche, the "knights of the spirit." The pygmies

and the parasites had no claim to indulgence. As yet, he contended, Russia had no such poets. Griboedov, Krylov, Puškin, and Gogol, did not suffice him; whilst Russia could boast a Fet as against Shakespeare, Dante, Byron, Goethe, and Heine! Pisarev admired Dickens, Thackeray, George Sand, and Victor Hugo, who had awakened men from their slumbers and had done practical work. He could even admire metaphysicians like Pierre Leroux, for Leroux, despite his impossible doctrine of metempsychosis, had supported mankind in the great struggle, just as had Proudhon and others.

Nor must we forget that Tolstoi displayed similar feelings towards art, towards his own art. Many parallel thoughts can be discovered in the writings of Pisarev and Tolstoi. Students of aesthetics have become accustomed in the case of Tolstoi to his repudiation of art and to his realistic definition of art as absolute truth; but just as Tolstoi continually returned to art, so likewise did Pisarev no less than Dobroľubov and Černyševskii again and again immerse himself in works of art. This is what counts, not the "annihilation of aesthetics," not the campaign against Puškin, Schiller, etc. Besides, aesthetics is one thing, art another!

In studying Pisarev, we must always take into account this writer's tendency to polemic overstatement. In the very essay of 1862 in which he coquetted with the idea of crime, the essay on Bazarov, we read the following involuntary confessions of the Bazarovian realist: "In the depths of his soul he approves much which in words he denies, and perchance it is this, this element that he hides, which preserves him from moral decay and moral nullity." Moreover, as we have seen, the essay of 1862 concludes, like Herzen's similar writing, with love. We are told by Pisarev's biographers that he was very strictly brought up by his mother, and that while at the university he continued to be guided by the teachings of his youth. The dedication of *The Realists* confirms this statement, and shows us in Pisarev the very dualism of theory and practice which, as a theorist, he attacks.

The "titanic ideas" announced by Pisarev were not notably distinguished for incisiveness, momentum, or originality; the main secrets of Pisarev's influence were the fire of his enthusiasm, and his relentlessness. The hum of battle sounded in his essays; their aggressive negation, their revolutionary mood, won the heart of

youth. The power of Pisarev's writings was enhanced because the government imprisoned the raw student for a proclamation in which he had defended Herzen against the reactionary minions of authority. The most widely influential of Pisarev's essays were written in prison.

Pisarev did not exercise an illuminating influence upon literature and philosophy, and still less can it be said that his work was creative, but among all the radicals of his day¹ his was certainly the most philosophical intelligence.¹

Pisarev, like Černyševskii, was essentially a philosopher of the enlightenment. The "thoughtful realist" aims at a "rational comprehension" of the world. He strives to secure a precise and scientific conception of the universe. With Buckle, he sees human progress, and anticipates its continuance solely through the diffusion and strengthening of the reasoning powers, through culture. Pisarev knows of only one evil thing in humanity, ignorance; and he has but one remedy to

¹ During the sixties and seventies there were a number of other authors and journalists besides Pisarev to represent the realistic trend; their names are but little known to-day, and their works lie buried in the various reviews that have been named above. Antonovič acquired a reputation from 1859 onwards as a critic, contributing to the *Sovremennik*; after Černyševskii's arrest he became editor of that periodical; subsequently he achieved notable successes in his speciality, geology. Selgunov worked unremittingly from 1859 to his death in 1881. Noteworthy were his studies upon the English proletariat, based upon the work of Engels, and published in the *Sovremennik*; and many other articles. There has been a collected edition of his works. Zaicev was, with Pisarev, a leading collaborator on the *Russkoe Slovo*. In materialistic fashion, Zaicev declared that artistic work was a manifestation of stimulated sensuality, of spinal irritation; he was an eager adversary of liberalism and aristocracy. His literary criticisms were far more radical than those of Pisarev. For example, Lermontov's hero was denominated "a disillusioned idiot"; manual workers were stated to be far more useful than poets. Despite his radicalism, Zaicev favoured negro slavery, and therefore attacked Harriet Beecher Stowe. If the Irish would eat peas instead of potatoes they would become more cultured, wealthier, and freer—and so on. When the *Russkoe Slovo* was suppressed, Zaicev took refuge abroad, and in 1880 wrote, concerning the Utility of Tsaricide. Blagosvĕtlov was of note at this period. From 1860 onwards he was editor of the *Russkoe Slovo* and had considerable influence upon Pisarev's development. Tkačev, an associate of Blagosvĕtlov, will be considered in § 111, vi. Among men of a still younger generation, Protopopov, the critic, who came to the front in 1877, has been regarded as a successor of Černyševskii, Dobroljubov, and Pisarev, although he wrote some sharp things about Pisarev. Subsequently he was under narodnik influence; and finally he became a mystic. The positivist Skabičevskii, who died quite recently, deserves mention as critic and historian of literature; he formulated his critical credo in the polemic against Pisarev's exaggerations, but continued down to our own day to represent the realistic trend. Skabičevskii, however, though a realist, was a bourgeois realist.

recommend, knowledge. Brehm's *Animal Life* delights him, for he finds it an embodiment of genuine, real, realistic science.

In his struggle for enlightenment, the impassioned philosopher, a man of nervous temperament, becomes an ultra-rationalist. "Reason is worth more than all the rest; or, to put the matter more precisely, reason is everything." The Russian "annihilator of aesthetics" has in him an element of enlightened absolutism, a spice of Josephan utilitarianism.

Pisarev, therefore, rejects theory; or rather, and this is the true formula of realism, he demands the personal verification of theory by practice. Word and deed, as Dobroljubov says, are to be one. Pisarev repeats this.

III

§ 110.

THE designation "nihilism" was not new in Russia. As far back as the thirties, Nadeždin, in his campaign against romanticism, had given the name of nihilist to those who in literature and art would recognise no leading principles. In 1858 Dobroljubov made fun of the reactionaries who stigmatised young men and their justified scepticism as nihilistic. At this date the nihilist onslaught began to become active, and Turgenev, in his novel, did not merely present a new type but gave it its name.

Let us now attempt to analyse the concept nihilism, to display its leading content.

i. The concept of realism was first formulated in the domain of literature and art. This is readily comprehensible when we consider the importance of literature under the oppressive regime of absolutism. From the days of Bělinskii onwards literary criticism became an endeavour to present the essence of realism as contrasted with romanticism. In this sense, Bělinskii accepted for Gogol's work the name given it by opponents, who had said that this work belonged to the "natural" school. Defending such naturalism, Bělinskii presented romanticism and realism as generalised outlooks, as philosophies. Naturalness, simplicity, truth, now became the watchwords of the realist aestheticians; and folk-songs were held up to the poets as models. The advocates of this trend did not demand any slavish imitation of nature, did not

demand merely photographic reproduction, but they insisted that the artist, too, should cultivate the sense of exactitude and precision which modern science was developing and maturing. They clung firmly to objectivism as contrasted with the subjectivism of the romanticists.

Černyševskii and his successors (Dobroljubov and Pisarev) conceived realism in the sense of philosophic positivism, conceived it as naturalism. Seeing that Russian social and political conditions made even of literature an instrument of "accusation," it is not surprising that the literary critics, the aestheticians, should approve these accusations. The question was now mooted whether the ugly, no less than the beautiful, could properly be the object of art. To the realists, who answered this question in the affirmative, Gogol seemed preferable to Puškin, although Puškin, and our classical writers in general, had paved the way for realism. After the days of Černyševskii and Dobroljubov, French realism began to make headway in the form of naturalism. Zola, in especial, came to the front in the middle sixties; a decade later (1875-80), through the instrumentality of Turgenev, he expounded his theory (which was likewise directed against romanticism and sentimentalism) in the periodical "Věstnik Evropy." But many authors and critics failed to keep within reasonable bounds; exaggeration prevailed in art as well as in criticism; hence resulted the nihilistic "annihilation of aesthetics."

ii. Philosophically, realism is positivism. Comte taught the realists to regard mathematics and its exactitude as the scientific ideal, and thus whereas the romanticists had extolled the nature philosophy, the realists proclaimed that mathematics and those natural sciences in which mathematics were employed were the genuine and proper knowledge. The mental sciences were condemned, or the attempt was made to transform them into natural sciences. Psychology, in especial, became physiology and biology. Positivism was conceived by the realists in a materialist and sensualist sense. As a rule, stress was laid upon positivist method.

Pisarev, in the presentation of his views, sometimes followed Comte's definition, although he failed to conceive it with precision. He said, for example, that the realist desired to establish scientifically nothing more than the relations of phenomena, not general results. But this term "general results" is extremely vague, and does not belong to the true

positivism of Comte. Pisarev, like so many others, is in truth an empiricist, and he himself frequently speaks of the realists as empiricists. This interchange of empiricism with sensualism and materialism is a stereotyped phenomenon in the history of thought. In like manner, the idealisation of the natural sciences, of naturalism, frequently occurs, and is typical of empiricism. Enumeration, weighing, measuring, the precise record of facts, these constitute for Pisarev the only right method, laboratory methods being applied to life by the nihilistic Bazarovs.

Facts, this is the realistic and nihilistic slogan, used to wearisome iteration, palpable facts being recognised naturalistically and materialistically, whilst impalpable facts are simply ignored. The nihilist is extremely hostile toward everything which he terms abstract or general; he demands the concrete, concreteness is his war-cry. "There is no such thing as an abstract truth; truth is concrete. . . . Every thing depends upon the conditions of time and space" (Černyševskii). "Let us have the real man of flesh and blood with his doings, not fantastic relationships to the entire outer world" (Dobroljubov). We must have facts, therefore, isolated facts, no philosophy, no metaphysics, no general outlook on the universe, no theory, no illusions, no verbiage.

Pisarev positively condemns a general outlook, writing: "There can be nothing more disastrous for the student of nature than to have a general outlook on the universe."

The nihilist distorts positivism further, inasmuch as, in contrast with Comte or Mill, he subordinates theory to practice, life being in this sense opposed to science. Looking at the matter more closely, we find that science in this connection means official academic science. Thus Pisarev tilts against "modern scholasticism."

The genealogical tree of nihilism is not difficult to draw up. Comte and Mill; Taine and Littré; Büchner, Moleschott, and Vogt. The three last-named, in especial, exercised great influence over the majority of nihilists. Moleschott proclaimed the nature student as the Prometheus of the modern age. He expounded *The Circulation of Life*, explained that chemistry was the supreme science, and actually expected from it the solution of the social question. The Russian students, hungering for knowledge, and the budding reformers, were fascinated by these materialistic pronouncements and watch-

words of Vogt and Büchner, these utterances of the *Force and Matter* type which were then arousing widespread interest.

Subsequently Darwinism and naturalistic evolutionism found eager acceptance.

The positivism of the nihilists was derived from Feuerbach and Stirner, and in part from Hegel. We have seen that the Russian Hegelians had much to say about the rationality of the real. The development from Hegel to Feuerbach and to materialism was the same in Russia as in the west.

Schopenhauer must likewise be mentioned as a teacher of the nihilists. His pessimism, his criticism of official philosophy, and his literary style, had during the sixties a potent influence in Russia.

Most of the nihilists acquired their philosophical culture at second hand, from Russian teachers. First of all came Herzen, and subsequently Bakunin. Herzen's influence was displayed chiefly in the theoretical field, whilst Černyševskii directly affected practice, above all in the sphere of ethics.

Russian literature, and in particular accusatory literature, supplemented philosophical schooling, and for many, indeed, replaced philosophical schooling.

Foreign belletristic literature came to play a part beside that of Russia. We may refer to the positivism of George Eliot; to the realism of Dickens and Zola (and Spielhagen with his novel *Problematic Natures* may also be mentioned in this connection); to Victor Hugo, George Sand, etc. The corrosive criticism of Heine was especially influential.

iii. Turgenev's Bazarov is a man who bows before no authority, one who will not accept any principle as an article of faith, be that principle furnished with as many testimonials as you please. The definition may seem somewhat vague, somewhat tortuous, but we can and must make it clear. Nihilism criticises and negates the authorities and principles of the elder generation; in the concrete, it criticises and renounces the Uvarovian trinity of church, state, and nationality. "Destructive" criticism is aimed chiefly at orthodoxy and theocracy, even though in view of the censorship the onslaught must be indirect. Atheism and materialism are at once preconditions and logical consequences of nihilist criticism and negation.

When Pisarev, like all the realists, is continually engaged

in the attempt to destroy authority, superstition, illusion, and falsehood, he is campaigning against orthodoxy. But the nihilists have by no means thought out their doctrine metaphysically; their nihilism is social and political; they aim at destroying Old Russia, the Russia of Nicholas. They read Mill and Schopenhauer, but the metaphysical nihilism of these authors was largely ignored; the criticism of the Russian nihilists was turned against the oppressive theocracy.

Fundamentally, Pisarev's attack on aesthetics is an onslaught upon the illusions of theology.

Atheism and materialism repudiate teleology, offering their own causal explanation of the universe, of the individual life, and of the life of society. Materialism is mechanism, naturalistic mechanism.

In Herzen's writings, nihilism already makes its appearance as positivist disillusionment. The opposite of positivist disillusionment is metaphysical and religious intoxication. It is a case of nihilism versus mysticism.

Pisarev frequently condemns the "intuitive" philosophy, to which he counterposes practice, the daily bread.

Dostoevskii was the first to force upon nihilism reflection upon its own relationships in the field of metaphysics and in that of the philosophy of religion; he was the first to make a serious attempt to grasp its general significance, though preliminary essays in this direction may be found in the writings of Bakunin and Herzen. Subsequently, building upon the foundation laid by Dostoevskii, Nietzsche conceived nihilism metaphysically and in its world-wide and historical relationships.

However much the nihilist might read Schopenhauer, however greatly he might esteem the German writer's works, he did not become a pessimist, did not surrender to despair. The nihilist is fierce (Herzen is right here), and he turns wrathfully against oppressive authority. The nihilist accepts the views of Stirner, but Stirner does not make him indifferent. Stirner himself, refraining in 1848 from participating in the revolution, incorporated into his life the true significance of his book *The Ego and his Own*, whereas the Russian "ego" is a theoretical and practical revolutionist guided by the teaching of Bakunin, his aim is socio-political destruction, pandestruction. The nihilist is a politician, not a metaphysician; he is opposed to the theocracy, but he is not

aware of having any philosophy of religion; he holds fast to his Moleschott or to his Pisarev, and that suffices him.

The nihilist is fundamentally an unbeliever, but he believes in the frog (Pisarev), in the electric cable (Herzen), or in the railway (Bělinskii). The nihilistic atheist and materialist believes in his atheism and materialism; often his belief is no less fanatical and blind than that of his orthodox opponents. The nihilist has merely changed the object of his faith. In infancy and boyhood he had believed in the doctrines of the catechism; in the higher classes of the middle school and at the university he has come to believe in the doctrines of Feuerbach and Moleschott. The nihilistic philosophy of enlightenment is negative, negational; it is not critical; the unbelieving nihilist is a believer, just as the "infidel" Mohammedan becomes a fervent Christian.

This unbelieving belief is typical of Russian philosophical development, as we have had occasion to see in the case of numerous Russian thinkers.

iv. The emphasis laid upon practice led the nihilists to morality. Ethics was the most important nihilistic discipline. The influence of German philosophy was here partially operative, for since the days of Kant that philosophy had preferred the practical reason to the theoretical. Personal motives, too, played their part. Černyševskii and Dobroljubov had had a theological training, whilst Pisarev's home education had been on rigidly moral lines. A determinative influence was exercised by Russian social and political conditions, by the intolerable character of theocratic absolutism, which rendered a new conduct of life essential. It is true that the nihilists fulminated against morality, but they were referring to the old ecclesiastical morality. Bakunin desired a "new morality," Černyševskii desired "new men."

Hoping to establish ethics upon irrefutable principles and unshakable foundations, Černyševskii and his successors had recourse to egoism and utilitarianism. This system has often been extolled as empirical and practical, and was contrasted by the nihilists with the moral phrasemongering (in fact unpractical) of many so-called idealists.

Just as to the nihilists empirical natural science seemed to be the true, the absolute, the mathematically demonstrable basis of philosophy, so was hedonism to safeguard their ethic, and was above all to make it thoroughly practical. Bazarov,

says Pisarev, has knowledge and will; he desires to act. *What is to be Done* is the distinctive title of the nihilistic evangel, which is competent to give a definite answer to the most burning questions.

Many critics of nihilism have referred to the religious character of the movement. Unquestionably this was a new trend, one which involved an attempt, moving forward with logical consistency from its base, to regulate the whole of life anew. The nihilists were quite in earnest in their desire for "new men." Their consistency and their tenacity may be compared with religious endeavour, in so far as religion is employed mainly as a sanction for morality.

It has already been pointed out that the egoism and hedonism of the nihilists must not be taken quite at their face value. The nihilists railed against the unpractical and fanatical rigours of monastic morality and Christianity in general; they rejected the idea of sacrifice; but only too often they were themselves zealots and fanatics, giving their lives with a delight in sacrifice, with a positive desire for victimisation, which frequently reminds us of the morbid love of religious martyrdom. Vladimir Solov'ev wittily remarked of these men of the sixties that their logical inference appeared to be, "Man sprang from the ape, therefore love thy neighbour as thyself."

What does the egoist Černyševskii actually preach? "We recognise nothing higher on earth than the human individuality"; and again, "A positivist man, one who is positivist in the proper sense of the term, cannot be other than loving and noble-minded." Pisarev and Herzen return to love.

The nihilists wish to be consistent; they endeavour to apply in practice, at once and universally, the theories they have so recently acquired; deed and word are to harmonise. In brief, the nihilists are campaigning against the system of conventional lies.

The nihilists wish to escape the consuming tedium from which the unoccupied aristocracy, and above all the landed gentry, suffer; they desire to find practical and genuinely useful work.

Herzen adduces in example Homjakov, who fled to Europe to find refuge from boredom, who there wrote his tragedy *Ermak*, who held converse with all possible and impossible Czechs and Dalmatians, and then flung himself into the Turkish war; Puškin's Oněgin envied general paralytics; Lermontov's

Pečorin betook himself to Persia; Čaadaev consorted with Catholics; other writers became orthodox and slavophil. It was all the outcome of tedium vitae. In his *Realists* Pisarev gives a similar account of the effects of boredom.

The nihilists, therefore, attack romanticism on ethical grounds as well. "Oh why was I not a block of wood?"—thus Pisarev quizzically of the romanticists weary of life; their German romanticist colleagues à la Schlegel envied the quiet existence of the plants.

Against romanticist sentimentalism and extravagances of feeling, the nihilists entrench themselves with irony and cynicism. Concerning the irony and cynicism of Bazarov, Pisarev writes that irony, internal cynicism, is directed against sentimentality, gushes of feeling, and similar absurdities. Bazarov, he says, is animated by this cynicism. Pisarev likewise approves outward cynicism, a rough method of expressing this irony, extreme bluntness in general. But these characteristics do not constitute the essence of realism; they are mere ephemeral manifestations; and they are less formidable than they appear.¹

The ultra-positivist impassivity of the nihilist was in fact a mere mask.

The nihilists were democrats (they used the familiar "thou" to all). In practice this meant that they were to work for the recently liberated *mužik*, and were themselves to work like the *mužik*. The liberation made the nihilists turn to the peasants; the movement "towards the people" began. The nihilist wished to enlighten the peasant. As a democrat and as a worker he would not distinguish himself from the peasant; assuming a peasant mode of life, he endeavoured to become simpler; outwardly, and in part inwardly, he grew to resemble the peasant. The nihilistic democrat therefore adopted plebeian manners and customs.

Pisarev recommends agricultural work to the member of the intelligentsia who, when he becomes for practical purposes a peasant, is thus best in a position for carrying on his work of enlightenment.

This utilitarian democratic movement therefore aimed at "annihilating" aesthetics. In times of social and political difficulty and oppression like the years which immediately followed the liberation of the peasants, excellent men incline

¹ This analysis of nihilist cynicism is found in the first essay on Bazarov.

to take a very depreciatory view of art, and still more of philosophising about art. "L'art gâte tout," Mably had said just before the French revolution; the sansculottes had other things to think about.

The nihilists, therefore, would have nothing to do with aesthetics either in externals or in the forms of social intercourse. This was the outcome of their fraternisation with the muzik and the operative. But in addition many of them were in truth extremely poor, and those that had any money to spare devoted it to the purchase of books and other things that seemed more important to them than arts and graces. Not without justice could their opponents censure them for lack of cleanliness, for being badly dressed, and so on.

As we see in Bazarov, in Rahmetov, and even in Pisarev's style, nihilism was hostile to all needless formalities. Pisarev wrote and spoke "without ceremony," as the Russians phrase it. For instance, when he differed from Goethe, this was enough to make him accuse Goethe of philistinism. He was ever fond of strong expressions. Whenever possible he minted new words to help him in the campaign against obsolete opinions and ideas. For example, the old-fashioned daughters of good families were by him designated "muslin girls," and so on. Pisarev, like his predecessors, was an enemy of phrases, but he knew (and declared occasionally) that phrases are indispensable, and he therefore coined nihilistic phraseology.

The nihilists, being a hunted minority, held firmly together, and without deliberate conspiracy a kind of secret society came into existence. The nihilists recognised one another by dress, language, methods of criticism, general views. To this extent, therefore, Mihailovskii was right in comparing the nihilists with the disciples of Tolstoi, and the former resembled the latter in their sectarian spirit.

In personal relationships, and above all in friendship and in marriage, the nihilists consistently carried out their ethical principles. In nihilist circles, friendship was based upon inexorable straightforwardness, all conventional trappings being discarded.

Side by side with friendship, the sex relationship, love and marriage was regarded as the truest of all the relationships of life. The love and the marriage of the "thoughtful" realist became "thoughtful" love and marriage. Thus nihilism was the most radical emancipator of the Russian

woman. The opponents of the nihilists fail to recognise how great was the service which Černyševskii, Dobroljubov, and Pisarev rendered in this field. Even Saltykov, as has been shown, was so short-sighted and old-fashioned that he could not judge the big words of the nihilist spokesmen in accordance with their real significance, in accordance with their actuality. The utterance of Černyševskii's Rahmetov concerning the community of wives is still quoted shudderingly against the nihilists.

v. It was a logical development that nihilistic ethics with an aspiration towards the practical should bring the nihilists into politics. The criticism and negation of authority, scientific and artistic individualism, the spirit of independence, the struggle against theological and theocratic idealism, necessarily led to social and before long to political rebellions, revolts, and revolutions. The horror which Gogol had voiced in *Dead Souls*, affected persons of conspicuous intelligence; and in a society based upon serfdom it was natural that a vigorous nihilism, a nihilism eager for deeds, should originate. The inadequate reforms of the sixties did not convert Černyševskii into a professor, but made it essential for him to become the tribune, the advocate of the mužik. What happened to Černyševskii happened to all the others; absolutism precipitated the younger generation in the direction of revolution.

The nihilists followed Ryl'ev, and gave ear to his appeal on behalf of civic duty. When Nekrasov, in his *Poets and Citizens*, fulminated the phrase, "Thou canst not be a poet, but it is thy duty to be a citizen," the nihilists took the matter quite in earnest, regulating their theories in accordance therewith, and devoting their leisure to politics and other practical work on behalf of the people. It was for this reason that Pisarev "annihilated aesthetics"; it was for this reason that Bazarov was hostile to poesy and art; it was for this reason that, somewhat earlier, Bělinskii had given utterance to his heretical judgment concerning the Sixtine Madonna.

In actual fact, nihilism embodied an endeavour to introduce poesy into life, or, to put it in another way, to transfigure life poetically. From the time of Puškin and Bělinskii, Russian literature and literary criticism had been so intimately concerned with Russian life, and had so vigorously endeavoured to fathom its meaning, that the day naturally came for men to attempt the practical, ethical, and political realisation of

the teachings of literature. The nihilists were the heirs of Russian literature and literary criticism.

Turgenev rightly presented Bazarov as an enemy of the aristocracy, as a revolutionary, as a pendant to the followers of Pugačev. The democratic hostility to aristocracy was enhanced and concreted in the social sphere by the proletarian position of the literary *rasnočinec*. The nihilist felt proud of his contrast with the aristocrat; he was class conscious; he was in revolt against oppression, theoretically at first, but before long practically, ethically, and politically as well.

The nihilist was opposed to the political doctrines and ideals of the aristocrats. He renounced state and church, and he renounced the aristocrat's nationalism. When his adversaries closed their ranks against him, when they reproached him with atheism, materialism, and russophobia, the nihilist, cynically enough in many cases, admitted all these counts in the impeachment. Nevertheless the nihilist, the nihilist above all, loved Russia, in his own peculiar manner; he loved in Russia that which seemed to him lovable and sacred.

The nihilist was radical to the extreme; he was the sworn foe of political liberalism and of the bourgeoisie. He spoke of himself as a democrat and a socialist.

Nihilist sentiment was to a large extent anarchist. Thus, as we have seen, Pisarev's realist did not shrink even from crime. He recognised no objective authority competent to forbid murder and robbery, competent to restrain him from crime. To the nihilist, all things were lawful. Such had been the doctrine of Bakunin, such had been the doctrine of Herzen and Bëlsinskii. The problem of crime occupied his mind from the first appearance of nihilism. Initially, the interest was theoretical, when he discussed the moral implications of Byron's *Cain*, discussed them in association with the metaphysical doctrines of subjectivism and solipsism, but soon the interest became practical and the nihilist developed into the revolutionary and the terrorist.

vi. Intimate analysis discloses several distinct varieties of nihilism, and the literary presentation of nihilism created several distinct types of nihilist. The nihilists themselves disputed which type was the model, some seeing in Bazarov, some in Rahmetov, etc., the correct and genuine incorporation of nihilism.

A definitive judgment of nihilism is far from easy, for the nihilists were active in very various fields, in theory and in practice, in philosophy and in science, in ethics and in politics, in medicine and in other technical spheres—universally.

Moreover, nihilism evolved, and assumed various forms.

Frequently a distinction is made between degrees of nihilism. Herzen, for example, who dissented from Černyševskii, spoke of the ultras, of the Sobakevičs and Nozdrevs, the Dantonists of nihilism. This subdivision of nihilism into moderate and radical wings is still current to-day. Herzen, despite his antipathy to Černyševskii's trend, himself accepted nihilism as a radical philosophical tendency. The conservative and reactionary opponents of nihilism denounced as nihilism every movement aiming at liberty, and an elementary knowledge of Latin was sufficiently widespread for the mere name to inspire terror.

A summary criticism of nihilism would be futile. We may recall the opinions of Herzen and of Strahov, that nihilism made no new contributions to thought, that the nihilists had no real understanding even of their own principles, and so on. Many took an adverse view of nihilism as the philosophy and politics of the young.

To me the true significance of the matter, the *signum temporis* for Russia and for Europe as well, is indeed found in the youth of the spokesmen of nihilism. In *Fathers and Children*, Turgenev, though half unwittingly, hit the mark. The children demanded an account from their fathers.; the children wished to learn from their fathers what they themselves were to do; the children drew the logical conclusions from the parental premisses. So accurate, so logical, often enough were these deductions, that the parents were apt to become alarmed. Herzen, with sacrilegious hand, overturns the altars of the old gods, and Pisarev thereupon asks him, "Are not all things now lawful?"

The Russian "children" of the sixties attempted to up-build a new and complete philosophy of life upon the foundations that had been laid by their fathers in the forties; in all seriousness these "children" wished to become new men, desired to begin the new life. Such was the sense in which Dostoevskii conceived nihilism, looking upon it as the leading problem of the day, returning again and again to its criticism, and attempting to refute it. Following Dostoevskii's example,

Nietzsche formulated the problem, and in this spirit the problem of nihilism is to-day being reconsidered with renewed zeal by many thinkers.

Since the sixties, nihilism has been the question of questions for thoughtful Russians—and for thoughtful Europeans.

IV

§ III.

THE great hopes which, after the Crimean catastrophe, had been founded upon the liberation of the peasantry and upon administrative reforms, were speedily dashed, and a revolutionary movement ensued, culminating in the assassination of Alexander II. The outward history of this movement is known; partial freedom stimulated aspirations for complete freedom. We have now to consider the views which found expression in and through this movement, to discuss the program disseminated by secret presses and unlawful secret societies, both in Russia and elsewhere.

i. In 1862 was established in St. Petersburg the first secret society, known as *Zemlja i Volja* (Land and Freedom). It maintained relationships with the Polish revolutionaries, and through the instrumentality of Bakunin was likewise in correspondence with Herzen, though the last-named mistrusted it.

The program of the Central Committee of the Russian People maintained the duty and the right of revolution as a means of defence against the oppression and cruelty of absolutism; it sharply counterposed the interests of the people to the interests of tsarist absolutism; and appealed for the cooperation of those whom no danger could affright. The ultimate aim of the revolution was stated to be the summoning of a national assembly which was freely to decide the social organisation of Russia; the activity of the society would terminate when freedom of election to the national assembly had been secured.

Another secret society, to which reference has already been made, was *Velikorus'* (Great Russia). Černyševskii was said to have participated in the work of both these societies (§ 103).

The secret organisation of the radical revolutionary elements began at various places and assumed many different forms.

A secret society came into existence in Moscow, and towards the close of 1865 was consolidated under the name of Organisation. In this society, two trends were manifest, one comparatively moderate, which aimed merely at the diffusion of a socialist program, and the other more radical, desiring to bring about the revolution by direct action and if needs must by tsaricide. Karakozov, who belonged to this left wing, made the first attempt upon Alexander's life on April 17, 1866. Karakozov and his associates were adherents of Černyševskii, but the attempt was made by Karakozov upon his own initiative and in opposition to the wishes of the society.

Agitation was carried into wider circles by the proclamations issued from the newly established secret printing presses. The aim of these proclamations was not so much to formulate a program as to function as instruments of political propaganda and to promote a political awakening. Such proclamations were sometimes issued by authors and publicists of note, or were ascribed to these, rightly or wrongly. They were addressed either to the community at large or to particular strata of society, to cultured persons and to students, to soldiers, to peasants, to operatives.

As early as 1854, proclamations were issued (by Engelssohn); but not until the radical movement of the sixties was in full swing did they become an effective means for political propaganda.

Much attention was attracted by the before-mentioned proclamation *Young Russia* (May, 1862), which contained threats of a bloody and pitiless revolution; Russia was to be transformed into a republican and federative state; there were to be national and local parliaments, a judiciary appointed by popular election, just taxes, "social" factories and shops, "social" education of children, emancipation of women, abolition of marriage and the family, abolition of monasteries, provision for invalids and the elderly, increased pay for soldiers, etc. Should the tsar and his party, as was to be anticipated, turn upon Young Russia, then: "Inspired with full confidence in ourselves, in our energies, in popular sympathy, in the splendid future of Russia, predestined to be the first of all countries to realise socialism, we shall sound the clarion call, 'Seize your axes.' Then we shall strike down the members of the tsarist party, shall strike them unpitifully as they have unpitifully struck us, shall hew them down in the squares

should the rout venture forth into the open, hew them down in their dwellings, in the narrow alleys of the towns, in the wide streets of the capitals, in the villages and the hamlets. When that day dawns, he that is not for us will be against us, will be our enemy, and our enemies must be destroyed root and branch. But with each new victory and in the hour of struggle, never forget to repeat, 'Long live the social and democratic Russian republic!'"

The proclamation purported to be issued by the "Revolutionary Central Committee."

The excitement aroused by this bold document was intense. The liberals, no less than the authorities, were outraged beyond measure, for the liberals were stigmatised as henchmen of the tsar. Even Bakunin was ill pleased, for he considered that those who had issued the proclamation failed to understand the situation, that they had no definite goal, and that they lacked revolutionary discipline. Herzen, who was attacked by name in the proclamation, criticised it, but did not take it too seriously, saying that it was an ebullition of youthful radicalism, that its authors had wished to instruct politicians and officials more far-seeing than themselves. The proclamation, he said, was un-Russian; it was a *mixtum compositum* of undigested Schiller (Robber Moor), Gracchus Babeuf, and Feuerbach.

The proclamation is an interesting testimony to the nature of the epoch. We see that the younger radical generation of the sixties is socialistically inclined, that liberalism and its constitutionalist formulas have been found inadequate; that society is to be rebuilt from its foundations on a socialist plan.

According to the philosophy of history of the writers of the proclamation, society consisted of two classes, the members of the tsarist party and the non-possessing revolutionaries, for the existing order was based solely upon private property; the tsar was merely the man standing on the highest rung of the ladder, whose lower rungs were occupied by landowners, merchants, and officials—all alike capitalists. Private property was to be abolished; above all, the land was to belong to the whole people, and therefore the *mir* with its provisional subdivision of the land was accepted; but such property as had been hitherto held privately was to be held only on terms of usufruct, and after the usufructuary's death was to accrue to the *mir*. Since every individual must belong to a village

community, the social and democratic Russian republic would take the form of a federative union of the village communities.

Federation was to be free, and therefore the "brother" Poles and Lithuanians could form independent states should they be unwilling to enter the Russian federation.

Herzen was wrong in describing the proclamation as un-Russian. Not merely may we consider Sten'ka Razin and Pugačev to have been its forerunners, but it likewise embodies the ideas of Pestel, from whom the authors learned, as well as from Černyševskii and Bakunin.

The influence of the French socialists is likewise discernible, and perhaps also that of Marx.

The proclamation is unquestionably obscure in point of political outlook, as regards ways and means; this becomes obvious in its appeal to the people, to the "millions" of the old believers, to the army and its officers, to the Poles and the peasants, and above all to young men ("our main hope").

Analogous in its outlook was the proclamation *To the Younger Generation*, which has hitherto been ascribed to Mihailov, who was sentenced on this account and sent to Siberia. In actual fact the proclamation was written by Šelgunov.¹

The proclamation represents the younger members "of all classes" as successors of the decabrists, animadverts against the pitiful economists "of the German text books" and against narrow-minded individualism, and repudiates the attempt to make an England out of Russia. In support of Herzen's and Černyševskii's doctrine that Russia could skip certain stages of European development, we read: "Who can maintain that we must necessarily walk in the footsteps of Europe, in the footsteps of a Saxony, an England, or a France? The Gneists, Bastiats, Mohls, Raus, and Roschers, serve up to us masses of excrement, desiring to make the refuse of dead centuries into laws for the future. Such laws may do for them, but we shall find another law for ourselves. It is not merely that we can find something new, but it is essential that we do so. Our life is guided by principles utterly unknown to Europeans." Quite after the manner of Čadaev and Herzen, the Russians

¹ In the year 1873, Dostoevskii referred to a proclamation, *To the Younger Generation*, which he had shown to Černyševskii, and concerning which Černyševskii had expressed an adverse opinion. If Dostoevskii's statement that this proclamation was quite short is accurate, it cannot have been the one usually attributed to Mihailov.

are described as backward in their development, but are said to be competent for this very reason to undergo a different evolution, non-economic and peculiar to themselves. "Therein lies our salvation," that we are backward in our development. The Russian bourgeoisie, manufactured by Catherine II, is to be swept away, for the bourgeois are nothing but peasants, only peasants without land.

In addition to these proclamations, addresses to the tsar and to the general public were circulated. Such addresses were sometimes issued by radicals, but still more by liberals and especially by some of the liberal zemstvos. For example, the Tver zemstvo issued a document of this character in 1862. Secretly printed addresses were likewise circulated for propaganda purposes. As far as political demands are concerned, these writings ask for nothing more than constitutionalist reforms.¹

ii. Bakunin is of leading importance in connection with the further development of the revolutionary movement. It is therefore necessary to consider a Bakuninist program, and we will choose for this purpose the program of the year 1868, as formulated in the "Narodnoe Dêlo" (The People's Cause) Bakunin's Genevese organ. Herein the liberation of the mind is proclaimed as the basis of social and political freedom; the belief in God and immortality and in "idealism of any kind" is proscribed, the spread of atheism and materialism being announced as definite party aims; religion is said to produce slaves, to paralyse the energies, and to prevent the realisation of natural rights and true happiness.

The economic condition of the people is affirmed to be the "corner stone," and this economic condition is said "to explain political existence"—thus runs a somewhat obscure formulation of economic materialism. In essence the state is based upon conquest, upon the right of inheritance, upon the patria potestas of the husband and father, and upon the religious consecration of all these principles. The necessary outcome of the existence of such a state is the slavery of the working majority and the dominion of the exploiting minority, of the so-called cultured class. For the abolition of these

¹ There should be mentioned in this connection the plan for an address to the tsar, written wholly or partly by Chernyâevskii and outlined in a proclamation issued by the secret society Velikorus' (1861). In 1862, Herzen and Ogarev drafted such a document, which was condemned by Turgenev. It was never circulated.

privileges it is necessary to do away with the inheritance of property, to secure equal rights for women, this involving the abolition of the patria potestas and of marriage; to maintain children until they reach full age, and to secure for them at the hands of a free society an education which shall make them equally competent for "muscular" and "nervous" work.

In ultimate analysis the basis of economic organisation must rest on the two principles, that the land is the property of those who till it, the property of the village communities, and that capital and all the instruments of production belong to the workers, are the property of workers' associations. The entire political organism is to be a free federation of agricultural and manufacturing associations (artels); the state is to be destroyed. The separate peoples in Russia may, should they so desire, unite to form a free federation, becoming members "of the Russian folk," and this will affiliate with the equally free societies of Europe and the entire world.

iii. Important for the further development of secret revolutionary propaganda was the Society of the People's Assize, a secret society founded by Nečaev in 1869. Nečaev, Bakunin's disciple, secured widespread notoriety through his *Catechism of Revolution*. This work was an introduction to conspiracy and to propaganda by deed, and presupposes the acceptance of Bakunin's program.¹

In the *Catechism* the arts of the secret conspirator are urged with consummate Jesuitry, this word Jesuitry being understood in its most evil connotation as political Machiavellianism. The members of the secret society have to obey their leader absolutely, and for the most part remain unknown one to another; the revolutionary conspirator must be a blind instrument, must abandon all personal interests and sentiments, must break every family tie and must give up even his name, to devote his whole individuality to the life and death struggle; the genuine revolutionist abandons all romanticism, even hatred and personal feelings of revenge being subordinated to

¹ The *Catechism* is reprinted in Dragomanov's edition of Bakunin's Correspondence, p. 371. Many regarded the *Catechism* as the work of Bakunin, who never denied the supposition. Dragomanov left this question open, and it needs reconsideration. G. Adler, in the article *Anarchism in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 2nd edition, p. 308, adduces certain passages as doctrines and utterances of Nečaev taken from the *Catechism*, but they are in fact utterances by Bakunin and are not to be found in the *Catechism*. Cf. Dragomanov, op. cit., pp. 353 and 363.

the revolutionary idea. The secret conspirator may and must do anything needful for the cause; he may lie if lying will promote the working of the revolutionary forces; he must enter into suitable relationships with prostitutes, with the police, with "the so-called criminals," etc. The members of society, against which Nečaev is campaigning, are divided by him into six categories. The first of these consists of individuals whom the revolutionaries have sentenced to death, and who must be removed forthwith, whereas the most evil of creatures may be left alive if his misdeeds promote the growth of revolutionary energy. The second class consists of persons whose lives may provisionally be spared. In the third category are "highly placed beasts," wealthy individuals who are personally of no importance, but who can be exploited for the benefit of the revolution. In the fourth class are aspiring officials and liberals of various grades. With these the revolutionary remains ostensibly on friendly terms that he may learn their secrets, may compromise them, may make it impossible for them to draw back, and may compel them to serve the revolution. Fifthly come the doctrinaires, those who are conspirators and revolutionaries in word merely, and similar chatterers; these must be urged to deeds and converted into genuine revolutionaries. Women constitute the sixth category, the most important of all, and these are divided into three sub-classes: (a) those of no account must be exploited like the men in categories three and four; (b) the enthusiasts among them, who however are not yet fully won over to the cause, must be treated like the men of the fifth category; (c) the adepts, the genuinely revolutionary women "must be regarded as the greatest of our treasures, without which we could do nothing."

The real aim of the secret society is to secure perfect freedom and complete happiness for the workers. But since this freedom and this happiness can be secured in no other way than by an all-destroying revolution carried out by the people as a whole, the guiding purpose of the secret society must be to increase the existing evils in order that the people may lose patience and may be stimulated to a mass rising.

In 1869 and 1870 Nečaev published a periodical in Geneva. It was entitled "Narodnaja Rasprava" (The People's Assize), and no more than two numbers appeared. Herein was preached absolute negation and pandestruction. The formulation of

plans for the future was condemned, and condemned too therefore was all exclusively theoretical rational activity. The only knowledge to be tolerated was that which directly promoted practice, the practice of "radical and universal pandestruction." As for reconstruction, "to upbuild is not our work, but that of those who will come after us." The immediate concrete aim was "to sweep away the tsar with all his family." If, none the less, Alexander II was still permitted to live, this was merely because his proceedings were stimulating the revolutionary movement among the people. Nečaev was willing to leave his condemnation and punishment to the people's assize; the Russian folk was entitled to inflict a death sentence on the man who had deceived them with his lying reforms.

During 1869, Nečaev organised among the Moscow students a secret society which, under his leadership was speedily to shed blood. An alleged traitor, a student named Ivanov, was sentenced and murdered, the Bakunist revolution having thus an ominous beginning with the assassination of one of its own adherents. Nečaev had an additional reason for this blood-letting in that he desired to intimidate his own followers, to knit them more closely together, and to promote the spread of the idea of pandestruction by the excitement which the murder would cause.

Bakunin condemned Nečaev in strong terms—though not until after Nečaev's "deed." In 1870 Bakunin spoke of Nečaev as a traitor, and in 1872 censured his Machiavellianism and Jesuitism. It is difficult to decide to what extent Nettlau is right in maintaining that Nečaev had fooled Bakunin and Ogarev. It was certainly characteristic of Bakunin that his plans for world-wide destruction laid him open to be befooled by such as Nečaev. From the very first Herzen distrusted Nečaev. In 1872 Nečaev was extradited from Switzerland as a common criminal, and in Russia was condemned to twenty years in a penitentiary, but was confined in the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul where he died in 1882. Even had this not been his fate, he would have been unable to maintain his position in the revolutionary world. As Kropotkin shows in his *Memoirs*, Nečaev's program was promptly repudiated by Čaikovskii's adherents. Moreover, in Lavrov's program Nečaev's position is denounced. Above all, the later members of the Narodnaja Volja disapproved of Nečaev's methods.

Further, the anarchist followers of Nečæev and Bakunin, Čerkezov, for instance, the opponent of Marxism, did not accept this aspect of Nečæev's anarchism.¹ Kropotkin does not reject the idea of armed revolution, but he is opposed to all deception, whether practised against friend or enemy.

Not until much later, when the younger generation had forgotten the facts established by Herzen against Nečæev in 1871, were certain attempts made to idealise him.

Once only was the method of Nečæev practically applied, this being in the peasant revolt of 1877 in the Chigirin district. Here a false "secret charter issued by supreme authority" was dangled before the eyes of the peasants.

iv. Of a very different character was the program of those organisations which made it their business to promote the revolutionary culture of the masses as a precondition of the definitive revolution. I may refer for example to the program of the Čaikovcy who were organised in the year 1871.²

For the Čaikovcy, the social revolution was the terminal aim of all revolutionary organisation, and the greatest possible number of peasants and operatives must be won over to the cause. Adherents among the operatives, returning to their native villages, would promote the spread of revolutionary ideas among the peasants. Local disturbances, such as were advocated by Bakuninist groups, were not approved, for it was held that these casual risings diverted people's attention from the terminal aim, the definitive revolution. But no objection was raised to local disturbances and local acts of resistance to government when these originated spontaneously.

The Čaikovcy sympathised with the workers' international of Bakuninist trend, and sympathised with the Russian refugees, to whom they attributed an independent and peculiar influence upon the Russian folk.

v. The program of the Lavrovists, the adherents of Lavrov, has important bearings upon revolutionary developments during the seventies. It will be found in the periodical "Vpered" (Forward) which was published in Zurich and in London in several different forms during the years 1873 to 1878.

The Lavrovist program recognises the existence of two

¹ Cf. W. Tcherkesoff, *Pages d'histoire socialiste*, I, *Doctrines et Actes de la Sociale Démocratie*.

² N. Čaikovskii was a refugee from Russia in the year 1871, but returned to Russia in 1905. His program was revised by Kropotkin.

universal tasks, two struggles, in which every thoughtful man must participate; the struggle of the "realist" outlook against the theological and the metaphysical, the struggle of science against religion; and the struggle of labour against the idle enjoyment of the good things of life, the struggle to secure complete equality for individualities, the struggle against monopoly in all its forms. The former struggle, we are told, is nearly finished, and as far as Russia is concerned has no notable significance (!). But for the latter, the principal struggle, we must now prepare the ground and provide a realist foundation. By a realist foundation, Lavrov means positive or scientific socialism.

Lavrov opposes the conservatives and the pseudo-liberals, but likewise opposes Nečaev and Bakunin, energetically rejecting falsehood as a weapon for use in the campaign to secure juster social institutions. Falsehood must be overcome, just as must all the instruments and methods of the old injustice; the new order cannot be founded upon exploitation, nor upon the dictatorial dominion of the few, nor upon the forcible appropriation of unearned wealth. Against an enemy (Lavrov emphasises the word) it may doubtless be permissible to make use of falsehood in moments of extreme and temporary need, but the employment of such methods among equals and among persons of like views is a crime. In answer to Bakunin and Nečaev, he points out that even those who say that the end justifies the means will always add, with the exception of those means whose use will per se prevent the attainment of the end.

Lavrov declared that the social question was the first and the most important of all questions. He expressly subordinated the political problem to the social and above all to the economic problem, and he insisted that in view of the importance of the social struggle we should put all thought of nationality out of our minds. Accepting Marx's theory of the class struggle, Lavrov's primary demand was, therefore, for the organisation of the "entire" working class movement, and he was here thinking of the Russian peasants as well as of the factory operatives. An all-embracing organisation was essential because isolated struggles were irrational and purposeless in view of the powerful organisation of the enemy.

Lavrov was convinced that the terminal aim would not be achieved at one step; there would be intermediate stages.

He therefore held very strongly that during the progress of the struggle we should never cease to pursue the possible, and to choose suitable means for the attainment of the goal.

Political programs and parties of a constitutionalist and liberal character were regarded as inadequate. Just as little as Herzen, would Lavrov accept the bourgeois republic in place of the bourgeois monarchy, for the whole principle of the bourgeoisie was faulty. It was no doubt essential to make the best possible use of liberal institutions in so far as these could be made to subserve socialist aims (Lavrov was thinking of freedom of conscience, the right of free combination, and the like); but the socialist ought not to think of making common cause with the liberal, though perhaps here and there the two might occupy common ground.

In respect of nationality, according to Lavrov's program human beings only were to be recognised, and the common aims of mankind; all the nations, therefore, were to unite for joint work, regardless of linguistic traditions. Rivalry between the Russians and the members of other nationalities was unsocialist.

In Russia, the peasants constitute a preponderant majority of the population, and consequently work for the peasant masses was the special mission of the Russian socialist. The Russian folk must not merely be the aim of the social revolution, but its instrument as well. It is the work of the Russian revolutionary, the intellectual, to expound the socialist aim to the people; he must not desire to exercise authority over the folk, for his only role is to carry into effect the universal social aspirations. It is the task of the intellectual to instil into the folk confidence in itself, conceived as an individuality, to enlighten the people concerning its own aims and activities; his work is to pave the way for the coming of Russia's better future. "Only when the course of historical events indicates that the moment of revolution is at hand and that the Russian folk is prepared for it, are we justified in appealing to the folk to realise the great transformation." Revolutions cannot be artificially evoked, for they are the issue of a long series of complicated historical processes, and are not the result of individual wills. Nevertheless, every attempt at a popular revolution, even should it prove unsuccessful, is a means of social education. "But whether a particular revolution be useful or injurious, history leads up to revolutions with in-

evitable fatalism." Lavrov declares in conclusion that for Russia, too, the revolutionary path is "the most probable."

For Lavrov, likewise, the mir seems the social and economic foundation upon which the socialistic transformation of society as a whole can be based. But it is necessary that, as a preliminary, the peasants shall receive enlightenment, for otherwise, even should the revolution prove successful, they would be exploited by the minority.

Marx and Comte versus Bakunin, such is the gist of this revolutionary program. In view of the lust of battle which animates the young Bakunist revolutionaries, Lavrov voices the exhortation, "Look before you leap!" As against the secret society men (*buntari*), Lavrov emphasises the advantages of propaganda, and the opponents of the Lavrovists therefore spoke of them contemptuously as "progressives."

vi. "Nabat" (The Alarm Bell), a periodical published in Geneva, and edited by Tkačev, was the organ of Lavrov's adversaries. Tkačev was a Blanquist who took part in the opening political demonstrations of the early sixties, and was sentenced in the Nečaev trial. His aim was to continue and outbid the radicalism of Bakunin and Nečaev, so that for him not Lavrov merely but even Bakunin were "bourgeois pseudo-revolutionaries" in the sense of Nečaev's *Catechism*. Tkačev denominated his system, jacobinism. The immediate aim of the revolution is to seize political power, but this seizure of power is not itself the revolution, to which it is no more than a preliminary. The revolution will first be realised by the revolutionary state, which will attain to the negative and positive aims of the revolution.

The revolutionary state will strengthen itself by summoning a national assembly (*narodnaja duma*), and will conduct revolutionary propaganda, will, that is to say, guide education in accordance with the principles of the new order. Whereas Lavrov laid the principal stress upon the education of the people for the revolution, and made the revolution dependent upon such education, Tkačev taught that the forcible overthrow of the old order would precede the revolutionary propaganda.

In matters of detail Tkačev recapitulates Bakunin's ideals. The existing mir with private ownership will be transformed into a completely communistic local community; all private tools and machinery for production will be expropriated;

and the exchange of products will be effected directly, to the exclusion of all intermediaries. Physical, mental, and moral inequality will be abolished by degrees; all will be educated alike, in the spirit of love, equality, and fraternity; the existing family, with its subordination of woman and its indulgence of man's egoism and arbitrariness, will be abolished. The centralised state will gradually be replaced by the self-government of the communes.

Since the immediate aim of the revolutionaries is the seizure of political power, they must organise themselves in a "state conspiracy." By this Tkačev means something essentially similar to the Lavrovist "mass organisation." He expressly condemns isolated revolutionary outbreaks on the part of small circles, but he demands like Bakunin a rigid hierarchical subordination to the "general leadership," for this alone "can bring definiteness of aim and can secure unity in the activity of all the members." For to Tkačev the immediate and sole program of revolutionary activity is "organisation as a means for the disorganisation and annihilation of the power of the existing state."

Tkačev remained editor of "Nabat" till 1877, and the paper was continued under other editors until 1881. It was disavowed by the Narodnaja Volja as Nečaev had been disavowed, for the blood-curdling glorifications of terrorist deeds were too compromising.

The influence of "Nabat" in Russia does not seem to have been great, but Tkačev, writing under pseudonyms, diffused his views also in authorised radical periodicals. Though he had to choose his words carefully, in view of the censorship, he was, like other radical writers, perfectly well understood. Tkačev had an effective style as publicist and as literary and historical critic, and his writings exercised a revolutionary influence upon the young.¹

¹ Tkačev was a consistent expounder of economic materialism. He rejected in its entirety Russian aristocratic literature with its excursions into the domain of the humiliated and the suffering. Owing to the new developments, he said, the position of writers had become economically insecure, and in their creative work this insecurity betrayed itself in the form of *weltschmerz*. Consequently every aristocratic author exhibited two sides. For example Turgenev, Gončarov, Pisemskii were great writers, but "apart from this their horizon did not extend further than the length of their noses"; with one side of his nature, Tolstoi loved the people, but with the other side he loved to chatter; Dostoevskii was not worth mentioning; and so on.

vii. In the year 1877, a new Zemlja i Volja came into existence. The organs of this association advocated peaceful revolutionary propaganda. The agrarian problem was represented as the supreme social problem for Russia. The factory problem could be "left in the shade," since it did not really exist for Russia, but was the social problem of the west. In Russia, the supreme demands had always been for land and freedom. Land must be the property of those who tilled it, and must therefore be taken away from the landlords. For the Cossacks, liberty signified free self-governing communes, in which those elected to carry out the popular will were subject to recall. Quite similar were the views of the secret society Zemlja i Volja, as the successor of the revolutionary socialists Pugačev and Razin, men of the people. No attempt was made to formulate a more specific program; the future could take care of itself; for the time being it was necessary to realise "the revolution of the folk," that is to say to revolutionise the masses of the people, in order to render possible the socialistic organisation of the Russian nation.

The organisation of the society was directed towards the attainment of this aim. Its leadership was centralised, but not in accordance with the prescriptions of Bakunin and Tkačev. Where important questions had to be decided, the officers took a vote of the council, and in matters of supreme importance a ballot was taken of all the members. The council consisted of the members residing in St. Petersburg, which was the centre. The league was subdivided into four groups: intellectuals (for propaganda and for the organisation of university students); operatives; the village group (which contained the largest number of members); and the disorganisation group. The last-named was the most important, for it had life and death powers over the members. Its duties were to help imprisoned comrades, to set them at liberty whenever possible, and to protect them against the violence of the administration; from time to time these duties brought the society into open conflict with the government, although such conflict was not a regular part of its program. As a precaution against treachery, traitors might be killed in case of need. The disorganisation group kept the details of its plans and doings strictly secret, communicating them to the council in general outline merely.

In addition to the four groups there existed certain sections

for special tasks, the most important of these being the "heavenly chancellery" of the central executive, whose business it was to provide passports, etc.

viii. The aim of the Zemlja i Volja was peaceful revolution, but nevertheless the heralds of this peaceful revolution advanced to terrorist methods, the white terror evoking the red. In July 1877, corporal punishment was administered in prison to Bogoljubov, a revolutionary, and the authorities committed a number of revengeful actions. In consequence of these, Trepov was shot by Věra Zasulič (1878), Mezencev was stabbed by Stepniak, and various other terrorist acts were committed or attempted.

In June 1879, there was organised a declared terrorist party, Narodnaja Volja (People's Will) replacing the Zemlja i Volja. The purpose of the new party was to terrorise the government and the reactionary elements of society.

The party declared itself socialistic in the sense of the narodniki. Only the people's will had the right to sanction social forms; every idea which was to be realised politically and socially must "first of all traverse the consciousness and the will of the people." To this people's will, which strongly reminds us of Rousseau, the capitalist state was counterposed as oppressor. In accordance with the principles of people's weal and people's will, the Narodnaja Volja desired to restore power to the people by political revolution, and a legislative assembly would then undertake the reorganisation of society. The leading socialistic principles, notwithstanding their infringement by the arbitrary proceedings of the monarchy, had remained alive in Russia. These principles were, the consciousness of the people that it was justly entitled to the land, communal and local self-government, the rudiments of federal organisation, freedom of speech and conscience.

The political program of the Narodnaja Volja comprised the following items: continuous national representation; local self-government; independence of the mir as an economic and administrative unit; ownership of land by the folk; all factories and similar industrial enterprises to be in the hands of the operatives; absolute freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, combination, and electoral agitation; universal suffrage; replacement of standing armies by a militia.

More important than the program, were the organisation and the work of the Narodnaja Volja. The leadership of

the party was vested in the executive committee. The work was subdivided into the popular diffusion of the idea of a democratic revolution, and into agitation which was to give expression to the dissatisfaction of the folk and of society with the existing order. Terrorist activities were to take the form of the removal of the most noxious individualities in the government. The killing of spies was another terrorist duty.

With this end in view, small secret societies were to be organised everywhere, these being affiliated to and directed by the central executive committee. Members of the party were to endeavour to secure influential positions and ties in the administration, in the army, in society, and among the people.

Aware of the fact that a secret organisation whose members comprised no more than an infinitesimal minority could not properly express and sustain the people's will, the energy of the party was concentrated upon preliminary labours, upon the preparations for a rising. "If, contrary to our expectations, this rising should prove needless, our collected forces can then be applied to the work of peace."

These general principles were incorporated in a number of specialised programs, which prescribed the work to be done among the urban operatives, in the army, in the intelligentsia, and among young people. Moreover, the party had to attempt to arouse European sympathy for its aims, and this, it was considered, could best be effected by suitable literary activities.

The Narodnaja Volja conducted all the terroristic attempts and enterprises, and was before all responsible for attempts made upon the life of the tsar. Three such attempts had been undertaken before the society was organised, whilst the Narodnaja Volja was responsible for four. Despite its declared terrorist aim, "to break the charm of the administrative power" by the assassination of the most noxious members of the administration and the government, the Narodnaja Volja condemned the blind campaign of destruction advocated by Bakunin and Nečaev, Nečaev's methods being rejected as charlatanry. After March 13, 1881 (the assassination of Alexander II), the terrorist activity of the society came to an end. In the general belief this change of tactics was brought about by the alienation of public sympathy from the Narodnaja Volja, but according to Stepniak this was not the determining cause of the change. The Narodnaja Volja, he declares, dis-

continued individual outrages because it had decided to devote itself exclusively to the preliminary work of revolutionising the masses.

It continued to exist, but seldom played any public part. (After Turgenev's death in 1883, the Narodnaja Volja issued a proclamation, and there were a few other manifestations of activity. During the revolutionary movement of 1905, it was reorganised as the Social Revolutionary Party.)

ix. Besides the terrorist Narodnaja Volja, there issued in 1879 from the Zemlja i Volja the party of the Černyi Pereděl (Black Redistribution, that is to say, redistribution or reallotment of the black earth—see vol. I, p. 154). The aim of this party was to promote an agitation among the operatives and peasants. Plehanov, who was its leader in the theoretical field, strongly condemned the methods of the Narodnaja Volja.

The Černyi Pereděl likewise declared itself representative of the narodničestvo, of the revolutionary section of that movement, seeing that its members considered that the solution of the agrarian problem was the very essence of the social question, and being guided in this view by the same reasons as those which influenced the narodovolcy. Socialism was declared to be the last word in sociology, and collectivism was considered the goal of the "radical reformer." This radicalism must be "economic" radicalism, meaning that the radical reformer must strive to the utmost to secure the betterment of economic conditions, since these constitute the real basis of all other social and political conditions (historical materialism). In 1879, Plehanov believed that collectivism could develop in Russia out of the mır and the artel, especially since capitalism was preparing agriculture, too, and landownership for socialisation—for in Russia as in Europe capitalism paved the way for socialism. Plehanov and his associates in the Černyi Pereděl believed that capitalism in Russia would concentrate landed proprietorship, and would therefore prepare conditions for the "black redistribution" essential to the mužik.

The Černyi Pereděl was likewise revolutionary, but its view of its mission differed from that of the narodovolcy. The members of the Černyi Pereděl considered that political revolutions had never secured economic freedom for the people, nor had even afforded anywhere guarantees for political freedom. Constitutions were exploited by the bourgeoisie against

the monarch and against the working masses, and the same thing would happen in Russia. It was a matter of no importance whatever whether Alexander II or Alexander III did or did not serve out these "social cakes" (the constitution); the bourgeoisie would eat them whilst the revolutionaries looked on. Doubtless the intelligentsia and also the folk desired political freedom; but for the *mužik* freedom was intimately connected with economic conditions, and it was to such conditions that the *mužik* must look in the first instance. The business of a genuinely practical revolutionary party in Russia was to awaken men intellectually and to prepare the means for the struggle. Such, at any rate, was the work of peaceful days; when the revolution came, the party would have to regulate the movement and to determine its trend. The special function of the intelligentsia was initiatory merely, the folk would do the rest for itself and would create its own leaders. But the function of the intelligentsia did not consist in the mere handing on of culture in accordance with legally authorised methods; an energetic revolutionary secret agitation must be promoted.

In 1881, the Černyi Peredél was forced for a time to suspend its journalistic activities, but in 1883 the party was reorganised as the Group for the Liberation of Labour, and developed henceforward along Marxist lines, in continuous and close connection with the Marxist and socialist movements in other lands and above all in Germany. In 1883, and in fuller detail in 1884, Plehanov defined the attitude of his party towards other parties and trends, condemning from the Marxist outlook the socialism of Herzen and Černyševskii, the anarchism of Bakunin, and the Blanquism of Tkačev. We shall have more to say about this matter when we come to discuss the history of Marxism.

§ 112.

WHEN we survey these programs which appeared during the space of two decades, we recognise that political radicalism has taken the form of socialism. All the programs preach socialism, those of earlier date chiefly in the French sense, whilst the later ones are formulated more along the lines of Marx and Lassalle. To speak of Russian socialists, the ideas of Pestel, Herzen, Bakunin, Černyševskii, and Lavrov, are prominent. The leader of the Marxists was Plehanov.

The socialism is, as Herzen put it, "Russian socialism." That is to say, it is agrarian socialism, for the peasantry represents and is the mass of the Russian people. Everyone of the programs pays its homage to the *narodničestvo*, this statement being no less true of the early Marxists than of the adherents of Černyševskii, Bakunin, and Lavrov.

The radical *narodniki* believed in the peculiar social institutions and the peculiar mission of Russia, according general recognition to the independent evolution of Russia, and contrasting that evolution favourably with the development of Europe.

It was necessary to win over the folk to the cause of its own liberation, to win over the *mužik*, and thus originated the movement "towards the people," some going towards the people as teachers, others as agitators, the respective aims being to educate and to revolutionise the folk. The revolutionary enthusiasts soon learned by experience that they were officers and generals without an army; they perceived that the masses of the folk were incompetent for action and that no more than small peasant circles, like the small circles of operatives, could be induced to make up their minds for the revolution. Very rarely could a local rising be expected to achieve success, and it was not possible to reckon with certainty upon anything more than the willingness of isolated individuals to sacrifice themselves. More and more did it become evident that a widespread popular rising such as that of which Bakunin had dreamed, must remain in the land of dreams.

The movement "towards the people" was of brief duration. It began in 1872, became considerably more extensive in 1873, but was already checked in the following year, the government having imprisoned or banished hundreds and even thousands of those engaged in it (trying them in great batches, as in "the trial of the one hundred and ninety-three"). Those who had no worse fate were placed under police supervision, and all suffered socially.

Simultaneously the radicals began to grasp the nature of the contrast between country and town, between peasant and operative, and to apprehend the revolutionary significance of this contrast; in the programs of the later seventies we find that the urban proletariat is already declared to be the true incorporation of revolutionary ideas and revolutionary

energy. The most emphatic and effective revolutionary propaganda was carried on in the towns and above all in the capital; this, too, was a necessary outcome of the revolutionary aim, which was to abolish the monarchy, to get rid of the dynasty, and to do away with the highest organs of the government.

In proportion as the urban proletariat became recognised as a distinct class, did the Marxist ideas of the class struggle and of economic determinism secure general recognition.

From this point of view, we recognise that terrorism was a guerilla warfare of intelligentsia versus absolutism. The struggle has been frequently represented as nothing more than a students' movement, but the view is erroneous. Apart from the consideration that the total number of students was at this time inconsiderable, among students revolutionists were certainly in the minority. Students of both sexes participated in propaganda by deed and functioned also as teachers and agitators; but by the end of the seventies the majority of terrorists were members of the working class, and even in the leadership of the movement these latter competed with the intellectuals.

Precise statistics of the terrorist movement are still lacking, and we do not even know how many revolutionary groups existed. In a recently published history of the Narodnaja Volja it is asserted that the members were few in number and that the executive committee was quite a small body. This may be true, but it does not lessen the significance of the radical and terrorist movement. The government and the police considered the Narodnaja Volja the chief enemy, and fought the organisation with all the means at their disposal. There can be no doubt that the terrorist revolution was rendered possible solely by the understanding, sympathy, and support it secured among wide liberal strata of the urban population and the intelligentsia, and even among the bureaucracy.

In Russia at that epoch there were few indications of a spontaneous folk-movement in the social direction. The most distinctive manifestation of a social movement occurred in the year 1881, after the death of Alexander II, in the form of the vigorous antisemitic movement which took place in the south and in the west. At any rate, by adherents both of the Narodnaja Volja and of the Černyi Pereděl, the pogroms were regarded as the beginnings of a movement which, while

directed at first against the Jews, would subsequently develop into an attack upon the master class as a whole. Antisemitic articles were published in the organs of both these revolutionary associations. The Narodnaja Volja went so far as to prepare an antisemitic manifesto in the Little Russian tongue addressed "To the Ukrainian People," but it was never circulated. This took place in August 1881, and it must be remembered that after the assassination of the tsar on March 13th the party was in a state of incipient dissolution.

Terrorism and its revolutionary practice gave expression to the vigorous individualism characteristic of literature and of all liberal aspirations. I do not mean to imply that socialism and individualism are mutually exclusive, but I wish to emphasise the fact that these radical and revolutionary programs were not the issue of clear concepts concerning the revolution.

Their aim was the definitive social transformation, the social revolution, the inauguration of the new society and of the new man. We learn from the programs that the revolutionists were themselves doubtful whether terrorism, above all in the form of individual outrage, was the true tactic of the social revolution. The evolution of radicalism and terrorism shows, to put the matter in concrete terms, the way in which Marx was continually gaining wider influence as compared with Bakunin. The definitive social revolution was distinguished from preparatory revolutions, and still more from isolated terrorist outrages. Outrages, local disturbances, revolts, and revolutions, were appraised from the utilitarian outlook, their value as means to an end was estimated by the utilitarian calculus. Nihilist utilitarianism took a critical attitude towards Bakunin's revolutionism.

In this connection, the fact is distinctive and one to be stressed very clearly that the more Marxist members of the Zemlja i Volja, those who conceived the social revolution as a mass revolution, were beginning to part company with the terrorists even before the assassination of Alexander II and the ensuing reaction.

It is true that the ideas and programs of the respective sections had not yet been fully clarified. In all the programs we can discern uncertainty and vacillation in the delimitation of frontiers between the social and political spheres. Between the Lavrovists and the Bakuninists, for example, there were

many disputes concerning the differences between propaganda and agitation, but since in practice both the opposing groups adopted the same methods, the distinction between Lavrovist propaganda and Bakuninist agitation was fluid.

Its socialist program notwithstanding, terrorist radicalism, in virtue of its whole practice and in view of the character of its secret organisation, was political rather than socialist. The goal of the movement was the abolition of absolutism, and when practical questions concerning political and social institutions came under consideration, the views of the radical terrorists were, after all, not so remarkably radical. In the letter to Alexander III which the executive committee of the Narodnaja Volja issued after the death of Alexander II, it was conceded as possible that the national assembly would legalise the monarchy; the revolutionists would accept this if the election of the deputies had been effected freely and in due form of law.

§ 113.

IN Europe, and in Russia as well, revolutionary terrorism was from the first identified with nihilism. One who was in the movement and who suffered personally under the white terror, Šiško, who was writer as well as revolutionist, tells us that after Karakozov's attempt, the accused were asked whether they belonged to the sect of nihilists, and that many had to sign a declaration renouncing the errors of nihilism, of the periodical "*Sovremennik*," and of socialism.

Nihilism was and was not identical with terrorism. Nihilism was the aspiration for new men and the new social order, was the attempt to attain to the philosophy and to the mode of life of these new men and of this new social order; terrorism is merely a means to an end, and may be a means to this end. But not all the terrorists were nihilists in theory or in practice. Kropotkin says with perfect justice that nihilism was far more profound than terrorism.

Philosophically considered, the revolutionary programs are based upon materialistically formulated positivism; we encounter in them the thoughts of Feuerbach, Comte, Mill, Vogt, Büchner, and Moleschott. Marx, too, begins to exercise an influence; so also, through Lavrov's instrumentality, do Kant and Schopenhauer; whilst the teaching of Spencer and the doctrine of evolution (Darwin) play their part. Among

Russian teachers of revolution, in the sixties, next to Bakunin. Černyševskii was most influential. Enough has been said previously regarding the influence of other Russian thinkers, above all of Herzen.

Atheism and materialism are definite demands in these programs, being counterposed to the Russian theocracy; atheist and materialist teaching is popularised to make it palatable to the common people.¹

The problem as to the permissibility of revolution, and above all as to the permissibility of assassination and crime, will subsequently be considered in fuller detail, when we have made acquaintance with the views of the other theorists of revolution. The theorists of terrorism do not treat the question in association with the various philosophical problems formulated by nihilism, but content themselves with asserting the revolutionary *jus talionis*. *A Life for a Life* was the title of the pamphlet published by Stepniak shortly after the assassination of Mezentsev. This title gives concise expression to the ethical theory of the terrorist revolution, and it is found also in Stepniak's other writings on terrorism, above all in his novel *The Career of a Nihilist*, which describes the life of the nihilist terrorists.

Stepniak compares the arbitrary use of force by the gendarmes, the way in which the members of that body cynically oppress on the large scale all who cherish thoughts of freedom, depriving them of life, with a band of robbers, against whom everyone is by natural right entitled to defend himself by force. Faced by the absolute and arbitrary power of the gendarme, the socialist's only resource is to take up arms in his own defence. Mezentsev was formally condemned to death by Stepniak's associates, and the sentence was carried into effect. But Stepniak was aware that political slavery was conditioned by economic slavery, not conversely. The bourgeoisie is the real enemy of the socialists; the gendarmes, and the government generally, protect the bourgeoisie and the economic inequality sanctioned by the bourgeois class; only in so far as they do this, are gendarmes and government attacked by the socialists. Stepniak therefore demanded of

¹ For example, in the popular pamphlet *The Story of the Kopeck* (1870?), the muzik philosophises as follows concerning God: "God takes care of us, for without the muzik he would not have so much as to buy a candle for himself, and he would have to do without incense. In fact, but for the muzik, God would have perished long ago."

the government that it should abstain from all arbitrary acts and forcible methods, and should concede complete amnesty to political offenders ; if this were done, the socialists would leave the gendarmerie and the government alone ; the government could do nothing more for the socialists. The rest was in the hands of the bourgeoisie, and from the bourgeoisie the socialists would seize the rest, taking the very life of the bourgeoisie as well. But this fight is the concern solely of the two opponents, the socialists and the bourgeoisie ; if the government does not interfere in the struggle, the socialists will not trouble the government. The socialists are quite indifferent how the rulers arrange with the bourgeoisie for the partition of power. " Grant a constitution or do not grant it, as you please ; appeal to the electors or do not appeal ; make the landlords, the popes, and the gendarmes, electors if you will—we care for none of these things. Do not infringe our elementary human rights. This is all we ask of you."

Altogether on these lines was the decision of the executive committee of the Narodnaja Volja that the tactics and activities of that body could only be admitted and justified as exceptional measures of defence and in view of the peculiar circumstances of the time. After the attempt on the Winter Palace, the committee issued a proclamation (February 20, 1880) deploring the death of the soldiers who had guarded the palace. When Garfield was shot, the committee condemned the assassination of the president (September 23, 1881). In a country where individual liberty renders it possible to carry on an honourable campaign of ideas, where the free popular will determines the laws and chooses the rulers, in such a country political assassination as a method of warfare is no more than a manifestation of the very despotism against which the Russians are fighting. Individual despotism and party despotism are equally to be condemned, and force can be justified solely when it is directed against force.

It is obvious that Stepniak's ideas concerning the relationship between the state and the economic basis are somewhat crude. Moreover, we may doubt whether the terror had any real revolutionary effect, and we may contest its utility for the very aims advocated by Stepniak. As we learn from the programs, many of the revolutionists harboured doubts of such a character, but men like Stepniak were not accessible to these and similar considerations.

Stepniak had no profound insight into the ethical and philosophical problem, for he was nothing more than a revolutionary practitioner. In his novel he described the revolutionaries, noting among other things that they were men of atheistic views, but he went no further, he did not discuss the relationships between atheism and terrorism. Yet the philosophical problem of nihilism and terrorism, and in particular the problem of crime, to which we have just had occasion to recur, was far more deeply considered by Bělsinskii, Bakunin, and Herzen. These writers had asked themselves what was the connection between nihilist atheism and materialism, on the one hand, and revolution with the associated method of assassination, on the other. Pisarev vindicated for the nihilists the right to kill and to rob; the opponents of nihilism, led by Dostoevskii, endeavoured to prove (above all from the works of Pisarev) that nihilist atheism was the parent of revolution and crime. But a word of caution is here necessary. We have to remember that certain theologians have defended tyrannicide, and we shall have in due course to ponder the problem more deeply.

V

§ 114.

IN the various literary works devoted to nihilism, those of Turgenev, Černyševskii, Dobroljubov, etc., we find many contributions to the psychology of the Russian terrorist. In addition to these imaginative pictures, we have authentic records, and in especial we have autobiographies of noted revolutionists and terrorists of the epoch under consideration. Among these may be mentioned certain writings by Věra Zasulič, the memoirs of Debagorii-Mokrievič, etc. Those who read Russian can study the data furnished by clandestine periodicals, and all the literature of the movement towards freedom. Of especial importance are the works of Stepniak, wherein he described the revolutionary activities of the sixties and seventies. In my Russian library I have a special section for the revolutionists, containing, in addition to clandestine journals, the memoirs, diaries, political treatises and pamphlets, sociological works, short stories, and novels, which were written by men, young for the most part, in fortresses, Siberian prisons,

or in the foreign lands to which they had fled for refuge. I must confess that it arouses in me a strange emotion to read the poems or the political writings of the decabrists who paid for their bold views on the scaffold (Rylëv, Pestel, etc.); and still more remarkable is the impression aroused by the works of those who were personally engaged in the work of political assassination, or who furnished the leading inspiration to some terrorist outrage involving the deaths of large numbers of persons.

In 1889, Stepniak's novel *The Career of a Nihilist* was published. In 1878, the author had in the open street stabbed General Mezencev, chief of the secret police, and Stepniak's experiences in the service of the revolutionary secret society formed the topic of the novel, which Georg Brandes and Prince Kropotkin commended to the European public. The work affords considerable insight into the psychology and ethics of the nihilist revolutionary.

From the first, the revolution, whether theoretical or political, had no base of support among the masses, for these, or at any rate the peasants, were opposed to it down to a quite recent date. For a long time the Russian revolutionary idea was restricted to a small circle and to isolated individuals, so that the revolutionary thinker and the revolutionary propagandist lived a life apart. The revolutionary circle had a world of its own, and formed a state within the state.

Moreover, the revolutionaries were isolated through the inadequate development of means of communication in a country of vast extent, and the movement therefore lacked living continuity, so that in one town after another the work was ever being begun anew by some little circle. Hence the Russian terrorist revolution was episodic and desultory, the work of unknown leaders, many of whom resided in Europe. The movement, it is true, was diffused throughout Russia, but there was no direct communication between the different circles and individualities; the nihilists acted independently, though, being exposed to the same influences, they worked everywhere much in the same manner. There thus came into existence a kind of muted harmony.

The Russian revolution, like Russian revolutionary literature, was at the outset the work of persons of aristocratic birth, and this circumstance influenced its character. For in the first place the aristocrat, though theoretically a socialist

and man of the people, had a mentality alien from that of the peasant (and in early days the Russian operative was no more than a peasant). Despite its socialistic and democratic program, the revolution was essentially political; it was an aristocratic struggle for freedom waged against tsarist absolutism. The aristocratic revolutionary had an individualist conception of his task; it was to him a point of honour. Not being habituated to daily physical toil, he aspired to distinguish himself by deeds of personal heroism. In a word, he was strongly individualist.

The Russian terrorist was young. In Italy, in Germany, etc., revolution was the work of Young Italy, Young Germany, and so on; but Young Russia was much younger than Young Europe. The papers were full of news items about revolts among schoolboys and girls. Pisarev began authorship at his school desk; Herzen was barely thirteen when he joined with Ogarev in a vow to take vengeance for the executed decabrists.

The youthful terrorist had a fine enthusiasm, but he was green in judgment, he lacked knowledge of men and things, he knew little of political and administrative institutions. For these reasons, his enmity was concentrated upon individuals, and was frequently directed against the tsar alone. Owing to this political anthropomorphism (it might even be termed fetichism), the young terrorists were in social and political matters utopian, unpractical, and negative.

The boyish nihilist, in his inexperience and simplicity, was naïve also in the ethical and political fields; he was frank and straightforward, devoid of understanding for compromise, and with no fears concerning the consequences of his logic. Thus the "children" made their "fathers" very uncomfortable. Ščedrin, who at first condemned the nihilists, subsequently expressed his respect for these "nestlings," discerning in their callowness a great welling up of energy.

Russian women and girls played a prominent part in the terrorist revolution. The wives of the decabrists were renowned for the devotion and tenacity with which they clung to their husbands' ideals. Nihilism and the revolutionary movement secured from women and girls a notable contingent of persons of fearless temperament and indomitable will. We may recall the high estimate placed by Bakunin and Nečaev upon feminine cooperation in the revolution; and the Russian

government, from the adverse outlook, took a similar view.¹ The poet Polonskii, although he acted as censor, wrote in 1877-1878 an enthusiastic description of a girl propagandist languishing in gaol. Turgenev's prose poem *The Threshold* is an apotheosis of the woman terrorist Perovskaja.

Girls often consecrated their lives to the revolution when they were still little more than children.²

Many writers on the Russian revolution ascribe a religious character to the movement, but it is necessary here to be precise in our use of terms. The revolutionist, especially if still quite young, believed in the revolution as shortly before he had believed in heaven. He delighted in self-sacrifice, and had a certain resemblance to the early Christians with their love of martyrdom. Nolens volens the terrorist shunned self-indulgence; he had no taste for bodily pleasures; despite his theories he was not, could not possibly be, a practical materialist and hedonist. He sacrificed everything to his ideal, even personal inclinations, even love and marriage. There was something of the ascetic about him.

The Russian terrorist was frequently a mystic; he had a mystical faith in the revolution; he had exchanged his religious creed for a philosophical and political creed, for a kind of revolutionary gnosis. Just as the religious mystic immerses himself wholly in the anthropomorphic idea of his god, so did the revolutionary devote himself wholly to the contemplation of the deed to be performed and of the person to be destroyed. The horror of crime, the horror of assassination, had a deliriant influence upon these young minds, made them drunken with death, and in proportion as it did this, it unfitted them for detail work. The Russian revolutionist could die for his idea, but he could not always live for it.

Not infrequently the Russian revolutionist became utterly indifferent to life; he grew accustomed to the dangers, the

¹ Cf. the article entitled, *Woman*, in the collective work, *Russia by Russians*. In this article we find the 1874 report of Count Pahlen, Minister for Justice, who ascribed the success of the revolutionary organisations to the collaboration of women and girls. Amfiteatrov, the writer of the article, estimated that among the revolutionists the numerical proportion of the women to the men was as 1 : 4.

² We find, for example, in the reminiscences of Breškovskaja, "By sixteen I had read much of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot, and I knew by heart the French revolution."

death risks, to which his friends were exposed, and in the end his own death seemed to him nothing more than a means towards a revolutionary end. He took to heart the saying of Mihailov: "In truth it is no whit easier to die in a room than to die on the battlefield!"

But because of this very indifference, the revolutionary shunned detail work, and when he was forced to undertake it it was because he was attracted to it by the stimulus of danger, not because he desired it as an occupation.

The peculiar technique of revolution made of the revolutionary a specialist who was unfitted for all other work.

This remarkable terrorist occultism had a powerfully stimulating effect upon the revolutionaries and upon the population at large, for the mysterious, the unforeseen, the incalculable, has ever a strange power.

In his occultism and mysticism, the Russian revolutionary was a zealot, a fanatical autocrat, a revolutionary tsar. Such was Bakunin. Despite his democratic program and his socialistic ideals, the revolutionary, no less than his adversary, was an aristocrat.

In conjunction with revolutionary occultism, there developed a species of revolutionary augurship, and not inaptly did Herzen describe as a new priestly caste, the revolutionary minority which desired to lead the European majority. This augurship readily passed over into Machiavellianism and Jesuitry; a Nečaev was produced as soon as the terrorist outrage ceased to be a duel and became a murder. The revolutionists, as we learn from Lavrov's utterances concerning falsehood, felt how delicate, how terrible, was the situation; and was it not terrible that the revolutionary, who was willing to stake his life unhesitatingly, should in his tactical caution be constrained to falsehood and misrepresentation? The executive committee did no doubt as a rule inform its victims that sentence of death had been passed upon them, but the actual outrage had to be planned and carried out with the utmost secrecy. This hero, this martyr, was one who must be prepared to lie unceasingly. But indeed we shall do well to remember that the hero's death on the field of battle is supplemented by the death of the spy. The Trojan war knew, not Hector alone, but also Ulysses. The revolution, revolutionary organisation, has its tacticians and diplomatists as well as its technicians. It has, moreover, its bureaucrats.

Let us try to form for ourselves a vivid picture of the Russian terrorist's life. In the majority of cases his existence, full of vexations and hardships, had to be passed in bitter poverty and deprivation. For the refugee, Europe was but a civilised Siberia. Whilst the Siberian prisoner or exile succumbed to misfortune, the refugee was prematurely worn out by his activities. In many cases, the revolutionist was driven to suicide to escape the informers, who even in Europe would not leave him in peace. In Russia itself, the struggle between the police and the nihilist was of a most exciting character. The secret police waged a life and death warfare against the conspirators, using all possible means to gain the upper hand. The conspirator had to be ever on his guard, even against his most intimate friends, as is evidenced by the frequent assassination of spies and traitors. Finally we have to remember that for the revolutionists all family ties were dissolved; that they had been torn from their customary environment, from their familiar social sphere; that they had been isolated, had been plunged into a sea of tears and blood, had become indwellers of a realm of death.¹

The revolutionist frequently became a proletarian, a *déclassé*, losing all interest in culture, and judging society and social organisation from this narrow outlook.²

The Russian terrorist, like Russian liberal and progressive society in general, had, notwithstanding his realism and realistic nihilism, a nervous and restless element in his composition. I have numbered among my personal acquaintances several Russians who, burning with curiosity and eagerness, came to Europe as to the promised land, and yet hardly had they become settled there when they began to feel that European life was too uniform, too bourgeois, too orderly and philistine, too monotonously grey. The European intelligentsia, European political and socialist parties, appear to the Russian utterly unrevolutionary; parliament is insipid; Russia, with all its horrors, seems to him more attractive, and he is seized with violent home-sickness.

"We need something different; we need storm and life,

¹ The average duration of life of the Russian terrorist was estimated at two years. The number of victims of the terrorist revolution during the years 1866 to 1892 is stated to have been 30,000.

² Lieutenant-Colonel N. V. Sokolov, an administrative exile, wrote *The Renegades* (1866) in which he ascribed all human progress to the activity of the *déclassés*.

a world that is lawless and therefore free," wrote Bakunin. To him and to Herzen, the revolutionary seemed successor to the Cossack. It is certainly true of the revolutionary and of the Russian intellectual, that he has in him something of the nomad. He may perhaps be regarded as a combination of the monk and the Cossack or of the monk and the pilgrim.

The Russian terrorist cannot withdraw his hand from the plough, however much he may wish to do so ; he has no place under the government and official society, unless he becomes an inert tool in the hands of his former enemies. In certain instances, a revolutionary author and leader may openly go over to the opposite side, as happened in the case of Tihomirov, but it was impossible for an ex-revolutionist to resume a quiet working life in Russia. Whenever the Russian revolutionary movement became stagnant, the champions of that movement sought a field for their activities in foreign lands. Men like Stepniak took part in the Herzegovina rising and in the Benevento revolt ; others were active in the Paris commune. Bakunin was the prototype of Turgenev's Rudin.

If we are to form a just estimate of the Russian terrorist, we must take into account the way in which tsarism fought him.

The outlook of absolutism towards revolutionary valour cannot but remind us to some extent of John the Terrible. The tyranny exercised over literature and over academic freedoms was all the more intolerable in Russia, because in these respects liberty had already for the most part been secured elsewhere in Europe, and because such liberty could not be kept out of Russia, unless the tsarist censorship should attempt to gag the whole of Europe. None the less the impossible was attempted. Forcibly and brutally Russian absolutism stamped on every movement towards freedom. Each revolutionary outrage had to be atoned for by the sacrifice of countless victims on the scaffold, in fortresses, and in Siberia. The revolutionists fell sick and died by hundreds in the fetid gaols. Many of them, unquestionably, were perfectly innocent. Numbers became insane. Many terminated their protracted martyrdom by suicide, often in some unprecedented manner, as by the hunger strike. Even more inhuman than the cruelty was the depravity of the bureaucracy, the arbitrary infliction of corporal punishment upon political prisoners, and all the brutality to which the official tyrants were prone. Cases of the violation of nihilist girls and women are on record.

Kvjatkovskii, a member of the *Narodnaja Volja*, prosecuted in 1880 for participation in the terrorist movement, gave in his speech for the defence the following account of the psychology of the Russian terrorists. While frankly admitting that his party was preparing for a popular revolt, he protested against the designation "anarchist." The revolutionary party, he said, recognised the necessity for a government; its opposition was merely to the existing absolutist form of government; it was, therefore not an anarchist party. "I do not propose to maintain that terrorism plays no part in our program. I admit that this is one of our activities. But it occupies only the second or third place in order of importance. We practise it for the protection of our members, but not as a primary means to secure our ends. It is not necessary to have been a tiger from the first and by nature in order to display tigerish qualities. Social conditions exist by which lambs are converted into tigers. Political assassination was evoked by the horrible cruelties practised by the government against the revolutionaries."

The student Balmašev, who in 1902 shot Minister Syppjagin, made a similar answer to the court when he was asked to disclose the names of his helpers and confederates. His sole assistant and fellow conspirator, he declared, had been the government. "I do not deny that in earlier days, at school and at the university, I carried on propaganda against the government, but I never favoured terrorism or the use of forcible methods. Far from it, I was always an advocate of legal order and constitutional procedure. But the Russian ministers convinced me that right and legality do not exist in Russia, that they have been replaced by unpunished illegality, by a regime of arbitrary force, against which force is the only weapon."

Bakunin was not merely the theorist of Russian terrorism, but was in addition the spokesman of the hatred which tsarism had stored up in the minds of the cultured classes, hatred for the church, for religion, for the state, for the Russian theocracy. Kropotkin no less than Bakunin, Kropotkin the anarchistic apostle of humanitarianism, was overflowing with a like hatred. Again and again the Russian lamb has become a tiger. "Gods pass. Kings pass. The prestige of authority passes. Who shall take the place of gods, kings, and priests, if not the free individual, confident in his own powers? Simple faith vanishes.

Make way for science! Caprice and charity disappear. Make way for justice!" Kropotkin teaches, with Nietzsche, that the strong individual must win for himself the right to force. In his strength, he may kill the tyrant as he may kill a viper. "A life for a life."

These incentives of the Russian revolution must be sensed behind the revolutionary deeds if we wish to understand the true nature of the movement. The revolutionary negation of Russia was the offspring of mingled love and loathing.

The loathing often made the Russian revolutionaries blind, blinder than was consistent with the achievement of the revolutionary aim.

The traits that have been previously described as typical of the realists, the roughness of their forms of social intercourse, their laconic speech, their contempt for everything that was not relevant to the ends immediately in view, the cynicism analysed by Pisarev—all these qualities were still more fully developed in terrorist circles. It was natural, for the terrorists were men consecrated to death.

Whatever the faults of the Russian revolutionists and terrorists, it is impossible, in a final survey, to judge them unfavourably. Their ardent devotion to intellectual and political freedom, their self-sacrificing enthusiasm for the folk, their reckless disregard of their personal interests and of their own lives, their fidelity towards their comrades—these are brilliant characteristics, are qualities of the utmost value, which cannot fail to arouse respect and sympathy for individual revolutionists and for the Russian people from which they sprang.¹

¹ In 1894, when two calumnious articles had been published by the New Review (London) attempting to discredit in the eyes of Europe the whole Russian revolutionary movement, Kennan, in *Free Russia*, found apt words for the defence: "In the course of my late visit to Russia and Siberia I made the personal acquaintance of more than five hundred men and women who were regarded by the Russian secret police as 'Nihilists.' Some were still at liberty in European Russia, some were in exile in Siberia, and some were in penal servitude at the mines of Kara. Among them all, I did not find a single human being who could be called, by any stretch or licence of language, an Anarchist, nor did I find a single human being who would have approved—still less encouraged—such crimes as those recently committed in Paris and Barcelona. Most of the 'Nihilists' whom I met in Siberia were simply moderate Liberals, and even the members of the extreme and radical fraction of the revolutionary party, known as the 'Terrorists,' declared to me, again and again, as they had already declared to Alexander III in their famous letter of March 10, 1881, that they were fighting merely for a free repre-

representative form of government, and that if the Tzar would summon a national assembly, to be elected by the people, they—the 'Terrorists'—would submit unconditionally to the decisions of such an assembly, and would not allow themselves to offer violent resistance to any government that such an assembly might sanction.' Men and women who make declarations of this kind can be called 'Anarchists' only by those who are grossly ignorant of their character and aims. In conclusion, I can only say again what I have already said elsewhere, that, morally, the Russian revolutionists whom I met in Siberia would compare favourably with any body of men and women of equal numerical strength that I could collect from the circle of my own acquaintances. I do not share the opinions of all of them, but it is my deliberate conviction, nevertheless, that, tested by any moral standard of which I have knowledge, such 'Nihilists' as Volkhovsky, Chudnofski, Alexander Krapotkin, Kogan-Bernstein, Charoushin, Klements, Natalie Armfeldt and Anna Pavlovna Korba, represent the flower of Russian young manhood and young womanhood. General Strelnikof may say that they are 'fanatics' and 'robbers'; secret agents of the Russian police in London may call them 'Anarchists'; and Mr. Galkine-Wrasskoy may describe them as 'wretched men and women whose social depravity is so great that it would shock the English people if translated into proper English equivalents'; but among these men and women, nevertheless, are some of the best, bravest and most generous types of manhood and womanhood that I have ever known. I am linked to them only by the ties of sympathy, humanity, or friendship; but I wish that I were bound to them by the tie of kindred blood. I should be proud of them if they were my brothers and sisters, and so long as any of them live they may count upon me for any service that a brother can render."

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE SO-CALLED SOCIOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVISTS; LAVROV AND MIHAILOVSKII

I

§ 115.

PETR LAVROV became well known in Europe as a theorist and leader among the revolutionary refugees. Of his numerous essays, pamphlets, and longer works, a few only have been translated, notably the *Historical Letters*. He also contributed several essays to European socialist periodicals, chiefly French and German.

Lavrov's literary physiognomy is peculiar to himself. Pisarev, with youthful impudence, termed him a scholastic, but this was a libel. Lavrov was a conscientious scholar, what Russians might call "a German professor." He was diligent as an analyst, but lacked constructive talent and had little originality, and was a vigorous but not an incisive thinker. As an author he was cumbrous, and of his opus magnum, which was to be a history of thought, nothing more was ever completed than an introduction to the introduction. But he was prolific as a clandestine poet, and his Russian "Marseillaise" is still sung.¹

¹ Historische Briefe aus dem russischen übersetzt von S. Dawidow. Mit einer Einleitung von Dr. Charles Rappoport, 1901. These Historical Letters were first published during the years 1868-1869 in the periodical *Nedělja*, being signed with the pseudonym, Mirtov. In 1870 they were published in book form. In 1872, Lavrov prepared a new edition which, however, was not issued until 1891, when it had been revised and had been supplemented by a letter written in 1881 on the Theory and Practice of Progress. This second edition is the basis of the following sketch. Lavrov was a prolific writer of essays and books, his books being no more than enlarged essays. Consult also Arnoldi (Lavrov), *The Task of History, the Project of an Introduction to*

Like his contemporaries, Lavrov was a student of Hegel and of the Hegelian left, his first literary works being devoted to Hegel; but whereas so many Russian writers of that day remained Feuerbachians, Lavrov returned from Feuerbach to Kant. He was acquainted with French philosophy, that of Cousin and others, but the influence of Comte and of positivism generally were decisive upon his development. Among the French socialists, Proudhon influenced him more than Louis Blanc or any other. The writings of Darwin and Spencer had a great effect upon him, and through a study of the doctrine of evolution he was led to make the Comtist idea of progress the central notion of his system. In epistemology, too, Lavrov learned much from Herbert Spencer.

Lavrov was a contemporary of Černyševskii, and was influenced by that writer. The two men passed through the same philosophical school, and were busied with and disquieted by the same problems. But whereas Černyševskii decided in favour of positivist materialism and utilitarianism, Lavrov turned back to Kant, though without abandoning positivist materialism and utilitarianism. Lavrov was keenly

the *Study of the Development of Human Thought*, 1898; Arnoldi, *Contemporary Teaching concerning Morals and the History of Ethics*, 1904; *Attempt at a History of Modern Thought*, vol. I, Introductory, part 1 Preliminaries, *The Tasks and History of Thought*, book I, Prehistorical (1888).—Petr Aleksēvič Lavrov was born in 1823. His father was a retired colonel, and a wealthy landowner. From the age of thirteen the son was educated in the artillery school for an officer's career. Under the father's pedantic and unsystematic supervision the boy devoted himself at home to an unregulated course of reading, this being facilitated by his knowledge of French and German. When nineteen years of age he became an officer, and when twenty-one he was appointed teacher of mathematics in his school, subsequently becoming teacher, at the artillery academy. He married in 1847, his wife being of German descent. His education at home was conservative. At the military school his views were modified as a result of his training in exact science. The excitement aroused by the Crimean war affected him no less than others; his poems, voicing the views of the opposition and revolutionary in sentiment, were widely circulated in manuscript, but they were topical verses rather than the expression of any carefully considered program. Lavrov, like his contemporaries, had given much time to the study of German philosophy, and in addition was well read in French socialism, being familiar with the works of Fourier, Saint-Simon, Louis Blanc, and Proudhon, and with those of the Catholic socialist Buchez and his pupils. These influences led him in 1862 to join the secret society *Zemlja i Volja*, in which, however, he did not play an active part. At this epoch, too, he was acquainted with Černyševskii. In 1865 his wife died. A year later, after the attempt of Karakozov (to whose circle he did not belong), he was arrested on account of his clandestine literary

aware of the opposition between criticism and positivism, between subjectivism and objectivism, between Kant and Comte, but lacked power to transcend this opposition. His solution of the difficulty was to conceive the fundamental epistemological problems psychologically, somewhat after the manner which had been adopted by the most recent adherents of Hume, and after the manner which Spencer attempted for the apriori. Lavrov also speaks of the concept of duty quite in the Kantian style. He formulates his own categorical imperative, but this imperative (and it is here that he differs from Kant) is referred by him to psychical endowments which are to be admitted positivistically as extant facts.

Notable is the extent to which Lavrov was influenced by thinkers of the second and third rank. In the *Historical Letters* more space is allotted to the consideration of Proudhon, Buckle, Ruge, and Bruno Bauer, than to the consideration of Kant and Comte, although the book is essentially concerned with the ideas of the two last-named philosophers. Proudhon reproduced the ideas of Kant, Buckle, and Comte; but just as in Proudhon's writings Kantianism passes without transition into Hegelianism and into positivism, so in the

activities, poems directed against Nicholas I and Alexander II, and on account of his personal relationships with Černyševskii and Mihailov. In 1867 he was interned at Vologda, where he wrote his *Historical Letters*. Lopatin, the translator of Marx, helped him to escape. Herzen had invited Lavrov to Paris, and he reached that city in March 1870, but before that date Herzen had died. Lavrov became a member of the International, and took part in the Commune, being sent to Belgium and to London to seek help for the Commune. In London he became acquainted with Marx and with other continental refugees, but had before this date become a convinced socialist. From 1873 to 1876, he was editor of the revolutionary periodical *Vpered*, with whose program we are already familiar. Not only did he become estranged from Bakunin and the Bakuninists, but in 1876 his own supporters turned against him. From 1876 to 1877, *Vpered* continued to appear under a different editorship. For six years thenceforward Lavrov remained outside the revolutionary organisation of the new *Zemlja i Volja* and of the *Narodnaja Volja*, and in 1879 he protested against the fighting methods of the latter body. After the assassination of Alexander II, Lavrov resumed a place in the ranks of the active revolutionaries, promoting the organisation of the *Red Cross* of the *Narodnaja Volja*, and being for this reason expelled from France for some time. In London he entered into relationships with the *Narodnaja Volja*, and became co-editor of its organ, *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli* (1883-1886). During this period Lavrov was chiefly engaged in the attack upon absolutism. During the nineties, Lavrov edited clandestine refugee literature, and wrote, *Contributions to the History of the Russian Revolution*. In addition, as in earlier years, he was continually occupied with his personal work in the theoretical field. He died in Paris in the year 1900.

writings of Lavrov do Kant and Comte, Comte and Hegel, seem to merge one into another. Further, just as, for Lavrov, Buckle was the chief instigator to the study of numerous questions, so Ruge was the Russian's leader in the problems of individualism.¹

We shall learn shortly how far as a socialist Lavrov agreed with Marx. For the moment it will suffice to say that Lavrov's socialism was ethically grounded, that Lavrov rejected historical materialism, appealing to the categorical imperative and not to the general law of evolution.

Historical Letters embodies an endeavour to solve the old problem of object versus subject, subject versus object, Lavrov contrasting history with the process of nature, civilisation with nature. By the term history, Lavrov understands objective and subjective history, to use the current distinction. He conceives objective history as part of the general nature process, considered not materialistically but in Spencer's fashion. The contrast he conceives between nature and history is therefore, properly speaking, a contrast only between nature and history in the subjective sense. Such is the significance we must attach to Lavrov's "historical realism," the name he himself gives to his standpoint. He opens his enquiry by asking whether natural science or history is "the closer concern" of modern man. He replies that history touches man's vital interests more closely; that history is the story of human problems. Natural science may enable us to conduct life more rationally, but history alone can represent life and comprehend it. We recognise that "history" signifies here the history of consciousness, that the contrast to which reference is made is between nature and consciousness, and, be it noted, between nature and individual consciousness—nothing but individual consciousness, as Lavrov again and again insists.

This opposition between natural science and history is not subjected by Lavrov to a detailed epistemological examination. It certainly does not suffice to say that history is man's, modern man's, closer concern; but we can excuse Lavrov when we remember that Comte failed to examine the contrast with any greater precision. Nor shall we dispute the contention that history, as contrasted with natural science, embraces,

¹ Ruge drew attention to Buckle by his translation of that writer's work (1860).

properly speaking, the entire domain of the mental sciences, and that it merges into psychology.

Lavrov reckons the morphological and phenomenological disciplines among the natural sciences. The former are those termed by Comte the concrete sciences, whilst the latter are the sciences whose aim it is to establish the laws of phenomena. They are enumerated by Lavrov in the following order: geometry, mechanics, physics and chemistry, biology, psychology, ethics, sociology—a somewhat motley hierarchy, which is obviously reminiscent of Comte as restated by Spencer. Lavrov is at one with Spencer and differs from Comte in affirming the independence and importance of psychology and ethics, because he takes consciousness as his starting point, and is unable to accept the Comtist view of psychology as an appendage to biology. None the less the Comtist and naturalist demands are conceded to this extent, that psychology, ethics, and sociology are made to figure as natural sciences. The use of the term "phenomenological" is doubtless intended to imply that positivism is phenomenological, but the word is unhappily chosen, seeing that (from Lavrov's outlook) the "morphological" sciences have likewise to do with phenomena. With Comte, Lavrov sees in the phenomenological sciences the laws of phenomena. They are, in fact, the "abstract sciences" of Comte.

History does not appear in Lavrov's hierarchy. It is plain, however, that we must understand him to speak of history, now in a wider sense (that which is contrasted with nature), and now in a narrower and more ordinary sense. But the domain of the latter is not clearly defined. We are told merely that history must furnish the interpretation, must explain the significance, of historical development. It must therefore provide a philosophy of history such as was undertaken by Comte as a department of sociology. Lavrov had not attained to clarity of thought upon these fundamental epistemological and methodological questions. For example, he gives very vague explanations of sociology, and in especial he fails to determine the relationship between sociology and history. He defines sociology (which he also speaks of as "social science") as the theory of the processes and events of social development, and also as the science of social organisation (the social organism). But concerning the relationships between these disciplines and history, all he tells us is that

they are "closely connected," and he explains that history is the science of non-recurrent phenomena, whereas sociology is the history of recurrent phenomena. Are we to interpret this as meaning much what recent philosophers of history (for example Windelband and Rickert) mean when they talk of the individual in the historical process? In one who wrote after Comte, and after the Spencerian criticism of Comte's hierarchy of the sciences, this lack of precision is a serious matter, even apart from the consideration that, as previously pointed out, Lavrov failed to distinguish clearly between the ideas of Comte and those of Kant.

For Comte, in his classification and hierarchy of the sciences, applied his positivism, which he believed to be perfectly objectivist. Psychology, based upon the conceptions of consciousness, disappeared from the field, because consciousness, individual consciousness, disappeared before the historical process of humanity at large; psychology was degraded to become a mere department of biology, sociology being constituted as the true mental science, and being conceived also as the psychology of humanity and of human history. Spencer, on the other hand, rightly rejected the Comtist hierarchy of the sciences, for he found it impossible to dispose of the facts of "subjective" psychology in the unpositive and autocratic manner adopted by Comte. Spencer insisted upon the rights of logic and above all upon those of ethics, and on these lines constructed his epistemologically modified classification of the sciences. Spencer had recognised how naïve was Comte in epistemological matters; he had grasped the fundamental significance of consciousness and therefore of psychology; and in like manner he had recognised the importance of ethics beside and above sociology. Spencer paid due epistemological regard to the rights of subjectivism, whereas Comte, in his later phase, which was contrasted with his objectivist positivism, was forced uncritically into subjectivism. Spencer, too, believed that his evolutionism sufficed to explain Kant, alike epistemologically and ethically.

By the study of Kant, Comte, and Spencer, Lavrov was led to the same problems as Spencer, but Lavrov lacked the philosophic strength which would have enabled him to establish his doctrines upon sound epistemological foundations, to render his standpoint philosophically secure. Lavrov's classi-

fication of the sciences was an unorganised compromise between Comte and Spencer.

§ 116.

EVOLUTION is the evolution of thought, of thinking. Since the sixteenth century, mankind has abandoned the religious outlook and the religious regulation of life which had hitherto prevailed, and a secular education has been the result. But there has ensued a disastrous dualism between scientific theory, between theory based upon the sciences (philosophy), on the one hand, and the police state (Lavrov means the absolutist state) which has replaced the church, upon the other—the police state characterised by competition in the economic field. This dualism must yield place to a new and superior unity of theory and practice. Scientific socialism and internationalism are competent to bring about such a synthesis. But religious views and practices will continue to exist as vestiges long after socialism and scientifically grounded social institutions have come into existence.

Thus far we have a presentation of Comte's developmental scheme, socialistically retouched, but it is not made clear to us why the absolutism which has replaced the church has manifested the same or a similar opposition to science as did the church.

The Comtist scheme is expanded by Lavrov in the Darwinian evolutionist sense, following the lines of Spencer and of more recent students of civilisation, notably French and English writers. Lavrov's *History of Thought* begins with the history of the cosmos and of the formation of the earth. Man separated himself from other animals in virtue of the organ of thought, living at first in loose isolated groups, which attained their acme in the patriarchal tribal organisation. Lavrov leaves open the question whether the patriarchate preceded the matriarchate, and in any case to him the problem is of less importance than it is to the Marxists. From out the patriarchal order the economic organisation of contemporary society developed through the division of labour, and the political and legal state organisation came into being. This development was completed (Lavrov here follows Comte) upon the basis of the theological and religious outlook on the universe. Like Comte's, is Lavrov's conception of the church, and of the medieval state subordinated to the church; the

reformation broke the power of the church and its doctrines ; the absolute state came into existence, but will yield place to the new socialistic ordering of society.

Whereas Comte regarded social evolution and its stages as proceeding in accordance with a historically given regime of law, Lavrov refuses to accept this reign of law as a mere empirical datum, but desires to understand it and establish it rationalistically. Comte had indeed explained his law of the three stages psychologically, with reference to the analogy of individual development. But in his *Philosophie Positive*, Comte failed to demonstrate the individual obligation to accept his positivism ; he did not show why everyone of us ought to cooperate actively in the spread and practical development of the positive, antitheological, and antimetaphysical outlook on the universe.

Lavrov was aware of the weakness of positivism in this respect, and he therefore endeavoured to introduce the idea of moral obligation into the historical process without the epistemological dualism which severs Comte's *Politique positive* from his *Philosophie positive*. To Lavrov, universal history was per se a world assize ; he regarded evolution as the development of moral aspirations ; for him, the historical description of individual historic epochs was an illustration of ethical principles.

To Lavrov, history was a developmental process subjected to definite and necessary laws. Man, himself, was likewise subordinated to these laws, but was at the same time empowered, with full awareness of the situation, to adapt himself to the historical process, freely deciding to strive for attainable goals. Lavrov terms the primary social state "culture," this being the stage which Hegel described as the unfree and the unconscious. But, according to Lavrov we have to understand by "civilisation," history as it is deliberately made by men with awakened consciousness, the purposive elaboration of inherited "culture."

The Kantian postulate of freedom is transformed by Lavrov into the illusion of freedom. The conscious individual (and when Lavrov speaks of consciousness he is thinking not only of the psychological but also of the critical and ethical consciousness) chooses aims for himself and appraises these aims ethically. But whereas Kant had endeavoured to establish ethical purposiveness upon his apriori, Lavrov is

content to recognise the existence of a higher impulse towards truthfulness and morality. Lavrov here follows the French socialists, and we may consider in especial that he must have borrowed from Louis Blanc the doctrine of physical, intellectual, and moral needs; but whereas Blanc had a theistic foundation for his psychology, Lavrov detests metaphysics and religion.

Thus Lavrov attains a peculiar subjectivism of aims and values. The moral ideal is considered to give men their perspective for the arrangement and valuation of history, many recognising that, despite temporary arrests and relapses, historical progress is a reality.

The brief formula of the idea of progress is thus worded by Lavrov: "The development of individuality alike physically, mentally, and morally; the incorporation of truth and justice in social forms."

Society and individuals are veridical data; but only the fully conscious, the "more definite" individuality, the personality, only (as Lavrov expresses it, following Ruge and Bruno Bauer) the critically thinking individuality, makes history—by elaborating, as we have already been told, traditional culture, and thus forming a human society out of the human ant-hill. The critically-thinking individuality keeps history going, keeps it moving, and in doing so converts simple evolution into progress.

Bruno Bauer in conjunction with many adherents of the Hegelian left, transformed Kant's Critique of Pure Reason into a "pure critique," that is to say into a negation of theology and of the (absolutist) state. Lavrov agreed in this estimate, but wished the criticism to be conceived more in Kant's own sense. Such was the leading problem with which he dealt, though it was not clearly formulated. We note, however, his endeavour to display the contrast between faith and criticism, meaning by faith, not religious faith merely, but faith of every kind. He was aware that faith alone can move mountains, and he desired such a faith for himself, condemning unfaith as indifferentism. Criticism must not destroy faith. Its function is to upbuild firm convictions, so that what was criticism yesterday becomes belief to-day. Faith is omnipotent, but is not all-sufficing, since falsehood no less than truth may be animated with faith. This is why criticism on the part of the thinking individualities is essential;

for Lavrov, "critical thought" becomes the creative principle, as spirit was for Hegel.

It is plain that Lavrov saw the negative tendency of the Hegelian left, and that for this reason he drew nearer to Kant, but failed, as we have seen, to formulate the problem with adequate precision. For like reasons and in like manner he extolled the Russian critics (Herzen, Granovskii, Bakunin, Černyševskii, and Dobroljubov) without giving any exact account of the nature of their criticism.

The same philosophical weakness clings to Lavrov's other ideas.

For example, he expounds his subjective teleology of the historical process, but looks also for objective props of this teleology; such is the origin of his formula of progress. Moreover, he believes in a coincidence of individual interest with the interest of the community, quite after the manner of the older metaphysical teleologists and teleological economists. But while expressing profound approval of this community of interests, and terming it "solidarity," he is nevertheless disquieted because, after all, the interests of the individual and those of the community are frequently divergent. When this happens, however, an appeal is made to the categorical imperative: "Live according to the ideal which thou hast formed for thyself of what a fully developed human being should be." Lavrov is aware that progress has been a most costly affair. Blood has flowed in streams, but has been poured out ever for the sake of posterity. It is therefore the duty of each one of us to pay his share of the costs of progress, to do his best to lessen the evils which threaten society, in the present and in the future.

Lavrov sees that his critically-thinking individualities are in truth isolated in their brilliant and heroic struggle against society, but he consoles himself with the thought that the heroes are never quite alone, and that the number of their adherents and fellow fighters is increasing.

The duty of the strong, of the "more definite" individuals, is, therefore, to join the party of those who are struggling on behalf of progress. There are in truth three tasks for the critically-thinking individuality. First of all such persons must instruct and enlighten their fellow men concerning progress, must devote themselves to propaganda; secondly, they must enter into an organised progressive fellowship; last of all,

the organiser of the party of progress must alike theoretically and practically be a model of the right way of living.

Lavrov recognises as his fundamental dogma the idea of humanity ; life is the cult of the ethics of humanity, but life further demands self-sacrifice ; the struggle for progress is imposed upon individuals as a moral duty.

Lavrov criticises the various theories of progress, and rejects most of them. He cannot accept uncritical optimism ; he rejects pessimism ; and he is no less displeased with naturalism, which describes progress as an illusion, and considers mechanical and technical evolution to be the only real factors of history. In this connection, historical (economic) materialism is likewise rejected. Lavrov terms himself a historical realist, and for the historical realist the very formulation of the problem is different. Even if the universe and history were naught but illusion, man cannot help setting himself aims and seeking suitable means for their realisation. Man cannot comprehend the ultimate nature of things, and need not, therefore, waste his time over metaphysics ; but we can and must act ethically, even though our ethical aspiration be purely subjective. Let the nature of things be what it may, for *us* insists Lavrov, the question of "the better," the question of progress, remains always of vital significance.

Lavrov's compromises are obvious. He has amalgamated Kant's thing-by-itself, the apriori of cognition, and the categorical imperative, with positivist relativism ; he has fused and confused Kant with Comte. Of course, Lavrov is likewise extremely sceptical, admitting as he does the possibility of illusionism, even though he terms it "idealisation" ; this idealisation, he considers, is found above all in the working of the consciousness of freedom (of free will), by which the power of the laws of unconscious matter is transcended. Lavrov accentuated his scepticism by the study of the ancient sceptics, quoting above all Protagoras in support of his relativist subjectivism.

Lavrov, like Kant, values practice more highly than theory. Or rather it may be said that Lavrov is so much the positivist that he here modifies Kant to some extent, placing theory and practice on the same level, postulating the unity of theory and practice. The idea of progress is doubtless theory, but at the same time it involves practice, and the practice of progress involves for our age that the conscious, the fully

developed and progressive man, should collaborate in a party with others of the like way of thinking to ensure the realisation of progress. "History needs sacrifices, and he makes sacrifices who accepts the great and severe task of becoming a fighter for his own development and for that of others. The problems of evolution *must* be solved. The conquest of a historic future *must* be achieved. Everyone who has become conscious of the evolutionary need has to face the terrible question: Wilt thou be one of those who are ready for all sacrifices and sufferings, that they may be numbered among the fully awakened and far-seeing fighters for progress, or wilt thou stand aside, as passive spectator of the terrible ills of the world, with the carking awareness that thou art a renegade? Choose!"

Fighter for progress, but perspicacious fighter! We have already made ourselves familiar with Lavrov's theory of revolution as formulated in the program of "Vpered"; we have seen how he cautiously weighs the pros and the cons, how he endeavours to calculate the chances of the revolution, and how, just as in the *Historical Letters*, he feels the final decision to be a terrible responsibility. Lavrov was one who could not venture without thus estimating the chances, and this is why he and his adherents were vilified by the Bakuninists as mere propagandists. In actual fact, as a practical revolutionary, Lavrov never failed to fulfil the three demands which he considered to be imposed upon the practitioner of progress, upon the revolutionary; but he did not show himself to be a leader of the revolutionary movement. Yet it must be remembered that Lavrov never claimed such leadership.

At the outset he opposed the terrorism of the Narodnaja Volja, but in the end he joined that camp, approving, or at least tolerating terrorist tactics. He protested against Tolstoi's doctrine of non-resistance, and expounded the ethical justification for the exceptional use of forcible measures.

We can now form a definitive judgment upon Lavrov's subjectivism, and alike from the epistemological and the metaphysical outlook this is the important matter in the study of the movement of Russian thought.

Lavrov's views are ill-defined.

Lavrov formulated his subjectivism in several different ways, and he admitted, to use his own phrase, that it was derived from various sources. He drew distinctions between

subjective aims, the outlook on the universe, on the one hand, and the consequent judgments, the valuation of the world outlook, on the other; between judgments concerning the course, the epochs, and the phases of progress, and judgments concerning the causes and consequences of these epochs and phases. It is obvious that this subjectivism implies nothing more than variations in the judgments of the individuals who are thinking historically—that it has nothing whatever to do with the great question of subjectivism and objectivism as studied by postkantian German idealists. The Marxists, for example, likewise speak of class morality, and thus, for all their objectivism, recognise such a “subjectivism,” i.e. relativism.

But Lavrov furnishes us with supplements to critical subjectivism in so far as, with Schopenhauer, he cherishes epistemological and metaphysical illusionism. Nevertheless in this question Lavrov is less decided than Schopenhauer, for Lavrov is a sceptic, and his acceptance of illusionism is no more than conditional.

In the name of individual freedom, Bělsinskii protested most energetically against history, its chronological sequence, and its individual data, and yet we should not term him a subjectivist. Lavrov, like Bělsinskii, championed the individual and individual liberty against the historical and social totality. Society was no abstraction to Lavrov; it was a real complex of definite and “more definite” individuals. Progress, says Lavrov, is not non-individual, it is definite persons who progress, who comprise society and make history. Some are the genuine factors of the historical process; others merely participate in it; and yet others are merely in it, are simply there while it goes on. We see that Lavrov rejects, not only the Marxist conception of society and history, but the Comtist conception as well; he holds fast to individual consciousness, and endeavours from this outlook, somewhat after the manner of Spencer, to effect a reconciliation between the views of Kant and those of Comte.

People often speak of Lavrov’s “subjective method” but Lavrov himself rarely makes use of the expression. We have not, in fact, to do with a method, but with something more concrete, with a decision upon the question of objectivism versus subjectivism. The term “subjective method” is employed more frequently by Mihailovskii and subsequent writers.

§ 117.

LAVROV'S socialism is essentially based upon Kant's idea of humanity—humanity and human dignity. Mankind, life, sacrifice, are Lavrov's humanistic battle cries; justice and truth are his two great demands. Theoretically the aspiration towards truth, practically the struggle for justice, these are the duties of the developed individuality. Justice is recognised to consist in equal respect for the rights of one's own and for those of another's individuality.

Lavrov was on terms of personal friendship with Marx and the earlier Marxists, but never accepted historical materialism. To use his own words, he was not a historical materialist, but a historical realist. Being the latter he rejected materialism as a whole, regarding it as too dogmatic, as unduly metaphysical; nor could he accept the extreme objectivism of the materialists, the historical materialism of Marx. Lavrov was a subjectivist. Nevertheless he endeavoured to be just to metaphysical and historical materialism, which impressed him by its consistency and its radicalism. In the works he wrote after the *Historical Letters*, economic conditions were recognised as extremely important factors, political manifestations, for example, being deduced therefrom. From time to time he represented the present as predominantly economic, but he never really abandoned a rationalist foundation.

Nor must we fail to note what Lavrov said about the class struggle, which did not to him seem of essential significance as it did to Marx.

We must note, too, his outlook on the international, which he regarded as the realisation of philosophic cosmopolitanism, waxing enthusiastic on behalf of the latter at the very time when Marx was endeavouring to exclude cosmopolitanism from the international.

Lavrov was further distinguished from Marx by his conception of society and of history, for Lavrov made the individual his starting point, held fast to the individual consciousness, and considered that qualitative differences between individuals must be invoked to explain the historical process. Concessions to Marx and Comte were doubtless made, but the individualism of the "critically-thinking individuality" was nevertheless retained.

In agreement with Comte, Lavrov conceived historical

development as the development of mankind. But whereas Comte regarded the individual nations as the representatives and leaders of mankind during different epochs, and expected that the definitive positivist organisation of humanity would ensue from a synthesis of the leading nations of Europe, Lavrov assigned to the nations a more modest role, holding that human development was effected by individuals. The idea of nationality had, he thought, no more than a temporary and transient significance; nationality was characterised, in part by certain mental qualities, but mainly by historical occurrences; in practice the question of nationality was a question of states. Lavrov was hostile to nationalist chauvinism. For him (and here he reminds us of Čadaev) the true patriot was one who endeavoured to make his nation, his fatherland, the finest representative of science and of justice among contemporary nations.

The state, too, had for Lavrov no more than a temporary significance, although it seemed to him more important than did nationality. The leading task of socialism was, he considered, to fight the state, against which the social revolution was directed. The state originated in a contract. Lavrov accepted this obsolete theory, but his interpretation of it was that the social contract, whereof law was the formal expression, could not be regarded as absolutely binding. For Lavrov, the state was no more than the external order which men without convictions had accepted—it was the unreflective acceptance of vital conditions which were not dependent upon individuals. In this view the state becomes a coercive order, merely physical at first, but subsequently moral or religious. Lavrov therefore held that political history was of very trifling interest, that the aim of progress was to reduce the state to a minimum. To attain this minimum was the endeavour of modern scientific socialism, which would abolish the social order of the state as a modification of the church.

Lavrov's conception of the future was that it would be a federation of communes and artels. Nevertheless he admitted the possibility that there would be a zemskii sobor, as an organ of the definitive social revolution, and presupposing that it would duly promote the economic and political interests of the peasants. Lavrov made a sharp distinction between the liberal conception of the state and his own conception. In all forms of state, the republican not excepted, he was

opposed to centralism, for he regarded the centralised state as essentially bourgeois.

I cannot expound in detail how in these questions, too, Lavrov was eclectic, how here likewise he displayed tactical vacillations between "politism and apolitism," between socialism and anarchism, between Marx and Bakunin. This is obvious in his relationship to anarchism and in the cautious way in which he formulates his hostility to the state. His opposition to Bakunin and Načaev was based chiefly upon ethical grounds.

Lavrov's attitude towards Herzen was dictated by the former's consistent socialism and by his ethical rigorism. Lavrov was a stoic, and Herzen seemed to him unduly dilettantist (using the word in Renan's sense). He stood nearer to Bělinškii and Černyševskii, and had, indeed, marked resemblances with the latter. In the early sixties, Lavrov preached anthropologism, following Černyševskii. From this standpoint, the "historical realist," like the Feuerbachian anthropologist, was thoroughly rationalistic and definitely anti-religious. When we studied the program of "Vpered" we saw that historical realism was sharply contrasted with theology and philosophy. Černyševskii, too, was an ethical rigorist, and it was from the characters in *What is to be Done* that Lavrov derived the content of his socialistic imperative. Finally, Černyševskii likewise displayed a certain harshness of style, and we may ask ourselves whether in his case, as in that of Lavrov, this may have been connected with the vigorously rationalist outlook.

Passing finally to consider Lavrov's relationship to the narodniki, it is an illuminating fact that Lavrov cannot be accounted one of the philosophers of the narodničestvo. To Lavrov, as to the other progressive and revolutionary thinkers and politicians of his day, it seemed that the Russian peasantry constituted the Russian folk, and his "workers' socialism" was conceived rather on agrarian than on industrial lines. Moreover, he approved the mir and the artel as socialistic institutions, and he favoured propaganda among the peasants. But just as for himself he was content with propaganda among the intelligentsia, so were his whole method and mentality too much the fruit of his strong and peculiar individualism for it to be possible that he should accept as decisive and assume for his own guidance the principles of the narodničestvo.

Late in life (1893) Lavrov wrote an introductory article entitled "History, Socialism, and the Russian Movement" for a collection *Materials for the History of the Russian Social Revolutionary Movement*, published by some of the older adherents of the Narodnaja Volja. Herein, and likewise in a second article written in 1895, "The Narodniki 1873-1877," he expressed warm approval of the propaganda of the revolutionary narodniki as a fulfilment of the Russian socialist mission. He welcomed this propaganda amongst the people as the logical continuation of the civilisation and Europeanisation of Russia that had been begun by Peter. The movement "towards the people" seemed to him the fruit of the humanist idealism of the forties, and above all of the enthusiastic materialism and realism of Černyševskii and Pisarev. When, shortly before his death, the Russian refugees founded an agrarian socialist league, Lavrov hailed its program with delight.

§ 118.

PROFESSOR KARĚEV declared that Lavrov was the first and most influential of Russian sociologists. In my opinion, Čadaev and Kirčevskii were more notable than Lavrov as philosophers of history and as thinkers. The questions which by Comte, Marx, and the later sociologists were placed in the foreground of sociological interest, questions of fact and of methodology, were not, it is true, discussed by Čadaev and Kirčevskii, or at any rate were not discussed in detail, for the only philosophy of history with which they were acquainted was that of German idealism; but they did not fall into the errors which characterised Lavrov's thought upon such matters.

Lavrov, though familiar with the sociological and philosophical situation of his day, was incompetent to play an effective part in its further development. Let me give an example. Lavrov's conception of the historical subjective method was that the individual historian or philosopher of history, taking his stand in the present at the close of a historical period, acquires thereby a historical perspective, and from this standpoint looks on into the future. The presentation is quite accurate, but explains nothing, for it merely states the fact of historical contemplation and historical construction

(i.e. speculation regarding the future). Neither *qua fact* nor *qua methodology* is the process elucidated and firmly established. Lavrov should at least have paid due attention to the problems of historical method formulated by Mill, who built here upon a Comtist foundation—to say nothing of the discussion of the wider problems of the philosophy of history.

I may content myself therefore, in this study, with indicating what were the problems with which Lavrov busied himself, for the results of his investigations were of comparatively little moment. It was important in relation to Russian conditions that Lavrov should have occupied, nay tormented, his mind with the philosophical problems of his day. He did good service here, and showed his strength by his avoidance in the theoretical field of the materialism to which his contemporaries succumbed; but his influence in this direction was negative rather than positive. Lavrov's subjectivism would have been of considerable importance in the development of Russian thought had he been able to state precisely the boundaries and the range of subjectivism, and had he been able to present an epistemological criticism of his objectivist Russian contemporaries and predecessors. He failed, too, to assume a definite position in relation to contemporary adversaries of materialism. He gave special approval to Jurkevič, the opponent of Černyševskii, but characterised him by the vague epithet of "dialectician."¹ Moreover his polemic against Pisarev and Antonovič, against the nihilists and their radical opponents, dealt only with their depreciation of morality and their contempt for the idea of duty, for as usual the metaphysical and epistemological problem was far too cursorily considered.

To express the matter concisely, the essence of Lavrov's philosophic weakness lies in his failure to take a profounder view of the relationships between Kant and Comte. Kant's criticism was quite unhistorical; Comte's positivism was thoroughly historical, but quite uncritical; Comte, Hegel, Darwin, and Spencer were the spokesmen of contemporary historism, of evolutionism. Now how is Kant's criticism to be associated with this historism and evolutionism? Can criticism and historism be harmonised, and if so, how? German philosophy is still occupied with these questions to-day, and

¹ Lavrov thought well also of Giljarov-Platonov, the theologian, speaking of him and of Jurkevič as "our ablest contemporary dialecticians."

it was the merit of Lavrov that he mooted the problems as early as the close of the sixties. But his defect was that he made no attempt to solve the problems epistemologically. I have previously explained that he effected no more than a compromise between Kant and Comte, his essential mistake being that he degraded the Kantian criticism to the level of the criticism of Ruge and Bruno Bauer.

I may point out that Lavrov, in contradistinction to the other philosophers that have been treated in this work, though himself an imaginative writer, was but little concerned with literary criticism. It is true that he wrote essays on Tolstoi, Turgenev, and others, but merely in order to discuss the socio-political problems of the day, as they were presented in the works of these writers.¹

Consider, again, what Lavrov thinks concerning the problem of individualism. Writing of the relationship between the individual and society, he declares that individuals (by which he means the "more definite" individuals, his critically-thinking individualities) create the organism, wherein they subsist "as mere organs" of the common organism. It is true that the individualities are accustomed to "moral isolation," but they voluntarily undertake social duties, they subordinate themselves, so that their individualities disappear, to become merged in the general trend of thought.

Now what precisely is this "general trend of thought"? Must not the "more definite" individuals recognise it as a duty, on occasions, to resist the general trend? Is it permissible for these "more definite" individuals to merge themselves, to disappear, if the thought trend is to be general or universal? It can be universal only if they too exert their influence upon it; if they disappear, the individualities of less value remain predominant.

¹ In a dialogue, *To Whom Belongs the Future?* Lavrov formulates his views on aesthetics. Being a positivist, he is on the side of realism as against romanticism, and rejects the romanticist theory that artists are persons of especially lofty and positively prophetic capacity. Realistic psychology will not admit that things can be comprehended without precise analysis and systematic synthesis. Lavrov is therefore inclined (and this is typical of his method) to adopt a middle position between the two extremes, and to say that the artist perceives the true significance of things by his direct intuition of them. Lavrov gives as an example Lermontov and his poetic "intuition" of contemporary history. It is obvious that, notwithstanding his positivism, Lavrov has here abandoned positivism for romanticism, or has at any rate tinged positivism deeply with romanticism.

Besides, Lavrov directly contradicts himself. In one place he demands the subordination of the individual to the whole, and speaks of the disappearance of individuality, but he subsequently protests against the subordination and engulfment of the individual, saying that we must think merely of a merging of "social and individual interests" (interests, then, are something altogether distinct from individualities).

In ethics, too, Lavrov did not get beyond a compromise. On the one hand he accepted Kant's absolutism and rigorism, and yet he simultaneously clung to utilitarianism and the theory of egoism. How is the struggle between the conflicting interests to be adjusted? How are we to figure the harmony of egoistic and social interests? "Sociality becomes the realisation of individual aims (purposes) in social life." But is this definition of sociality anything more than an assertion of mutual accommodation?

Finally, while Lavrov adopts from Comte a positivist, antitheological, and antireligious standpoint, he provides no foundation for his positivism. He should have analysed religion more closely, for positivism cannot rest content with the simple assertion that religion is a vestigial remnant. Is religion really dead? Or is it only theology and the church that are defunct? Lavrov accepts the Kantian reduction of religion to morality, and insists therefore upon Proudhonian justice in addition to (theoretical) truth. He is in his rights, but, Kant notwithstanding, and we may even say because of Kant, the problem of religion is not thereby reduced to non-existence.

In the political field, Lavrov's work remained preparatory, cultural, educative, rather than the work of a leader. His industry, probity, self-sacrificingness, sense of discipline, and above all his character and example, had their due influence; but as a leader he was weak. He lacked the faculty, so essential to the leader, for making prompt decisions, and his political development was tardy. In the sixties he was of moderate conservative or liberal views, certainly not a radical. During the seventies he became a declared socialist, coming to consider social questions more important than political, and taking the social revolution as his terminal aim. In this phase, he was opposed to liberalism, and declared that the socialist must not make common cause with liberals. In the eighties, politics has resumed its place in the first rank; the primary

task was to break and destroy absolutism ; for this end, he was now willing to unite with the liberals. Whereas some years earlier he had condemned terrorism, he now favoured terrorist methods. For a moment he even believed in the possibility of negotiating with absolutism and its official representatives. I am thinking here of the episode with Pobédonoscev's "Holy Retinue."

Lavrov closed his political career as editor of clandestine literature. Throughout life he was a writer and a man of learning, but sacrificed his learned leisure and his opinions for political ends. This must not be taken as implying that he was weak of character. Whilst he temporarily accepted political and revolutionary methods, his fundamental aim ever remained to bring about a moral modification of society, for this change seemed to him of more decisive importance than any socio-political transformation.¹

The judgment of the most competent of his contemporaries, of those whose personal knowledge of the man especially entitled them to an opinion, was that Lavrov's greatest and most far-reaching influence was exercised by his *Historical Letters*, by the effects which this book produced upon the rising generation then awakening to revolutionary ideas.

Lavrov's influence upon his contemporaries and successors was greatly restricted because he became what I may term an absolute westerniser. I mean that in his books he concerned himself little about his Russian predecessors and contemporaries, writing like an Englishman or a Frenchman who knew nothing of Russian literature and Russian thought. For example, he accepted the Comtist developmental scheme ; his thought was devoted to western Catholicism and Protestantism, to European philosophers and their systems. The Russian church and its development, Russian sectarians, and Russian thinkers, seemed for him practically non-existent. Čadaev had renounced the Russian church, but we feel that this renunciation cost him much. Lavrov desired to be a revolutionist, a revolutionary leader, but he wished to play this part with a positivist ataraxia which made him his own

¹ His adversaries continually recur to the fact that prior to the publication of his program in 1873 he had drawn up two other programs of a more radical character. In 1895, Lavrov explained this apparent vacillation by saying that in the two earlier programs he had attempted to establish at least a *modus vivendi* with his Bakuninist adversaries, and had therefore partially suppressed his own views.

historian while he was yet living. Lavrov wrote as if he were presenting another's thought system instead of his own.

An additional cause of Lavrov's weakness as a leader was that, for all his theoretical scepticism, he was a convinced utopian, for he believed in good earnest that the definitive social revolution was impending, that its coming was a matter of two or three years at most.

II

§ 119.

NICOLAI KONSTANTINOVICH MIHAILOVSKII¹ is rightly placed beside Lavrov. The two men represent the same philosophical trend, and their writings have considerable resemblance in point of style. Mihailovskii, a self-taught man thirsting for knowledge, had his attention drawn by Lavrov to the rich sources of European literature. This was his introduction to Comte and to socialism, and he was greatly influenced by the fundamental conceptions of "historical realism." Though he was not pleased by the *Historical Letters* the book had a considerable effect upon his mind.

Mihailovskii belongs to the younger generation, being younger than Černyševskii and Lavrov, and a contemporary of Pisarev and Kropotkin. During the years after the liberation of the peasantry he was exposed to the philosophical and political influences which have been adequately discussed in earlier pages. A good German and French scholar from childhood onwards, Mihailovskii was not solely dependent upon Russian teachers, but early began to absorb French and German literature, belletristic no less than scientific.

He was chiefly distinguished from his somewhat older contemporaries in that the influence of Hegel upon him was small, whereas the influence of Comte was practically decisive. I might speak of him as a fully conscious Comtist, but I cannot term him a critical Comtist, for he did not sufficiently

¹ Mihailovskii was born in the year 1842, in the administrative district of Kaluga. His parents were of noble birth, but not very well off. After leaving the lower gimnasia he went to the mining academy, from which he was sent down. As early as 1860 he produced an essay on Gončarov. Thenceforward, from his eighteenth year until his death in 1904, Mihailovskii devoted himself to scientific and philosophical self-culture and to the popularisation of science.

exercise his faculty of epistemological criticism. Had he done so he would not have remained a positivist. But his outlook on positivism was less naïve than that of many of his contemporaries.

In epistemological matters Mihailovskii was a positivist and an ultra-empiricist. Comte's formula, that while observation cannot take place in the absence of a guiding theory, this theory cannot possibly have been constructed without preliminary observation, is accepted by Mihailovskii as it was accepted by Mill, the former believing with the latter that this is not to argue in a vicious circle. The observations and generalisations which are at first unnoticed (Mihailovskii writes that they are "unconscious"), are subsequently developed into clearly formulated general and abstract propositions, which guide the detailed observations. These propositions are generalisations from experience; there is nothing innate or *a priori* about them.

Mihailovskii expressly rejects innate ideas, as expounded by the doctrine of idealism. Not merely is he, with Mill, opposed to the notion that there are inborn moral ideas; but further, touching upon the problem of mathematical axioms, he decides with Comte and Mill that these axioms, and axioms in general, are no more than extremely simple and therefore generally recognised truths.

In opposition to Kant, Mihailovskii borrows here also from Spencer. By empiricism (experience) he understands, in addition to our own experience, the experience of our forefathers. The brain of the newborn is not a *tabula rasa*. He even believes that hereditary transmission of ancestral experience is manifested physiologically through changes in the descendants' nerves. It is true that Mihailovskii does not verify the hypothesis, and all that he says under this head amounts in the end to no more than to show that the so-called innate ideas are referable historically to tradition and psychologically to *apperception* ("apperception preponderates over perception"). It is true that he has certain hesitations, seeing, for example, that tradition may be false as well as true; and seeing that the *a priori* of idealism, when explained by inheritance, becomes tantamount to "preconceived opinions," i.e. to prejudices. But he is satisfied in the end with the emendations that result from experience and from increasing insight.

In metaphysics, too, Mihailovskii follows Comte, holding

that the nature of things is uncognisable, incomprehensible. But the thesis is not precisely formulated in detail; the proposition is reiterated in the terminology of Hume and Comte and sometimes also in that of Kant; on the whole it is Spencer's agnosticism to which Mihailovskii adheres. Quite in the sense of Comte, he insists upon the idea of the relativity of knowledge. Man cannot get beyond his five senses; there are no absolute truths, but only relative truths, things that are true for men.

It is plain that Mihailovskii's theory of cognition remains purely positivist. Like his contemporaries, above all like Lavrov, he rejected the Kantian idealism, in so far as this was criticism, in a most uncritical manner; and he reduced the *a priori* to physiological differences of organisation.

Nevertheless Mihailovskii was not a naturalist, not a materialist like the radical realists; to him psychical phenomena were no less real than physical. Mihailovskii was here in agreement with Lavrov and with the emphasis the latter laid upon consciousness.

From Comte and Spencer, Mihailovskii passed to Darwin. Having been trained in the natural sciences, he retained his interest in these branches of knowledge. Darwinism gave him an opportunity to clear up his ideas upon the important question of the social struggle, and evolutionism confirmed for him the positivist doctrine of progress; but, as we shall shortly see, he made a profound, a positively dualistic distinction, between progress and evolution, and he rejected Darwinism.

In ethics, Mihailovskii was a utilitarian, and he took occasion from time to time to defend this standpoint, all the more since utilitarianism was condemned in official literature. For example, he championed utilitarianism against the theologian Malcev, a Russian writer whose name is not unknown in German theological literature. For Mihailovskii, utilitarianism was the ethic based on experience. Precisely because based on experience was it preferable to intuitive morality, erroneously preferred as more ideal. Mihailovskii differed from Lavrov concerning Kant, and Kant's conception of duty, which Mihailovskii could not accept. Were he a painter, said Mihailovskii, he would represent the history of mankind in three pictures. The second of these would be named "The Last Criminal." It would show society perishing,

but in the very last moment the last criminal would have been executed in the name and in honour of absolute justice. In the main square of the abandoned and ruined city, we should see the crumbling scaffold on which is the skeleton of the last criminal; perched on the skull is a raven; fiat justitia, pereat mundus.

Despite this rejection of rigorism and its metaphysical foundation (the term metaphysical is used in the Comtist sense), Mihailovskii laid stress upon the necessity for recognising the extant contrast between good and evil, which he tended to conceive as a continuation of the ancient Iranian and Indian dualism. Truth has withdrawn to heaven, and the task of the ethical volunteer corps is to bring it back to earth. For the positivist, truth is merely relative, not absolute; but in practice, says Mihailovskii, it is after all absolute for man, since man cannot transcend it.

Mihailovskii was a Comtist, but he apprehended positivism as it was originally conceived by Hume and emended by Mill, for both the English philosophers regarded ethics as an integral portion of philosophy. Spencer, too, showed Mihailovskii the right path in these matters.

Mihailovskii was much influenced by the socialists as well as by Comte. Proudhon, Louis Blanc, and Marx, must in especial be recognised as his teachers. Proudhon was commended to him by the authority of Herzen, and exercised a great effect upon his mind in earlier years. In 1867 he translated Proudhon's *De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières*, and he learned from its author to prize individuality. He was attracted by Louis Blanc's philosophy of history, was delighted by the principle of the organisation of labour, and was an enthusiast on behalf of social workshops; he is said to have spent his inherited property upon the founding of a bookbinders' workshop. Marx's writings, and in especial the first volume of *Capital*, drew Mihailovskii's attention to the dangers of the division of labour and to the anarchy of the capitalist economic order.

From 1877 onwards, Mihailovskii was interested in the work of Dühring, the opponent of Marx and Engels, and was interested also in that of F. A. Lange, recommending both Dühring and Lange to the Russian youth. It need hardly be said that Mihailovskii's thought, like that of his Russian predecessors and contemporaries, was akin to Feuerbach's.

In addition to these influences, we have to consider Mihailovskii's acquaintanceship with the works of Rousseau, for this led the Russian towards socialism, towards the social collectivity, as contrasted with Proudhonian anarchism.

Russian literature exercised a notable influence upon Mihailovskii. I have already referred to Lavrov; but Mihailovskii learned also from Herzen, and still more from Černyševskii, whose anthropologism recurs as "humanitism." Mihailovskii was a consistent opponent of Pisarev and the latter's adherents, and sharply distinguished his own individualism from that of Pisarev. Nor did Mihailovskii forget Bēlinskii. It is noteworthy that Mihailovskii was at an early date intimately associated with Nekrasov and Saltykov, becoming in 1868 a contributor to Nekrasov's periodical. At this time he was on friendly terms with several other Russian authors, amongst whom may be mentioned Eliseev and Šelgunov. Among the Russians who helped to form his mind, Mihailovskii refers to Nožin, who died prematurely in the year 1866, being then only twenty-three years old. The two men worked together for several years on the staff of the same journal. Nožin was involved in the trial of the Karakozovcy. Nožin was a zoologist. In a European journey he had made the acquaintance of Bakunin. His publicist ideas derived primarily from Proudhon, but he differed from his teacher in his view that the division of labour was injurious to individuality and was the cause of the unequal division of the product of labour. Nožin denied the reality of the Darwinian struggle for existence among the individuals of the same species, referring expressly to the phenomena of mutual aid. All these ideas recur in the work of Mihailovskii.

§ 120.

MIHAILOVSKII was a sociologist, and in sociology was a follower of Comte, but he was distinguished from Comte, and was distinguished no less from Marx and the Marxists, by his insistence upon the "subjective method" in sociology.

In Russian literature, much has been said concerning Mihailovskii's and Lavrov's "subjective method." The Marxists, in particular, have fiercely attacked it, and one of Plehanov's principal writings is devoted to Mihailovskii and to a refutation of the subjective method.

Mihailovskii, like Lavrov, recognised the existence of psychology, side by side with sociology, as an independent science, differing here from his leader Comte, and accepting the views of Mill and Spencer. The sociologist must employ the subjective method as well as the objective; social and historical facts demand a psychological as well as a material explanation. Consequently Mihailovskii often speaks of "social psychology."

Mihailovskii explicitly protested against the idea that the subjective method was not inductive, and would conflict with experience. But in sociology, he said, in the explanation of the relationships between human beings, the objective method was not all-sufficing. The historical process, he declared, is teleological, for individual men, groups of men, and humanity as a whole, pursue aims. Now an aim implies a desire, the sentiment of what is agreeable, and the consciousness of duty. The sociologist, therefore, in his presentation of the historical process and of social organisation, must duly take into account this subjective element in man.

Mihailovskii demands that the observing sociologist shall allow his mind to permeate the observed object, man; the observer, as he puts it, must "merge" with the object, so that the observer may find himself in the place of the observed; he demands that the sociologist shall have the faculty of "impressionability" (imaginative insight).

But this is not to give an exhaustive account of Mihailovskii's subjective method. Every individual, he says, is member of a historically given group of human beings, of a class, and shares the opinions and desires of that class. Utterly different are the respective judgments formed by the feudalism and by the socialist concerning historical and social things. What standpoint should the scientific thinker assume? Mihailovskii admits that a man's views are invariably suggested by his social position. How, then, is scientific sociology possible? Mihailovskii adheres to the opinion of Comte. He who desires to devote himself to sociology must attain to a high moral level, that he may be able to do justice to all views and valuations, and that he may be able to overcome preconceived opinions based upon tradition (apperception).

For Mihailovskii, the objective method in sociology seems no more than a mask, assumed by men without conscience in order to befool their conscientious fellows. Mihailovskii

justifies his departure from Comte's historicism by referring to Comte's own mental development, to the way in which Comte moved on from his objective sociology to the subjective method in politics and the philosophy of religion. He quotes Balzac's *La recherche de l'absolu*, showing how the brilliant realist had made positivist detachment appear ludicrous and contemptible, by representing a disciple of Lavoisier defining tears in purely chemical terminology as consisting merely of this and that variety of matter. In contrast with such an outlook, Mihailovskii champions the socio-psychological standpoint, rightly declaring that to do this is not to abandon positivism.

Comte had demanded that we should avoid any tincture of enthusiasm or of a spirit of condemnation in our judgment of historical and above all of political facts; we should regard them, he declared, as simple facts of observation, comprehending each fact solely in its setting in relation to coexisting phenomena and in association with the antecedent and subsequent condition of human development. But Mihailovskii, while recognising that this positivist detachment is a demand of "pure rationality," regards it as impossible and unsound. "Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner," is a pretty saying, but wrongheaded. "Tout comprendre" must not be taken to imply that we are not to insist upon the fundamental opposition between good and evil. "Tout comprendre" is impossible; no one can understand everything, and therefore we must not forgive everything. Besides, "tout comprendre" is impossible to a decent man; for example, certain meannesses are quite beyond his understanding. In a word, there is no justification for the demand that the historian should display a positivist detachment. Mihailovskii returns frequently to the exposition of these views, and they are especially to be found in the preface to his *John the Terrible*.

Plehanov's rejection of Mihailovskii's subjective method is based on the contention that this method suggests no other criterion than the personal wishes of the individual, that it proposes to replace scientific research by subjective caprice.

Indisputably there are historians and philosophers of history who are guided by caprice, but the objection is none the less fallacious. As a Marxist, Plehanov adopts the standpoint of purely objective history, the individual consciousness being eliminated by Engels and the other Marxists. Mihailovskii's views are clearer and more accurate, for he recognises that

the objective interpretation of history is inadequate. Marx believed himself to have proved that the age of communism was approaching by historical necessity; he believed that this proof could be furnished by the use of the Hegelian dialectic. But what would be the result of such a proof for my personal conduct, for yours, for Marx's own, for everyone's? The socialist decides in favour of socialism and communism upon ethical and not upon historical grounds; the Russian socialists are right; Marx's attempt to give socialism a purely objective historical foundation was futile. It is only because men of the present day are deciding in favour of communism, and have reasons and motives for this decision, that historians have been able to point to the beginning of the communistic epoch. Other philosophers of history, differing from Marx, refuse to consider the socialist movement as the opening of a new historical epoch, and look upon it as no more than a morbid episode. Which party is right? Upon whose side, that is to say, is the truth — a truth which, as I see it, can be no more than relative? It is clear that the question with which Mihailovskii is really concerned when he discusses the subjective method, is whether psychology, and sociology grounded upon psychology, are really possible. To-day we may say that the question has been adequately answered, has been answered alike theoretically, epistemologically, and practically, by the advent of a genuinely scientific psychology and sociology, whereby the objections of the Marxists have been rendered simply anachronistic.

But for Mihailovskii the question has a yet more general significance. If every human being be involuntarily and necessarily guided by the preconceived opinions of his class and of his day, how is science possible? To put the matter in concrete terms, Which class can contend that it possesses science, that science is enlisted in its service? Mihailovskii replies by amending Lassalle and Engels, by saying that science serves the people, that is, the "entirety of the labouring classes of society."

It is necessary to note and to commend the way in which Mihailovskii invariably pays great attention to the problem of accurate method. When discussing individual scientific and philosophic writers, he never fails to examine their methodology, and to consider how it corresponds to their actual treatment of the topic. As regards sociology, he

challenges the validity of analogy as a method capable of giving accurate results, his views in this respect conflicting with those of Spencer and certain Russian sociologists, above all with those of Stronin.

Mihailovskii contests Spencer's opinion that society is an organism, rejecting at the same time false conceptions of a collective consciousness. For Mihailovskii, society is an organisation of individuals of like kind and of equal value. In his explanation of historical and social facts, the sociologist ought not to set out from the whole, but from the consciousness of the individual. The nature of the individual, says Mihailovskii, is most conspicuously shown in work; for men, for the human individual, work is what motion is for matter. (It must be observed that Mihailovskii is here drawing an analogy!) Work is the chief attribute of individuality, the chief characteristic of individuality as such. Talent, birth, wealth, beauty—these are non-essentials, to a greater or less extent they are chance qualities; talent comes by favour of fortune; a man's wealth is not won solely by himself; and so on. But work is the deliberate use of energy, the expenditure of energy to attain a goal, and work is therefore the manifestation of man's true essence, the manifestation of individuality.

It follows that the essence of sociality is to be found in the collaboration or cooperation of individuals, and that the nature of the cooperation determines the character of successive epochs.

For this reason, because cooperation socialises men, Mihailovskii is just as little inclined as Comte and other sociologists to admit the validity of economic materialism. Cooperation is not merely economic in nature, but comprises all social work, including intellectual work. In the last resort, culture subserves the purposes of work, and therefore culture cannot be utilised as an explanation of social and historical processes. Of course the cooperation of human beings is explicable by motives and reasons, and is referable above all to inborn egoism and altruism. Here Mihailovskii follows Adam Smith, for to natural and inborn egoism he counterposes the no less inborn and natural altruism; he appeals to Comte's "altruism," to Feuerbach's "tuism," and to Dühring's "sympathetic natural impulses."

Mihailovskii was not slow to study Marx. Immediately

after the appearance of the first volume of *Capital* he read the book carefully, and was especially interested in the chapters upon cooperation and upon the division of labour, for his attention had already been drawn to these questions by Comte, Adam Smith, and Louis Blanc. In his work on Darwinism, published in 1870, Mihailovskii stated that in *Capital* he had found the confirmation of his views concerning the disastrous consequences of the division of labour. Mihailovskii was likewise interested in Marx's philosophy of history, and had frequent controversies with Marx and the Marxists, especially in later years, when the latter had come to regard him as an adversary. Notwithstanding his esteem for Marx, he never accepted the doctrine of historical materialism, but, on the contrary, always energetically combated it.

The way in which Mihailovskii appealed to psychical energies in explanation of social facts, is shown by his studies concerning imitation and suggestive influences, a theme in which he was always greatly interested. From 1882 onwards he penned a series of essays analysing the way in which human beings influence one another, and why certain men in particular (the "heroes") influence the masses for good or for ill, and compel lesser men to follow their example. Mihailovskii displayed much industry, here anticipating Tarde, in studying the French writers who have recorded manifestations of imitativeness and have described its pathological forms.

It seems self-evident to Mihailovskii that history is subject to laws. Man, he says, cannot escape from the domain of natural law. But in the field of politico-moral processes the human will is one factor among many, and within this field therefore freedom of the will has its scope. The formation of ideals and the endeavour to realise these ideals, occur, therefore, likewise in accordance with law. Mihailovskii understands freedom of the will in the determinist sense, making a sharp distinction between determinism and fatalism.

General laws determine the order of the phases of historic evolution, but individual intervention can retard or accelerate the course of development. Great and vigorous personalities make their appearance upon the frontier between two phases of development.

Mihailovskii, consequently, takes a critical view of the so-called "great men theory" of recent days. Following

Louis Blanc, he shows that great men create, not out of themselves, but out of their environment, and that it is individual circumstances and the circumstances of the day which make these great men representatives and leaders. Precise psychological analysis enabled Mihailovskii to reduce to reasonable proportions exaggerations à la Carlyle (hero-worship), and to keep close to fact.

Mihailovskii's social psychology, precise and indefatigable, utterly excludes historical materialism. For Mihailovskii, as he himself said at times, the stomach question was also a soul question.

§ 121.

THE philosophy of history, as Mihailovskii maintains in opposition to the sceptics in his study of Louis Blanc, ought to expound the meaning of history. Mihailovskii takes this idea from Comte, the socialists, the evolutionary students of natural science, and above all from Darwin. In practical and political matters it is natural that Mihailovskii should think as a Russian concerning the meaning of historical development, his outlook being determined by that of his Russian predecessors and contemporaries.

He formulates a scheme of development in three stages, naming them, in conformity with Lavrov, the objective anthropocentric, the eccentric, and the subjective anthropocentric stage.

The objective anthropocentric stage is characterised by the naïve belief in accordance with which man holds himself to be the objective, absolute, and real centre of nature, determined from without. It is the stage of anthropomorphism and mysticism, the stage of theology and religion, the stage of objective teleology. The second or eccentric stage, pushing dualism of body and soul to an extreme, regards man as under the dominion of abstract ideas. The third or subjective anthropocentric stage is the genuinely human epoch, wherein man, his ethical ideals, a purely human teleology, are realised. It is, at the same time, the era of science and of positivism. Manifestly this scheme is referable to the three stages of Comte. We are contemplating the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive stage; but whereas Comte maintains as his principle of classification the theoretical relationship of man to the universe, Mihailovskii is increasingly concerned

with the ethical relationship of man to his fellows and to the universe.¹

We may think also of the three stages of Louis Blanc, which are likewise to some extent a reflex of Comte's ideas; the stage of authority (Catholicism), of individualism (Luther and Protestantism), and of harmony or association. Mihailovskii himself expounds Louis Blanc's philosophy of history, and does so to clarify his own ideas. He also reproduces Saint-Simon's scheme, in which Saint-Simon distinguished between the organic era and the critical; and he adduces Vico's three stages, the divine, the heroic, and the human. He compares all these schemata with Comte's stages and with his own.

Mihailovskii devotes much thought to the three stages of development. He mocks the question why historians and philosophers of history commonly inclined to speak about three stages, and answers his own question by an analysis of the Hegelian dialectic evolutionary process, which likewise has three stages. He contends that the basis of this conception of three stages is to be found in the natural and obvious contemplation of the future as compared with the present and the past. Since the future is the natural continuation and development of the past, with the idea of the three historical stages there very readily becomes associated the concept of the Hegelian dialectic or that of Vico's "ricorsi," namely that the third stage redevelops itself into the first. But this redevelopment is not a reversion; it is a further evolution upon a higher level. Mihailovskii therefore distinguishes between the degree of development and the type. When Rousseau, for example, expresses his loathing for civilisation and his desire to return to primitive conditions, he is not longing for the savagery and lack of cultivation characteristic of primitive man, but aspires merely to restore primitive simplicity (the type, that is to say) in conjunction with the higher evolution.²

¹ In a study of Bismarck (1871), Mihailovskii, quite in Comte's manner, formulates the following aphoristic scheme: I Absolutism, Theology War, Regime of Great Landed Proprietorship II Constitutional Monarchy, Metaphysics and Professional Dexterity, Stock Exchange, Regime of Capital; III Science, Right to Work and Duty to Work.

² An example may make the matter clearer. Mihailovskii holds that economically England is on a higher level than Russia, but that as type Russia is higher than England. When Tolstoi said that the melody, Back to Mother Volga, was loftier than any of Beethoven's symphonies, the assertion was true of the type, not of the stage of development.

The idea of Vico's recurrences (*ricorsi*) is reduced by Mihailovskii to the simple conviction that the social principles given to man by nature necessarily enter into strife one with another (as we see, in the modern age, in the struggle between authority and criticism), and that ultimately one of these principles secures general validity as the principle of authority has done in science, and so on.

Mihailovskii likewise applies his three stages in the domain of economics. Society is for him the organisation of labour, society is a working and co-operating society.

In the first stage, according to Mihailovskii, simple co-operation is dominant, a number of individuals working side by side and together for the same practical end. From the very first these individuals are differently endowed and differ in the extent of their training; but even at this stage there are manifest the first and still inconspicuous consequences of co-operation, in the form of the division of labour. Division of labour, however, does not become well marked until the second stage. This "eccentric" stage is not characterised by any aim tending to unite men, by any human aim; theory and practice are severed; the division of labour is perfected; the individual becomes one-sided and a mere organ of society; man ceases to be a complete man, and therefore ceases to be man. Not until the coming of the third stage, the subjective anthropocentric stage, does man return to the type of simple cooperation, but does so upon a higher plane of evolution. "Man for mankind, everything for mankind," becomes the saving password.

In the domain of knowledge, the fully developed human being is presented to us as "the profane one." He is the positivist philosopher who has renounced metaphysics and theology, and who endeavours to cognise those things only which are within his mental grasp. He is the positively trained man of culture in contradistinction to men of professional dexterity and the one-sided specialists of earlier days.

§ 122.

MIHAILOVSKII was compelled to consider Darwin's theory of evolution, for this theory was interwoven with the leading social and political problems, not only by Marx and Engels, but also by the Darwinists and their

opponents. History and the philosophy of history were extended to cover biology, zoology, and cosmology; and conversely the theory of evolution in the world of natural science influenced history and the history of philosophy. Mihailovskii was very keenly aware of this mutual relationship.

Mihailovskii examined Darwinism and Darwinistic literature to ascertain whether the theory of the struggle for existence must be applied to human society to justify struggle, or at least to show that struggle was inevitable. He admitted that struggle was characteristic of nature, of the animal world, but since he would not admit the applicability of the analogical method to sociology, he considered that biology could not furnish any sociological deductions. He accepted the Darwinian theory in large part, was willing to admit that man is an animal, of animal origin, but did not think that this made it necessary, as he once put it, to regard man as a beast. Experience showed him that the struggle for existence has indeed a place in human society, but it also taught him that man, recognising the harmfulness of the struggle for existence, endeavours to mitigate it and to put an end to it.

When he speaks of struggle in society, Mihailovskii thinks not merely of war, but also, and still more, of the continuous struggle enduring for entire epochs between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and weakly on the other. In this matter he accepts the view of the socialists, who desire to put an end to the social struggle of the capitalist era with its highly elaborated system of the division of labour.

Like Marx and the other socialists, Mihailovskii discerns in history a degenerative development of egoism as contrasted with the temporarily weakened altruism of mankind; it is insatiable covetousness which splits society into the two camps of rich and poor, of workers and rulers.

According to Mahailovskii, Darwinism does not explain the social division of labour. Spencer attempted to identify the physiological differentiation of the various organs of the individual with the differentiation of individuals in the capitalistic epoch. Mihailovskii considers that such an identification is impossible; the facts with which we have to deal in the two cases are of distinct categories, and analogy is no proof. Moreover, Darwinism affords an explanation of the differentiation of species only, not of individual differentiation.

Mihailovskii accepts the general law of evolution, in accordance wherewith organised matter becomes ever more complex and the sum of individual energies and capacities continually increases. The increasing complexity consists in this, that the number of the organs increases, that the differences between them become more marked, and that physiological division of labour (i.e. the differentiation of organs for special functions) becomes more effective. Social division of labour, however, as history shows, is not a natural law; it is an empirical law, a social and historical law applicable to a particular epoch, and the division of labour can therefore be replaced by simple cooperation.

Liberalism, with its false doctrine of the necessity for free competition, might endeavour to turn Darwinism to account. But, with Louis Blanc and the other socialists, Mihailovskii shows that as far as the workers are concerned, liberty and free competition do not entail freedom but slavery. To liberalism, therefore, he counterposes socialism, which demands equality, including economic equality; and he proposes to replace the division of labour, with its differentiation of individuals, by the simple cooperation of fully cultured individuals, of individuals whose cultivation is persistently maintained. Free competition, being in truth anarchy and slavery, must be abolished.

Darwinism is conceived aristocratically and plutocratically, not democratically. Mihailovskii therefore shows that the boasted democracy of the natural sciences (an idea which appealed to many socialists) has no absolute validity. Sociology, history, and scientific philosophy may be democratic. "All roads lead to Rome," says Mihailovskii. He admits, too, that the natural sciences, by weakening theology, by establishing the doctrine of the natural equality of men, and by favouring the spread of modern industry and technique, may have exercised a democratising influence in the era before the great revolution. But he considers Buckle to be wrong in maintaining that natural science is essentially democratic.

Looking at the matter subjectively, Mihailovskii contends that it is a universalised aspiration of modern man to abolish the division of labour; the modern human being energetically desires to become a complete individuality, to make an end of the partialities and incompletenesses that are entailed by the enforced division of labour. The aspiration is justifiable,

and does not conflict with innate altruism ; on the contrary, altruism will first become possible in a society of fully developed individuals, of individualities. Mihailovskii considers that the struggle for individuality comprises the main content of human history and development ; this struggle corresponds to the social ideal of the abolition of the division of labour, of the process by which the individual is damaged, restricted, subdivided. The division of labour must yield place to simple cooperation on the part of fully developed human beings.

" Our human ego is not something single and undivided ; it is not an 'ego,' it is a 'we.' But the members of this plural have long since, by the process of organic evolution, been reduced to the level of completely subordinated individuals, whose independent significance is merged in the consciousness of the whole." Spencer, the opponent of socialism, might be content with this declaration. Here, as so often, Mihailovskii's thought is far too biological, so that he himself lapses into the detested objective method. The lack of clearness is connected with the fact that, as regards consciousness, Mihailovskii adopts the alleged explanation furnished by Haeckel, Maudsley, and others, which assumes man to comprise within himself numerous subjects and consciousnesses which are hierarchically subordinated to the whole ; this whole is self-conscious, and carries out its will as a unified undivided ego.

In this connection it is necessary to refer to the concept of individuality. Mihailovskii does not apply this term merely to the isolated human individual, as individuality, seeing that to him the family, the class, the state, the folk, etc., are likewise individualities—" egocentric " individualities fighting for their individuality.

Mihailovskii's aim is to fuse Proudhon with Louis Blanc, to effect a harmonious combination of individualism and socialism. With this end in view, he gives the following formula of progress. " Progress is the gradational approximation to the totality of individuals, to the maximum possible and most comprehensive division of labour among the organs and to the minimum possible division of labour among men. Immoral, unjust, injurious, and irrational, is everything tending to arrest this movement. Moral, just, rational, and useful, are those things alone which lessen the diversity of society while thereby increasing the diversity of the individual members of society."

Beyond the limits of this formula, says Mihailovskii, no compromise is possible between the interests of the individual and those of society; beyond the limits of this formula, no end can be secured for the wearisome struggle between these respective interests.

All formulas of this character, precisely because they are so extremely generalised, are liable to divergent interpretations; and this criticism is especially applicable to Mihailovskii's formula owing to the deliberate vagueness of its terminology (e.g. the use of the expressions "maximum possible" and "minimum possible"). Lavrov contested the validity of the formula, saying that it did not deal with the actual facts of evolution; it was negative; it merely prescribed what history ought not to have been. Later critics, adherents as well as opponents of Mihailovskii, have refused to accept the formula. Mihailovskii himself seems to have been aware of its vagueness, for he frequently returns to the subject with elucidations and amplifications. Interesting is Mihailovskii's relationship to Durkheim, who, following Comte, regards the modern division of labour as the most important factor in recent history and as the foundation of social solidarity. The possibility of this sociological conception and valuation of the division of labour compelled Mihailovskii to revise and supplement his formula. Durkheim's *De la division du travail social* was published in 1893. Criticising the work in 1897, Mihailovskii wrote, in definite opposition to Durkheim, that the social division of labour must be conceived as involving class differences and class contrasts. But it is open to question whether the emendation can save the formula or free it from ambiguity.

§ 123.

FOR the history of philosophy, at least for the two earlier epochs, Mihailovskii contents himself with the most abstract formulas. He reviews the work of Louis Blanc, Vico, Comte, etc., drafts his schemata, supplements or modifies in various respects what he has culled from these authorities. It is needless to go into fuller detail here, though I may mention in passing that Mihailovskii assumes that after the first development of man from the animal world there was a period wherein no cooperation was practised. He was greatly interested in studies dealing with the primitive forms of marriage

(by Bachofen and others), and in works on the law of population, but did not upon these subjects utter definitive views of his own. As in so many other questions, it sufficed him to gain a general scientific outlook.

Were we to enter into a fuller criticism of his views, we should have to ask whether Mihailovskii had rightly understood the evolution of the division of labour and the significance of that process, and we should have to enquire whether the abolition of the division of labour has the fundamental importance that Mihailovskii ascribes to it. Marx looked forward to such an abolition in the society of the future, but to him the matter was of no more than secondary importance. Closer study of the subject is requisite. With Bücher and others we may distinguish between several kinds of division of labour; we must clearly recognise that the injurious effects of division of labour are largely dependent upon the undue length of the working day, and so on.

No more than a passing reference can be made to all these questions, for I desire to do no more than indicate the leading defects of Mihailovskii's periodic subdivision of the stages of evolution. His distinction of the three stages as objective anthropocentric, eccentric, and subjective anthropocentric, was a failure.

In early days man was objectivist, for he did not, like Descartes, deliberately make his own consciousness the starting point of his theory and practice; man had a naïve belief in the outer world, wherein his thoughts and feelings were wholly immersed. Nevertheless, and indeed for this very reason, he was a (naïve) anthropomorphist and mythologer, as we learned in § 41A. The middle ages had not become "eccentric"; what Mihailovskii talks of as eccentric is nothing more than the objective anthropomorphic stage; there is no distinction here between the middle ages and the earlier epoch. Besides, the dualism of body and soul is by no means characteristic of the middle ages.

Equally unsatisfactory is Mihailovskii's characterisation of the subjective anthropocentric era. He supplements his study of Louis Blanc's philosophy of history by an accurate estimate of Descartes' subjectivism; but he fails to distinguish adequately between epistemological and critical subjectivism, on the one hand, and sentimental or "romanticist" subjectivism, on the other. In both respects the

anthropocentrism of such a philosopher as Fichte was something very different from the anthropocentrism of the medieval and classical philosophers. I can but refer again to § 41A.

Just as little as Lavrov, does Mihailovskii attain to a psychological grasp of the difficulties which his predecessors, Bakunin, Bêlinskii, and others, had had in their dealings with the subjectivism of German idealism. For all his perspicacity and circumspection, Mihailovskii shows here his lack of adequate insight in the psychological and the philosophico-historical fields. He has not grasped the epistemological significance of German idealism, despite his own excursions (immediately to be discussed) into the same domain of thought. Mihailovskii's defects arise out of his positivism.

§ 124.

MIHAILOVSKII contemplates chiefly the modern age, the present day, having far less interest in the earlier periods of history. With Comte, he considers that the modern age is the historical transition to the desired social reconstruction.

Following Comte, he characterises the epoch of transition as anarchist, exaggeratedly individualistic, and sceptical. Like Comte (and like Louis Blanc and the French in general), he considers that the decomposition of the Catholic-feudal middle age begins with Protestantism, with Luther, and in philosophy with Descartes, whose "cogito ergo sum" gives expression to a one-sided and overstrained individualism. Descartes is already sceptical, but Montaigne is the true spokesman of the sceptical spirit. Then came the eighteenth century, with Voltaire, the encyclopædists, and the materialists, the age of rationalist enlightenment, whereby the old medieval philosophy and morality were definitively uprooted. The great revolution brought this negative and destructive epoch to a close, being itself the transition to a new organic epoch.

In Mihailovskii's terminology the revolution constitutes the transition from the eccentric to the subjective anthropocentric modern age; the revolution is the beginning of the modern age. In connection with this philosophico-historical construction, I must refer to what has previously been said concerning his philosophy of history; the Comtist formula has replaced his own, for there is really no difference between

the two; the characterisation of the period of transition, in especial, is purely Comtist. Hence Mihailovskii has to make use of Comte's terminology. The designations subjectivism, individualism, anarchism, scepticism, and metaphysics, are all taken bodily from Comte.

This close adhesion to the views of Comte leads us to the question how we are to apply to Russia Comte's subdivision of historical epochs. Mihailovskii is far too fond of speaking of the Catholic and feudal middle age of the west; he accepts the world-historical importance of Protestantism and the great revolution. But has the revolution, have Protestantism, feudalism, and Catholicism, the same world-wide significance for Russia? Comte considered that his classification into epochs was universally applicable, and he utilised it for the explanation of human evolution in its entirety. To Mihailovskii, however, fell the task of discovering how to apply the formula to Russia. On one occasion, referring to the relationship between Russia and western Europe, he said that the Russians disported themselves like a cook who had been given an old hat by her mistress. If we look to the philosophico-historical significance underlying the sarcasm, the meaning would seem to be that Russia is following the same developmental course as the west. We shall learn, however, that Mihailovskii likewise defended the view that Russia might evolve differently from Europe. But, for this very reason, an exposition of the universal validity of Comte's historical epochs might have been useful.

Mihailovskii assumes that the political problem, the question of political freedom, has been solved by the revolution; but that the question of social equality, the bread question, has not been solved. However, in his opinion, by 1840 the problem had become ripe for solution.

According to Mihailovskii, the complete freedom demanded by the revolution took the form of anarchy. Men rejected supernatural and theological traditions, and devoted themselves to observation and experiment, but economic freedom was not established in conjunction with theoretical freedom. Liberalism is inadequate. "Mankind," solemnly proclaiming the rights of man as the eighteenth century drew to its close, assumed the lineaments of the petty bourgeois, covetous and small minded. This bourgeois was an enthusiast for freedom of thought, and demanded political freedom, but was a con-

vinced defender of serfdom; he favoured political freedom, but defended the monarchy, because liberalism pushed him onwards toward republican forms. The liberal bourgeois was delighted with Darwin's doctrine, because it enabled him to adduce scientific proof in support of his inward conviction that inequality was a most useful institution.

In Russia during the forties the social question was brought to the front with the appearance of "the aristocrat doing penance" (the phrase is Mihailovskii's own). Isolated specimens had appeared at an earlier date, but in the epoch of the forties he first appeared on the historic stage as a mass phenomenon. During the sixties aristocrats of this type became a notable historical factor, mingling with the *raznočincy*, that is to say, with men from the lower strata of society belonging to the most varied professional classes and differing greatly in the extent of their possessions, who had been called to social activity by the reforms.¹

The modern Russian woman is for Mihailovskii a notable sign of the times. Mihailovskii warns us against regarding the woman's question as the principal question of the fifties and the sixties; the new women, he says, are among the "aristocrats doing penance"; the new women take their places among the new men. Mihailovskii insists that there were no *raznočincy* among the new women, and that the ideas of the *raznočincy* had but little influence upon new women.

Mihailovskii is very serious and extremely definite in the enunciation of his views concerning love and marriage. Offspring, he says, are not the aim of marriage, but merely one of its consequences. Love, he contends, has physical roots, but psychological blossoms. A successful marriage will not interfere with the aspiration for individuality.

§ 125.

MIHAILOVSKII rejects economic liberalism because this doctrine leads in the end to Stirner's egoistic individualism, to social atomism. He is not unsympathetic towards certain representatives of the ethical trend of political economy and towards some of the so-called professorial socialists, but

¹ Mihailovskii instances Pisarev as an aristocrat doing penance, whilst he regarded Rěšetnikov as a literary *raznočinec*.

his formula for the solution of the social question (the abolition of the division of labour by simple cooperation) has a purely socialist foundation. His socialism, however, is not Marxist.

We have already seen that Mihailovskii does not accept economic materialism. He rejects, further, the positivist objectivism and the amorality of the Marxists; nor does he, like Marx and the Marxists, provide for socialism a necessary and exclusively historical foundation. Mihailovskii is a subjectivist, and his socialism has an ethical foundation; in his treatment of history he elucidates the social mischief which has been effected under the regime of liberalism. Despite his socialism, and qua socialist, Mihailovskii fights for the rights of individuality. The loss of individuality, the impossibility for the average man to develop his individuality completely, de-individualisation—this is for him the crowning evil of the capitalist division of labour, and of the capitalist economic oppression of the masses.

Mihailovskii prizes Marx's sociology more than he prizes that writer's economics. He considers that Marx was still far too much influenced by the unsound conception of the abstract man by which the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the other classical economists, was dominated. Speaking generally, Mihailovskii censures the economists for undue tendency to abstraction, objecting above all to the concept of national wealth as an abstract figment in whose name individuality is stifled. It is for this reason, says Mihailovskii, that the liberal political economists never carried the principle of individualism to its logical conclusion. Like Comte, he refuses to regard political economy as the leading and determinative constituent of social science, for he looks upon it as a discipline subordinate to sociology, one whose function it is to discuss a variety of social reciprocity, namely economic reciprocity.

Mihailovskii wrote freely in support of his campaign against "the disciples" (i.e. the followers of Marx), but it cannot be said that he settled his account with Marxism adequately.

His polemic against the Marxists brought Mihailovskii into closer personal relationships with the narodniki, and eventually he became one of the collaborators on their literary organ. But we cannot term him a narodnik, even though some have wished to describe him as a representative of the "critical narodničestvo." He blames the narodniki for their

failure to direct their interest towards all sides of social life, and for their narrowness in regarding the folk as consisting of *mužiks* alone. To Mihailovskii, the folk was the entirety of the working classes of society, and he therefore was decisively opposed to Voroncov's unsympathetic attitude towards the intelligentsia, whilst he rejected the liberal and bourgeois identification of the folk with the nation—the political nation. But he never forgot that the enormous majority of Russians are *mužiks*, and that for this reason political and social activities must be mainly concentrated upon the *mužik*.

When he spoke of the intelligentsia he was thinking of the scientifically and artistically cultured members of the community. This intelligentsia, liberal and progressive in its political and social ideals, though detached from the folk, honestly devotes itself to the service of the folk, and with the judgment as well as with the emotions. The intelligentsia, therefore, consisting of workers, of persons who are working on behalf of the folk, must be sharply distinguished from the bourgeoisie, for the bourgeoisie is composed of non-workers, it is the class of those who pay the workers.

Mihailovskii's views concerning the *mir* and the *artel* resembled those of his predecessors, and he was at one with the *narodniki* in holding that these institutions, being of a social nature, must be preserved. Mihailovskii, however, laid less stress than did some of the *narodniki* upon the social significance of the *mir*, precisely because his socialism was less exclusively based upon the economic system. This is manifest, likewise, in his utterances concerning the manual workers. Mihailovskii censures the Marxist intellectuals for their tendency to exalt labour over the labourer. In his view, neither the operatives nor the *mužiks* were to be regarded as constituting the entire folk.

Mihailovskii was opposed to capitalism. As we are aware, he considered that the division of labour, with its antisocial consequences, was the outcome of capitalism; whereas the *narodniki* held less decisive views upon this matter. Some of Mihailovskii's strictures upon the capitalisation and industrialisation of agrarian Russia have been declared reactionary. The interpretation is unsound. We must keep in mind Mihailovskii's fundamental philosophic and sociological doctrines, for these give the true meaning to his concrete and practical declarations. Mihailovskii never failed to apply

his ethical measure to economic development, to apply it, that is to say, to the individual men who were conducting economic development.¹

Mihailovskii found the correct answer to the question whether Russia had or had not yet become a capitalist country. In Europe, he said, capitalism was not so completely dominant as the narodniki maintained (Mihailovskii was criticising the views of Voroncov). In Russia, on the other hand, the development of capitalism had proceeded a great deal further than the narodniki were willing to admit.²

Mihailovskii believed that it might be possible for Russia to overleap the middle stage of European evolution, that of the bourgeois state, and to attain forthwith the higher phase of political and social order. Writing in 1880, he said this development was theoretically conceivable, but that its likelihood was daily diminishing.³

¹ Here is a characteristic sentence from an economic report of the year 1872: "True freedom, rightly organised and useful industry, honest financial combination, the construction of necessary railways, genuine self-government, cannot be opposed to the interests of the folk, or, and this is the same thing, cannot be opposed to the interests of labour." True, useful, honest, necessary, genuine—these and similar epithets show what were Mihailovskii's views upon industrial development. Nor must we forget that for him the folk did not signify the agriculturists alone. We see in the passage just quoted that he accepts the definition of the concept folk which he has taken from western socialist science.

² Mihailovskii found much to say about the leading narodniki, and especially about Voroncov and Nikolai-on. With perfect justice he wholly condemned Juzov; but he approves the sociological works of Juzakov.

³ In 1877 Mihailovskii defended Marx against a Russian critic (Carl Marx before the Tribunal of I. Žukovskii). He here mooted the question whether Russia, now enlightened by Marx concerning the capitalist evolution of the west, must necessarily follow the same course. Accepting Marx's description of European evolution, he enquired whether Russia might not take warning by this development. As shown above, he made a distinction between historic determinism and fatalism. He held, therefore, that a Russian disciple of Marx could not be content to look on quietly at his country's evolution. It was necessary for the onlooker to take a side, he must make up his mind whether he was to rejoice at the capitalisation of the still medieval economy of Russia, to rejoice despite all the evils attendant on the process, to rejoice in the break up of the medieval mir and artel and of the system of common property in the soil and the instruments of production; or whether he would deplore these developments and seek to resist them to the uttermost. Quoting Marx's polemic against Herzen (in the first edition of *Capital*) Mihailovskii defended Herzen's view that Russia could traverse an evolution sui generis, but did not surrender to slavophilism, and did not ascribe to the Russian folk any mystic or sublime qualities peculiar to the Russian national spirit. The Russian, he said, must and will learn from Europe. The man who has studied Marx will reflect upon the evolutionary process to which

§ 126.

IT is not easy to ascertain Mihailovskii's attitude in political matters, and especially his views concerning Russian refugees and the Russian revolution, for very few sources of information on these matters have as yet been opened. Of late there has been a tendency to regard him as having been in truth, even though unofficially, one of the "ideologues" of the Narodnaja Volja, whilst some declare that even more that Lavrov he was a leader of the revolution.

My own view of Mihailovskii's relationship to practical politics is formed by a study of his works, and these suggest that his outlook was predominantly theoretical. As a sociologist, of course, he considered the political questions of the day; as a socialist and an adversary of liberalism he favoured the radical trends; but I do not believe that he was personally in the revolutionary camp.

Such is the general impression produced by his writings, even though, reading between the lines (as we must do in the case of all Russians who wrote under the pressure of the censorship), I can discern passages containing extremely radical allusions to the misdeeds of powerful persons. It does not follow that Mihailovskii's influence was trifling because he was never banished to Siberia. In 1883, Pleve sent him to Viborg for a speech he had made to students at a ball, and it is said that sharper measures were contemplated.

Russia is subject, and if the Russians must traverse the same route as Europe, they can traverse it fully aware of what they are doing. But since Russian conditions differ from those that obtain in Europe, the development of capitalisation in Russia may prove peculiar to that country. Mihailovskii drew attention to this possibility in 1872, shortly after the publication of the Russian translation of Capital. Marx wrote an answer to Mihailovskii, but the reply did not appear until 1888, when it was published in the Russian periodical, *The Legal Courier*, as A Writing by Carl Marx. Marx explained that he had not formulated his law of evolution as universally valid, but that as soon as a country had entered this specific course of development it became subject to the formulated laws of evolution. In each individual case the matter must be considered in relation to the peculiarities of the historically extant conditions. There was no fatal necessity about the capitalist development of Russia, nor was it essential that in Russia the countryfolk should be proletarianised in order to become "free" industrial workers, as had happened in Europe. Mihailovskii referred to Marx's reply as late as 1892, insisting once more that in view of the special character of Russian historical conditions, it was certainly possible that Russian evolution would take a course peculiar to that country.

The opinion I have formed regarding Mihailovskii as politician, an opinion based upon my first study of his writings, may now be briefly elucidated by an examination of his ethical teachings and of such clandestine works as are at my disposal.

Like Lavrov, Mihailovskii assumes the unity of theory and practice.¹ He refers to the development of the fifties. The younger Russians of that day adopted materialism, positivism, and realism because, after the experiences of the Nicolaitan epoch, they wished to know what the world really is, whilst simultaneously, and for the same reason, they desired to know what the world must become. Not merely did they contemplate the world positivistically, but they wanted to transform it in the positivist direction.

From the mutuality of the individual and of society there is deducible, according to Mihailovskii, but one practical morality, which is far from being a morality that implies, under ethical pretexts, a withdrawal from social life. He opposes recipes for self-development; he opposes the comfortable and cheap individualism which works "upon, in, over, and under itself" (compare Pisarev's similar expression), whilst ignoring the folk, the working people. For the same reason, Mihailovskii rejects liberalism because it is concerned only about the few. He is not satisfied with political freedom in default of economic freedom, for he will not consent to the sacrifice of millions of hungry proletarians for the sake of a few thousand fat bourgeois. For Mihailovskii the only ethics are socialist ethics, and the socialist tests everything by its effect upon the workers. For Mihailovskii, therefore, "the right of ethical judgment is per se the right to intervene in the course of events, and to this right there corresponds a duty, the duty of responsibility for one's actions. The living individuality, with all its thoughts and feelings, becomes, at its own risks, a factor in history."

The ethical struggle must therefore at the same time be a struggle for the right. To Mihailovskii it seems that the motivation to this struggle is necessarily twofold. The campaign on behalf of individuality, intervention in the causal chain of historical and social events, is on the one hand determined by a sore conscience, and on the other by an

¹ Mihailovskii is fond of pointing out that the Russian terms for the respective concepts of truth and justice, *pravda* and *spravedlivo*st', have the same primitive significance.

injured sense of honour. In his study of Saltykov, Mihailovskii brings into prominence these two fundamental motives of practical socialist ethics. A man's conscience, he says, leaves him no rest as soon as he has come to realise that in one way or another he has unjustly exercised power over his fellows; his conscience demands an adequate sacrifice. If he cannot change his nature or his habits, it is his duty to offer up his life. The sense of honour is the awareness of needlessly endured affronts and constraints, and this therefore demands, not self-sacrifice, but space for all the energies and ideals that have hitherto been repressed. If, from the pressure of circumstances, this space, this satisfaction, cannot be secured, the man whose sense of honour has been awakened is in this case too impelled to sacrifice his life. Mihailovskii is aware that this rigorous demand will not always be fulfilled; he knows that the conscience and the sense of honour are not in every case sufficiently keen; he knows that compromises will be effected. There are cases, again, when the sacrifice of life is not required, and when men find satisfaction in struggle. Finally, in the great majority of men, conscience and the sense of honour are not awakened at all.

Mihailovskii enters a protest against the criticism that his concept of honour is identical with the feudal and aristocratic "honneur" of the days of chivalry; it is, he contends, a new and entirely different ethical sentiment. Personal wellbeing as an ethical principle, he says in one place, is old, and it is enough for the bourgeois; the ethics of compunction are likewise old; but new, perfectly new, is the "sentiment of *personal* responsibility for one's own *social* position."

In his study of Renan and Dühring (1878), Mihailovskii contrasted the idea of the sovereignty of the individual, the democratic right of every individual to political initiative, with the oligarchical and monarchical right of the few or even of a single person, which the bourgeoisie regards as valid. We may harbour doubts concerning the way the principle is formulated; we may ask whether the relationship between conscience and the sense of honour be rightly conceived; but the fundamental idea is sound.¹

¹ In the study of Dühring, Dühring's theory of vengeance as the source of criminal law and of law in general is described as negative, and the autonomy of the individual is asserted as a positive, as a reasonable demand of democratic equality. But it is a matter for examination how much of Dühring's theory underlies Mihailovskii's theory of the sense of honour.

When therefore the question is mooted, which rules are higher, those of individual morality or those of social conduct, Mihailovskii shows (*Letters Concerning Truth and Untruth*, 1878) how the customary political programs may lead indeed to results, but not to sound and just results. It seems to him, therefore, that the conscience is the only ultimate court of appeal. He refers to the fortunate circumstances in which there may be no conflict between individual and social ideals, but being well aware that these are no more than fortunate (i.e. exceptional) circumstances, we must continually reiterate the moral demand to remain faithful under all circumstances to truth and justice.

Let us now examine Mihailovskii's own political conduct.

We may recall that he began to come to the front in the literary world during the early seventies, at the time when the far-reaching and widely diffused literary movement was in progress, paving the way for and organising the practical movement "towards the people." His writings during this first phase afforded sufficient proof of his socialist views. In 1873, Lavrov invited him to collaborate upon "Vpered." Mihailovskii hesitated for a time whether he should not leave Russia for good, and make common cause with Lavrov; but in the end he became convinced that, as he expressed it, he was no revolutionary, and was indeed more afraid of the revolution than of the reaction. His political credo at that time was, "Sit quiet and make ready." Mihailovskii was a Lavrovist in that he accepted Lavrov's propagandism, whilst his refusal to work with Lavrov shows that he had formed a just estimate of Lavrov's incapacity for leadership.

Mihailovskii's views were still apolitical. This is most plainly shown in his criticism of Dostoevskii's *The Devils*, published in the year we are considering (1873). Mihailovskii therein declares that he desires political freedom, "but if all the rights associated with this freedom are to be for us nothing more than a pretty and sweet-smelling flower, these rights and this freedom are things we can dispense with! Away with them when not merely do they fail to provide for us the possibility of paying our debts, but when they even contribute to swelling the total of these debts!" At a later date (1886), Mihailovskii declared that these words were too emphatic, but it would seem that his views concerning the utility of politics had undergone a change.

Mihailovskii's socialism, his work for the folk and above all for the peasants, harmonise better with the political aspirations which found their climax in the call, "Land and Freedom." I do not know whether and to what extent he was then connected with the secret societies, but in 1878 he wrote on behalf of "Načalo" (beginning, principle), a revolutionary periodical clandestinely printed in Russia, a leaflet in which the acquittal of Věra Zasulič by the jury was made the occasion for the demand for a constitution or for the summoning of the zemski sobor. Should this demand not be granted, a secret committee of public safety must be constituted. "Woe, then, to the fools who oppose the course of history!" Zasulič was represented as the embodiment of the Russian conscience and the Russian idea, but Mihailovskii emphasised the words which Zasulič had uttered before the judge: "It is hard to raise one's hand against a fellow human being."

In 1879, Mihailovskii published in the organ of the Narodnaja Volja two *Political Letters by a Socialist*. They were political because he had come to the conclusion that the revolutionists were mistaken in despising political work because they aspired to the social revolution. He reiterated his views concerning the consequences of the French revolution, which had indeed brought the constitutionalism of bourgeois liberalism, but had left social inequality. The revolutionaries were wrong in believing that Russia could effect the social revolution without the aid of the bourgeoisie. Russia, he showed, was still under the yoke of its bourgeoisie. Alexander II would not voluntarily grant a constitution; it must be forced from him. Mihailovskii therefore summoned the revolutionaries to the political struggle. In Europe, political freedom was proclaimed after the third estate, the bourgeoisie, had already become firmly established alike intellectually and materially. Russia must learn by Europe's example, and must exact political freedom by force before the bourgeoisie had in like manner become firmly established in Russia. Mihailovskii did not believe that the Russian folk would rise in revolt; and the revolutionaries, the intelligentsia, must therefore take up the political struggle. The social disease of Europe was caused, not by political freedom, but by the system of private robbery. The Russian eagle had two heads, and with one beak he tore political freedom

in pieces, whilst with the other he gobbled up the peasants. "Aim, therefore, at both heads of the bird of prey! Vogue la galère!"

Mihailovskii's writing was signed "Grognard." It certainly lacks clarity. What were the revolutionaries really to do? How were they to conduct the desiderated political struggle side by side with the social struggle? Were the two campaigns distinct, and if so in what respect?

The second writing was somewhat clearer. Mihailovskii declared that he did not himself feel able to kill a human being in cold blood, and that he had never thought it right to teach others who was to be killed and how. He desired to undertake a logical investigation, from the outlook of those who claimed a right to kill, to ascertain what practical meaning the assassination of such men as Mezencev could have. The revolutionaries said that the Russian revolution was of an exclusively social character. They did not want a constitution, for this would merely impose a new yoke upon the people. They contended that the assassinations were nothing more than a defence against spies, against the Mezencevs. Blood must be paid for with blood.

The reader will recall Stepniak's theory, against which Mihailovskii now directed his arguments. Mihailovskii insisted, in the first place, that the alleged self-defence was, after all, nothing but a political struggle; the terrorist murders had no specifically socialist character; the same means were employed by aristocrats, clericalists, liberals, intriguers of all kinds. Hence, continued Mihailovskii, it is not the Mezencevs who ought to be killed, but the idea of autocracy. He therefore demanded a political struggle of a different kind. The terrorist method was too episodic and unsystematic; there was no clear consciousness at the back of it; the revolutionists, he complained, understood how to die but did not wish to live. His conclusion was that the revolutionists ought to combine with the liberals for a systematic political struggle, not a struggle waged on their own behalf, but for the sake of the whole country and to win the whole country. For Mihailovskii, the constitutionalist regime in Russia was merely a question of the morrow, though this morrow, it was true, would not bring the solution of the social problem. Human peace and wellbeing belonged to a remoter future.

Among other clandestine essays I must mention a vigorous

criticism of Count Loris-Melikov, the "Asiatic diplomatist," and the *Open Letter of the Executive Committee to Alexander III*. In the latter document an explanation is given of the death of Alexander II, and his successor is exhorted to put an end to the revolution by granting complete amnesty and by summoning a legislative representative assembly of the entire people.¹

Concerning Mihailovskii's relationship to the Narodnaja Volja and its executive committee, we are further enlightened by the fact that he was deputed to take part in the negotiations with the "Holy Retinue" which were conducted by Lavrov in 1882.

Mihailovskii subsequently wrote several more essays for publication in clandestine journals, among which was one discussing the suppression of his review in 1884. His political views do not seem to have undergone any further change. But this point cannot be decided until a complete edition of his writings and a collection of his letters are available. In the works belonging to the close of the eighties and subsequent years he is partly engaged in his struggle with the Marxists. In a letter of July 1898 to Rusanov (Kudrin), who had been a refugee, he deplored the effects of the refugee movement by which Russia was deprived of her young people. Mihailovskii was inclined to regard this loss as responsible for the prevailing mental chaos and for the spread of Marxism. The end would doubtless come before long. Either liberal tendencies would gain the victory at court, or else "we shall return to the terror with its indefinite consequences (though I regard the results of the terror in the seventies as definite enough)." Rusanov's explanation of Mihailovskii's allusion to the indefinite consequences of terrorism was that the terrorist movement did not "march consistently forward towards a definite end." In 1901, again, it seemed to Mihailovskii that the return to terrorism was inevitable. "I cannot myself take part in it, and I cannot recommend it to others, but it must come sooner or later."

We see that Mihailovskii vacillated from the first between theory and practice, between sociology and politics, between constitutionalism and revolutionism. He condemns the terrorist revolution; in his moral system there is no place

¹ This document, one of considerable political importance, received its definitive form in Mihailovskii's hands.

for Stepniak's motivation by vengeance ; but when terrorism has become an accomplished fact he recognises it as inevitable, and finds himself "logically" compelled to rally to its support. Mihailovskii was ever fearless in the way he devoted his pen to the awakening of political consciousness and of the vengeful feeling of honour.

§ 127.

MIHAILOVSKII'S attitude towards the religious problem was peculiar. He was favourable to religion, ascribing to it the greatest value alike for the individual and for society ; but his treatment of the matter was never more than casual, and he frequently apologised for being altogether the layman in relation to theology.

This avoidance of the religious problem was not wholly dependent upon his fear of the censorship.

Mihailovskii's distinctive outlook upon this field is displayed in his studies of Tolstoi and Dostoievskii. He does not analyse the attempts they made to solve the religious problem, and merely reports that they considered it. He shows a similar reserve in his analysis of European writers. In 1873, penning a critique of Strauss's *The Old Faith and the New*, he merely takes occasion, apropos of the theory that the gods are anthropomorphic constructions, to throw light upon the contrast between an ideal and an idol ; and he demands that idealistic and realistic idols (in the addition of the "realistic idols" he is inspired by his antagonism for Pisarev's realists), that is to say, mythical and anthropomorphic idealisations of men and things, shall yield place everywhere to ideals.

None the less, in 1901, Mihailovskii published *Fragments concerning Religion*. Here, in reference to the greater literature on the topic, the existence of the new "science of religion" is recognised, and its justification is admitted ; but at most he is willing to allot the vague name of "teachings concerning religion" to this domain of enquiry. He inveighs against economic materialism, with its endeavour to make light of the significance of religion (in socialism and elsewhere) ; but thereafter he is content to refer to recent works upon the evolution of religion and to make special mention of certain theories concerning the origin of religion—those of Comte, Spencer, Tylor, Lubbock, Feuerbach, Guyau, etc.,

As regards the essential definition of religion, Mihailovskii refers to his own expositions of the matter in 1875. These were interesting, all the more so, perhaps, because they were parenthetical, because they were the outcome of frequently recurring personal moods and doubts.

Mihailovskii had been disquieted, not for the first time as we shall learn, by the increasing frequency of suicide, and it occurred to him to compare our own epoch with that of the decay of Rome. In this comparison he was concerned more with differences than with resemblances, and was particularly struck with one phenomenon. Recalling the early Christians and their pagan opponents, he was filled with wonder at both parties, both the martyrs and their persecutors, being astonished at the splendid definiteness of all their doings. These people were perfectly clear as to their purposes, those of one side killing with unalloyed energy; and those who died being equally clear as to what they were dying for. This definiteness of view, said Mihailovskii, existed because both sides were religious. "It was religion which gave their feelings, their ideas, and their actions, the definiteness which our feelings, ideas, and actions lack; the lack of this definiteness in our dead-alive social life can be explained solely by this lack of religion. . . . By religion I understand a doctrine which connects the views concerning the universe prevailing at a given time, with the rules of individual life and social activity; this connection must be so firm that no one who professes the religious doctrine can possibly disregard his moral convictions, any more than he can admit that 2×2 is a tallow candle." Mihailovskii complained of the indefiniteness of the age. Our views of what is were isolated; our views of what ought to be were isolated; similarly, our actions were isolated. This, exclaimed Mihailovskii, is our misfortune, the supreme misfortune of Russian social life. Kavelin had desired to overcome the moral weakness of the Russians by the elaboration of an independent Russian philosophy. But in opposition to Kavelin, Mihailovskii contended that this would not suffice. Philosophy might unify ideas of what is and what ought to be, but this unification would merely be effected in the sphere of thought, in the thoughts of a few men; it would not be effected in the sphere of life. Philosophy would not furnish that *religious* devotion to an idea which alone was competent to overcome moral weakness. It did

not suffice to unify theoretical ideas. "The crumbling habitation" of ideas must be set in order in such a way as to be the starting point of action in a definite direction.

Mihailovskii did not forget Spencer's philosophy of religion, but Spencer's religion did not suffice him, for in his view it lacked the most essential characteristic of religion since it was incompetent to guide men's actions. Mihailovskii was aware that the demand for a coherent outlook on life was widespread, but this philosophical coherence the field of theory did not suffice for the demands of practical life; did not teach us how to live. Again and again, Mihailovskii alluded to the absolute certainty, definiteness, devotion, preparedness, and active zeal, of the Christian martyrs.

Mihailovskii consistently held to this theory, returning to it in his *John the Terrible* (1888) and again in the *Fragments*. In the work on John the Terrible he gave a more succinct definition of religion, saying that it was a harmonious blend of reason and sentiment.¹ It is important to note that Mihailovskii, therefore, considered that the essence of religion must be sought in the sphere of reason as well as in that of feeling. Knowledge and faith, he said, are in a sense less widely separated one from another than is commonly assumed, faith or belief represents our provisional conclusions, before we have attained to knowledge; in the domain of science, hypotheses constitute the element of faith; by a quite natural process, beliefs (hypothetical assumptions) are replaced by knowledge, and conversely from knowledge we pass on to beliefs (hypothetical assumptions).

We are not here concerned to ask whether Mihailovskii's philosophy of religion is sound, but it certainly seemed remarkable that in his critical studies, and above all in those dealing with Russian poets and prose writers, Mihailovskii did not undertake a profounder discussion of religious problems. I have previously referred in this connection to Tolstoi and Dostoevskii, but the remark applies equally to Merežkovskii and other writers about whom Mihailovskii wrote critiques.

¹ A more precise analysis of Mihailovskii's views would demand a fuller account of his psychological conceptions. Here, in reference to his positivism and to the question of positivist detachment, I may point out that he did not regard reason, feeling, and will, as three absolutely distinct faculties or activities, but considered that all three elements are present in every psychical act. Mihailovskii referred occasionally to Lehmann's psychological study, *The Principal Laws of the Affective Life of Man*, 1892.

It applies above all to Mihailovskii's endeavours to take a comprehensive view of latter day developments in Russia, for such a view cannot be attained without a study of the religious problems and endeavours of an epoch. Yet Mihailovskii, though, as we have seen, he thought the main weakness of the day was its lack of religion, did not undertake such an enquiry.

Positivism or positivist detachment cannot have been his reason for ignoring the matter, for he had early overcome this defect of positivism. Nor can I regard his ethical views, his utilitarianism, as the cause—all the less seeing that, despite his hostility to Kant, his utilitarianism had a distinctly rigorist flavour.

The objection may be made that Mihailovskii reduces religion essentially to morality (the question whether this is done with or without Kant may be left unconsidered), and that his analysis of the springs of moral conduct is therefore adequate. It is unquestionable that Mihailovskii's primary demand from religion was not for dogmas, but for strength of character, for definiteness. For him, nevertheless, religion was something more than, something different from, morality. In his *Literary Reminiscences* (1894) he alluded to various ethical systems, and made the following characteristic utterance: "Morality incontestably begins from the moment when man imposes any sort of bridle upon his ego, from the moment when he is willing to give up any of his wishes in the name of something which he regards as higher, as sacred, as inviolable. Until this moment comes, we have nothing but customs!"

By other socialists, Mihailovskii, for having used this image of the bridle, was accused of borrowing from Kant's rigorism. He defended himself, though not very vigorously. (He might have referred to his description of the execution of the last criminal!)

"I believe that I do not err in saying that the extant Russian realism is as remote from the ideal of religion as it is from a star in the heavens." The lack of religion was evident, not in Russia alone, but in France and throughout the world. Mihailovskii gave an account of Bourget's novel *Le disciple*, and accepted its analysis of the modern mental cleavage which takes the form of the paralysis of will by the analytical reason. He recurred to his diagnosis of the lack

of religious harmony in modern man. Noteworthy is the manner wherein, along a devious route, Mihailovskii passed by way of Bourget to Dostoevskii, coming to essential agreement with the last-named. But it is likewise noteworthy that he did not directly consider Dostoevskii's analysis of the modern man in order to give his opinion thereon.

Let me repeat, however, that Mihailovskii was sufficiently positivist to regard religious feeling, in the sense in which he used the word, as thoroughly natural, for he would have nothing to do with mysticism. Instructive, in this connection, is the study of 1875 mentioned two or three pages back. He considered that weakness of character was exhibited even by the men all of whose thoughts and doings had been summarised by Šcedrin in the single word "devourers"! Even these clear-sighted and deliberate devourers were afraid to display their morality in all its nakedness, and concealed their motives behind moral flourishes. "So difficult do even such as these find it to be religious. Do I say 'religious'? Yes, for it is to be religious to pursue an aim with the whole soul, with the whole will, without any reserves." Mihailovskii concludes the passage with a lament that it is impossible to approximate to this religious ideal if a man has a wider and more complicated program than the "devourers," if he desire to recognise a wider circle of phenomena, and if he wish to take his stand in a more complex grouping of facts. Being an evolutionist, Mihailovskii assumes that religion is destined to undergo further evolution. Whereas Comte, led astray by Hume, had regarded religion as a surpassed historic phase, Mihailovskii holds rather with Spencer that religion is destined for further development. He understands Hume's view that religion is mere superstition, but does not agree with it. In so far as religion involves faith, it may at any given moment become superstition; but superstition can be replaced by knowledge; thereby religion is modified, not destroyed. Mihailovskii draws attention to the fact that men have found the designation faith or belief inadequate, and have therefore made use of the term religion. It is obvious that Mihailovskii felt that in his own epoch there was occurring a transition from the extant ecclesiastical religion to a higher religious form, but for his own part he was incompetent to determine the psychological characteristics of the transition and to formulate the elements of the new religion.

§ 128.

MIHAILOVSKII'S interest was to a high degree concentrated upon the signs of the period of transition, and he endeavoured to find meanings in the chaos of the transition. He was especially struck, as one of the signs of the times, with the increasing frequency of suicide, characteristic of Russia no less than of western Europe, and he was able to show that suicide and melancholia were assuming positively epidemic proportions.

He touched on the question in 1875, in connection with his first formulation of the religious problem, referring to the great number of suicides in Russia, and asking the momentous question as to the cause. He recognised that the corpses of the unfortunates harmonised in tint with the corpse-like lividity of background in the general social structure, but this was to see a picture, not to give an explanation. He knew that at least half of those who had taken their own lives could not have explained a moment before the act why they were about to do so, whilst in the case of the other half the suicide had been determined by the pressure of the question, Why am I in this picture at all? Finding no answer, they deliberately sought death. Thus Mihailovskii's answer to the sinister "Why," was that a life without meaning or aim was intolerable.

On this first occasion, Mihailovskii did not dwell on the topic. It merely occurred to him that the frequency of suicide and the associated cry for "bread and circuses" gave our time a similarity to the decadent epoch of Rome. Though the thought was not followed up, it led Mihailovskii to recall the early Christian martyrs and their opponents, and it was in this connection that he formulated his definition of religion. From the definition and from the connection in which it is given, the conclusion may be drawn that the lack of religion is the answer to the question asked by the sociologist and by the suicide who falls victim to his era. A life without meaning and aim is intolerable.

Mihailovskii returned to the problem of suicide in a study of Eduard von Hartmann and of modern pessimism with its characteristic torment of the soul and its ultimate expedient, suicide. He took Goethe's Faust as spokesman of the day, and explained why Faust could find neither happiness nor

satisfaction. Faust was unhappy because he could discover no answer to his questions regarding the real being and essence of things. Faust failed to understand that there is no answer to such questions, that it is a false metaphysics which leads us to ask them, and that we must do away with them altogether. This false metaphysics must be replaced by positivism. The metaphysics is false because it has originated in a false relationship to the sciences, has originated in an aristocratic endeavour to answer ultimate questions without a positive study of the special sciences. It is the philosophy of capitalism, is constructed by the capitalist who is cut off from the tools that produce by direct labour. The Fausts seek happiness, but discover nothing beyond an unappeasable thirst for happiness, because their metaphysics is based upon the labour and hunger of millions, and because this leads them to set themselves tasks which transcend their own powers and transcend human faculty in general. Practical life, positive and unmetaphysical knowledge, oppose Faust and refute him.

Faustian metaphysics is not only theoretically false, but is likewise morally unsound, being an expression of the crass egoism which leads a man to isolate himself from the great majority of his fellows, although he wishes to exploit the labours of his fellow men for his own private purposes. "The metaphysician is a man who has been driven mad by fatness."

The Fausts, therefore, are just as unhappy as the speculator who is driven to suicide by a collapse on the stock exchange. Mihailovskii alludes more than once to the suicide of the unsuccessful commercial speculator, and there is an obvious connection in his mind between the word "speculation" in this sense and the speculation of the Fausts.

Mihailovskii concludes his sketchy analysis by saying that neither Hartmann with his philosophy of the unconscious, nor Pogodin with his orthodox slavophilism, could exorcise the spirit of suicide.

In a study of Garšin (1885) Mihailovskii analysed *The Night*. It is a minor point that Mihailovskii should have regarded the hero's death as a suicide, whereas Garšin merely made him die suddenly from the intensity of his newly awakened sentiment of love for his fellows. What interests us is Mihailovskii and his analysis of suicide. Like Faust, the egoist is recalled to childhood by the sound of the bell summoning

to early mass; he feels what pure love and pure sentiment might be; he would like to tear the pot-bellied idol out of his heart; but he does not know where to turn and how to take up the burden of his fellow men's misery. The new feeling is fugitive, and the egoist puts an end to his life with a pistol shot.

Mihailovskii considers that Bourget's book *Le disciple* contains an accurate analysis of the modern incapacity for living. The modern man is riven in twain, his thought is estranged from life, his thirst for analysis undermines the energy of will, he is afraid to act, and he succumbs to this disease of the will.

In his explanation of consciousness as an aggregate of multiple consciousnesses, Mihailovskii extols the centralism and despotism of the central consciousness, which finds expression in the will. This, he says, is health, but the loss of such a healthy despotism leads to a weakening and destruction of consciousness and of life in general. It is obvious that the explanation is purely verbal, that no real explanation is given why consciousness and will become enfeebled, seeing that we are not told for what reason the beneficent activity and energy of the healthy centralising despotism disappear, because we do not learn under what conditions they disappear.

§ 129.

MARX had represented Goethe's Faust as a capitalist. Mihailovskii followed up the idea, for the Faust problem attracted him and busied him from early days. In one of his first studies, that of *Voltaire as Man and Thinker* (1870), Mihailovskii discussed the question at some length.

Faust could not become happy because he had set himself an impossible aim and had chosen improper means for its realisation. Faust made a sharp distinction between the physical and the mental, and this was why, as Goethe aptly shows, he desired to solve his metaphysical problems with the aid of magic. But merely to formulate these problems is to enter the wrong path. In order to illustrate the morbidity characteristic of these Fausts with divided minds, Mihailovskii quotes from Brierre de Boismont's *Du suicide et de la folie suicide* similar speculations by a suicide.

Voltaire's good, learned, and wealthy Brahman was no

less unhappy than Goethe's Faust. He had studied and taught for forty years, and knew in the end just as little as Faust ; an old woman, his neighbour, who had learned nothing, and merely had faith in Vishnu and the old myths, was perfectly happy. The Brahman was well aware that he too would have been happy had he remained stupid, but neither he nor anyone else would have been willing to change places with the happy old woman. Voltaire caustically enquires why intelligence and happiness should be thus contrasted, but cannot furnish an answer.

Metaphysical speculation devours itself and others. Mihailovskii, borrowing an expression from Turgenev, terms it "self-devouring." There is a remedy for the trouble, the remedy recommended by Chrysostom to a disciple suffering from the malady of speculation, and it is to have a wife and children. This, says Mihailovskii, is practical counsel, for it prescribes that man shall not live for himself alone, but shall concern himself for others. The Brahman and the old woman are both defective, both impossible, both victims of social institutions ; they are not complete human beings, but merely parts of the social organism. The Brahman's old neighbour works and does nothing else, just as Wagner, Faust's famulus, does nothing but work, seeing that his only function is to acquire knowledge of facts. The Brahman and Faust, no less than the old woman and Wagner, are not complete human beings. They are all invalids ; they all suffer from hypertrophy of some particular organ, which undergoes excessive development *pari passu* with neglect of the other organs. If we are to remain human in our study of science, we must not like the Brahman and Faust endeavour to transcend the limits of the knowable, but we must be equally careful to avoid becoming like Wagner enslaved by sensual empiricism. Wagner, too, ceased to be human, for it was he who endeavoured to construct the homunculus. Faust did not follow Wagner in this unnatural aberration, but Faust himself succumbed to the folly of metaphysics.

In the second part of Faust, Goethe attempted to solve the problem. The allegorical struggle with the forces of nature, says Mihailovskii, is magnificent ; the endeavour to be useful is morally good—but it fails. The principle of utility is no less inadequate than are all the other special criteria, such as truth, beauty, justice, etc. The only sound criterion of

perfection in human affairs is integrality, a harmony of functions in man, and harmony of means in man's activities. By an integral human being, happiness for himself and his associates can only be found in activity on behalf of himself and his associates. Wagner can discover truth as well as another; to stitch shoes and to drain marshes are useful actions. The man of science may strive with nature, and he may do this theoretically (not practically like Faust); but what he must shun is the method adopted by Faust or by Wagner. Faust desires to work magic, and thereby becomes non-human. Wagner, too, is non-human, for everything human is alien to him; he is the piston of a pump, a pumping machine; not a whole but a mere part; not an individual (integral or undivided) but a mere instrument for the acquisition of facts.

With Comte, Mihailovskii appeals against Faust and the Brahman to the consideration that in true humanity theory and practice exist in mutual equipoise. If we can give Faust and the Brahman fuller scope for their activities, if we can give them the opportunity and the power of sympathising practically with others' lives, if we can awaken in them the altruism of Comte, the tuism of Feuerbach, the sympathy of Adam Smith, they will become healthy, they will be concerned about very different problems, and this concern will lead them to victory, not defeat.

Faust and Wagner, the Brahman and the old woman, live close beside one another, but they do not know one another, and scarcely notice one another. They are complementary opposites, the obverse and the reverse of the same "eccentric" medal.

The use of the word eccentric shows us what was Mihailovskii's historico-philosophical explanation of the Faust problem.

It is the division of labour into the economic and mental spheres which has made men non-human. Philosophically it is metaphysics which causes the disintegration of the stage of eccentricity. It is thus in Saint-Simon's sense that Mihailovskii appraises the eighteenth-century enlightenment which found expression above all in Voltaire, by saying that an organic epoch is succeeded by a critical epoch. In the story of the Brahman and the old woman his neighbour, Voltaire displayed the opposition between knowledge and happi-

ness without being able to show how the opposition could be transcended. Voltaire could not be positive; he was merely negative; his philosophy and Goethe's philosophy issued from a moribund social order.

The connection of the Faust problem and the suicide problem in Mihailovskii's thought has now been made clear. Faust's questions cannot be answered by metaphysics; his ethics can furnish no satisfaction for his aspirations. Faust, like the Brahman, can undermine the old woman's faith, but he has no power to make either himself or his associates happy. In the moribund epoch, men die by their own hands.

The age is inharmonious; all our social institutions are inharmonious; individual human beings are inharmonious. Epoch, society, and men, are irreligious—thus runs Mihailovskii's briefest formulation, for to him irreligion is the disharmony of reason and sentiment, of science and life, of philosophy and ethics. Upon this disharmony depends the modern malady of the will, the incapacity for living.

Faust is the representative of civilisation. The majority of German civilised beings are to some extent Fausts, and this is why Mihailovskii considers *Faust* the greatest of Goethe's works. Not until the end of his life does Faust succeed in doing that which every village lad learns to do from the very beginning—useful work. Mihailovskii asks which is the higher, Faust or the village lad. In accordance with his theory of progress, Mihailovskii replies that, whilst Faust has attained a higher stage of evolution, the village lad stands higher as type.

§ 130.

FROM 1901 onwards Mihailovskii wrote his literary reminiscences in a series of essays entitled *Literature and Life*. These were subsequently collected in book form as *Literary Reminiscences and the Present Chaos*. Two additional volumes of studies, reprinted from Mihailovskii's review after his death, pursue the same aim.

When Mihailovskii speaks of "the present" he thinks primarily of the nineties and of the opening years of the new century, but he is also concerned with the eighties, with the whole period since the days of Nicholas, and one may even say with the epoch since the forties, when the Russians first clearly recognised the consequences of the great revolution.

By "chaos" Mihailovskii means the philosophical and literary confusion attendant upon the unclarified and gloomy situation, but we must remember that the Russian word *smuta* likewise signifies "riot." In his historico-philosophical scheme he describes the period of transition from the eccentric to the subjective anthropocentric epoch as anarchy and false individualism, and likewise speaks of it as revolution and as scepticism. The ultimate stage of the eccentric epoch has deindividualised and therefore dehumanised man. Faust, Wagner, and the stock exchange speculators, have broken the shackles of religious and political absolutism without being able to throw off economic shackles. The regime of arbitrary force continues, and in the tiniest village no less than in the capital the usurer satisfies his avarice with the aid of the state police. In the west, liberal constitutionalism and parliamentarism, the monarchy and the republic, serve the bourgeois vampire; whilst in Russia, absolutism, with its bureaucracy academically trained on the European model, serves the bourgeois.

Mihailovskii's analysis of the chaos lays bare its various elements. In the theoretical field the leading factor is the indefiniteness and dilettantism of metaphysics, the negative philosophy of the spiritual and political slaves who have been awakened by Voltaire and the enlightenment.

Morally, the enlightened slave, the bourgeois, now freed from his dread of the old authorities, reveals himself in his pornographic literature. Mihailovskii does not hesitate to condemn, as far as Russian developments are concerned, Zola's theoretical talk concerning the alleged naturalistic positivism; and with all the energy of which he is capable he censures such writers as Nemirovič-Dančenko who have devoted their pens to a literature which has sunk to the level of the Parisian "Journal des Cochons." Mihailovskii is especially fierce in his denunciation of the lesser bourgeoisie of the third republic. By their wealth they were removed from the necessity of labour; they had abandoned clericalism and even Catholicism without finding anything to replace it which could minister to the mental and moral life; thus had it come to pass that the "Journal des Cochons" was the catechism of these philistines. Pornography has always existed, but not until to-day has it been raised to the level of a public system.

In Russia the lesser bourgeoisie was not so numerous as in Europe, but here it was the greater bourgeoisie which followed in the footsteps of the aristocratic leaders. Mihailovskii was never weary of attacking the European leaders of decadence, symbolism, magianism, and the rest, so that he might inflict shrewder blows upon their Russian imitators. He adopts from Nordau a few references to these types of degeneration, and analyses the ideas of Sacher-Masoch.

Pessimism is the upshot of such ethics. The readers of the "Journeaux des Cochons" become gloomy and melancholic; tedium and melancholia drive them to a voluntary death. Works dealing with the problem of weltschmerz did not escape Mihailovskii's literary attention, and he did not fail to point out the false individualism of the chief exponents of weltschmerz. Mihailovskii enters the lists against Stirner and Nietzsche as apostles of arbitrariness. Nietzsche, it is true, opposed the decadent movement, and therefore occupied higher ground than his Russian imitators, against whom Mihailovskii protects their teacher; but Nietzsche's superman is, after all, no more than the expression and the advocacy of eccentric dehumanisation.

Thus Mihailovskii is led to attack Darwinism with peculiar energy, and unceasingly to oppose its aristocratic master morality.

The ethics of free competition unchains the war of all against all. To Mihailovskii, Byronic "gloom" seems the ultimate result of this development. It is only a dog that remains faithful to its dead master.

The bourgeois is subject to the dominion, not of the state alone, but also of chauvinistic nationalism. For this reason Mihailovskii is even more averse to the new slavophilism than to the old, and for this reason he attacks the chauvinist narodniki. He continues his campaign against all the decadent phenomena of the day, disregarding accusations that he is aiding sanctimonious humbug and police rule. He knows well enough that the obscurantists opposed Darwinism, declaring Darwinism to be a sign of the times. In a vigorous satire, *Darwinism and Offenbach's Operettas* (1871) he shows that Darwin's doctrine may very well be compared with Offenbach's music, in that here and there Darwinists and Offenbachians misuse science and art for the benefit of the bourgeoisie. Beyond question Offenbach with his cynical mockery of the old gods

and the old morality could exist only in a decaying, degenerating, and corrupt society. But this immorality is one of the hammers of history; a great amputation is imminent. The eighteenth century enlightenment and the diffusion of wealth have freed the lords of the theatre from their fears, and they now plunge into enjoyment.

Notwithstanding his onslaughts on the dominant morality, Mihailovskii did not become a disciple of the Russian preachers Dostoevskii and Tolstoi. They too, were absolutists who represented their own opinions and feelings as universally valid rules of ethics. In the case of both these moralists Mihailovskii censured the exaggerated personal striving towards self-perfectionment, which led Tolstoi to a Buddhistic quietism, and Dostoevskii to the voluptuousness of martyrdom. Man has not simply to consider his personal responsibility. Not conscience alone is decisive, but also the sense of honour, and it is the two in conjunction which lead the rightly balanced human being to play his part in the social order.

Mihailovskii opposed the representatives of the latest Russian philosophical idealism, which was on such excellent terms with bourgeois politico-social materialism. In the days of the great revolution, the bourgeois had been the idealists, whilst the philosophers of that day had taught anthropological and cosmopolitan realism. The philosophical idealists were like Voltaire, who thought that a belief in God was a good thing for his tailor.

Mihailovskii was especially opposed to those later disciples of Marx who abjured historical materialism to champion mysticism and ecstasy. Whilst Mihailovskii had at first attacked the Marxists on account of their historical materialism, he turned later against the materialists who had been converted to idealism.

Mihailovskii draws a sharp distinction between religion and mysticism, considering them to be fundamental opposites. Mysticism translates man from natural reality into a cloudy indefinite remoteness, into regions where the fantastic gods of the mythologies play their senseless parts; religion, on the other hand, connects man with the realities of life, and makes him responsible for his actions. Belief and knowledge may be dead, may be incapable of leading to action. Religion is the harmony of belief and knowledge with man's ethical ideals, and is the impulse to action in a definite direction.

The religious man has a clear and definite idea of what he wills to do ; he believes, not only in what he wills to do, but in what he actually does.

§ 131.

WHILE still a student at the mining academy, Mihailovskii made his first literary venture by penning an analysis of the female types in Gončarov's books (1860), but he did not seriously engage in authorship until 1869. A general survey of his works subsequent to that date gives the following results. During the first years, to be precise, from 1869 to 1871, Mihailovskii's writings were of a predominantly scientific character. Some were essays upon themes of his own choice, but most of his scientific writings were critical notices of works by other authors, selected by Mihailovskii from the literature of the world as a vehicle for the conveyance of his own ideas and plans. The six-volume edition of his works contains about thirty-five lengthier essays, twenty-three of which deal with European and twelve with Russian authors. In the period from 1872 down to the beginning of January 1904, Mihailovskii wrote more or less connected accounts of the principal events in Russian life, of individual authors, and of literary trends, with occasional references to the drama and to graphic art. Such essays, taking the form of "Literary and Journalistic Observations," "A Layman's Notes," "A Contemporary's Notes," "A Reader's Diary," and so on, bulk more largely than studies of a monographic nature. As far as such studies were produced during this period, they belong chiefly to the seventies. Mihailovskii never wrote a book, a work containing the systematic elaboration of some particular theme. By deliberate choice he remained a critic, but as he himself put it on one occasion, the critic is neither more nor less than the expounder of artistic creations. Mihailovskii himself, however, was likewise an expounder of scientific creations.

If we compare Mihailovskii's style and his whole method of criticism with those of his predecessors, the contrast with Herzen and Bělinskii becomes obvious. Mihailovskii has more kinship with Černyševskii and Lavrov. His writing has a certain hardness, produces an impression of greyness, and yet we soon forget this as we go on reading, for we become enthralled by the contents, by the sturdiness, and by the

conscientiousness of what is written.¹ Mihailovskii had belletristic aspirations, and proposed to write a topical novel, but soon desisted from the attempt. His best friends advised him against it, and he was sufficiently self-critical to recognise that his imagination was unequal to the task. The cumbrousness and monotony of Mihailovskii's style is especially conspicuous in his more intimate reminiscences and in his critiques of the masterworks of literature; but he understood how to express his judgments in pregnant words and phrases, as if in the hope that these, giving colour, would make the reader forget the stylistic monotony. Not a few of his words and phrases have become widely current.

Throughout life, though he acquired much knowledge, and acquired it thoroughly, Mihailovskii regarded himself, not as a philosopher, but as a reader. "A Reader's Diary"—here we have a picture of the onlooker who is an indefatigable reader, but we have likewise a characterisation of his literary modesty. This modesty does not exclude a justified self-complacency. When he contrasts himself as a "layman" with professional experts, or when his pen finds a critical word to say about "men of learning," we sense satire and gentle mockery. Yet Mihailovskii could gladly do justice to the claim of the professional expert. He was less abstract than Lavrov. The latter took Europe as his starting point, and contemplated Russia from a distance; the former lived in Russia, and set out from the extant problems and difficulties of that country.

Whereas Lavrov, like so many of his predecessors and contemporaries, wrote as a refugee, and whereas, living abroad, he enjoyed complete freedom of speech, Mihailovskii worked at home, under the knout of the Russian censorship, and very few of his essays were first published abroad. The consequence was that Mihailovskii's method of expression was somewhat subdued, and bore the stamp of excessive reflection, while his choice of subjects was determined in relation to the censorship. But the very significance of Mihailovskii lies in this, that he did not take refuge abroad, and was not sent to Siberia. Thus for three decades, from the beginning of the seventies onwards, his works were as a beacon to the younger generation and as a guide to his contemporaries. But this

¹ Herzen, though pleased with the contents of Mihailovskii's first published work, *What is Progress*, censured its style.

guide himself belonged to the generation of those who had attained to intellectual maturity after the liberation of the serfs.

Reference should be made to Mihailovskii's literary and philosophical steadfastness. Whereas in their literary development most of the Russian thinkers have displayed crude transitions and profound internal revolutions, Mihailovskii remained the same from his debut in youth to the end of his literary career; he developed, he matured, but there was no change in his fundamentally positivist outlook. As he himself puts it, he wore an overcoat throughout life. In one of his essays he compares Proudhon and Bëliniskii, referring to the steadfastness of the Frenchman and to the vacillations and mutability of the Russian. He is inclined to regard this lack in Russian writers as due to the want of a cultural tradition, but he is aware that to Europeans tradition is a heavy ballast. The influence of Mihailovskii's steadfastness was necessarily all the greater seeing that his fundamental outlook and his leading doctrines were already formulated at the very outset of his career.

Literary criticism thus used to the exclusion of other methods was the implement of the philosophic and political opposition. Discussing the doctrine of the adaptation of individuals to the environment, Mihailovskii distinguishes between two types of adaptation. Some endeavour to raise the environment to their level; others adapt themselves to the environment. The fishes and the birds, he says, are the best adapted in the latter sense, and they therefore are the happiest of all animals. In human society, the birds and the fishes are represented by the men who delight in celebrating the days of their patron saints (the Russians have a special name for such festivals). In politics and history, the leading principle of these proposers of toasts is patriotism; in economics, it is perpetual harmony and wealth for wealth's sake; in science, it is science for science' sake; in philosophy, it is the teleology of nature; and so on.

In aesthetics, these adapters have the principle of art for art's sake, and against such a formula Mihailovskii protested from the very first. Art, in his view, had social significance. As early as 1874 he defined the poet as one endowed with the capacity of speaking for himself and for others. What applies to the poet applies to artists in general.

They can speak for others, they can live the inner life of others, **can** feel their way or think their way into the inner life of others. Mihailovskii considers that the artist possesses in a high degree that capacity for sympathy which every man ought to have, but of course the artist is likewise distinguished by his method of expression which differs from that of the non-artist. The aim of the critic must therefore be to report how the artist speaks for himself and for others, and to report for whom the artist is speaking. The critic must grasp the relationship between the artist and his object, and must show how this relationship is artistically displayed. Mihailovskii complains of Čehov that he applies his artistic apparatus in like manner to the swallow and to the suicide, to the fly and to the elephant, to tears and to water. Mihailovskii demands from the artist the same definiteness that he demands from others.

Mihailovskii will only recognise as a true artist one who does not speak for a class or group of society, but for the entire folk, for the workers. The idea of the folk is implied in every serious work of art. Starting from his view that society rests upon cooperation, he would like to introduce work as the measure of value into belles lettres and aesthetics no less than elsewhere. The thought is not elaborated, but enough is said to show what Mihailovskii demands from art, namely that it should pay at least as much attention to the idea of the folk as to the idea of love.

Mihailovskii frequently insists that the true artist should exhibit a sense of proportion, for he considers that the essential quality of artistic capacity is displayed in moderation. To give a concrete instance, he contends that Grigorovič and Lěskov lack a sense of proportion.

Art is per se social and ethical; ethics and aesthetics are intimately associated—although Mihailovskii recalls the fact that Cain and Abel were brothers, and yet one of them slew the other! Mihailovskii was not guilty of literary fratricide; his ethics and his socialism are guided by the old but beautiful and genuinely humane saying, *nil humanum a me alienum puto*; but the fact that he had no liking for the decadents and for their sexual erethism and abnormality may be ascribed, not merely to his socialist ethics, but also to his healthy virility.

From this outlook, Mihailovskii can best adjust his relations

to his contemporaries; his ablest and most detailed literary studies deal with his friends and acquaintances, with Ščedrin, Uspenskii, and Nekrasov. It is characteristic that he should show most interest in and understanding for the imaginative writers, those whose work manifests reflection or the direct life of feeling—Ščedrin, for instance, on the one hand, and Uspenskii and Garšin, on the other. Jakeibovič (Melšin) is congenial to him; of Čehov, the same can be said as regards the later works, wherein that writer has abandoned his earlier pose of impassivity. Mihailovskii found Andreev obscure, and Gor'kii's work did not please him, for he considered Gor'kii's characters too domineering.

There is little about Puškin in Mihailovskii's writings, and little about Gogol. He cannot forgive the latter for sermonising, and he finds the same tendency to sermonise uncongenial in Dostoevskii and Tolstoi. The two last-named writers, however, receive detailed consideration, with the remarkable omission, previously referred to, that Mihailovskii largely ignores their discussion of religious problems. Doubtless Mihailovskii had good grounds for rejecting passivity and humility, but these do not comprise the whole of the religious problem. The relationship to Dostoevskii is remarkable, for Dostoevskii's literary and journalistic genre resembled that of Mihailovskii. Yet Mihailovskii's treatment of Dostoevskii was inadequate, whilst Dostoevskii never said a word about Mihailovskii.

Mihailovskii has frequently been extolled, as for instance by Kropotkin, because as early as 1875 he predicted the religious crisis which was coming in Tolstoi's mind. Kropotkin refers to the articles entitled *The Right Hand and the Left Hand of Count Tolstoi*. In my opinion, however, Tolstoi had clearly displayed this trend long before 1875, for the later Tolstoi is foreshadowed in that writer's earliest creations. However this may be, we are here concerned only with the characterisation of Mihailovskii himself, with the study of Mihailovskii's mental development. We can readily understand that he could not approve Tolstoi's campaign against science, or the ethical outlook on marriage enunciated by Tolstoi in *The Kreutzer Sonata*, though it may be suggested that Mihailovskii took the onslaught on science too literally. Moreover, Tolstoi's apolitical trend requires closer examination, for we must ask whether it did not in the end subserve the aims of the political

movement. May we not suppose that the left hand (passivity, shrinking from responsibility) knew what the right hand (energy, criticism, activity) was doing?

In historical perspective, Mihailovskii pictured the evolution of Russian literature as a transition from aristocracy through the stage of the "aristocrats doing penance" to the democratic literary movement of our own day. Analysing the spokesmen of the aristocratic epoch, and in especial the writers of the forties and the sixties, Mihailovskii found in their work a confirmation of his own historico-philosophical analysis of the age. Lermontov's *Hero of our own Time* is the spokesman of *bezvremen'e* (the word has the double meaning of bad weather and bad luck), the representative of an inert epoch. From Avděev's *Our Society in the Heroes and Heroines of the Literature of the Fifties* (1874), Mihailovskii cites the analysis of the types Čackii, Oněgin, Pečorin, Rudin, Bazarov, and Rjazanov; and Mihailovskii is doubtless right when he makes common cause with Avděev on behalf of Rudin as a representative of the sixties, suggesting that Rudin was by no means so passive and inert as is usually held. Turgenev already represented the coming of better days, and still more could this be said of Mihailovskii's favourite authors, but the *bezvremen'e* has by no means disappeared, as can be shown by a study, not only of Dostoevskii, but also of Tolstoi, and still more of Čehov and of the decadents.

Apropos of the term favourite authors, Mihailovskii is by no means a blind admirer. For example, in connection with the dispute concerning Nekrasov's true character, Mihailovskii recalls an early saying of Nekrasov's, that he had sworn not to die in a garret. Mihailovskii saw clearly enough that this proletarian wished to become a wealthy man.

In his criticism of philosophical and of social and political trends and currents (Mihailovskii speaks rather of "moral and political" trends and currents), Mihailovskii is concerned chiefly with the present day. Only in passing does he allude to the earlier movements, like those of the slavophiles and of the westernisers, for he considers that both these trends belong entirely to the past.

He says very little, too, concerning his Russian predecessors in the critical fields, concerning Černyševskii, Herzen, and Bělinskii; but in the early days of his literary activity he is never weary of pointing out the exaggerations in the nihilist

aesthetics of Pisarev and that writer's associates, whilst he stigmatises Pisarev's attitude towards Puškin as pure vandalism. Mihailovskii is a sharp critic of realism, condemning the whole trend, but Pisarev and Blagosvëtllov in especial, for this literature, he says, had no thought for the folk, but only for a sect. Mihailovskii speaks with much sympathy of the works written by his friends Eliseev and Šelgunov.

The shafts of Mihailovskii's criticism were directed against European authorities as well as against those of Russia, and in this respect he is differentiated from Černyševskii, Herzen, and Bëlinskii. Consider, for example, his writings on Darwin and Darwin's successors, on Spencer, Voltaire, Renan, Stirner, Nietzsche, Hartmann, Zola, and Ibsen. Mihailovskii uses this means of attack against many of the dominant views in his own camp, for the foes of his own household seem to him more dangerous than declared opponents.

In connection with his analysis of the contemporary chaos, and in especial in his analysis of the decadent movement, Mihailovskii had a controversy with Merežkovskii and with the critic Volynskii.

I must conclude these brief and incomplete observations. It has not been my aim to expound Mihailovskii's views on aesthetics, but merely to show his spiritual associations ("Tell me thy company, and I will tell thee what thou art").

Our definitive judgment of Mihailovskii cannot but be favourable. His uniformity, consistency, and independence were of notable significance to Russia. He was not a genius, nor even a brilliant writer, but his methodical foresight, his endeavour to attain clearness and precision, made his works what they still are, a notable school of sociological and political culture. The subjective method (a bad name for an excellent thing) corrected the one-sided drift of the positivists towards natural science and materialism, and supplemented realism by the study of psychology and of mental activities.

Delight in psychological analysis led Mihailovskii to bring his philosophy into harmony with the "psychologism" of the Russian novelists, but the outcome of this psychologism was to lead Mihailovskii to reduce the theory of cognition to the sphere of psychology. The consequence was that, not in metaphysical questions merely, but likewise in epistemological questions, Mihailovskii's thought was affected by a vagueness which was dangerous to the success of his aspirations

towards precision. Without being aware of it, Mihailovskii replaced epistemological criticism by a reliance upon authorities whom he did not venture to question. Comte, Feuerbach, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill were for him such authorities.

Of late there has been a tendency to class Mihailovskii as among the empiricist critics, and to speak of him as a precursor of Mach and Avenarius. Such a classification is admissible only in so far as it is true that Mihailovskii accepted the positivism of Comte and Mill, and was content with a purely psychological analysis. Believing with Comte that we can have no scientific knowledge of the nature of things, Mihailovskii rested content with this agnosticism. Mach and similar thinkers have moved along the same road with their revival of Hume; but Mach, Avenarius, etc., studied Kant, and took Kant's thought into account in the formulation of their own empirical standpoint, whereas Mihailovskii ignored Kant. Herein lies a notable distinction between Mihailovskii and the German Humists.

Of late certain disciples (Struve, Berdjajev, etc.) have undertaken an epistemological examination of Mihailovskii's subjective method, and have brought it into harmony with the more recent developments of German philosophy, but I cannot see that these investigations have had any noteworthy result. The "chaos" against which Mihailovskii fought still dominates the theory of cognition and the field of criticism.

Mihailovskii's psychologism can further be detected in his philosophy of religion. An effect of the religious spirit is mistaken for the very essence of religion. But an important contribution is made to the practical aspect of the problem, inasmuch as Mihailovskii demands clearness and definiteness above all in the ethical domain, and here finds his strongest standing ground. In this respect he is in agreement with Hume, but also with Kant and with more recent writers, such as Mill and Spencer. His theoretical agnosticism becomes a practical gnosis, if I may employ the word to denote his clearly conceived and deliberately chosen ethical outlook.

I have already pointed out that Mihailovskii did not study the religious problem as considered in the works of Dostoevskii and Tolstoi. This seems to me very remarkable, but I cannot venture to suggest an explanation. In his analysis of the envioning chaos he occasionally refers to the philosophy of

religion of some of the slavophil stragglers (Rozanov, for instance). But this cannot be termed a serious analysis of the problem. Is it possible that fears of the censorship withheld him from a thorough analysis, not only of Dostoevskii and Tolstoi, but also of such writers as Vladimir Solov'ev and Pobëdonoscev? But surely the work could have been published abroad?

For Mihailovskii the association of religion with morality was extremely intimate, and here the influence of German philosophy, indirectly that of Kant, is perceptible. To Mihailovskii the transition to socialism, and to a union of French and of German socialism, was to be effected on these lines. In this matter Feuerbach rendered Mihailovskii the service which Mihailovskii rendered to Marx.

Such considerations indicate Mihailovskii's philosophical position in relation to socialism. Some have regarded Mihailovskii's work as the climax of "Russian socialism." In actual fact, Mihailovskii derived his socialism from the same philosophical, historical, and political sources as those from which the views of Lavrov, Černyševskii, Bëlinskii, and Herzen were derived; but Mihailovskii's outlook upon the justification of socialism and the necessity for socialism was far more comprehensive than that of the other writers named. In essence, Mihailovskii's socialism, like that of his predecessors and teachers, was a logical application of humanist morality. Man, the human essence, are the alpha and omega of Mihailovskii's socialism. For Mihailovskii, therefore, socialism was revolutionary in Europe, but conservative in Russia.

In this matter, above all, he agreed with Lavrov. The fact that Mihailovskii and Lavrov, one remaining in Russia, the other a refugee in Europe, should have simultaneously insisted upon the ethical trend of philosophy and of socialism, is one of primary significance, and exercised a great influence in educating and leading forward the young generation that arose after the liberation of the peasantry.

I may point out in conclusion that Mihailovskii would have done well to pay closer attention to Marx and Marxism. What he had to say about these matters in his controversies with the Marxists and the narodniki (in the middle nineties and subsequently), and in his controversies with Plehanov, Struve, and Voroncov, did not serve to clear up the questions

in dispute either philosophically or economically. Mihailovskii was an adversary of historical materialism, but nevertheless his philosophy of history paved the way for the spread of Marxist ideas, both in their orthodox and in their revisionist forms.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE THEORISTS OF THE OFFICIAL THEOCRACY: KATKOV; POBĚDONOSCEV; LEONT'EV.

I

§ 132.

WE have now to turn to the contemporary opponents of the progressive and radical politicians hitherto considered, and shall begin with Mihail Nikiforovič Katkov (1818-1887), the publicist defender of the government and the theocracy.

At Moscow during the forties Katkov was a member of Stankevič's circle, being on intimate terms with Bělinskii and Bakunin, and beginning his publicist activities under Bělinskii's auspices. When Bělinskii left Moscow for St. Petersburg, Katkov, with Ketčer and Bakunin, accompanied him part of the way. Shortly afterwards a breach occurred between Katkov and Bakunin, and in Bělinskii's house on one occasion (1840) the two men actually came to blows. At the end of the thirties, Katkov was under Hegel's influence, which, however, was soon replaced by that of Schelling—the Schelling of the later phase. In 1840 and 1841, Katkov attended Schelling's lectures in Berlin. Already in 1840, when the leaven of Schelling had begun to work, Katkov adopted as his program the three high-sounding words of Uvarov, Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. Nevertheless the aspiring young thinker found it possible to conceive Uvarov's program in the sense of Peter. He wrote in 1840: "Russia first originated through Peter." In 1841 he expressed himself as strongly averse to the Old Russism of Pogodin and Pogodin's associates, defending Europe, and maintaining that Europe was not falling into decay.

In 1845 he had become professor of philosophy, but in 1850

he lost this position during the reaction that followed 1848. Taking up the work of publicist in 1851, he was appointed editor of the official periodical "Moskovskija Vědomosti" (Moscow News), subsequently notorious, and held the post until 1855. In 1856 he founded the "Russkii Věstnik" (Russian Messenger), and under his editorship this review soon became the most noted organ of moderate liberalism. In the early days of his public career, Katkov was an enthusiastic admirer of England and English institutions; he paid a visit to England, and studied the English constitution, reading the works of Blackstone and Gneist. The "Moskovskija Vědomosti" became the standard-bearer of constitutionalism. But his political anglomania was already of a perfectly innocent character, as is shown, for example, by his admiration for the English landed gentry. By now in essentials Katkov was a conservative, and therefore in his newspaper he had taken sides against the early slavophiles. The slavophil theory of nationality, and slavophil burrowings into the foundations of Russian nationality, were uncongenial to him. The French, he said, are not so terribly concerned about their nationality, nor is such concern needful, for if nationality be healthy it will assert itself spontaneously. Homjakov, of course, held a different view, and could appeal to Klopstock, Fichte, and Schiller.

As late, nevertheless, as 1858, Katkov took part with Košev in organising a demonstration and a collection of funds on behalf of Kruse, who had been deprived of his office of censor on account of liberal views, but after 1861 Katkov moved notably towards the right.

In his view, the liberation of the peasantry and the ensuing reforms gave undue scope to the forces of progress, and opened undesirable channels for these forces. He detested in the progressive and democratic movement its negation of the principles of monarchy, aristocracy, and centralism, which he regarded as essential to true progress. The problem was, he considered, to allot to these principles their proper position and to assign to them their due boundaries in the organism of the state as a whole. "Interest in freedom," he wrote in 1862, "constitutes the soul of conservatism"—vague and indefinite phraseology was characteristic of Katkov's utterances. It is possible to quote passages from his essays wherein he accepts the new reforms and speaks of their splendid mission.

Of the zemstvos, for example, adopting here slavophil ideas, he expects that they will discover the true relationship to the past, will re-establish the national life in its totality, and will awaken the creative energies of that life.

He was thinking not only of the English gentry (the English gentry of that day!), but also of the Russian nobles, whom he regarded as the born leaders of the common people. Mihailovskii tells us in his memoirs that in 1861 Katkov denounced Eliseev for desiring to protect the aristocracy of culture against the aristocracy of birth.

In June 1862, Katkov opened a campaign against Herzen and the "Kolokol"; after the Polish rising in 1863 he exploited national chauvinism for his own ends. During the revolt, Schédo-Ferroti (von Fircks) published a pamphlet entitled *Que fera-t-on de la Pologne?* in which he demanded that Poland, whilst remaining an integral part of Russia, should be granted local self-government. Katkov made this the text for a violent attack on the Poles, and while ostensibly aimed at Schédo-Ferroti, his onslaught was really directed at the liberal minister Golovnin.

Katkov was not slow to oppose Černyševskii and the realist movement. At first, indeed, he had collaborated with Černyševskii on the staff of the "Otečestvennyja Zapiski"; but in 1861, in his own review, Katkov published Jurkevič's anti-materialistic writing, and the "Russkii Věstnik" became the chief organ of the counternikilist movement. Turgenev's *Fathers and Children* was published by Katkov; Dostoevskii, despite his earlier polemic against Katkov, issued his antinikilist novels under Katkov's aegis; and Katkov was delighted to publish the novels of Kljušnikov, Krestovskii, and Markevič. To Katkov, literature was subservient to his political plans. Not for the sake of literature had he founded his review, but because he had formed a sound estimate of the political power of literature; and in view of the literary conditions prevailing at the close of the Nicolaitan period it was not difficult for him, aided by his collaborators (the name of Ostrovskii may be added to those already mentioned), to acquire literary influence. In 1862, writing in Dostoevskii's review "Vremja" (Time), Grigor'ev rightly pointed out that literature was to Katkov of no consequence, a mere means to an end.¹ Katkov's disposition

¹ Katkov could naturally pay better than could the progressive organs and even Turgenev was often short of money!

is most unambiguously displayed in his censorial work as editor. Publishing Turgenev's *Fathers and Children*, he treated Bazarov most maliciously by simply suppressing all the mitigating traits of that hero's character.

The year 1863 and the Polish rising gave Katkov an authoritative position among the conservatives and nationalists. Resuming the editorship of the "Moskovskija Vedomosti," he thus acquired a widely circulated journal through which to push his designs. More and more the program of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality came to be conceived by him in the sense of the government; and after 1866, when the first attempt was made on the tsar's life, he definitely took up a position opposed to the intelligentsia. In 1867 he formulated his credo in the following terms: "Russia needs a unified state and a strong Russian nationality. Let us create such a nationality upon the foundation of a language common to all the inhabitants, upon that of a common faith, and upon that of the Slavic mir. Let us overthrow everything which imposes obstacles in the way of these designs. In this program of rigid Russification, the only exception he was willing to make related to the Poles (see § 68).

Katkov was shrewd enough to turn his attention to the schools. Effecting a rapprochement to Pobëdonoscev and Count D. A. Tolstoi, he favoured classicism in the gimnazija and he attacked the reorganisation of the universities effected in 1863. In 1878 the Moscow students accompanied the start of a convoy of exiles, and for this peaceable demonstration were savagely handled by the butchers. The next day Katkov's organ strongly commended this butcher patriotism.

With increasing energy, Katkov opposed the bureaucracy, which seemed Laodicean and too liberal. His prestige grew when in 1866 his paper was suspended for two months. Once again, in 1870, he received an official admonition. He was greatly dissatisfied with Russian diplomacy, while the Turkish war and its results were as little to his liking as to that of other politicians and partisans. His conduct of a campaign upon two fronts made Katkov highly respected in court circles, and it is reported that Alexander II, who beyond question was not wholly in accord with Katkov's ideas, protected Katkov by saying that that writer would be his own censor.

It was after Alexander's death that Katkov acquired his most extensive influence over the government and the court.

Loris-Melikov's dictatorship was his idea, although the plan was not carried out precisely as he had wished. Denouncing the assassination as the work of the Poles and of the intelligentsia ("the intrigue"), he gave free rein to his reactionary ideas. He had by now conceived a hatred for the zemstvos, and in economic questions had become a rigid protectionist. His accusations were directed against the ministries and the other high institutions of state, and he was right to this extent, that the state servants had often no clear views of what they wanted to do, were inert, vacillating, and lukewarm. Katkov was in alliance with Pobëdonoscev. Katkov's influence made itself felt in the administration of the schools and the universities. Orest Miller, a slavophil, but a liberal historian of literature, was suspended because he had given expression to his opinions upon Katkov. The reactionary university statutes of 1884 were mainly the work of Katkov.

The telegram of condolence which Alexander III sent to the widow of Katkov when that writer died, and the way in which his patriotism was extolled, showed how great was his prestige at court. The fact that Katkov was able to gain such a position for himself has been regarded as in a sense a victory of journalism over the closed circle of the Russian court.

Katkov frequently changed his opinions, for as politician he was far from being a man of firm and definite character, or one clearly conscious of his aims. Turgenev was doubtless right in speaking of him as a poseur; and other publicists, such as Annenkov and Panaev, took the same view. Katkov was shrewd enough; he recognised the instability of the regime of Alexander II (though this, indeed, did not require much sagacity). But Katkov himself was hardly less unstable. He lacked a thoroughly elaborated conservative philosophy, but he served the headless and heartless reaction, and (as Solov'ev put it) he defended the Russian state with truly Mohammedan fanaticism. This explains the paradoxical advice which he gave the Bulgarians during the reign of Alexander of Battenberg, when he counselled them to establish a republic. Monarchy, he said, was the best form of government for great states, but was unsuited for petty states, since the sovereigns of these were too weak not to pass under the influence of one or other of the great states, and this led to disastrous conflicts between people and ruler. Katkov's opinion secured the approval

of the renowned Colonel Komarov, but none the less it gives sufficient proof that Katkov's tsarism was affected by internal corrosion. The arguments Katkov used in favour of tsarism and autocracy were taken from de Maistre, but he lacked the political consistency of the man who glorified the executioner.¹ Moreover, in youth Katkov had had dealings with Tocqueville and Macaulay; in France and in England these were accounted men of moderate views, but in Russia their opinions had a revolutionary influence. Not without significance was the fact that in youth Katkov had made translations from Shakespeare, Hoffmann, and even Heine.

His own indecisiveness enabled him to understand the indecisiveness of the government and the bureaucracy, and likewise enabled him to understand the shortsightedness of the censorship, which (in a petition to the government) he accused of undermining religion. Nor was he under any illusions concerning the weakness of the autocrat. In Katkov's devotion to the reaction there was a dash of anarchism. If I mistake not, Herzen realised this when he pointed out with delight that Katkov had forced journalism upon tsarism.

We cannot discover in Katkov's writings any definite system of political views, nor did he exercise a guiding influence in matters of principle. Mihailovskii once aptly termed him the *vii* of the "Moscow News." The *vii* is a Little Russian mythical being who is unable to see in ordinary circumstances because his eyelids reach to the ground; but the *vii* can see perfectly well if his lids are held forcibly open with a pitchfork.

Katkov was continually vacillating. In the sixties, for example, he was opposed to the slavophiles; in 1880, at the Puškin festival, he became reconciled with them (with Ivan Aksakov, at least, for Turgenev refused to clink glasses with him); but almost immediately after this reconciliation Katkov resumed his old attitude of hostility. During the Turkish war he was antigerman; in 1882 he was well pleased with Bismarck, because the chancellor was more Russian than was Russian diplomacy, which rested upon no national foundation; but from 1886 onwards he opposed Bismarck and the Bismarckians in the most violent terms. In like manner, he was at first antifrench, and subsequently profrench. Having been

¹ Shortly after Katkov's death de Maistre's theocratic policy was discussed in the *Russkii Věstnik* (1889), and was applied in its entirety to Russian affairs.

a moderate free trader before the Turkish war, he became a protectionist when the war was over.

Katkov was the typical bourgeois stigmatised by Herzen and Mihailovskii, one of those parvenus who push themselves into the company of the great ones of earth, impose themselves by force of individuality, but at the same time render service. At the outset of his career he had written to Kraevskii: "The sum of my ambition is to be employed upon special service by a big gun, or at least by a gun of medium calibre."

I do not think I underrate Katkov or do him an injustice when I refrain from the attempt to construct a philosophy of history or a philosophy of religion out of his innumerable articles and reviews. (I may mention in passing that in 1852 he wrote a history of early Greek philosophy for a collective work produced by his friend P. M. Leont'ev.) In the early seventies, A. S. Suvorin, editor of the "Novoe Vremja," described Katkov, Leont'ev, etc., as busy exploiters of credulity and stupidity. Subsequently, Suvorin changed his mind in this as in other matters; nevertheless, in an obituary notice published in the "Novoe Vremja" of August 9, 1887, a week after Katkov's death, Suvorin wrote: "He occasionally endeavoured to formulate his views, and when he succeeded in such a formulation he could never avoid oratorical sophistry." It may be added that the "Novoe Vremja" was itself expert in journalism of this nature.

§ 133.

IN addition to the journalists of the theocracy, we have to consider Konstantin Petrovič Pobėdonoscev (1827-1907), who defended theocracy as a sociologist.

"The bringer of victory," such is the significance of the name Pobėdonoscev, the name of the man whose opinions were long dominant among the ruling class of Russia, of the man whose desperate attempt to suppress the progressive movement of the Russian youth and the Russian intelligentsia was largely responsible for the deplorable situation of the country. Such a name as "the bringer of victory" is a lucky and desirable one in a land of superstition and at a court where superstition is rife. It is true, however, there were many in Russia to point out that *bėdonoscev* means "bringer of evil" and that *donoscev* signifies "informer." Whoever wishes to know what has been going on in Russia under Alexander III and Nicholas II must

study the mental, scientific, and journalistic characteristics of Pobědonoscev. His activities were extensive, and were concerned with the questions of the day. In addition to learned collections of juristic data, he published legal textbooks (the most important of which was a manual of civil law), and a number of journalistic essays. In 1896 appeared a series of articles under the title of *Moskovskii Sbornik* (Moscow Collection), in which Pobědonoscev expounded his political and religious creed. The book ran through a number of editions.

The mere title "Moscow Collection" is enough to show anyone who possesses the necessary insight that the author, though he held office in St. Petersburg, felt himself to be a man of Moscow—for to Pobědonoscev, Moscow was the third Rome of true Christianity, the ideal capital of the genuine Russian. Born in Moscow, in Moscow he became professor of civil law and procedure, and as such was appointed juristic tutor to the imperial princes. In 1880, during the Loris-Melikov regime, the tutor of Alexander II was appointed chief procurator of the holy synod, and held this office until 1905.

His official position gave his opinions the great weight which they have possessed in Russia since the time when Alexander III ascended the throne. The liberal or semi-liberal system of Loris-Melikov was replaced by the clericalist system of Pobědonoscev, and notwithstanding 1905 and 1906 this system is still (1913) dominant in St. Petersburg.

Pobědonoscev was and desired to remain the man of Moscow. He sought his intellectual forbears among the Moscow slavophiles, and above all among the slavophil Old Russians. It is undeniable that his fundamental philosophical principles remind us of those held by the leaders of the slavophil school, so that we think now of Kirěevskii, now of Konstantin Aksakov, and now again of Samarin and Homjakov; but the images of these notable thinkers pale before those of Pogodin and Katkov, which loom far more plainly behind the pages of the *Moskovskii Sbornik*. As far as Katkov is concerned, we do not see that writer in his youthful and liberal days, but we discern the counsellor of Alexander III. The assassination of Alexander II brought Katkov and Pobědonoscev into power. In nihilism and revolutionary terrorism, Pobědonoscev found the precise antithesis, as a philosophy of history, to his own fundamental outlook, which was that Old Russian civilisation, as the precise opposite of western civilisation, could alone constitute the

true basis for a genuinely Russian political system. The relationship between Russia and Europe resembled that between day and night, between light and darkness, between Ormuzd and Ahriman ; Russia was social order, Europe was anarchy ; Russia was life, Europe death, the death of the individual and of the nation as a whole, death at once moral and physical.

Finally, though with a gross distortion of the slavophil philosophy of history, Pobědonoscev considered that the essential malady of Europe and of liberalism (including Russian liberalism under Alexander II) was rationalism. The meaning he attached to this term varied. Sometimes he attacked logic and the syllogistic method ; sometimes he censured logical formalism or animadverted upon the critical movement in literature. In contrast with these things he extolled life and its immediate needs, placing all his confidence in immediate sensation, in warm feeling, and in experience. Quite after the manner of so many ultra-moderns, did he thus display Rousseauist views. For Pobědonoscev, too, had studied in the school of Rousseau, and like so many of the romanticists he rejected science, philosophy, and civilisation. He did not, however, aim at the return to a state of nature, but at returning to the prepetrine third Rome with its Byzantine orthodoxy and its philosophy of the fathers of the church. This philosophy is mystical, and utterly without rationalism. Pobědonoscev accepted in its entirety the mystical psychology of the slavophiles, but as a practical statesman and ecclesiastic he carried it out to its logical political consequences. Thus the mystical imitator of Christ (Pobědonoscev translated à Kempis) developed into the "grand inquisitor" of Dostoevskii.

According to the literal phrasing of this Orthodox Russian theory of cognition, only the blockhead can desire to think clearly about everything. The most valuable ideas, those most needful in life, remain in a mystical chiaroscuro in the remote recesses of the soul. The greatest thoughts are necessarily obscure. The mass of the population is under the sway of a natural *vis inertiae*, but this inertia must not be confused with unculture and roughness, for it is a natural and healthy shrinking from logical thought, a natural tendency to shun the hustle of modern progress. The folk trusts tradition, which has not been thought out, but has been made by life itself ; history, history alone, not the law of nature, is the desirable and needful authority for mankind. The believing

spirit of the genuine Russian, being uncorrupted by logic, accepts this authority as a matter of course; the folk feels directly, feels in its soul, and perceives absolute truth, artist fashion, by way of faith. In folk-sagas this absolute truth has found artistic expression, for the saga is the history of the whole folk. History is the most trustworthy of all authorities. Absolute truth is religious truth; but it is the Russian church, not religion in the abstract, which embodies absolute truth. This truth is imparted to the uncultured masses by the church ceremonies, without any admixture of logic and philosophy. The Russian church possesses absolute truth, is absolute truth, and therefore the Russian folk possesses and is this truth. The various churches correspond to the needs of the various nations, and the Russians have a church of their own. The believer will never recognise a foreign doctrine, but on the contrary, "should need arise he will forcibly impose his own belief on others."

As we see, the mysticism of Joannes Damascenus (who was the slavophiles' favourite father of the church) has degenerated into orthodox Jesuitism. If every nation has its own religion and nationality, why should Russia, with its millions of Poles, Germans, Finns, Swedes, etc., have but one church and but one recognised nationality? "Europeans!" the answer runs—that is quite another affair: the Russian church, the Russian folk, has and is absolute truth, and that suffices!

From rationalism, the original sin of Europe, there arises by logical sequence a second original sin, belief in the excellence of the natural man. Pobědonoscev, however, teaches that man is by nature bad and full of malice, and he infers from this that democracy in all its forms is evil. Pobědonoscev attacks parliamentarism and the representative system of government with inexorable scorn and mockery, stigmatising parliamentarism as "the great lie of our age." Liberty, equality, and fraternity are mere phrases and idols. No man of honour, no man with a sense of duty, can accept the modern electoral system with its universal suffrage. Pobědonoscev inveighs against the agitators, the modern sophists and logomachists, who keep the masses in leading strings, and he is no less opposed to the demagoguery of trial by jury. He detests the newspaper press, and denies its claim to represent public opinion, for the press too is one of the most lying institutions of our time. Of course this remark was not to be taken as applying to Katkov's news-

paper, but only to the organs of the nihilists, the socialists, and the liberals.

Pobědonoscev considered that the frequency of suicide in modern times afforded proof that modern life had become utterly unnatural, senseless, and false. The old and tried standards of social and family life had disappeared, and their place had been taken by egoism, the outcome of unbridled individualism and subjectivism. The man who can find no supports outside his own ego, the man who possesses no moral standards independent of that ego to guide him through life, runs away from life and destroys himself. Even better men, men with high ideals, succumb to the falsity of their environment, becoming aware of the vanity of their ideals when these are not sustained by faith.

A strange hotchpotch this of truth and falsehood, a characteristic jumble of far-sightedness and short-sightedness. The newspaper press is evil, and yet Pobědonoscev is himself author and journalist; the masses of the people run after the agitators, and yet these same masses are absolute truth when, in their unculture and superstition, they prostrate themselves before the Orthodox altars! *Vox populi vox dei*, when *populus* acknowledges the Orthodox faith; but *vox populi vox diaboli*, when *populus* demands a parliament and the suffrage! Thus does the mysticism of the fathers of the church take vengeance on Pobědonoscev, upon his philosophy, and upon his politics. He is cultured enough to perceive how superstitious and uncultivated are the masses and the Russian clergy; he admits the facts; but his mysticism makes it impossible for him to see clearly, to distinguish between true religion and superstition, to banish superstition in the interest of true religion. Pobědonoscev, therefore, did not merely regard superstition as "a matter of no importance," but he even regarded the religious fervour of the folk as endowed with something sublimely mysterious. The sublimity of this mystery produced so strong an impression on his mind that he declared popular elementary education to be needless and injurious, for this would be rationalism, this would be logic, and logic is the work of the devil. "The diffusion of popular education is absolutely harmful."

This sophistry and partial application of logic was to be momentous for Russia! Man is by nature evil and malicious; therefore the masses must be guided under the tutelage of the

holy synod in the service of the autocracy. Men are by nature evil and malicious ; except for the chief procurator of the holy synod and all the greater and lesser aristocrats. Western civilisation is a disaster ; but the modern breech-loading rifles, the new ordnance, the railways, telegraphs, and other practical acquirements of the "logic" and the logical sciences of Europe, must nevertheless serve the Russian Orthodox autocracy. Pobēdonoscev, like all reactionaries, has himself been sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought, or at any rate is sufficiently inconsistent to accept the fruits of European civilisation without foreseeing that the inevitable result will be to make holes in his Old Russian philosophy and by degrees to destroy it. Such is the great lie of the Russian reaction, He who makes use of locomotives, cannon, telegraphs, and telephones, may forbid logic and philosophy as much as he pleases, but the prohibition will be of no avail, for he must perforce teach mathematics and natural science, and these will once more bring philosophy and logic into honour, if by a devious route. In all seriousness, Nicholas I forbade the study of philosophy at the universities, but the prohibition was futile, for Russian thought became all the more distinctively naturalistic and even materialistic in trend. The Russian autocracy needs an army of officials, and these must be educated men. Even if they were to take Pobēdonoscev's manual as their only textbook of jurisprudence, they could not understand it unless they had had an extensive preliminary training. Pobēdonoscev himself, though unwittingly, definitely espouses the doctrine of economic materialism when he teaches that law is nothing more than the formal fixation of the relationships created by life and by economic conditions. Moreover, the modern state cannot dispense with political economy. The bureaucracy of the modern absolutist monarchy cannot base its actions solely on the teachings of Joannes Damascenus and on the authority of the sagas. Katkov realised this when he directed his campaign, not only against the students, but also against the Russian bureaucracy.

It need hardly be said that we may find much to agree with in Pobēdonoscev's condemnation of the errors of our civilisation and of our political institutions. Who, for example, would dissent from what the chief procurator wrote about demagoguery ? Who could be wholly content with parliamentarism, as it exists, say, in Austria ? Was Carlyle, of whose works Pobēdonoscev was a diligent student, satisfied with parliamen-

tary government? Do not the anarchists, moreover, reject parliamentarism? A number of notable Europeans, alike men of the study and men of practical life, have held views which do not differ greatly from those held by Pobëdonoscev. But the great distinction lies in this, that in Europe we already have some experience of parliamentary government and of democracy, and hence it is not merely our right but our duty to criticise these institutions, for to do this is to fulfil democracy. But a Russian who from western literature sharks up arguments against parliament, democracy, and the newspaper press, in order to incorporate these arguments into his absolutist system, is a man ever open to suspicion. Indisputably, demagoguery (not parliamentarism *per se*) is one of the great lies of our epoch. But in this epoch of ours to defend autocratic absolutism, even for Russia; to endeavour to find historical, philosophical, and religious arguments on behalf of this regime, though its incapacity is manifest to all the world—what is it, when done by a man of culture but a literary crime? Pobëdonoscev was the declared enemy of the west, and yet it was from the west that he derived his own culture and his own antiliberal and antidemocratic arguments.

For the representation of Pobëdonoscev's views the question of the relationship between state and church has an important bearing, seeing that Pobëdonoscev was in a position to speak, not only as teacher of public law, but also as chief procurator. He criticised the various attempts at a solution that had been made in Europe. In the Catholic system, he said, the church controlled the state. The more or less liberal systems which had developed from the eighteenth century onwards, granting equal rights to all religions, independence of the state from the church, and a free church in a free state, were vague half-measures, and could not be effectively carried out in practice. The church, in view of its educational function, could not possibly renounce the moral guidance of the citizens; a separation between church and state was *de facto* impossible; "a state without a creed is a purely utopian ideal, and one incapable of realisation, for unbelief is the direct negation of the state."

* It is necessary to draw attention to the sophistical character of Pobëdonoscev's argument. All that he has a right to say about European states is that they are "churchless"; but he makes use of the word "*bezvěrnœ*," which may mean "faithless" and "unbelieving" and goes on to use it unhesitatingly in the sense of "unbelief" (*bezvěrie*).

Holding firmly as he does to the theory that there is a natural harmony between state and church, it goes without saying that for Russia, where there are many creeds, the Orthodox church is to be the state church. "The state recognises one creed among all as the true one; it supports and favours one church exclusively; all other churches and creeds being regarded as of lesser value."

Such was the spirit in which Pobēdonoscev, as chief procurator of the holy synod, treated the old believers and the sectaries, being especially harsh to the stundists.

When the decree of toleration was issued in April 1905 and was followed by a manifesto in October of the same year, the clergy demanded the summoning of a council for the revision of the existing relationships between church and state. In response to this demand, Pobēdonoscev sent the chiefs of the eparchies a questionnaire, wherein, however, no reference was made to the thorny problem of the relationship between church and state. Despite his slavophilism, Pobēdonoscev suddenly became a defender of Petrine ecclesiastical reform and of the uncanonically founded synod.

In Pobēdonoscev's view, perfect harmony between church and state was to be realised by unmitigated absolutism. He was ever the most determined opponent of political no less than of religious reform. During the regime of Svjatopolk-Mirskii, when the question of political reforms was under discussion, Pobēdonoscev, speaking in the name of religion, denied the tsar's right to limit in any way whatever the powers bestowed on him by the deity. Similar had been the ideas of the ecclesiastical politicians in the days of old Moscow.

It is said that as early as 1906 Pobēdonoscev had elaborated a design to recruit from the clergy against the duma a clerical governmental party, and certainly the elections to the fourth duma realised this plan.

Pobēdonoscev was by no means original. His *Moscow Collection* was a mere compilation of well-known ideas from numerous European and Russian conservatives and reactionaries. Most of the notions in the book may be traced back to Le Play. Pobēdonoscev wrote a cordial appreciation of this Catholic adviser of Napoleon III. But Le Play was no more than one among the many French adversaries of democracy and revolution to exercise an influence upon Russian politicians and

theorists, the most influential of all, as we have seen, being de Maistre.

I have mentioned the Russian predecessors and teachers of Pobēdonoscev, but another name must be added to the list, that of Leont'ev, about whom we are to learn in the next section. Nearly all Pobēdonoscev's ideas may be found in the writings of Leont'ev no less than in those of Le Play, and it is possible that these two thinkers made the strongest impression upon Pobēdonoscev's mind. But the chief procurator gave expression to Leont'ev's ideas in the Russian forensic style. Leont'ev's ideas led him to a monastery remote from the world ; but Pobēdonoscev, adopting these same ideas, could bask at the courts of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Leont'ev insisted upon the need for great deeds of deathdealing significance ; whereas Pobēdonoscev (as we learn from a London report concerning the tsar's decree of January 26, 1905) asked to be promoted to the second class of the official hierarchy, and was granted the privilege of wearing an extra stripe upon the trousers of his full-dress uniform, to show that he ranked as a minister.

In view of these facts it is not agreeable to have to institute a comparison between Pobēdonoscev and Tolstoi, and yet the official and personal relationships between the chief procurator and Tolstoi impose such a comparison. Somewhat prematurely, in 1900, Pobēdonoscev refused Tolstoi the right to a religious burial, whilst in 1901 he had Tolstoi excommunicated. These measures suggest hostile sentiments and yet it is impossible to avoid comparing Pobēdonoscev with Tolstoi. Both men manifested the same aversion to civilisation, science, and philosophy ; to both, religion seemed the alpha and omega of endeavour. Tolstoi's estimate of parliament, democracy, and many other institutions, was closely akin to that of Pobēdonoscev. The great difference between the two men lay, however, in this, that Tolstoi wished for a rational religion, Pobēdonoscev for a mystical and positively irrational religion. In this matter Tolstoi's opponent was in the centre of the great mystical movement which affected so large a part of the Russian intelligentsia in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the movement whose greatest prophet was Dostoevskii. Pobēdonoscev, too, had learned from Dostoevskii, having had personal relations with that author. A strange comparison this between Pobēdonoscev and Tolstoi—Tolstoi to whom

religion was a world problem and an intimately vital question ; Pobėdonoscev to whom religion was a means to political ends.

After the death of Alexander II, Tolstoi sent Pobėdonoscev, for transmission to Alexander III, a heartfelt letter petitioning that the assassins should be pardoned. Pobėdonoscev kept the letter to himself, and did not reply to Tolstoi until after the execution of the condemned. The defender of capital punishment then wrote as follows : " Our Christ is not your Christ. To me Christ is the man of energy and truth, who heals the weak ; but it seems to me that your Christ shows lineaments of weakness, is himself in need of healing."

Other writers and artists besides Tolstoi were subjected to censorship by Pobėdonoscev. I may recall the chief procurator's intention to forbid the exhibition of Polėnov's picture of Christ and the woman taken in adultery. The tsar, however, liked the picture and purchased it.

Some interest might attach to a discussion of Pobėdonoscev's ideas concerning foreign policy. His feelings towards France, for example, were far less cordial than those of most chauvinists, advocates of the Franco-Russian alliance ; he had little fondness for Austria ; he was by no means an enthusiast for the Slavs, and the liberal Czechs were especially uncongenial to him. But he took pleasure in the description of travel written by Vratislav von Mitrovič, the Bohemian nobleman who visited Constantinople in 1591 as member of an embassy from Rudolf II. Pobėdonoscev translated the book, and it is obvious that he took a sympathetic delight in the believing author's descriptions of the life and doings of the Turks.

Pobėdonoscev, despite his hostility to negation, was himself after all merely negative ; he negated the west. But his negation was weak and half-hearted ; he cast out Satan with Satan's aid ; the pillars of his theocratic orthodoxy were European authorities, whose works he turned to his own account ; à Kempis, de Maistre, Emerson, Spencer, Carlyle, Goethe, etc., were utilised to lay the foundations of the crown jurist's scholastic edifice. Amid his incessant appeals for uniformity, he displayed a deplorable lack of uniformity. But this is characteristic of all theological and theocratic apologetic literature, and is by no means peculiar to Russia. Two German translations of the *Moscow Studies* have been published, both under Protestant auspices, the translators being delighted with the Russian obscurantist.

Pobědonoscev has been extolled for his genial and winning manners. We remember that certain inquisitors used to weep when sentencing their victims to death, and we recall that the "winning" Pobědonoscev was the firm ally of such men as Plevé, the grand dukes Vladimir and Alexis, and the leading spirits in the black hundred. In Aylmer Maude's biography of Tolstoi we are told that in 1901, when Tolstoi fell ill after his excommunication, Pobědonoscev commissioned a priest to visit Tolstoi and subsequently to announce that Tolstoi had confessed to him. I have not looked for confirmation of this story, but it is perfectly credible, for Pobědonoscev was a thoroughgoing Jesuit.

Characteristic were the announcements he made for Europe and in Europe (see various interviews, newspaper articles, etc.). In these it was his habit to pay compliments to Europe, to declare that complete freedom of conscience prevailed in Russia, that current accusations against the Russian government were absolutely false. Complete freedom of conscience! Why, then, did not Archbishop Antonii agree with Pobědonoscev's ecclesiastical policy? And Witte, no less than Antonii, turned against Pobědonoscev (see § 188).

§ 134.

KONSTANTIN NIKOLAEVIČ LEONT'EV (1831-1891) represents a very different type of defender of the theocracy.

Leont'ev acted as army surgeon in the Crimean war, and subsequently became a general practitioner in the country. After a time, entering the service of the foreign office, he passed the years 1863 to 1870 as consul in various towns of European Turkey. It was during this period that he became reconciled with Orthodoxy. Resigning his post he lived for a while on Mount Athos (1870-1871). He then returned to Russia, subsequently served on the staff of the official newspaper in Warsaw (1880), and then became censor in Moscow. In 1887, however, he finally retired from the world to reside in the monastery of Optina Pustyn', which Kirčevskii and likewise Dostoevskii had frequented in their day. He was secretly received as a monk, and in 1891 died in the Troicko-Sergievskaja monastery near Moscow.

Leont'ev made his literary debut as contributor of belle-

tristic articles to liberal periodicals. After his conversion he renounced these activities, and condemned them even more severely than Tolstoi had done in his own case, for Leont'ev lamented that his early writings had been modelled upon the pagan, devilish, and utterly immoral works of George Sand, and that in point of style he had imitated Turgenev.

Nevertheless, after his conversion he wrote sketches of Christian life in Turkey (which were commended by Tolstoi among others), a number of short stories, a novel, and literary critiques.¹

Leont'ev unreservedly accepted ecclesiastical Orthodoxy and its doctrines. What he understood by Orthodoxy was Byzantinism, the primitive Greek ecclesiasticism which had given the law to the Russian church. Byzantinism was for him the peculiar Byzantine culture. Its system and its principle were characterised politically by autocracy conjoined with aristocracy; in the religious field, by true Christianity in contrast with the western church and the sects; and in the moral sphere, by refraining from putting the high value upon human individuality which was the dominant feature of Teutonic feudalism, so that in the Byzantine system earthly happiness and mundane life were renounced from the outlook of a rigorous Christian ideal, one contemning the world. Further, Byzantinism rejected the hope of general welfare for the people, its essential idea being sharply contrasted with the idea of universal humanitarianism, universal equality, universal freedom, universal perfectionment, and universal satisfaction. Artistically and aesthetically, Byzantinism had secured plain expression in its architecture and other works.

Such was the conception of Christianity formulated by Leont'ev in the year 1876. In his writings he continued to expound and defend the principles of the monkish religion to which he had come to adhere during his residence on Mount Athos, and to apply these principles to contemporary conditions, above all in opposition to the reforming and revolutionary trends of literature and politics.

Leont'ev's "true Christianity" is the Christianity of

¹ His essays composed during the years 1873-1883 were published in two volumes (1885 and 1886) as *The East, Russia, and Slavdom*. Noteworthy, in addition, is Father Clement Sederholm (1879), the biography of one of his friends, a monk from the Baltic provinces. Literary criticisms of Tolstoi and other writers may likewise be mentioned.

peasants, monks, and nuns, not rose-water Christianity with its chatter of love, and the rest of it. To Leont'ev, love for humanity was unchristian, was the idolisation of mankind. He considered fear the foundation of true religion, the fear of God, the fear of punishment here and hereafter. Man, the world, mundane life, are all essentially evil. The true life of the Christian is not found here but in heaven. The true (read Orthodox) Christian despises the flesh, and declares all nature, all natural inclinations and reason, to be evil; the true Christian renounces the world as the ascetics of the Orthodox church had renounced it. "Such were the views," wrote Leont'ev "which I learned from the Orthodox church and its monasteries—in these alone is truth to be found."

God had cursed the world; everything existing in the world must perish. Leont'ev's deductions were here identical with those of Mephistopheles. It was undeniable that the earth was beautiful, and the truth of mundane life was on the side of aesthetics; but Christianity ran counter to aesthetics, and the true Christian must sustain Christianity against the truth.

God and the world are opposites. "We must constrain ourselves to belief in God. . . . The recognition of God as a God of love is a falsehood." For Leont'ev, religion was far from being always consolatory. Often, he said, religion is a heavy yoke, but the true believer would not willingly be without this yoke.

The religion of fear, which represents God as the almighty Jehovah, the wielder of force, is logically and practically carried out on earth by the ruler, the anointed of Jehovah. This ruler must be a true image of the unloving God; he must be God on earth; the absolutist autocracy is the only true Christian state. Christian society is a theocracy; the autocrat is God's right hand; despotism was and remains necessary to the organisation of society; the human masses must be held together with the mailed fist.

The tsar is the highest and most sacred authority; what he does is good and legal; his actions must not be judged by results. One who fails to grasp this may be an excellent man, but is no Christian, no true Russian.

Leont'ev acclaimed the manifesto of Alexander III maintaining the principle of autocracy, for Leont'ev did not fear the name of reactionary. Russia needed reaction, needed forcible measures. Constraint, rightly used, was a good thing; the Russian peasant loved to be vigorously ruled. The true

Christian was lowly in spirit, and bowed humbly before the supreme will of the tsar.

Mysticism is the true knowledge of God ; mysticism is true science. Mundane science is condemned by Leont'ev, since it seeks the useful, not God and eternal life. Leont'ev rails against utilitarianism and eudemonism. To be a true Christian, a man has no need of modern science, modern technique, modern institutions. The peasant who believes that the world is supported by three whales is not a dangerous character ; illiteracy is Russia's good fortune ; " we must strive with all our might against popular education." It is for the intelligentsia to learn from the peasant, not conversely. For this it is not necessary to love the folk ; nor does it suffice to have a national or aesthetic sentiment for the folk, to love the folk-characteristics ; but in matters of principle we must be at one with the folk.

It is from this outlook of the monk of Athos that Leont'ev judges the world and its history, and judges in especial the relationship of Russia to Europe. Russia is of value only in so far as she has kept alive the principles of Byzantinism ; Europe is going down to mental and physical destruction because she has betrayed these principles ; in Russia, all traces of the European must be eradicated.

Leont'ev's philosophy of history is simple. Mankind and its individual parts (the nations) traverse three historical stages, childhood, manhood, and old age. In the first stage, primitive simplicity prevails ; this is succeeded by the complicated organisation and differentiation of the prime ; there succeeds in turn, the simplicity of levelling. In Europe, the Teutons in the days of the national migrations represent childhood and simplicity. During the middle ages, Europe attained her prime and exhibited the blossoming of all her energies. Since the eighteenth century enlightenment and the French revolution, Europe has been declining towards the tomb ; in the name of democratic equality, liberalism (the new religion of the bourgeoisie) has been extinguishing all the natural differences by which the nations live. This law of evolution is conceived by Leont'ev biologically. He regards Kirěevskii's slavophil philosophy of history and the way in which Kirěevskii contrasted Russia and Europe as positively ridiculous. The decay of Europe, he says, is the natural decay of an organism.

But if this be so, surely we must regard the censured views

of liberalism as the consequence and not as the cause of the decay? In any case, Leont'ev's theory implies that the natural law of evolution is something altogether different from the progress preached by European philosophers and their Russian imitators. However this may be, Leont'ev becomes somewhat alarmed when he contemplates the future of Russia, for he is seized with a doubt whether, in accordance with his evolutionary law, Russia, too, must not perish, despite her Byzantinism. He cannot console himself with the thought that Russia is still young, for his country is already in fact more than a thousand years old. Besides, Peter and his successors introduced a suspiciously large amount of the European enlightenment and of European institutions into Russia. How, then, can Russia be preserved? With pitiless consistency Leont'ev comes to the conclusion that Russia must, in contrast with Europe, undergo an arrest of development; Russia must be "frozen" that she may escape "living"—for everything that lives must die. Russia must therefore be protected from her arch enemy, European progress; Russia must not succumb to equalitarian liberalism. Leont'ev would rather accept socialism than liberalism, for socialism contains elements of discipline and organisation. Liberalism seems to him to embody negation as its principle; liberalism is decomposition, for it wishes to level and to suppress natural inequalities. Leont'ev believes that in civilized lands socialism will inevitably be realised, but that in Russia hereditary inequalities will persist. He deplures that in 1861 the "stone wall" of privileges was overthrown. The old aristocracy in conjunction with the tsar constituted aristocracy as by God established; their piety was exemplary; during the days of serfdom the peasant, too, kept the fasts of the church according to rule.

It is obvious that Leont'ev is disturbed by the undesired consequences of his evolutionary law. He would like to keep Russia in the second stage of development, and that is why the "mailed fist" of absolutism must be used against liberalism. The liberalism which in his belief was effecting the decomposition of Europe, was regarded with the utmost hostility by Leont'ev in all its forms and gradations; he considered every liberal to be half a nihilist; and he thought the most dangerous of all liberals were those who diffused their doctrines under the protection of the military uniform, the professorial chair, the judicial bench, or the editorial pen.

Leont'ev wished that the police were enabled to read men's inmost thoughts, so that they might prevent the liberals from doing any harm. He did not shrink from being termed a reactionary, and he approved the work of the informer. "It is time," he said, "that the word informer should cease to have a degrading significance. . . . Politics are not ethics."

It is obvious that Leont'ev is vacillating between a purely biological law of evolution and a social and historical law, according as he contemplates the problem from the outlook of historic determinism or from that of freedom. Whilst he laughs at the slavophiles as children, he cannot entirely escape the influence of their ideas. Before his conversion, Leont'ev's thought had been based upon that of Danilevskii, and upon the latter's principles of Russian policy; the ideas of *Russia and Europe* continued to some extent to influence his mind, although he gave a new significance to the leading demand of Danilevskii and the older slavophiles. He regarded it as the error of the slavophiles that they had failed to effect an organic union of nationality with religion and ecclesiasticism. He was manifestly in agreement with Košelev's formula, "Without Orthodoxy our nationality becomes fudge." He therefore abandoned nationality, for he regarded it as essentially based upon liberal and cosmopolitan democracy and as an instrument for the promotion of universal revolution. The title of one of his essays runs *National Policy as a Means to the World Revolution*. He considers that the main weakness of Russian policy is to be found in its nationalism. It is true that he conceives the idea of nationality as political nationality or nationalist policy. For this reason Leont'ev puts his whole faith in religion. From his outlook, Slavism as a principle is a nonentity when contrasted with Byzantinism, or at most is a sphinx, an enigma. Slavism as an idea is obscure and inchoate. There doubtless exists Slavdom, the unorganised substratum of Slav nations. There are panslavist aspirations; but panslavism, precisely because it is nationalist, conflicts with Byzantinism, and therefore with true Russism. Panslavism is a "utilitarian and liberal" ideal, and must therefore be abandoned; Russian policy must aim at the protection of Austria, for Austria is "a sanitary cordon against the Czechs and the other excessively Europeanised Slavs." Byzantinism is the foundation, Byzantinism is the nervous system of Russia, and there is no need for either Catholic or Protestant Slavs.

Leont'ev is disturbed because Byzantine Russia has annexed Catholic Poland, and the unrussian and unbyzantine frontier lands are a continual worry to him. Russia's mission, as suggested by the slavophiles, the unification of the Slavs, seems to Leont'ev a momentous and difficult task.

We may recall what Tsar Nicholas thought of panslavism, and we may recall that Nicholas practised the Austrian policy of Leont'ev in the days before Leont'ev.

For the nonce, Russia, said Leont'ev, was to be guided by the old maxim "divide et impera," above all in her Balkan policy. The political fragmentation of the Balkans was an advantage, and Russia's only aim should be to secure religious unification; the parliaments of the Balkan states were disastrous. The southern Slav bourgeoisie had already been infected by European liberalism, and nothing but the Turkish suzerainty had saved the Balkan states from annihilation by European liberalism. The Russian, said Leont'ev, has little in common with the other Slavs; by nature he is more akin to Asiatics, to the Turks and to the Tatars, than to the southern and western Slavs; he is lazier, more fatalistic, more obedient to authority, more good-natured, more regardless of consequences, braver, more inconsistent, and much more inclined to religious mysticism, than are the Serbs, the Bulgars, the Czechs, and the Croats. In his stories of Balkan life, Leont'ev showed much sympathy with the Turkish character, and a profound understanding of its qualities both good and evil.

Leont'ev agrees with the narodniki and the slavophiles in the view that Russia possesses in the mir an institution which is worthy to be incorporated into Byzantinism.

Leont'ev approves for Russia the annexation of Asiatic lands, as yet uncontaminated by Europeanism. He is unaffrighted by differences in race, language, and even religion, because, as we have learned, he considers that these maintain the life of society, are that life, and because at the same time they facilitate autocracy.

As regards the Balkan peninsula, Leont'ev desired above all, like the slavophiles and Dostoevskii, to occupy Constantinople, not on nationalist grounds, but in order to revive the eastern empire of Rome. He was so consistent in his Byzantinism that in the religious dispute between the Bulgars and the Greeks he espoused the Greek cause. As an absolutist, he consistently advocated aristocracy and condemned liberal

democracy, favouring not merely Magyar aristocracy but even Turkish aristocracy and the German aristocracy of the Baltic provinces. He held that a baron in the Baltic provinces was of more use to Russia than were the Letts and the Lithuanians. So logical was Leont'ev in the application of his principles, that in the American civil war his sympathies were with the southern slave-owning planters. Writing a good many years after the event, it was a regret to him that Russia should have supported the north against the south.

§ 135.

LEONT'EV'S thought and literary style recall Hamann and Carlyle in many respects, but also de Maistre and similar authors, whilst in the matter of doctrine we must refer back to Tertullian and his "credo quia absurdum." For Leont'ev will believe and can believe in nothing but the absurd.

For him religion exists only as mysticism, and he clings to theology and scholasticism. Though the declared enemy of the revolutionary realists and nihilists, he is himself obstinately realist and nihilist. Desiring a positively clear and definite religion, he holds fast to the letter as realised in practice at Athos and in the Russian monasteries. He puts his trust in ritual (terming it "ritual-mystic" religion), in monasteries, in monks, in the church visible with its doctrines and religious practices. "Before all, love the church ;" do not love mankind, do not love your neighbour. Love for the church is the true Christian love. The church teaches us to know God, to know Christ ; therefore we must obediently follow the church ; "love is a secondary matter."

Thus the church is the most important thing, not God, In the church, moreover, the hierarchy is the essential. In addition, Leont'ev venerates the monk (not the white clergy, for the members of that body are married) ; and among the monks he venerates the *starec* (the elder), whom he recognises as the absolute leader in religion and morals. Leont'ev desires to have an entirely material religion. To him personally God and Jesus are nothing ; he thinks only of the definitely prescribed teachings, dogmas, and practices of the church.

The world is naught, heaven is all, and he therefore seeks the

monastery, the hermitage, so that in part, at least, he may share the life of heaven while still on earth.¹

Leont'ev tells us that we must constrain ourselves to believe. This means that he subjected himself to this constraint, sacrificing science, above all natural science, to revelation. The medical man, the zoologist, the materialist, doing violence to his intelligence, came to believe in miracle, so that he could even imagine that when attacked by cholera the sight of an icon from Athos cured him within two hours.

But for Leont'ev the church proves in the end too complicated, with its multiplicity of hierarchs and monks; he requires a single view, he wishes to be guided by a single and perfectly definite opinion, he asks for a single authority—the autocrat, the tsar. This aspiration for real uniformity and unity should logically lead the defender of Byzantinism to the Roman papal church, for he demands a strong church, a true theocracy. In his polemic against Dostoevskii he rejects the humane all-man and the theology of Zosimus, but accepts the grand inquisitor, saying: "The grand inquisitor incorporates the positive side of Christianity." Leont'ev, as we have said, is willing to make concessions even to socialism because socialism has discipline. He conceives that the Russian autocracy may enter into an alliance with socialism and with ardent mysticism. When this happens, things will be made hot for many persons; then the grand inquisitor will be able to arise from the tomb and hold out his tongs to seize Dostoevskii.

In the polemic against Dostoevskii we read further that it is quite comprehensible to love the church. But to love contemporary Europe which is so cruelly persecuting the Roman church, a church that is grand and apostolic despite its profound dogmatic errors, to love this Europe is simply sinful.

His approval of the papacy and its grand inquisitors leads Leont'ev to Russian caesaropapism. It was no chance matter that Leont'ev, in the before-mentioned definition of Byzantinism, should have assigned the first place to political absolutism. In his aspiration for religious realism, he finds that for the church, too, the tsar becomes a practical and tangible head; to obey the tsar unconditionally and blindly, this is true Christianity.

It logically follows that Leont'ev's religion and Leont'ev's

¹ Leont'ev was married. I do not know if anything has hitherto been written concerning his relations with his wife. The only information I have on this subject is that his wife was long an invalid.

church cannot lay any stress upon either morality or love. Religion is *timor Dei*, Christian practice is therefore ritual, and in the ethical sphere Christianity is the consistent fulfilment of God's will, of his revelations. Leont'ev tells us that he loathes "an independent morality, a morality independent of the fear of the Lord."

Leont'ev's religion conflicts with natural human morality. Just as Tolstoi takes his Karataev from among the sectaries, so does Leont'ev seek among the *raskolniki* for instances of the true faith. He tells us of Kurtin the *raskolnik*, who slew his own son to preserve the boy from the danger of eternal damnation in the event of his losing the true faith. To Leont'ev the force of Kurtin's faith seems terrible, but it is faith, "and without this faith whither can a man turn, one who detests with all his might the soulless aspects of contemporary European progress. Whither can he turn if not to Russia where, within the Orthodox fold, the existence of such great and holy priests as Filaret is still possible?" We have learned what Filaret was.

From his own outlook Leont'ev arrives at valuations which recall Nietzsche, though not Jesus. "Everything that is beautiful and strong, is good; all one whether it be holiness or dissipation, conservation or revolution. Men have not yet grasped this."

This amoralism and the aesthetic and artistic outlook on the world were strongly developed in Leont'ev. His absolutist aristocratic leanings and his hatred of the democratic bourgeois were dependent upon this outlook, and he had learned the hatred from his teacher—Herzen. "Would it not be terrible," he exclaims on one occasion, "would it not be humiliating to think that Moses should have ascended Mount Sinai, that the Greeks should have built their lovely citadels, that the Romans should have fought the Punic wars, that the handsome and brilliant Alexander in his plumed helmet should have crossed the Granicus and fought at Arbela, that the apostles should have preached, the martyrs suffered, the poets sung, the painters painted, and the knights pranked it in the lists—only that the French, German, or Russian bourgeois in his ugly and ridiculous attire should 'individually' and 'collectively' enjoy himself amid the ruins of all these lost splendours?" And Leont'ev asks: "Which is better, the bloody but spiritually brilliant epoch of the renaissance, or latter-day Denmark, Holland, or Switzerland, tranquil, well-to-do, and smug?"

Leont'ev defends "the unlimited rights of the individual spirit, into whose depths the general regulations of the laws and the universal and customary opinions of mankind cannot penetrate." It is true that this amoralism was Leont'ev's standpoint before his conversion, but it was one which he was not able to transcend even after he had become a monk. Whereas before conversion he had contemplated history and human life aesthetically, as if he had been among the audience at a tragedy, after conversion he withdrew to his "moon" from which, with no less objectivity and equally as a spectator, he could express the opinion that for the development of great and strong characters it was essential that there should be social injustices, that there should be class oppression, despotism, dangers, mighty passions, prejudices, superstition, fanaticism—essential, in a word, that there should be everything against which the nineteenth century has fought. "Without forcible constraint no good thing happens."

In his literary studies as, for example, in the work on Tolstoi written shortly before his death, the artist of early days, the artistic observer of mankind and history, once more comes into his own.

It is Leont'ev's amoralism which misleads him into effecting a radical severance of religion from morality, and which induces in him the conviction that "politics has nothing to do with ethics." For the same reason he detests democracy, because democratic politics has in the last resort an ethical sanction (cf. Mihailovskii). Leont'ev's political thought has a religious trend, and for him the fear of the Lord is at the same time fear of the temporal ruler. Ivan Aksakov says of Leont'ev's philosophy of religion that it is "the voluptuous cult of the cane." Similarly de Maistre, long before the days of Darwin, left the weak to be the prey of the strong, and extolled the soldier and the executioner side by side with the pope.

Leont'ev's central thought is the necessity for theocracy. Augustine's city of God appears in Russian guise; God becomes tsar and tsar becomes God. Feuerbach and all those who conceive the essence of religion to consist in anthropomorphism and sociomorphism may well be content with Leont'ev. The historian of civilisation and the philosopher of history will see in his crude doctrines a reflex of the political conditions that prevailed during the reaction under Nicholas and his successors. Leont'ev did not evolve his theocratic ideal from

his inner consciousness, but learned it from the study of reality. Leont'ev's theology is an involuntary criticism of the regime of Alexander II and Alexander III. To Leont'ev it seems that atheism is tantamount to treason to the tsar and to the state.

Leont'ev's nature was an extremely complex one ; he himself describes it as "intolerably complex." He suffered from a spiritual disintegration ; his body was inhabited by two souls ; he had a Faust nature, or was as he put it "a spiritual Icarus." Artist and aristocrat by temperament ; realist and materialist by scientific and medical training ; pupil of Herzen, Černyševskii, Danilevskii and the Russian nihilists ; admirer of Turgenev and the great Russian and European writers—he turned his back on his training and his natural gifts. Desiring to stifle doubt, he sought the gloomy monastic cell, he became a monk. Yet it took him long to make up his mind, and he became a monk in secret only, for he who has eaten of the tree of knowledge can never wholly forget. This explains the internal struggle, the cleavage, the disintegration, the unceasing self-torment, and the ever-renewed thirst for absolute satisfaction. But the torment grew to become a need, and thus Leont'ev conceived God as a punishing Jehovah, as a Russian tsar, whose unrestricted arbitrariness develops into metaphysical freedom. Homjakov saw in Christ the head of the church, but to Leont'ev the head was the tsar. Religion became politics ; yet again and again the strong individuality of the man who wished to believe but could not believe rose in rebellion against the God-tsar. He would like to take courage, and to cast down the terrible god from his throne, but energy fails, and his tortured soul longs for eternal peace. The world, mundane life, vanishes before the image of eternity. Life seems so null, man seems so powerless, that Leont'ev has no need of morality ; he needs merely religious practice, and for him religious practice is nothing but fear and ascetic inactivity. It is pessimistic renunciation of will, complete moral and political nihilism, directed, however, not against God but against God's victims—a believing and theistic terrorism !

Leont'ev hates democracy and hates socialism. Essentially he is the egoistic aristocrat, who requires the whole church, the whole of heaven, for himself alone. Leont'ev spoke of his own religion as "transcendental egoism," and it was, in fact, a crude religious individualism carried to the pitch of anarchism.

Compared with Leont'ev, Katkov and Pobēdonoscev were mere bunglers, the hired condottieri of reaction. Leont'ev was the born reactionary, the predestined self-made reactionary. The Katkovs and Pobēdonoscevs enjoyed his approval, but he regarded them as compromisers, and considered that they availed themselves of petty expedients. Nevertheless Leont'ev defended Katkov against Turgenev and other adversaries who at the Puškin festival had refused to be reconciled with the great Russian publicist. Katkov had defended the might of Orthodox Russia and of the tsar, and on this ground Leont'ev esteemed him highly. Leont'ev would have liked to see Katkov "politically canonised during his lifetime." If the Russians possessed only a spark of moral courage, they would erect a statue to Katkov in Moscow near the Puškin monument. "It is time we should learn how to make a reaction." The reactionaries should be as pitilessly logical as the nihilists.

In theological matters Leont'ev had an untrained mind, but was well read in philosophy and literature. Whilst he accepted official Russia, his penetrating understanding made clear to him the futility and distintegration of the reactionaries no less than of the liberals, and made him, in his longing for unity and integrality, wish for the restoration of prepetrine Old Moscow.

In his philosophy of religion, Leont'ev took the slavophiles as his starting point. Kirčevskii, Homjakov, Konstantin Aksakov, Samarin, and Ivan Aksakov, facilitated for him the transition to orthodoxy, whilst the philologist T. I. Filippov fortified him in his Byzantinism. Danilevskii, he tells us, disclosed to him the true meaning of slavophilism. Katkov, finally, was for him the Puškin of civic activities. For Leont'ev, the development of slavophilism into Asiaticism was comparatively easy. In this matter, as in others, Leont'ev anticipated the actualities of tsarism. Prince Uhtomskii officially announced the panasiatist policy shortly after the death of Leont'ev (see § 33).

Critical theologians can hardly fail to recognize that Leont'ev was in essentials no Christian (cf. Aggeev's monograph on Leont'ev, 1909). Leont'ev's faith, even, is suspect to theologians, and with good reason, for the will to believe is not yet belief. In the later years of his life, Leont'ev was profoundly impressed by Solov'ev's philosophy of history and of religion, and Solov'ev's ideas shook Leont'ev's Byzantinism. Solov'ev

considered that the future belonged to a union of the churches, that Byzantium and the third Rome must yield place to the first Rome. Leont'ev wished to constrain himself to believe but wished the impossible.

Leont'ev's philosophy of religion and philosophy of ecclesiasticism win more influence among theologians than among the more recent philosophers of religion. Weak-minded men, or those who have become weak-minded, cannot withstand absurdities and paradoxes.¹

II

§ 136.

I HAVE alluded to the most notable defenders of official theocracy. Let us now take a comparative survey of the two camps, that of the right and that of the left.

Alike quantitatively and qualitatively, the theocrats are inferior to the radicals and the revolutionaries. If we contrast Bělinskii, Herzen, Bakunin, Černyševski, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Lavrov, and Mihailovskii, with Katkov and Pobėdonoscev, the two latter are incomparably weaker both as men of letters and as philosophers; Leont'ev alone has claims on our respect, but his theocratic allies were themselves alarmed by his syllogistic straightforwardness.

The reaction, long drawn out, after the days of Alexander I, had little to show in the way of intellectual pre-eminence. Karamzin, Šiskov, Pogodin, and Ševyrev; such official publicists, now quite forgotten, as Glinka, Greč, Bulgarin, and Senkovskii (Brambeus); such periodicals as "Majak" and "Věst"—a lean inventory!

The theocracy was incapable of attracting and training vigorous thinkers. The state fundamental law, Count Uvarov's formula, and the administrative machine, occupied and con-

¹ A brief reference only can be made to Leont'ev's epigrams, a few of which have been quoted in the text. They are often arresting and suggestive. For example, he speaks of his own system as "optimistic pessimism," for it is optimistic in respect of its transcendental egoism, but pessimistic in relation to this world. In many cases he does no more than remind well known phrases of his predecessors. Kirėevskii, for example, had referred to the artificial society which in Europe (as contrasted with Russia) was based upon the calculus of personal interests; for Leont'ev this becomes the "reciprocal honesty" of the European bourgeois.

tinue to occupy the energies of the reaction, under the aegis of the church. These labours were quite mechanical, and intelligence was practically superfluous for their performance.

As Leont'ev declared, the theocrats were opposed to everything towards which the nineteenth century aspired. Their primary aim was to forbid thought and culture, and to render these impossible. Philosophy, the sciences, the universities and the elementary schools, journalism, in a word, all the instruments of culture, were restricted. The new democratic trends and aspirations were crushed; socialism and liberalism, endeavours to secure liberty, equality, and progress, were strenuously opposed.

The theocracy had one of its main pillars in the aristocracy, in the great landowners. In this connection, the reactionary agrarian program of Russia may be said, in a sense, to have more justification than it has, for example, in Prussia, where the population is not predominantly agricultural. But even within the ranks of the Russian nobility there has always existed a liberal minority. The same remark applies to the army, the second buttress of governments and dynasties. To a certain extent, too, bureaucracy is perforce liberal.

There remains, then, the clergy, the altar, which is the most essential pillar of the throne. Theology is the true state philosophy of Russia, the official conception of the universe. Bakunin, in his earlier conservative days, formulated this in lapidary style for subsequent state philosophers and court philosophers, writing, "Where there is no religion there can be no state," and "Religion is the substance, the essence, of the life of every state." Pobědonoscev did no more than repeat Bakunin's formula when he declared, "Unbelief is the direct negation of the state." Surely it almost transcends irony that the founder of anarchism should have anticipated Pobědonoscev.

In Europe too, doubtless, conservatives and reactionaries appealed in political matters to divine revelation as the ultimate source of authority, appealed to divine right; but the divine right of the tsar was on principle elevated to the rank of a categorical imperative of revelation.

The struggle between religious faith and philosophical unfaith is not waged solely in the fields of philosophy and theology; it is at the same time a political struggle, the struggle between absolute monarchy and democracy. The Russian

radical philosophy of history and philosophy of religion bring the facts so clearly to light that democracy, no less than theocracy, has and must have a philosophical foundation.

Thus philosophy opposes theology in the political field, the philosophy which is above all associated with the ideas of Feuerbach, in whose name, from the middle forties onwards, the theoretical and practical resistance to tsarism was conducted. Without circumlocution, the nihilistic terrorists proclaimed atheism and materialism as the main pillars of their political program. Běliniskii, Herzen, Bakunin, Černyševskii, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, Lavrov, Mihailovskii, one and all (and it is no less true of Marx and the Marxists) start from Feuerbach. Now Feuerbach tells us bluntly that God is the anthropomorphic likeness and phantasmagoria of king, emperor, and tsar; he tells us, to quote Bakunin's harsh formula, that heaven is the dram-shop sub specie æternitatis.

"Feuerbach" on one side, "monk" on the other, are the slogans of the political opponents; in the eyes of the theocrats, atheism is treason to state and country.

Homjakov desired a true conservatism. The system of Uvarov and Leont'ev is not conservatism, but the blind acceptance of tsarism and tsarist administration. Bismarck distinguished between conservatism and governmentalism, but the Russian conservatives were far from having advanced to this point. The Russians aimed at absolute arrest, at the reprimination of prepetrine Moscow. In Europe, conservatism admits of progress, but Russian conservatism absolutely negates progress; it was natural, therefore, that the reactionaries should find themselves opposed to Peter and his reforms. The practical meaning of this was that tsarism was in conflict with itself.

The theorists of theocracy vigorously opposed nihilism and nihilist negation, but they themselves were merely negative and repressive, were uncreative.

V. Rozanov, who studied for a time under Leont'ev, characterised Pobědonoscev as a sceptic. All that Rozanov meant was that the deceased procurator did not believe in mankind or in the present, but for my part I feel justified in adding that Pobědonoscev, Leont'ev, and Katkov all suffered from the canker of unbelief, and that this explains their scholastic warfare against unbelief. Medieval faith was half interred with the bones of scholasticism, and the same statement applies to modern scholasticism alike in Europe and in Russia. He who

finds it necessary to furnish reasons to himself and others in defence of his traditional beliefs, is already a lost man.

Hence the theocratic apologia is mere Jesuitry. Even Leont'ev is under no illusions; he recognises that the reaction can find nothing but specious reasons for the defence of its unavowed aims, and that in the last resort it must necessarily have recourse to force.

Leont'ev felt that he was defending a lost post.

This is why the ex-revolutionary Tihomirov was dissatisfied, not only with Dostoevskii, Solov'ev, and Homjakov, but also with Leont'ev.

In the seventies Tihomirov had been a revolutionist and terrorist, and had been one of those to collaborate with Mihailovskii in composing the letter to Alexander III, Tihomirov drafting for that document the minimum demands for reform. As member of the executive committee of the Narodnaja Volja he took part in the before-mentioned negotiations with the "Holy Retinue." In the year 1888, in a writing entitled *Why I am no longer a Revolutionary*, he attempted to defend his change of view. Mihailovskii has written concerning the early activities of the convert in St. Petersburg. Tihomirov, collaborating on Katkov's paper and other reactionary journals, demanded absolute faith in religion and politics. He knew what scepticism was, since for a long time he had doubted the justification for revolution, but had none the less remained active for years in the refugee movement. In 1893 Tihomirov published a work upon *Clergy and Society in the Contemporary Religious World*, declaring here quite unambiguously that the believer must be absolutely devoted and perfectly submissive to the church. Religious faith, in his view, was exclusive of any kind of spontaneous religious activity on the part of the critical understanding; ecclesiastical authority rendered all search for religious truths superfluous; this search was pernicious. Just as the church was the highest spiritual authority, so were the autocracy and the government alone competent and alone entitled to regulate social order; Europe, no less than Russia, could be saved only by absolute monarchy. In Russia, "a skilled and vigorous police" would suffice to put an end to the various socialist fantasies.

In the first work written after his conversion, Tihomirov renounced revolution in favour of peaceful evolution, but when he had himself evolved in the reactionary direction he aban-

done evolution as well. Nevertheless, in the name of the church and of the autocracy a few shamefaced protests were made against Tihomirov's demand for blind obedience.

It was characteristic of the theocracy that it should seek its condottieri among renegades from the other camp (Katkov, Tihomirov, etc).

De Maistre paved the way for the Russian theocrats with his executioner, his glorification of the soldier, and his defence of the inquisition. De Maistre, too, anticipated Feuerbach by representing the monarchy as a true image of divine governance on earth.

Thus the Russian theocrats appear to us as westernisers, one might almost say absolute westernisers. It is the European theocrats and reactionaries who furnish their Russian congeners with a meagre store of intellectual provender; in return the Tihomirovs promise the European reactionaries that tsarism will bring help and rescue.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

VLADIMIR SOLOV'EV; RELIGION AS MYSTICISM

§ 137.

HAVING dealt with the defenders of official theocracy we have now to consider the theorist of "free theocracy". Vladimir Sergëevič Solov'ev, the most influential teacher of the recent searchers after God and the leading representative of the Russian philosophy of religion.

Solov'ev was born at Moscow in the year 1853. A gifted lad, he found much to stimulate his literary and philosophical faculties in his home and among the family acquaintances. Sergëi Solov'ev, the father, is already known to us as liberal historian and professor at Moscow university; the mother was also a person of active intelligence; whilst the Solov'ev family had lively traditions of the remarkable philosopher Skovoroda, to whom the mother was kin. The family talent is further signalised by the fact that Vladimir Solov'ev's elder brother was a writer of novels, whilst one of his sisters attained reputation as painter and poet.

Before leaving school, Solov'ev had already shown keen interest in philosophical and religious questions. In the middle and late sixties, when the representatives of the radical trend of Černyševskii and Pisarev were being persecuted, Solov'ev, at the age of fourteen, became an enthusiastic nihilist. Until his seventeenth year he was faithful to positivism, materialism, and atheism, regarding Pisarev as the greatest Russian philosopher, and Spinoza as the greatest philosopher the world had ever produced. Further, Solov'ev was an enthusiast for Buddhism, and his pantheistic inclinations were fostered by the study of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Entering the university in 1869, he devoted himself to the study of natural science, but transferred two years later to the philosophical

faculty, where his chief teacher was Jurkevič. In addition, he attended the philosophical lectures of Kudrjavcev-Platonov at the seminary. Throughout life Solov'ev cherished these two teachers in grateful memory. We are already acquainted with Jurkevič, the opponent of Černyševskii. The characteristics of Kudrjavcev's philosophy will be suggested by the consideration that he adopted the additional name of Platonov. A highminded opponent of contemporary philosophy, especially of materialism, positivism, and Darwinism, he exercised an enduring influence upon Solov'ev.

Study of the slavophiles led Solov'ev to Plato, and also to neoplatonism, to Plotinus; he was especially interested in the work of Homjakov. From the slavophiles he passed to Schelling, and Schelling smoothed his path to Baader, Jacob Boehme, and all the mystics, Swedenborg of course not excepted. Solov'ev found in the mystics the mainspring of true knowledge. The gnostics (Philo and Valentinus), the first Greek fathers of the church (especially Origen), and Augustine, became his favourite authorities. The study of ecclesiastical history and the ideal of the union of the churches led Solov'ev to the Catholic traditionalists (de Bonald, de Maistre, etc.).

Even before he left the university, but still more in later years (his translation of Kant's *Prolegomena* was published in 1889), Solov'ev was much disquieted by Kant as well as by the mystics. Hegel reinforced the rationalistic trend, whilst Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann confirmed Solov'ev in his mysticism. In addition, Schopenhauer directed his attention to Hindostan, whilst his own inclinations towards magian superstition made spiritualism, hypnotism, and occultism congenial to him. He was greatly influenced by Auguste Comte: at first by positivism, which, however, he soon came to regard as inadequate, his own earliest philosophical writings being refutations of positivism; and subsequently by Comte's works upon the religion of humanity.¹

In 1874 he took up his residence as professor of philosophy in Moscow, and published his work on *The Crisis in Western Philosophy*. Next year, however, he set out on a journey to

¹ In the Russian edition of Brockhaus' encyclopædia, the following articles on philosophers, theologians, and mystics are penned by Solov'ev: Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Origen, Pelagius, Basil the Great, Duns Scotus, Hugues of Saint-Victor, Raymond Lully, Hermes Trismegistus, Campanella, Malebranche, Swedenborg, de Maistre, Kant, Hegel, Comte, Hartmann, Maine de Biran.

study in the west, and visited London to examine in the British Museum the sources of our knowledge of Hindostan. Thence he passed to the east, to search among the Bedouins of Egypt for remnants of ancient apostolical tradition. Returning to Moscow in 1876, he resigned his professorship in 1877. A dispute had broken out over the university statutes between the liberal and the conservative professors. Solov'ev (in opposition to his own father) espoused the cause of the conservatives, and was supported by Katkov, with whom the younger Solov'ev had now become closely acquainted, Solov'ev being a collaborator on Katkov's review. At this epoch, too, he had friendly relations with Ivan Aksakov and Leont'ev, whilst among the younger slavophiles Kojalovič was a favourite associate.

Removing from Moscow to St. Petersburg, Solov'ev joined the ministry for education as a member of the scientific committee. The outbreak of the war with Turkey led him for a while to think of visiting the theatre of war as correspondent of Katkov's review, but the idea was never carried out. In St. Petersburg he became intimate with Dostoevskii, with the poet Fet, and also with Tolstoi, although his mental outlook became continually more divergent from that of the last-named.

In the year 1880, at the St. Petersburg philosophical faculty, he defended his dissertation, *Critique of Abstract Principles*, which had not brought him the desired professorship. Vladislavlev, professor of philosophy, was opposed to Solov'ev; Čičerin, too, was adverse at this time (see *Mysticism in Science*, 1880); and at a somewhat earlier date Kavelin had likewise shown himself an opponent (*Apriori Philosophy or Positive Science?*). Despite the veto thus exercised by two of the most notable representatives of westernism and liberalism, Solov'ev after a while (1888) moved away from Katkov towards the liberals—or at any rate his writings secured acceptance in liberal organs.

In 1881, after the assassination of Alexander II, in a public lecture Solov'ev demanded pardon for the tsaricides. There-with his academic career necessarily came to a close. Count Deljanov, minister for education, a willing instrument of Pobědonoscev, had no place for Solov'ev as professor, for Solov'ev was "a man with ideas."

Solov'ev now devoted himself to questions concerning the philosophy of religion and the history of the church. His studies in these fields led him to defend the union of the churches

and brought him near to Catholicism. He entered into close relationships with Bishop Strossmayer and the Jesuit Pierling. Among Catholic thinkers, Bossuet, with his philosophy of ecclesiastical history, became dear to Solov'ev. The religious censorship now forbade him to publish in Russia any writings upon religious topics, and his chief works were therefore produced abroad. The first volume of the *History and Future of Theocracy*, containing Foreword, Introduction, and Philosophy of Biblical History, was published in Russian at Agram in 1887; *La Russie et l'église universelle* appeared at Paris in 1889.

During the nineties, Solov'ev devoted his attention to ethical and political questions. His leading ethical treatise was entitled *Justification of the Good, Moral Philosophy* (1897, 2nd edition 1898).

At this time he planned with his brother a translation of Plato; he translated Kant's *Prolegomena*; and he wrote a detailed biography of Mohammed (1896)—the Mohammedan religious world had ever allured him.

Solov'ev paid frequent visits to Europe. In 1899 he revisited Egypt, and wished to go to Palestine, but lacked funds for the purpose. Returning home in debilitated health, he died next year (August 12th) on the estate of one of his professorial friends, Prince Trubeckoi.

All his biographers are agreed in deploring Solov'ev's carelessness about his health. His meals were ill selected and irregular; in later years he became a vegetarian, though he ate fish occasionally; when ill he often refused to follow his doctor's advice. He would work far on into the night; lived quite alone for months without a servant; whilst he would visit his friends unexpectedly, this too, perhaps, at a very late hour, in order to discuss vital questions with them. It cannot be said that he shunned society. He was restless, highly strung, of irregular habits, and might be described as a secular monk and ascetic.

§ 138.

A DETAILED study of Solov'ev would have to follow closely the philosopher's course of internal development, but in a sketch, which is all that can be given here, I must content myself with presenting the leading important ideas of Solov'ev's philosophy and with making no more than brief allusion to the chief phases of his development.

I will begin with a description of his most important work, the *History of Ethics*, the second edition of which was published shortly before his death. At the outset I must insist that this treatise is, in fact, Solov'ev's only finished work. It is far more carefully elaborated than any of the others, and it exhibits the author's views on the philosophy of religion in a clarified and largely mitigated form. It provides free theocracy and theosophy with an ethical foundation, whilst mysticism is kept within bounds by Kantian criticism.

Having to face the decisive question, what proof he can find for theism and consequently for theocracy, he adduces the so-called moral proof of the existence of God, but from this outlook he goes beyond Kant, whose hypothetical statement naturally seems to him inadequate. To Solov'ev the consciousness of good and evil appears absolute; he considers that this consciousness, and the distinction between good and evil, cannot be shaken by any scepticism. All that scepticism can effect is that it may make us doubt the existence of the objective world; it cannot affect moral conviction; man has to recognise within himself the dualism of good and evil, and he cannot fail to feel the sense of moral obligation; conscience cannot be purely subjective. To this point Solov'ev follows Kant. Morality is autonomous. But thence Solov'ev does not merely derive postulates; he deduces rather that God and the soul are not superadded to morality from without, but are the direct energies of morality. The historic fact that for the generality of mankind the moral standard continues to grow, and that for mankind this standard grows independently of individual men, leads Solov'ev to the conclusion that the moral growth of mankind is the direct outcome of the superhuman power of the Good; but the good is God.¹

Thus for Solov'ev the direct moral consciousness affords direct certainty of the living God and the living soul. Religion is for him the living sense of the real presence of the unitary and all-embracing godhead.

Before ethics, Hume called a halt to his scepticism. Solov'ev accepts this limitation, strengthens the argument by an appeal to Kant, and proceeds thence to the highest good of Plato. Solov'ev believes himself to have thus constructed an ethic entirely independent of theory, independent alike of the theory

¹ Solov'ev is not consistent in the use of the capital, writing sometimes "the Good" and sometimes "the good."

of cognition and of metaphysics—for ethics cannot be wholly independent of religion.

The views are reminiscent of Kant and Plato, but also of Spinoza ; and we must ask ourselves whether the real presence of the all-embracing God is to be interpreted pantheistically or monotheistically. When Solov'ev speaks of the soul he tells us that he does not conceive the soul as being necessarily an individual and independent substance. It is possible to conceive the soul as a relationship, as one of many mutually inseparable relationships, of the godhead to one or another substratum of mundane life, relationships that are perdurable, immortal. Immortal relationships? We cannot further consider this argument, which does not seem particularly cogent, for it has been adduced merely to show how Solov'ev passes back from Kant by way of Spinoza to Plato.

Solov'ev shows more originality and independence when he deduces the theocratic organisation of mankind from an ethical principle, that of asceticism. He assumes the feeling of shame to be inborn. It appears, he says, in three distinct modifications, and constitutes the moral vital energy. The sentiment of shame in the strictest sense is shown in the relationship between man and the lower creation, and in man's relationship to matter, in especial towards his own material body, towards matters of sex. The sentiment of shame also takes the form of fellow-feeling, of sympathy or altruism. Sympathy is not irrational as Schopenhauer contends ; it is rational ; it is the positive recognition of another ; it is truth and justice, compassion, conscience.

In veneration (*pietas*, *reverentia*), finally, Solov'ev discerns the root of religion for each individual. The first manifestations of veneration are seen in family life, in veneration for parents. "The idea of the godhead is incorporated in the living personality of the parents ; providence, the main attribute of the godhead, is incorporated in the care and foresight of the mother." To emphasise the religious significance of motherhood, Solov'ev appeals to the first stage of historical development, to the theories of matriarchy and gynocracy. Yet the father has the higher religious significance. The mother is greatly esteemed by children, but to the adult, death brings awareness of veneration towards ancestors ; to the adult, his father seems an understudy for the gods, whilst his grandfather

has simply become a god.¹ Christianity discovered the father of the universe and the sentiment of veneration in the spirit and in truth ; the relationship of sonhood became sacred ; this relationship attests what the Son of God has taught us, that we must do the Father's will, not our own ; for Solov'ev, Christianity, and God incarnate, are identical ideas.

Thus for Solov'ev shame is the starting point and the rational foundation of the moral organisation of mankind. Individual chastity is the guarantee of sound asceticism ; social chastity, the conscience, regulates the relationships between man and man ; finally, religious chastity, the fear of the Lord, brings man into his true relationship with God.

Without entering upon a detailed criticism, we may recognise, above all, the vigour of this attempt at a unitary construction, while perceiving that Solov'ev is more indebted than he is himself aware to Schopenhauer and modern philosophy. In a word, although his first and chief desire is to be a Christian, he seems to have mislaid Christian love. It is true that he frequently insists upon love as the basis of religion, but he is thinking of Spinoza's "*amor intellectualis*" and not of Christian love ; the "*pietas*" and "*reverentia*" of the patriarchs are far more akin to fear, to Leont'ev's *timor Domini*, than they are to Christian love. Moreover, Schopenhauer's "*sympathy in mutual human relationships*" is not love, and it is a mere accessory that the feeling should be rationalised.

- Such rationalisation of basic sentiments is extremely characteristic of Solov'ev ; he starts voluntaristically from feeling, but proceeds to rationalise feeling. Schopenhauer is supplemented and corrected by Kant and Spinoza. Spinoza shared with Schopenhauer the position of Solov'ev's first philosophic love.

The important question is whether Solov'ev failed to note that his explanation of morality and the religious sentiment accorded ill with Christian doctrine. In essentials Solov'ev accepted the attempts of the deists to explain religion as natural. He appealed on his own account to natural religion, never noting that natural religion and revealed religion are somewhat inharmonious. He showed, indeed, that we should not conceive religion either as fetichism or as mythology, but he merely

¹ Solov'ev lays especial stress upon the Russian practice of using patronymics (e.g. Vladimir Sergëevich, the son of Sergëi) as an index of the importance of "fatherhood."

did this in order that he might stress more effectively the *pietas erga parentes*. But since he admitted (following Darwin and others) that even the dog and the monkey, in their feelings towards the master, display the rudiments of religious sentiment, we must ask why man, who in religious matters stands so far above the beasts, should need revelation. We must ask what proofs there are of the existence of revelation. What need has Solov'ev of dogma, to which, as we shall shortly see, he attaches so much importance?

By Schopenhauer, too, Solov'ev was won over to the cause of asceticism, or rather Schopenhauer led him to esteem religious asceticism even more highly than before. The entire superstructure of his free theocracy is founded upon asceticism. For him, church, state, individual morality, the entire moral organisation of mankind, are ascetic. In asceticism, in the sentiment of shame, man realises himself to be man, therein he finds himself to be higher than the beasts and higher than matter; and in asceticism Solov'ev seeks the essence of genius. (Here, too, he borrows to some extent from Schopenhauer.)

It is impossible to expound Solov'ev's individual doctrines, or to recapitulate his prescriptions for asceticism. Suffice it to say that he conceives of marriage as a form of asceticism, characterising it as a great deed and as an act of martyrdom. Russian theologians refuse to accept Solov'ev's ascetic principle. Solov'ev, they say, exaggerates the significance of this principle in the spiritual life of mankind, and they insist that he is wrong in regarding it as a primary, not as a secondary principle. Finally they reproach him because his teaching is not in accord with Holy Writ, though it may be endorsed by that of some of the fathers of the church. Solov'ev does in fact come to the same conclusions as Eduard von Hartmann. Solov'ev demands absolute sexual continence, and the dying out of the human race would not conflict with his outlook.

Solov'ev's psychological interpretation of the sentiment of shame was fallacious, and his moral estimate of the sentiment was no less erroneous. We may admit that he showed a fine understanding of the feeling for another's individuality, the feeling that induces the reflective man to discover within himself something akin with all other individuals and even with non-living things, but Solov'ev errs when he interprets this sentiment as a manifestation of shame.

I must also draw special attention to the fact that he fails

to recognise the distinction between chastity and physical intactness (virginity), failing here to transcend ecclesiastical materialism.

In his poems the poet-philosopher gives an intimate record of a succession of meetings. The nine-year-old boy conceived an ardent love for a girl of the same age, and at this early age already sought help against passion in the church. The second meeting took place in London; the third in Egypt. On several subsequent occasions Solov'ev had tender relationships with women. Once he was on the point of marrying a peasant girl; another time, a family council dissuaded him from marrying a relative; a yet later intimacy was broken off by himself.

Solov'ev displayed similar inconsistencies as regards the other physical passions. He kept fasts, and ate no meat, but was fond of wine (not to excess) and sweets.

Solov'ev's doctrine of asceticism was connected with his view that man's nature is radically evil. In this matter, too, he followed Kant and not Rousseau, who considered that man was naturally good but had been corrupted in the course of history. In contradistinction to Kant, however, Solov'ev exhibited a habitual concern about life, tantamount to pessimism. This accounts for his antipathy to Nietzsche and to the Nietzschean cult of a pagan *joie de vivre*.

§ 139.

SOLOV'EV is definitely opposed to egoism and therefore to eudemonism and to utilitarianism, since these are based on egoism. He rejects egoism as individualism and subjectivism; his metaphysical amalgam of monotheism and pantheism makes it impossible for him to find satisfaction in individualism. His conception of the relationship between the individual and society resembles that of Comte. There is for him no opposition; society forms the content of personality, and the individual is concentrated society; in the historical process, the individual is the dynamic factor, whilst society is the static factor. Thus, and in similar ways, does Solov'ev formulate the problem. He does not trouble himself with psychological and sociological analysis, but is interested in practical aspects. For him, humanity is, or to be more precise, will become, a unified organism, the organism of the church universal. At present,

evolution has not gone so far, but the trend and aim of evolution are already so far discernible that we can in all seriousness now speak of "humanity as a whole."

Inasmuch as Solov'ev so decisively rejects subjectivism, he can only regard morality as organised morality. The individual, the individual consciousness does not exist in isolation, but as a member of church and state; the philosophical principles of ethics and religion are abstractions derived from a study of the concrete state and the concrete church, abstractions from the study of the members of these extant organisations.

Solov'ev distinguishes three leading social organisations, the economic, the political, and the ecclesiastical. The economic order reposes upon the division of labour (Solov'ev inclines here towards the views of Mihailovskii), and aims at the organisation of labour; the positive sciences and the methods of technique belong to this domain. The state is the political organisation of the workers, and in this field art and philosophy are active. The church, finally, is the spiritual society, the manifestation of mysticism and theology the organisation of spiritual love; the state does not need love, but only law, or justice, the latter being recognised by Solov'ev as merely a formal principle. Law is for him the attainable minimum of morality; law is distinguished from morality by the former's appeal to the coercive powers of the state. Solov'ev does not recognise that there is any right to inflict capital punishment or to impose sentences of lifelong imprisonment; but, differing from Tolstoi, he regards war as permissible.

Solov'ev defends human rights (though not equal rights) and rejects political privileges. The privilege of one, is realised in 'oriental despotisms; the privilege of a few, in classical aristocracies; and finally the privilege of many, in democracy.

Solov'ev rejects socialism on account of its economic materialism, saying that the socialist order would be a social ant-hill (Dostoevskii was fond of this phrase). The social question, he contends, will be readily and spontaneously solved from the religious outlook. Coming to practical details, Solov'ev is at one with the narodniki in contending that land should be assigned to every family.¹

According to Solov'ev the church with its doctrines and mystagogy must permeate political and economic society, the

¹ In opposition to Voroncov, Solov'ev defends agrarian reform; he favours latifundia, upon which intensive agriculture could be carried on.

state. This involves the essence of free theocracy, for men, he holds, cannot fail to approve and accept true Christianity as soon as they are sufficiently acquainted with it.

The church is the organisation of piety. Man lives in "this world," which is imperfect, finite, and relative; but man lives also a life in God, in "the realm of God," and for this latter life the church is the mediating religious instrument.

Religious life, religious truth, is neither scientific nor philosophical; it is not even theological; but it is life, pious life, such as the teachings of religion demand and render possible. Theoretic theosophy finds expression in theurgy. The mysteries of the seven sacraments and the dogmatic utterances of the seven councils (the holy seven!) are represented and manifested in the church by and through life.

In the church a fraternity, a liberty, and an equality, real because spiritual, are realised, not however through the individual, but through Christ. Solov'ev accepts Dostoevskii's dictum concerning "Russian socialism," whereby is denoted the essential being of the church universal. The principle of the spiritual life, says Solov'ev, basing himself on St. John, is "not of itself"; hence the need for the apostolate and the hierarchy—the church. The church is for Solov'ev the incarnation of God; in and through the church, men are united with Christ, God incarnate.

The personal representatives of the moral organisation of mankind, those upon whom the higher services devolve, are: the high priests, absolute authority (but an authority devoted to true tradition), the representative of the highest piety; the climax of grace and sympathy, absolute power, the being truly aware of existing needs, to wit the king (tsar); the prophet, finally, who represents the acme of the sense of shame and of conscience, represents absolute freedom, believes in the true picture of the future.

Solov'ev has most of all to tell us about the prophetic function. Christianity was in truth right to do away with the prophets. In rare cases only have they appeared since, and usually as false prophets, this explaining all the anomalies of medieval and modern history. Solov'ev desires the reestablishment of the prophetic function, but this does not depend upon the human will. The prophet has profound social significance in that he is perfectly independent, has no fear of anything external, and is not subordinated to anything external—possesses

an absolute freedom which neither the masses nor democracy can ever guarantee. The prophet is not a vain dreamer of dreams; his picture of the future is not a utopia spun out of personal fancies, but arises in response to the actual needs of society and is rooted in mysterious religious tradition; herein lies the connection between the prophet's mission on the one hand, and high priesthood and kingship on the other.

It is difficult to determine how far Solov'ev was thinking of Nietzsche in this description of a modern prophet. Nietzsche's prophet was creator rather than seer, whereas Solov'ev vacillates between seer and creator. For Solov'ev the creator became transformed into the artist (vide infra § 144).

§ 140

WHEN, in his *Ethics*, Solov'ev expounds his free theocracy, we feel throughout that his aim is to provide an ethical foundation for the idea of theocracy. Speaking generally, for Solov'ev life, history, and the world have a moral meaning. In his ethical system the Kantian outlook finds expression, and he endeavours to formulate the concept of theocracy as reasonably as possible, to bring the idea into harmony with the views of modern philosophers and sociologists.

The earlier works devoted to the establishment of the doctrine of free theocracy, those of the eighties, produce a very different impression, for in these Solov'ev is guided by the theology and the teachings of the slavophiles. In its first draft, his free theocracy has a much closer resemblance with the actual theocracy of Russian caesaropapism.

In practice, Solov'ev wishes to secure a free theocracy by a union of the three main churches. In this matter the state, as the second great social organisation, must cooperate with the church; the ecclesiastical and the political organisation must work in harmony. The absolute truth of the church being recognised, Christianity cannot fail to permeate the entire life of society; but for this the state, too must become Christian, and the state must help the church to diffuse Christianity.

In the west, the church conquered the powerful Roman state. After the schism, however, the church became unduly political, taking over the function of the state, and since the Teutonic state was too feeble to resist it, Catholicism grew

one-sidedly coercive. But the most momentous schism in the church was the secession of Byzantium, which thereby became Asiatic; the state subdued the church, the church retired into itself, lapsed into spiritual death, and was therefore conquered by Islam; the east was and is the true home of Christianity, which, however, has remained an inward Christianity, and has failed to animate life and civilisation. The extant autocephalic Orthodox churches have, even more than the Byzantine mother church, become the prey of little states. Solov'ev points to the hostile attitude of the patriarchate of Constantinople towards the Bulgarian church, and shows how the churches of the Balkans are dominated by a petty nationalist spirit.

Protestantism, in its justified protest against Rome, was too one-sided in its advocacy of the critical activity of the understanding.

Whereas the functions of high priest, king (Solov'ev is speaking in Russian terminology of the tsar), and prophet were harmoniously united in the person of Christ, these three religious functions were one-sidedly developed in the three churches. The papacy represented the one-sided development of high priesthood; Orthodoxy, the one-sided development of kingship; Protestantism, the one-sided development of prophethood. To express the matter in a different way, in the person of Christ there existed a harmonious unification and unity of Father (high priest), Son (king), and Holy Spirit (prophet). The aim of the church must be to effect the social realisation of this trinity in unity, but the three Christian churches have carried out the task in a non-organic and one-sided manner.

Russia received church and civilisation from Byzantium, and for this reason in Russia, too, church and civilisation are one-sided. Situated geographically between the Asiatics (Mohammedans) and the Latins, Russia maintained her freedom, developed her political organism, and separated herself wholly from the west. But in Russia the church was weakened even more than in Byzantium. Solov'ev gives an account of ecclesiastical evolution in Russia wherein the patriarch Nikon, in contradistinction to customary views, is represented as antichrist. The persecution of the raskolniki and of the sectaries is described as an unchristian use of violence; Peter's reforms are considered to be nothing more than an outward and mechanical linking-up with the west, nothing more than a first step; Peter

and his successors definitively subjugated the church. The task of Russia, therefore, is to secure an intimate and inward union with the west. She must not merely adopt foreign forms, but must understand them. At the same time, Russia will place a vigorous state at the disposal of the church universal, so that the latter may complete the rebirth of the nations. The Russian tsar and the pope must become the instruments of the genuine and the free theocracy—for the theocracy that reposes upon force is false.

The content of history is constrained by Solov'ev to submit itself to the limitations of the formula of a struggle between Asia and Europe. Solov'ev frequently speaks of the centralising force of the east (the Mohammedan east), of the individualism of western civilisation, and of the reconciling energy or mission of the Slavs.

Thus Solov'ev looks for light from the east, *ex oriente lux*. But he asks on one occasion whether it is to come from the east of Xerxes or from the east of Christ.

In historically extant Russia, Solov'ev discerns the capacity for the practical inauguration of the church of the future, and considers that this will be effected by the solution of the Polish problem and of the Jewish problem.

The mission of the Poles, says Solov'ev, is something very different from the attainment of political independence. The Poles forfeited their political independence because their nobles absorbed, overvalued, and therefore ruined, the entire state. The political independence of Poland can never be regained, and this political aim is fantastical and fruitless. Nor can Poland become comparatively independent upon the basis of a one-sided idea of nationality. But Poland can constitute a "living bridge" between the west and the east, and may serve the free theocracy by inaugurating the union of the churches.

The political aims of the Polish nobles are "irrational and immoral," and yet these nobles are to take part in the "service of God" which Solov'ev assigns to the Polish nation, they are to help in bringing about the union of the churches! Besides, how are we to represent to our minds the "living bridge" between east and west? Do such bridges exist?

The question of the Jews was one by which Solov'ev is more disquieted than by that of the Poles. In the Jews he discovers a living link between Old Testament days and the stage

of religion and revelation, of which Christianity was an organic succession. The relationship between Jews and Christians is, therefore, of a quite exceptional character. In Solov'ev's apocalyptic vision (vide *infra* § 148), the significance of the question is symbolically displayed when the author makes the number of the Christians exceed that of the Jews by no more than one half.

Upon his deathbed Solov'ev begged his friends to keep him awake, for he had many prayers to say on behalf of the Jews. In the complex of Russian problems, the Jewish question is one of the most momentous, and Solov'ev frequently discussed it.¹ The importance of the question for Russia depends upon the fact that there are nearly six million Jews in the country, a population equal to that of the whole state of Belgium.

To Solov'ev the Jewish problem is a Christian problem, a religious problem. Solov'ev's treatment of the Jews as pioneers of commerce and industry frequently recalls the manner in which Marx handles the question. It was not the Jews, but the Christians, who created the cult of the golden calf. Cultured Europe, which had become dechristianised, and had devoted itself to the service of mammon, was here the offender. The Jews were merely consistent in the way they followed the example thus set before them. If economic life is to be humanised, it must be resubordinated to the religious and moral life. For Europe and for Russia this can be effected in no other way than by the great union of the churches, in which the Jews will find their place. As a theocratic nation they will be at home in the renovated theocracy; now they are estranged from themselves just as the Christians are estranged from themselves. But true Jewish principles lead to Christianity, just as true Christian principles lead to Judaism. The union of the churches, therefore, will at the same time be a union between the renovated Christians and the renovated Jews, these latter being the better part of Jewry, namely the Russian Jews, who have maintained their religious principles in greater purity than have their western brethren. The Jews as town dwellers will retain their social and economic function, but this function will assume a different meaning,

¹ As early as 1882, at St. Petersburg university, in his lectures to women, he discussed the universal and historical significance of Judaism, whilst at a later date he wrote upon the theme.

will be guided by a loftier aim. Its aim will be to humanise nature and material life.¹

The utopian character of Solov'ev's ecclesiastical policy is manifest. He works with unhistorical schemata.

Solov'ev's essential error is, of course, that he assumes church doctrine to be absolutely true, and that from this outlook he touches up the whole of history; for him, not Jesus and Jesus' teaching, but church doctrine and church dogma, are decisive. He fashions for himself the ideal of a Christian church and the ideal of a Christian state. If, as Solov'ev tells us in his *Ethics*, the church is to represent sympathy with the soul, and the state is to represent sympathy with the body, there will doubtless be an organic harmony between church and state; but these as we know them are something altogether different. As a matter of historic fact, we recognise different types of theocracy, and Solov'ev is right when he rejects extant theocracy as false, as coercive; but he errs all the more conspicuously when he regards a union between pope and tsar as furnishing the promise and potency of a free theocracy. Solov'ev himself shows us how one-sided was the development of the papacy and of tsarism, how both these institutions have ever been based upon the use of force. Are we to expect that pope and tsar, having made common cause, will suddenly become compassionate? We ask whether the genuinely Christian state will and can cooperate with the church for the diffusion of true Christianity, and we ask what means the state will employ to secure this end.

¹ In support of his ideas of union, Solov'ev might have referred to the Judaising sects among the Christians and to the Christianising sects among the Jews. In actual fact the Jews have exercised a religious influence in Russia, and they have done this also in Europe. Concerning this question of an intimate synthesis of Judaism and Christianity, I may refer to a work of considerable psychological interest, Lhotzky's biography of Josef Rabinovič, entitled *Blätter zur Pflege des persönlichen Lebens*, 1904, Heft II. Solov'ev did not consider the possibility that the Jews, starting from their own religious foundations, might effect a religious reformation in the modern sense, might do this spontaneously, though availing themselves of the general acquirements of civilisation. This possibility, however, is the leading idea of the Russian Jew Achad-ha-am (Uscher Ginzberg), whose writings on the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion recall in many respects those of Solov'ev, Dostoevskii, and the slavophiles. For the consideration of the Jewish question in Russia, and for the understanding of the different parties among the Russian Jews, Achad-ha-am, in so far as he has been translated, is indispensable. I should add that Achad-ha-am's views are rooted in religious mysticism (that of the Chasidim), but that he has attained rank as a modern thinker. Consult, *Am Scheideweg* (At the Parting of the Ways), Achad-ha-am's selected essays translated from the Hebrew by Professor Friedländer, 1904.

§ 141.

SOLOV'EV'S views upon the philosophy of ecclesiasticism necessitate a comparison with the teachings of the slavophiles. Solov'ev was greatly influenced by the founders of slavophilism, and above all by Homjakov. After his materialistic crisis, it was by the slavophiles that Solov'ev was led to religion and the church, it was their trend which he followed throughout. He was at one with them in recognising the cultural primacy of religion, of mysticism, in the approval he gave to eastern theology, and in the importance he attached to the Russian church. Being guided by the same tendency, he was led on occasions to the same or to similar judgments in points of detail. The slavophiles and Solov'ev, moreover, sat at the feet of the same teachers (Plato, Schelling, etc.) ; whilst Solov'ev had personal and literary relations with Ivan Aksakov, and wrote for the latter's periodical " Rus' ! "

In the course of his mental development, Solov'ev came to recognise the value of Catholicism, came to consider that it possessed ecclesiastical advantages as compared with the eastern church. This made him diverge in certain details from the slavophiles, though his general trend remained the same. Where Solov'ev differed as a philosopher from the Slavophiles was that he attempted to found an independent theosophical system, whereas the slavophiles were content with the philosophical idealisation of official orthodoxy.

Solov'ev subsequently diverged from the slavophiles, and above all from Homjakov, in his exposition of the history of Christendom and of the severance of the churches. Solov'ev who upon historic and dogmatic grounds acknowledged the supremacy of the pope of Rome, referred the schism to antecedent heretical endeavours in Byzantium, and considered that the fault lay with Byzantium, not with Rome. We may say that in general, in his studies of ecclesiastical history, Solov'ev was far more influenced than were the slavophiles by the idea of evolution ; and we may say, too, that Solov'ev was more critical, though only towards the east.

For Solov'ev was of opinion that the Catholic church, in contrast with the eastern, and above all with the Russian church, had evolved and progressed. The Roman church had in especial promoted the evolution of dogma, and had made reiterated attempts to lead the cultural development of the

western nations, to permeate that development with its spirit. Solov'ev was greatly impressed by the rock of Peter and its steadfastness. Doubtless Rome had been masterful and pitiless in her condemnation of the godless world; but in this unyieldingness, too, we must recognise the mysterious energy of God. Solov'ev admitted that Rome had fallen very low, but it had continued to progress, and had never failed to rise after its falls. Russia, on the other hand, had never fallen because it had continued to sit unceasingly on the same spot.

In his ecclesiastical history and in his views of church policy Solov'ev's trend was unmistakably Catholicising. The reproach he levelled against Homjakov may be turned against himself. Homjakov, said Solov'ev, while criticising Catholicism and Protestantism in their historically extant forms, gave an idealised view of Orthodoxy. But no less idealised was Solov'ev's presentation of Catholicism and the papacy, whereas he took a somewhat more realistic view of the two other leading churches. But essentially, as has already been explained, he completely failed to see the historically extant churches in their true colours.

In Russia, both clericalists and liberals have written much concerning Solov'ev's attitude to Catholicism. On many occasions he was publicly represented as a Catholic, and publicly defended himself against the accusation, to which weight was, however, given by his acquaintanceship with Bishop Strossmayer and with Pierling, and by the fact that he had his book *The History and Future of Theocracy* printed at Agram.

Solov'ev did not in actual fact become a Catholic while in Europe, but his intimate friends expected him to go over to Rome, considering that this step would have been the logical outcome of his opinions. When directly asked why he had not been received into the Catholic church, seeing that his inclinations towards that faith were so strong, he replied that to become a Catholic would deprive him of his influence upon the Russian people. When further asked whether consideration for the welfare of his own soul did not imperiously demand that he should become a Catholic, Solov'ev rejoined that he was not concerned about his personal salvation, but was thinking about Russia.

I consider that the logic of his friends and opponents was sounder than his own. In the end, Solov'ev went so far to admit the cogency of these arguments that, in 1896, long after his friendship with Strossmayer, he joined the Russian Uniats.

Before death he received communion from an Orthodox priest (no Catholic priest was available).

None the less it remains significant that the most notable modern philosopher of religion should have been an admirer of Catholicism. It is not enough to suggest that Solov'ev was won over by the efforts towards union made by Leo XIII, for the existence of a whole series of Catholicising Russians before and since the days of Alexander I gives a more general significance to attempts towards union.

It need hardly be said that the slavophiles censured Solov'ev in strong terms for his attitude towards Catholicism and towards Orthodoxy. Ivan Aksakov frequently wrote against Solov'ev, and polemic writings emphasising the slavophil views concerning Orthodoxy and concerning the impossibility of a union, exercised a notable influence upon Solov'ev. He was less affected by the controversial opinions of Strahov and the other demi-slavophiles and demi-westernisers.

Solov'ev's sociological and philosophical estimate of nationality likewise distinguished him from the later slavophiles. The early slavophiles had not attained to perfectly clear views concerning the relationships of nationality to religion, church, and culture; although Kirěevskii had subordinated nationality to spiritual culture and religion; whilst Homjakov did the same thing, though he endeavoured to arrive at a more independent conception of the historic function of nationality. It was only the later slavophiles who made common cause with the Old Russians in proclaiming nationality as coequal with state and church.

For Solov'ev, race and nationality were entirely subordinate to religion and church. The idea of a nation, said Solov'ev, is not constituted by what the nation thinks about itself in time, but by what God thinks about the nation in eternity. It was his fundamental idea of the God-man and God-humanity which led him to view as essentially different the roles of the individual nations in the theocratic organisation of mankind.

When Solov'ev accepted the idea of Russian messianism, he was not thinking of the national qualities of the Russian folk, but of the Russian church and religion. He went so far as to declare that the qualities of the chosen people were a minor matter, seeing that this people, in fulfilling its function of saviour, would not be realising its own ideas, but the divine ideas. He spoke of the God-nation as an organic member of

God-humanity (by which he meant, the united church universal). But none the less for Solov'ev the Russian people and the Russian state were the chosen theocratic people and the chosen theocratic state.

Contrasting nationality with nationalism, Solov'ev fiercely attacked the nationalism of the younger slavophiles. He considered that Russian nationalism had exhibited three stages. The early slavophiles prostrated themselves before the nation as the chosen bringer of universal (religious) truth. Next came Katkov, who saw in the nation the elemental vital energy which was independent of universal truth. Last of all came the chauvinistic obscurantism of late date (he was referring to the era of Alexander III), when people paid homage to the national one-sidedness and the historical anomalies by which the Russians were kept separate from civilised mankind. Katkov was the nemesis of the slavophiles; recent obscurantism was the nemesis of Katkov. Solov'ev went so far as to say that slavophilism had declined to the level of "national and political blackmailing." He condemned Jaroš, professor at Moscow university, who proposed to supplement Katkov's program by the apotheosis of John the Terrible as the first and most exemplary Russian, Orthodox, and Tsar. Whilst Katkov had taken his crude politics from de Maistre, Katkov's successors contented themselves with a caricature of de Maistre (Bergeret, *Principes de politique*); in like manner, Danilevskii borrowed his leading idea from Professor Rückert, a German. This alleged primal Russian slavophilism was in fact un-Russian and foreign. Solov'ev's definitive formula was that we should love all other nationalities as we love our own.

From this outlook we must consider and appraise Solov'ev's own views concerning the Poles and the Jews. He gave due recognition to the valuable religious inheritance of these two peoples, who were when he wrote more hostile to the Russians than any others. The Poles and the Jews, he declared must lend aid to the Russians. The messianism of the "theocratic nation" was not a source of privilege, but involved duty and service; it did not give any right to dominance or hegemony. True patriotism, said Solov'ev, was to be found in national self-knowledge, not in national self-complacency, whereas the nationalists had reduced the slavophil idea of messianism to the level of zoomorphic, zoological patriotism. True patriotism involved conviction of sin and confession.

§ 142.

TO know Solov'ev thoroughly we must examine his theosophy, though we shall content ourselves with a few samples. What is meant by theosophy? The desire to know, the belief that we really do know precisely, what God is, what he has made and is making.

Solov'ev finds in German philosophy the last word of philosophic knowledge as hitherto attainable. Above all it is the latest German philosophical system, that of Eduard von Hartmann, which has attracted wide attention in Russia no less than elsewhere, that discloses to Solov'ev the mission of a new and higher philosophy. From Hartmann, Solov'ev learns, first of all, that epistemologically neither rationalism nor empiricism has proved competent to furnish satisfactory and trustworthy knowledge; metaphysically, Hartmann points the way to a concrete spiritual monism; in the ethical field, finally, we gain the knowledge that our ultimate aim can be attained and our true satisfaction secured solely in the unification of all being and through the development of the world-all, to which the individual must surrender himself.

Solov'ev is unable to follow Hartmann all the way, but he considers that Hartmann is on the right track, if only because the German sets out from Schelling's positive philosophy, a synthesis of Hegel and Schopenhauer, of rationalism and voluntarism. Schelling had been commended to Solov'ev by his first Russian teachers, the slavophiles.

Thus in German philosophy from Schelling to Hartmann does Solov'ev discover intimations of Christian philosophy as a rationalistic and scientific interpretation of Christian revelation. Solov'ev actually believes that he is able to secure a sound understanding of Christian revelation by a synthesis of German rationalism and French positivism. Comte's philosophy of history, positivist fetichism, and Hartmann's philosophy of the world process, lead him to the gnostics and neoplatonists, and to their theosophy and their theogony.

Solov'ev believes that from this material and imperfect world we can press forward to true, absolute being. We have thus discovered the inclined plane connecting the absolute with the finite, and the inmost nature of the world is comprehended and explained.

The absolute, for Solov'ev, is the all-in-one being, is God,

is the good. The absolute is one, of one kind, the unifying, the one thing uniting all others ; God is all-embracing and all-unifying in the sense that all parts of the world-all aspire towards him, through him, finding unity in him. God is love.

Absolute being, as absolute substance, as absolute reality, as *actus purus*, God taking pleasure in himself, God with his absolute autonomy, with his freedom (the only freedom in the true sense of the word)—is spaceless and timeless, is everlasting. Beside him, likewise eternal, exists chaos, the eternal potentiality, or as Hegel put it, evil infinity, multiplicity, the subdivided, the not-one, anarchy. God's wisdom (*sophia*) conquers chaos, displaying all might and intelligence ; at the same time (displaying goodness and grace) he bestows upon chaos more than chaos deserves, namely the possibility of choosing freely the side of God.

Like God, chaos is eternal. In this fundamental point Solov'ev already diverges from Christian mythology. But, following Christian mythology, he assumes that there are three hypostases in the Godhead, the father, the son *logos*, and the spirit.

According to Solov'ev, the doctrine of the trinity is a revelation of God, and is the doctrine of the infallible church ; but none the less Solov'ev believes himself able to expound and prove the doctrine upon grounds of reason. The existence of God being given, the trinity in unity of God immediately follows from this existence. Solov'ev considers that every living being necessarily possesses a unity, a duality, and a trinity. The unity is given by being itself. The duality arises from the conviction that this being does not merely exist, but that it is something, that it has a definite objectivity (the idea of itself, the *raison d'être* of itself). The trinity of the living being is comprised in the threefold relationship of the being towards this its objectivity : it possesses this objectivity simply in virtue of the fact that it exists ; it possesses this same objectivity in its activity, which is the necessary manifestation of the existing being ; and thirdly it possesses this objectivity in the sphere of feeling, in the enjoyment of its being and its activity.

With the aid of this scholasticism it is not difficult for Solov'ev, in accordance with the Hebrew text of certain passages from the Old Testament which he quotes word for word (betraying to us the while, that the Hebrew phrases

exercise a fetichistic influence upon his mind), and with the assistance of certain passages from the New Testament (which he gives us not in Greek, but in Latin), to interpret the Christian doctrine of the trinity and the three designations of father, son, and holy ghost, in the sense of strict monarchism (Solov'ev writes "monarchism," not "monarchianism," though the latter form is the one usually preferred by theologians), as energy, truth, and grace, or as power, justice, and goodness, or, finally, as reality, idea, and life.

God, as the absolute, could be self-sufficing, but this would conflict with his grace and goodness. From God and chaos, Solov'ev evolves the world and its history, evolves them as do all mythagogues, notionally and in their reality.

The sophia strives against chaos; this struggle presupposes a soul, the world-soul, the *materia prima*, the potential mother of the created world. The creation of the world proceeds from the father; the logos brings forth the higher world of ideas, but these ideas are mere contemplative and impassive beings; from the holy ghost originate the pure spirits or angels, which have feeling and will, and possess a higher order of freedom than man.

The cosmic process in its first period is astral, and at this time the stellar bodies are formed; during the second period our own solar system comes into existence; during the third period, within this system, the earth becomes the peculiar stage for mankind, mankind being conceived by Solov'ev as the second absolute. Solov'ev's God takes his delight, not in the angels, but in men. Every living being finds the meaning of his own being in the absolute being of God; the significance of man lies in the union between the divine and the mundane. In man, the world-soul becomes completely conscious of itself.¹

The fall of the angels and of man is described on Old Testament lines. The fallen angels, possessing a higher freedom than man, side eternally against God; man, with his more limited freedom, is able after the fall, to rejoin himself to God. According to Solov'ev, man possesses freedom of choice, and this is manifested in the choice of evil, not in the following

¹ Some expounders identify the world-soul with mankind or with "ideal humanity." Radlov has recently given expression to the latter view, with a reference to Comte's *Le Grand Etre*, which in Solov'ev's teaching, says Radlov, appears as the world-soul. In my opinion, the idea of the world-soul, as formulated by Solov'ev, derives from Schelling and Plato. It is certain, moreover, that Solov'ev was familiar with the speculations of Giordano Bruno, etc.

after good ; but after the fall, man can choose the good. Evil is for Solov'ev not the simple absence of good, but is a positive energy, one dominating the world, which man must destroy in himself—evil and the evil one being here fused into a single concept.

With the coming of man, the cosmological process is transformed into a historical process, and history forms the most important constituent of the world process ; the unification of the divine and the mundane must take place in man and for man. As a rational being, man can comprehend the divine, the absolute ; thus man is the mediator between heaven and earth, the deliverer of the world from chaos, the unifier of the world with God.

Man is a union of logos (reason) and matter (body) ; man is the active, woman the passive ; sex represents the contrast between the logos and the mundane.

Man as individual has complete being, but mankind alone can realise all that exists potentially in the individual. In actual fact there is but one form of human existence, man ; woman is no more than the supplement, society no more than the expansion of man.

The direct union of God with mankind has taken place in but one being, the God-man, the incarnation of the logos ; Christ, therefore, is the only complete personality, the supplement of the God-man is the holy virgin, his expansion is the church.

God, man, church, are the three fundamental ideas of Solov'ev. They may, however, be reduced to two, God and church, for the church is organised mankind ; and mankind, not man, is for Solov'ev the essential.

Cosmology is to him no more than the introduction to and the background of the historical process, which unfolds itself as a religious and moral drama. Man, as an imperfect being, cognises perfect good, and there thus originates in human beings the aspiration towards perfection. Solov'ev fully accepts the modern notion of progress, but conceives it as a spiritual process, wherein the external or material remains without significance. This progress is naturally collective, for only collective mankind can realise the destiny of man.

Regarded anthropologically, human history begins with the organisation of the sexual relationship (it is worth noting that Solov'ev's father maintained this theory against the

slavophiles); the second stage is characterised by the organisation of nations and of the state, wherein sex manifestations take the form of family life; this organisation continues to exist in the present, but will be replaced by the universal organisation of mankind which the future will bring.

This future organisation will be effected by the church and in the church; in the church the fullness of the genuinely human life will be attained; man will lead a complete existence, at once individually, socially, and politically.

Examining the spiritual content of evolution, Solov'ev considers that the first stage of universalism was Buddhism, the second Platonism, the third Christianity. Since the appearance of the God-man, history has been the history of the church, and the task of the philosophy of ecclesiastical history is to explain why, after Christ's coming, history should continue, and why and how the great schism of the churches should have preceded the predestined union of the churches. By his life, the God-man overcame moral evil; by his resurrection he vanquished physical evil, the evil of evils, death. Man must freely choose Christ, but freedom can be attained solely through experience, and therefore the historical process must endure after the coming of Christ. The baptised Christian must first spiritually assume Christ into himself; history makes this possible to him.

The meaning and the aim of the cosmological process and the historical process lie in this, that the world and mankind strive towards union with God; this union with God will secure for the finite, for nature, and for mankind, a share in divine immortality.

Thus does theosophy cosmologically and historically justify a belief in the kingdom of God. This kingdom is not to be identified with any of the existing churches, nor is it the sum and union of the separated churches; the union of the churches is merely the condition of its realisation in so far as it can be realised on earth.

Belief in the realm of God unites within itself three beliefs (thus is the doctrine expressed in the third of his *Addresses* commemorative of Dostoevskii): belief in God; belief in man; and belief in matter (nature). The severance of these three beliefs manifests itself in three one-sided intellectual trends. The quietists and pietists desire to content themselves with the mere contemplation of God; they despise the freedom of

man, and turn away from nature. The rationalists and idealists believe in man, but for them God shrinks to become an embryo man, whilst nature becomes the shadow of man. Since, however, this shadow makes itself strongly felt, the naturalists (realists and materialists) have come into existence; these worship the dead mechanism of nature, whilst denying all that is divine and spiritual.

Just as the three severed churches must be united, so must these three trends or "faiths" be theoretically synthetised and practically conciliated. The belief in God gives rise to belief in the God-man and in God-matter (the mother of God). True theism, true humanism, and true naturalism, in their organic unity, are the precondition for the realisation and diffusion of the kingdom of God on earth.

§ 143.

THE brief account that has been given of Solov'ev's theosophical and mythological speculations may suffice to furnish a general idea of his thought; I have done no more than select what is most important, and will not attempt an examination of the individual contentions, as regards their derivation from the works of this or that neoplatonist, from Plato, Paracelsus, Schelling, etc.

Essentially, Solov'ev's theosophical speculations are merely the projection of his ethics and politics into the universe, and Feuerbach would have claimed that Solov'ev's mythology was but additional confirmation of his theory.

In his *Critique of Abstract Principles* (1877-1880), Solov'ev already opens an attack upon the subjectivism of the new philosophy, and he combats it as scepticism. He finds even Kant unduly sceptical, for he considers that not rationalism alone (the dogmatic and critical rationalism of Kant and the absolute rationalism of Hegel), but likewise empiricism (sensualism, empiricism, positivism), leads to subjectivism, and therefore to scepticism. For experience and ratiocination lead only to relative knowledge; experience merely teaches what is, while reason tells us no more than what must be in given circumstances, so that in both cases we attain only to relativism. In contradistinction to this, Solov'ev demands absolute principles alike for practice and theory, demands absolute, absolutely certain, knowledge. "Nothing can furnish

true satisfaction but the one truth which can be neither of to-day nor of to-morrow because it is eternal." With Descartes, Solov'ev considers that scepticism can serve only as a methodological instrument, through the use of which the absoluteness of true knowledge is all the more brilliantly displayed. Solov'ev does not condemn the temporary and honest unbelief of a Thomas.

It was Solov'ev's aim to complete his ethic and his philosophy of religion by a systematic exposition of "theoretical philosophy," but he published no more than a few essays contributory to this work (1897-1899). It is interesting to read in one of these that Solov'ev does not admit the force of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. The "sum" is unwarranted. Of him who contends, I think (i.e., I have consciousness), therefore I am, we may ask, Whose consciousness have you? The answer might run, No one knows, for it might be the consciousness of Peter or of Paul; it might be a pathological consciousness; and so on.

Solov'ev believes, on the other hand, that in his *History of Ethics* he has provided an absolutely secure foundation for knowledge and activity, that he has furnished the basis for normal society, free unity in spiritual love. Free theosophy ensures truth, absolute truth; this truth is characterised by absolute reality and absolute rationality.

In contradistinction to the sceptical relativism of the antecedent empirical and rationalistic philosophy, Solov'ev anchors his free philosophy to the all-in-one being. This absolute (this absolute absolute, we might say after the manner of Solov'ev) is given us directly by the mystical or religious apprehension. Through this immediate apprehension, experience and thought are verified, thought acquires its absolute rationality, experience acquires its absolute reality, the mystically conceived "truth" becomes natural truth. Absolute truth is "introduced" into the forms of logical thought and is realised in experience.

In this unification of mystical cognition with experience by means of logical, rational thought, Solov'ev believes he has furnished a harmonious synthesis of theology, rationalistic philosophy, and positive science.

A synthesis of theology, Kant, and Comte?

In his endeavour to evade scepticism, in the last resort Solov'ev can discover no other expedient than to make an

unconditional surrender to theology. Nevertheless, the critical consciousness cannot find even in theology true repose and certainty; scepticism is not transcended. In Solov'ev's thought, Kant again and again comes into his own.

Kant and Kant's influence are already discernible in the fact that Solov'ev's real starting-point is from ethics, that Solov'ev seeks in ethics the foundation of the absolute as good. Practical philosophy is made the basis of theoretical, quite after the manner of Kant and his successors and in especial of Schopenhauer. At the close of *The Critique of Abstract Principles* we read: "In God, truth is eternal, but in so far as God is not in us we do not live in the truth; not only is our knowledge fallacious, but our very being, our very reality is fallacious. Consequently for the true *organisation of knowledge* the *organisation of reality* is essential."

We recognise Kant in Solov'ev's mythology. Solov'ev's theosophical novel gives an ethical description of the cosmological process; the world-drama is the mythical objectivation of ethical human relationships; ethical problems are mythologically projected into the aeons.

And what is Solov'ev's theoretical philosophy but the Kantian apriorism, expressed in a different terminology and provided with a different, a theological, content? Solov'ev's "mystical perception" is, in fact, modelled upon the "regulative ideas" of Kant. Just as for Kant these ideas were associated with rational or conceptual thought and with sensuous experience, so for Solov'ev is mystical apprehension associated with thought and experience or sensation. Solov'ev even uses unhesitatingly the Kantian terminology, speaking of "the forms of thought," of "concepts," and so on.

Conceptual thought and sensations, says Solov'ev, give to us objects merely as these are conceived and perceived by us. But we ascribe existence to such objects; we assume their effect upon us as manifested in our sensations to be immediately true; we create, in thought, relationships between one object and other objects; and we are convinced that the object exists independently of our thought and sensation. Here, too, Solov'ev employs Kantian terminology when he says that the object persists by itself; we have to do with the Kantian thing-by-itself. Even though Solov'ev differs from Kant in the psychological explanation of the way wherein the thing-by-itself enters into relation with our understanding, never-

theless the explanation he gives is Kantian in character. For Solov'ev considers that the apprehension of objectively existing things is a combination of belief, imagination, and creation. The belief is the inward and immediate apprehension of the object. In the belief that the object exists objectively, independently of our sensuous perception and conceptual thought, we manifest ourselves as free cognising subjects, as existing beings, who inwardly apprehend another existing being. This inward apprehension is a species of union of the knower with the known; it is something distinct from sensation and from comprehension in thought. The immediate apprehension is belief, faith; it is absolute, mystical cognition.

Further, in this act of belief, imagination plays its part. In our understanding we construct the idea of the object, we imagine what the object is. Ultimately, the ideal image of the object becomes incorporated in sensations. Solov'ev thus inverts the formula of rationalism, and contends, *nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit prius in intellectu*.

As I have pointed out, this psychological analysis of the process of cognition reminds us of Kant. We have here what Kant terms the spontaneity of the active understanding, the self-birth of our reason; we have the synthesis of the various elements of cognition in connection with which for Kant, too, the force of imagination had so great a part to play; and, further, the Kantian transcendental apperception, the "I think," comes into its own in Solov'ev's system. The great distinction between Solov'ev's doctrine and Kant's, is that for Kant the thing-by-itself is no more than imaginatively cognised, whereas Solov'ev effects an inward union with the thing-by-itself.

The dependence of Solov'ev's thought upon that of Kant is sufficiently indicated by the title of the work we are considering. It is a critique of abstract principles. In other words, it is a critique of pure reason; but pure reason does not suffice Solov'ev, and he transforms it into the direct mystical apprehension of reality.

With Plato, Solov'ev is an ultra-realist. Plato looked upon being as pure soul before incorporation; Solov'ev transformed Plato's pre-existent contemplation into an existent contemplation, and considered that man contemplates the truly existing in this life.

What is this that really exists? Solov'ev answers, like

Plato, that that which really exists is in truth God. Above all else, mystical contemplation apprehends God; but in addition we directly contemplate individual things; apprehending them believably, imaginatively, and creatively.

§ 144.

SOLOV'EV believes himself able to reconcile experience and thought with theology. In all seriousness, he believes himself able to apprehend, not God only, but the triune God, the God of revelation.

Solov'ev turns away from Kant and Comte to revelation; the critical and sceptical philosopher becomes a scholastic and a mythagogue who with the aid of analogies and images desires to rationalise the content of revelation. For Solov'ev, too, philosophy becomes ancilla theologiae, free theosophy becomes scholasticism. "To justify the faith of our fathers by raising that faith to a new level of the rational consciousness; to show how this old faith, freed from the shackles of local separatism and national self-complacency, can be harmonised with eternal and universal truth—such, in general terms, is the aim of my work." Such is the program of Solov'ev's *History and Future of Theocracy*.

The faith of our fathers, where has this faith been precisely formulated, and who are these fathers? Where has the eternal and universal truth been formulated? Like many orthodox theologians, Solov'ev frequently insists that Christ is the head of the church and of Christianity; but this means that the New Testament, supplemented by the Old Testament, constitutes the decisive authority in matters of faith. Solov'ev stresses this consideration against Tihomirov above all, for Tihomirov had referred the cultured to the authority of the clergy. Solov'ev quotes against him Platon, the metropolitan of Moscow, for whom the authority of Holy Writ was the sole and ultimate appeal. It is not the clergy, continues Solov'ev, but the folk, which is to be regarded as the bearer and custodian of Christian verity. Thus we are told that Jesus Christ, Holy Writ, the folk, our fathers, and the church, all furnish us with eternal and universal truth. This wealth of sources and criteria of truth is really somewhat embarrassing!

Solov'ev clings to the idea of catholicity, but in the end the formal principle of catholicity leaves him in the lurch, as

it has left others before him. The principle of catholicity of St. Vincent of Lérins did not prevent Pius IX from proclaiming papal infallibility as the formal principle of the Catholic church.

Solov'ev was not clear in his own mind concerning the formal principle of the Catholic church in the sense of the catholicity he demanded, as we can discern from the conflicting nature of the criteria he adduces. In the end, however, he discerned divine truth in the syllabus of Pius IX and in the new dogma of that pope.

Characteristic was Solov'ev's attitude towards Döllinger and the Old Catholics.

Instead of examining the reasons put forward by these prominent theologians, and instead of enlightening himself as he should from their historical studies concerning the development of papal centralism and absolutism, he dismisses the whole movement with the remark that Old Catholicism is nothing more than professorial learning, the learning of the study, that the masses have remained unaffected by it, that at most Bismarck has favoured it as against the Catholic church. Solov'ev was greatly impressed by the fact that the entire Catholic world accepted the new dogma of infallibility, whereas Döllinger and his associates protested in the name of individual freedom against the authority of the church, thus rejecting the principle of the Catholic church in favour of the Protestant principle.

This criticism of Old Catholicism, written in the year 1883, is extremely uncritical. In the first place, it is not true that Bismarck favoured the Old Catholics, for Bismarck, like Solov'ev, considered that the masses were quite unaffected by the movement, and that for this reason it was devoid of significance for the Protestant statesman. "*Quieta non movere*" was Bismarck's leading principle in practical politics, and he did not lift a finger to set the masses in motion. It is not to Bismarck but to Solov'ev that we should look for an examination of the problem, for a consideration of the numerous and important points made against papal absolutism by such men as Döllinger, von Schulte, Maassen, Friedrich, Langen, and others. But in his studies of dogmatics and ecclesiastical history, Solov'ev did not get beyond an extremely uncritical dilettantism, and thus it was that in a question of such importance he could associate himself with Strossmayer, a man of scant competence in theological

matters. Yet even Strossmayer found the new dogma repugnant !

None the less, the scholastics, some in especial, did much for the development of modern philosophy, and the slavophiles were perfectly right in holding that scholasticism had inaugurated the reformation and the revolutionary movement. Scholasticism slew theology—and Solov'ev, like the scholastics, had a fondness for discovering reasons for what he already believed. Solov'ev's scholasticism was an attack upon Russian theology, upon clericalism, and helped the Russian movement towards liberty. Solov'ev praised the true monk for his willingness to undertake all kinds of distasteful and dirty work in addition to the service of God ; such work was the fulfilment of the vow of obedience. In the field of literature, Solov'ev accepted service of this kind, and made a clearance of all the garbage of such pseudo-orthodox pseudo-patriots as Tihomirov & Co.

Solov'ev, however, was not solely concerned with this campaign against the Tihomirovs ; he had an internal struggle of his own, the struggle with himself, the struggle between faith and unfaith. " Kant " and " Plato " are the two war-cries wherein the tragic problem of Solov'ev is comprised. The man's whole life was a vain attempt to bring these two poles together, to reconcile their opposition. Kant represents deliberate action in accordance with the light of reason, represents individual activity and spontaneity ; Plato represents deliberate receptivity, passive contemplation of the objective higher world. Kant represents the self-sufficiency and independence of the individual critical understanding ; Plato represents dependence upon the absolute, upon the revelation of the absolute, upon dogma, upon the church. Solov'ev's life problem, life drama, life tragedy, was found in the epistemological impossibility of effecting an organic combination between fire and water, between two mutually destructive elements. It was impossible for Solov'ev to extinguish the Kantian flame with slavophil and orthodox holy water. The flame allured him ; in the fireman, the artist awakened ; the fireman forgot his duties, and in rapt contemplation, his eyes glistening in the radiance, he looked on admiringly at the splendour of the conflagration.

I am aware that this view of Solov'ev, this criticism, will please neither his friends nor his foes. I need not trouble myself about the foes, and in especial may ignore the theologians,

but I must insist that his friends and adherents discern in the works of their teacher and master a unity which is in truth non-existent. It cannot reasonably be contended that Solov'ev's greatness and originality lay in an alleged organic synthesis of opposites. Apart from the fact that a synthesis of such opposites cannot possibly be organic, it is in the very failure of the attempt that, in my view, is to be discovered Solov'ev's originality and significance, above all for Russia. Unwillingly did he become a heretic to his own teaching.

A man cannot for four years be a materialist, a positivist, and an atheist, without his thought being thereby affected throughout life. Shortly before his death he was engaged in the simultaneous translation of Kant's *Prolegomena* and of Plato; and he arranged for the translation, not only of Plato, but likewise of Lange's *History of Materialism* and of Jodl's *History of Ethics*—Jodl, the Feuerbachian!

Solov'ev's tendency towards individualism and subjectivism was reinforced by the study of Kant and of German idealism. His primitive materialism and positivism gave expression to a naïve objectivism or realism, and this phase was overcome by Solov'ev with the aid of Kant and idealism. At the same time, however, the study of Schopenhauer, Schelling, and even Hegel, made his mind receptive to slavophil mysticism—the ecclesiastical and religious conditions prevailing in his native land having, of course, a contributory influence. Despite Kant, and with Kant, Solov'ev moved on towards Spinoza, Jacob Boehme, and Baader. He learned from Baader how Kant and Descartes could be epistemologically transcended, or at least made susceptible of an orthodox interpretation. Kant's apriori was transformed into revelation; Kant's thing-by-itself and ens realissimum became the triune God as the highest and only rational being; transcendental idealism took on a new aspect as religious and mystical faith.

Impelled by necessity, Solov'ev moved on to Anselm and his *credo ut intelligam*; while, from the practical side, at least, Solov'ev had to halt when he came to Augustine. It was necessary that the freedom of man should be reconciled with the influence of the absolute on man, but it cannot be said that Solov'ev was able to give a precise solution of this problem. Basing himself upon Augustine, he was a determinist; but he endeavoured to content himself with psychologically conceivable freedom of choice as an extant datum. Metaphysically, he

followed Augustine in deducing the doctrine of grace. God, the absolute, exercises an influence upon the world and upon men; the logical consequences of absolute predestination cannot be evaded. Empirically, however, it suffices that we are aware of our freedom of choice, and that we are conscious of the fundamental distinction between the concepts of good and of evil. The Kantian ethic must be based upon the metaphysic of Anselm, Augustine, Origen, and Plato.

Baader led him astray into the attempt to transcend Kant entirely, and to establish even the theory of cognition upon a religious foundation; but Kant continually reasserted his rights, and Solov'ev found it necessary to concede that ethics could not be wholly grounded on religion. Again and again did he return to Kant.

More than once Solov'ev, in truth, forgot his past when he animadverted upon Tihomirov and the latter's rejection of "independent philosophising" in matters of religion.

Solov'ev was, as it were, a modern Origen, nor was it a chance matter that Origen should have exercised so strong an attraction upon him. We have in Solov'ev the same attempt as in Origen to reconcile gnosis with orthodoxy; upon a Platonist basis there is effected an association between mysticism and revelation, between the human and the divine. It gratified Solov'ev to find that Origen laid so much stress upon the idea of the God-man, whilst as a systematist Solov'ev was delighted with the first attempt at a systematisation of Christian doctrine.

I do not purpose to undertake a detailed description of Solov'ev's theory of cognition. Doubtless the attentive reader will already have perceived that Solov'ev gives an unjustifiable extension to the concept of belief, unhesitatingly subsuming religious faith in revelation under belief, which latter is in reality a judgment of truth. In fact, the question is begged.

For the further characterisation of Solov'ev's theory of cognition, I shall allude to two only of his doctrines

As we have seen, from Plato and the neoplatonists Solov'ev likewise took the doctrine of ideas, not in the Kantian form, but in that which we owe to Plato. He adopted the view that ideas were not simply ideal concepts, but objectively existing ideal beings. It need hardly be said that there resulted for Solov'ev all the epistemological difficulties which resulted long ago for Plato.

Of great importance finally for Solov'ev was his doctrine that theory depends upon practice. Here, too, Solov'ev did not think after the manner of Kant and his successors (Schopenhauer, for instance), but understood by the realisation of the divine in human nature that which he termed "free theurgy." Our whole empirical reality must be "organised," must be made inwardly "subject" to our mind, just as our mind must itself be made "subject" to the divine. "Free theurgy is the realisation of the divine principle through mankind, its realisation in the whole of empirical and natural reality; it is the realisation through mankind of the divine energies in the real being of nature" We perceive that the ethical and religious imitatio Christi has become the imitatio Dei in the sense of a metaphysical creation, for Solov'ev does not speak merely of the permeation of the human by the divine, but of the like permeation of nature in general. It is manifest, however, that Solov'ev cannot apply the idea of free theurgy consistently and in all seriousness, and he is therefore content to reduce theurgy to the spheres of artistic creation and aesthetics. Manifestly we have here an attempt to outbid the thought of Schelling, and consequently we find ourselves once more in the realm of mythology and mysticism.¹

§ 145.

TO enable us to appraise Solov'ev's mysticism, it is necessary to undertake an epistemological examination of the general nature of mysticism. This is essential to the understanding of Russian philosophy, and I should perhaps have discussed the question at an earlier stage, before giving an account of the slavophiles.

The attention of the mystic is exclusively concentrated upon a single object of cognition, and especially upon God, philosophy becoming theosophy. Amid the multiplicity of things, the mystic endeavours to grasp unity, and, more directly, to grasp the one; even the dualism of the ego and the non-ego is to be transcended. The mystic is a radical monist, at once monotheist and pantheist.

In the religious domain the mystic aspires towards union

¹ Solov'ev's free theurgy may be compared with the doctrine of Smetana, the Schellingian, who believed that in days to come religion would be replaced by a loving art which would purify and transform nature.

with God, and wishes to free the soul from the body and its earthly shackles. He longs for repose, repose of the soul, and finds it in mysticism.

Mystical exclusiveness readily becomes pathological, the attention being hypnotised by a single object ; contemplation rises into ecstasy, with its peculiar feelings of blissfulness.

The mystic despises the empirical, the conceptual cognition, which advances step by step, for he is impatient, and desires at one stride to attain to the highest cognition ; the mystic contemplates God and objects. In this aspiration towards complete knowledge, the mystic gladly adopts the results of cognition ; he cherishes traditionalism ; revelation is welcome to him as a complete doctrine. The mystic rejects logic and methodology ; he seeks the desert, the hermitage, and the cloister, with their artificial solitude, for there he can embrace mysticism as a permanent condition. The mystics have cultivated their own peculiar and quasi-pathological methods for the attainment of the mystical state in its completeness.

Mysticism makes its appearance in the earlier stages of civilisation. Speaking generally, we may say that as the centuries pass mysticism becomes weaker and rarer. Solov'ev finds it necessary to fall back upon the neoplatonists and upon Plato, whilst he gives his approval to the religious imbeciles (*jurodivyi*) of his own land. Obviously, certain times and certain places will display a greater inclination to mysticism than will others.

Mysticism is an outcome of a mythical outlook on the universe, and therefore thrives best in the theological and religious domain. The new critical and empirical philosophy and science exercise a debilitating influence upon myth and mysticism.

Criticism ; scientific specialised training with its complete subjection of miracle to law and consequent rejection of miracle ; scientific analysis of all so-called mysterious phenomena (hypnotism, spiritualism, etc.) ; technological efficiency, which replaces and outbids miracle ; the universal need to labour ; the doing away with idle aristocracy ; the general restlessness and haste of economically developed and civilised life ; the characteristics of urban existence ; finally, the great diffusion and educative influence of literature and art, supplementing and mitigating intellectualism, and thus rendering mysticism superfluous—such are the chief factors by which we can explain the decline of mysticism and the decay of myth.

To-day, therefore, the religious problem is dominated by the question whether religion, the religious mentality, be in fact necessarily mystical, and whether they may not exist in default of mysticism, though the theologians and many philosophers have ever insisted upon the need for the mystical factor. For our purposes it suffices to moot the question, and in our study of the various philosophies of religion to determine in each case the content of mysticism, its degree and its quality.

It is noteworthy that many of the opponents of mysticism condemn as mystical the mere dwelling in contemplation upon internal psychical processes and experiences (mental self-analysis). Many materialists, naturalists, realists, and positivists, detest such feelings and moods, detest all psychical processes of the kind. Yet many of these opponents of mysticism (the naturalists, for instance) are themselves mystics.

Attention must be drawn to another point. Mysticism is not, as mystics contend, a source of profounder and loftier insight. Mystics are wholly subordinated to the knowledge of their time and environment; the Christian mystic differs from the Buddhist mystic, and so on. As psychologists, the mystics are noteworthy only in so far as they comprehend the intimate relationships of men one to another and to the outer world. To this extent mystics may render service to ethics and religion.

There exist various kinds of mysticism, for the mystical mood varies in accordance with the object of mystical contemplation and with the nature of the mystical subject. It varies according as the object is God; God as Christ (man, the love of Jesus, the love of Mary, and so on); pantheistic God (conceived now materialistically, now again spiritualistically); theistic God; or, again, man, animals, and other objects (these, in association with the Godhead, constituting the so-called devotionalia). It varies also as the subject varies in conformity with variations in the degree and quality of culture and philosophy; in accordance with differences of time and place; and in accordance with peculiarities of individual or of national character. It varies according as the mystical thinker inclines to be intellectual or sentimental; to be clear or obscure in his scientific outlook; to be abstract or concrete in his mode of thought; to be dilettantist, poetic (thinking in pictures); according as he is inclined to theorise (gnostic or theosophic); or, finally, according as he is characterised by an

ethical trend (dwelling upon the sentiment of love or upon the need for a change of will).

As regards Solov'ev, it may be asked whether his mysticism was predominantly Russian, Orthodox (Byzantine), Catholic, or Protestant. This much is certain, that Solov'ev had immersed himself in the thought of various eastern and western mystics, ancient and modern, thus training himself mystically. His experience had included a knowledge of the monastic and folk mysticism widely diffused in Russia. Competent persons allude to meditation, contemplation, ecstatic union with God, absorption in the mysteries of ceremonial (mystagogy), as especially characteristic of the Orthodox church, and tell us that this applies above all to Russian mystics. Noteworthy in this connection are the hesychasts (quietists) of Athos. The west inclines to stress the ethical aspect, so that western mysticism operates above all upon the will, which is sometimes weakened, but sometimes strengthened (Loyola). Among Roman Catholics, mysticism was less common than in the oriental churches; and it was still less common in the Lutheran and Protestant churches (though there were Lutheran quietists). The eighteenth-century enlightenment was hostile to mysticism. With romanticism was associated a partial approval of mysticism, but on the whole we may say that the modern age is unfavourable to mysticism.

Solov'ev's mysticism, therefore, appears in the following light.

In the first place, we must point out that Solov'ev desired to escape from subjectivism and scepticism by way of mystical or religious cognition. It is questionable whether mystical contemplation, as he describes it, does really do away with subjectivism to the extent that Solov'ev contends. Does a presumably direct contemplation, uniting subject with object, suffice? Are not belief, imagination, and the creative act of imagination, likewise subjective? Beyond question, against Solov'ev's mystical cognition we may adduce the same arguments that he himself adduced against Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*; we may talk of errors, illusions, pathological states, as invalidating his theory no less than that of Descartes.

Moreover, in what respect is Solov'ev's mystical cognition religious? All that Solov'ev describes is the cognition of objects; every external object is similarly apprehended by the subject in a "mystical or religious" manner. This universal

application of the term seems forced, though I by no means wish to deny that Solov'ev's psychological study of the cognition of objects was perspicacious.

In view of these considerations, it might be contended that Solov'ev's mysticism is not really mysticism at all; on the other hand, it might be contended that Solov'ev's mysticism is not restricted to the domain of theosophy, but extends to all domains of thought, religious belief being no more than a special case of belief.

On the other hand, Solov'ev restricts mystical contemplation to God and to the higher suprasensible world, herein conforming to the traditional views concerning mysticism, and understanding by that term the direct intercourse between the cognising subject and the Godhead. He does not make it clear how far mysticism is philosophic and how far it is religious, for by the term "direct intercourse" we may understand objective cognition, but we may also understand the emotional aspect and outcome of such cognition, and above all the love of God.

In the present sketch, no attempt can be made to come to a definite decision regarding these and similar obscurities. There would first be necessary a detailed comparison of Solov'ev with Plato, Plotinus, Philo, and Origen; with Spinoza, Jacob Boehme, and Swedenborg; with Schelling, Baader, Schopenhauer, and the Indian mystics. Moreover, we should have to describe Solov'ev's own mystical mood in actual life; we should have to quote textually a number of passages from his writings; we should have to appeal to the biographies of Solov'ev and to the records of his personal intimates. Here I can do no more than give a brief account of Solov'ev's mysticism, as I have given a brief account of his philosophy, this account being based upon a study of his writings; but I cannot feel sure that what I say about his mysticism will evoke a mystical mood or mystical sympathy in the reader.

As previously stated, Solov'ev studied the works of eastern and western mystics, immersing himself in their mentality. This *per se* suffices to show that in mysticism, too, he was endeavouring to effect a synthesis. Inasmuch as setting out from Kant, he considered that morality was the most important element in religion, it was natural that he should prefer western mysticism, and above all Catholic mysticism, to oriental mysticism. Since he never permanently adopted the contemplative

life, but rather, as a born fighter, entered the arena on behalf of his ideals, we must be careful to avoid exaggerating his mysticism. We have learned that he regarded mere religious contemplation as inadequate. For him, religion was leadership, the active leadership of men and mankind by the church. For him, the Russian cloister and the Russian monk were historic representatives of traditional energy, in conjunction with the great landowners and the village community; but he did not consider monasticism powerful enough to conquer the modern world. He demanded the realisation of free democracy by an active "Christian policy."

From time to time, Solov'ev suffered from hallucinations, fancying he had seen Satan in bodily form, and having other spectral visitants. Whilst it is not improbable that his unhygienic and ascetic life was a partial factor in inducing his mysticism, we must also recognise that his mode of life was the outcome of his mysticism. Solov'ev held spiritualistic séances amid romantic forest solitudes; when in Egypt he visited a Bedouin tribe which was supposed to have preserved secret traditions of Solomon. He sought solitude in the city, but also sought society there. There was something too restless, too nomadic, about his temperament for him to be wholly and enduringly the mystic.

He accepted theology, Christian mythology, as revelation. His philosophy, therefore, necessarily became scholastic, despite his mysticism, and despite his repudiation of scholasticism. Philosophy, said Solov'ev, must illumine the religious life, and should not attempt to demonstrate it. But he was not always guided by his own rule, and the scholastic frequently replaced the mystic!

Mysticism obscured Solov'ev's scientific insight, debilitated his critical faculties (he wrote, for example, an introduction to a work by Hellenbach), and misled him in practical matters.

Solov'ev was interested, not merely in hypnotism, but likewise in spiritualism, in the unexplained phenomena of so-called telepathy, and in the various other matters comprised under the general name of occultism, endeavouring in these fields to discover proofs for the existence of a higher world of mystery and of its influence upon human life. The impracticable theosophy of his co-national Madame Blavatsky was more than condoned by Solov'ev.

The mystics seek, and everywhere discern, the mysterious.

They associate things and ideas which have no reasonable connection, for they discover secret similarities and identities. In this matter, the mystic resembles the scholastic, with his analogies, interpretations, indexes of truth, and so on. In the name "Roma," Solov'ev discovers the word amor, for it would appear that the Romans must have read from right to left after the Semitic fashion !

The attempt to find evidences for the influence upon this world of a higher invisible world, led him to regard as miracle the failure of the attempt on the tsar's life at Borki.

We have an index here, not merely of superstition, but of the conservative trend characteristic of mysticism. Mysticism is per se religious aristocracy, and aristocracy in general. The mystic evades the petty details of work, in scientific matters no less than in economic. He delights in the giddy theosophical constructions of a fantastic cosmogony ; he has no taste either for stable and empirical conceptual thought or for technical economic labour. Contempt for this world is aristocratic, a manifestation of a conservative and reactionary aristocratic trend.

Solov'ev organised his free theocracy in a thoroughly aristocratic manner. Above all, the gift of prophecy was denied to the masses and to the democracy.

In political matters, too, Solov'ev was conservative. This is why his attention was riveted by the miracle of Borki, whereas he had no eye for thousands of similar miracles. This is why Emperor William II (dissent as he might from the latter's philosophy of history) was for him the new Siegfried. This is why he admired Tsar Nicholas I, for to the tsar there had been granted a mysterious knowledge of higher Christian truth when in the name of Christianity he forbade Samarin to effect the forcible Russification of the Baltic provinces. In 1896, again, Solov'ev participated in the official jubilee, and shared in the joys, of his opponent Pobëdonoscev.

The aristocratic trend of mysticism was likewise displayed in his preference for Catholicism, though the reasons for this preference were not clear to his own mind. Although he looked upon the church as the catholicity of the human race, it was the monarchical element in the papacy which allured him. Monotheism found its living symbol and likeness in monopapism, if I may coin the term.

It is true, however, that Solov'ev's aristocratic leanings

depend upon his ecclesiastical ideas as well as upon his mysticism. He ascribes a decisive rôle to the hierarchy, thus completely abandoning Homjakov's conception of the church. Leont'ev, thoroughly approved his estimate of the hierarchy.

I need hardly say that I must not be interpreted as suggesting that every mystic is a mere conservative and reactionary. Mysticism was frequently adverse to scholasticism and to the church's faith in the letter. Even Solov'ev, despite his mysticism and by his mysticism, was driven into the liberal camp, just as the masonic mystics as well as the Voltairians were serviceable to the enlightenment. As circumstances may demand, we must examine mysticism either in respect of its content or of its social influence

§ 146.

ACCORDING to Solov'ev, Europe, having been secularised by the reformation, had since then been passing into a state of religious and moral decay. The ideal of Christianity had disappeared. Revolutionary philosophy had made praiseworthy efforts to replace the unity of the church by the unity of the human race, but with scant success. The universality of militarism converted entire nations into hostile armies, and stimulated a national hatred which had been unknown in the middle ages. The class struggle threatened to transform everything into blood and fire. As the increasing frequency of mental disorder, suicide, and crime, showed, individual moral strength had been weakened. In contrast with these symptoms of degradation, the most we could point to as indications of a certain degree of moral progress was that the criminal law had become less harsh and that torture had been abolished. Nothing but the union of the churches offered the possibility of realising the kingdom of God on earth.

In Solov'ev's opinion, secularised Russia, no less than secularised Europe, though in a different form, presented an image of decay.

Partial, one-sided, and purely political reform was incapable of producing the desired and indispensable regeneration. The program of the moral and religious rebirth of the individual and of the Russian people, the program of the positive all-in-one, as Solov'ev termed his theocratic idea, discountenanced the political aspirations of his contemporaries as one-sided and inadequate, and discountenanced above all the revolution.

In his conception of revolution and in his condemnation of the revolutionary movement, Solov'ev agreed with Dostoevskii, taking from that author his analysis and his estimate of the revolution, of nihilism, and of atheism. Just like Dostoevskii, Solov'ev had at first enthusiastically accepted nihilism. In his school days he had been an "iconoclast," and on one occasion had thrown out of the window the icons before which he had been accustomed to pray.

The essence of the moral decay of Europe and Russia, the essence of "secularisation," is discerned by Solov'ev as by Dostoevskii in atheism, in the turning away from God, in godlessness, which manifests itself as modern subjectivism and individualism, as the doctrine of the superman.

It was from Dostoevskii that Solov'ev took his philosophy of atheism, which, to put the matter shortly, was that atheism, as subjectivism and individualism, leads to murder or to suicide.

Solov'ev adduced, in addition the spread of criminality, the increasing frequency of suicide and mental disorder, as symptoms and consequences of moral decadence. He was especially interested in the study of suicide, his attention having been directed to the matter by Schopenhauer and Hartmann. He began his *Ethics* by enquiring what was the essential nature of suicide. He considered that suicide afforded proof that there are men, serious-minded men, who take their lives deliberately, fully responsible for what they are doing, actuated by disillusionment or despair, and thus give expression to their conviction that life is void of meaning. These practical pessimists impress Solov'ev's imagination more than do the theoretical pessimists, more than those who continue to cling to life despite all their reasoning concerning its futility; it is the existence of the former which induces him to give the leading place in his philosophy to ethics as the doctrine of the meaning of life. God is, and God furnishes, the meaning of life. Theism gives meaning and value to life, whereas atheism deprives life of meaning and value; atheism is death, and the atheist becomes a murderer or a suicide.

In his analysis of Dostoevskii, Solov'ev accepts this formula and develops it as follows.

A man who bases his right to change the world upon his wickedness and unreason is essentially a murderer; he will employ force against others, and will himself ultimately perish through force. He considers himself strong, but is in the

power of others. He is proud of his freedom, but is the slave of chance and of outward happenings.

The man must undergo conversion if he is to be saved from this logical sequence of his atheism, and the first step upon the way to salvation is that he should recognise his weakness and lack of freedom. But Solov'ev warns us that while one who takes no more than this first step will cease to be a potential murderer, he will nevertheless, if he goes no further, remain a potential suicide.

Suicide, the application of destructive force to oneself, is a loftier and freer deed than murder. The judge and the condemned are one and the same; but the judgment is false, for the decision to commit suicide involves a contradiction (this is an echo of Schopenhauer). The man recognises his weakness and lack of freedom, and yet the act of suicide manifests the possession of a certain degree of strength and freedom. Why, then, did he not turn this strength and freedom to account on behalf of life?

The suicide rightly recognises in himself the existence of human incapacity, but he draws a false conclusion when he makes this incapacity a universal law, for now he does not merely feel the evil but believes in evil. "Everyone who recognises the universality of human evil, but fails to believe in superhuman goodness, is driven to suicide." Now, superhuman goodness is God.

Thus suicide is the necessary consequence of atheism. Belief in God restores to men belief in man. But the man who is left entirely to himself, and who attempts to dispense with God, becomes a murderer or a suicide. The last deed of the godless man is murder or suicide. Unmeaning concentration upon oneself, disastrous isolation, results in murder or suicide. He only who unites himself in Christ with God and in the church with the world will avoid transferring his own wickedness into nature; all that he will take from nature will be death.

Dostoevskii bases the thesis in a somewhat different manner, and we shall have to discuss the problem in fuller detail when we come to consider the ideas of that writer. Here it suffices to say that Solov'ev, like Dostoevskii, identifies the revolution with murder, but that Solov'ev fails to discuss the matter adequately. He indicates that there is a connection between the problem of suicide and murder, and the general question

of objectivism and subjectivism; but he fails to perceive the real significance of the matter as it was formulated before his day by Bëlsinskii and Bakunin.

§ 147.

SOLOV'EV was a poet, and art plays a leading part in his system. When he wishes to give expression to his most intimate thoughts and feelings, he takes refuge in rhapsody. His last work on the philosophy of history was an apocalyptic vision. Speaking generally, his philosophy of religion is a product of the mythological imagination.

In the field of aesthetics, too, as a mystic Solov'ev followed Plato and Plotinus. Among recent writers, he was influenced by Schopenhauer and Hegel.

In harmony with his metaphysics and his free theosophy, beauty is defined as the perfect freedom of the individual parts in the completed unity of the whole; the uniting element, unity, uniformity, is the yearning of the philosopher, who desires to escape from his own internal disunion.

The beautiful is essentially identical with the good and the true. The artist's aim is the same as that of the philosopher and statesman. All three desire to grasp the meaning of existence. The artist embodies his ideas in pictures; the philosopher in ideas; the statesman in actions. Bëlsinskii expressed the same thought, but Solov'ev interprets the notion in the sense of his mystical theosophy, for to him an idea is what it was to Plato and Plotinus.

He frequently indicates his view that artistic genius and enthusiasm constitute a condition *sui generis*, rendering the enthusiast (Solov'ev, like Plato, conceives artistic inspiration as a kind of divine possession) capable of grasping ideas; artistic inspiration verges on the gift of prophecy and is essentially akin thereto.

He considers that the force of imagination is an element of primary importance in artistic creation. For him, imagination is an intimation of the higher world which, in virtue of this function of imagination, is able to come into touch with our phenomenal world. That which Schopenhauer discerns in music, Solov'ev discerns in poesy, and especially in lyric verse, for here we have a direct grasp of ideas, of the higher world. Goethe, Shakespeare, and Hoffmann, are the chiefs among

poets ; in this realm of art they are the arch-controllers of the force of "fantastic imagination." (Solov'ev translated Hoffmann's *The Golden Pot* into Russian.)

Solov'ev considers art higher than philosophy. Artistic creation, as a form of activity, is more akin than philosophy to moral action ; it is an image of the divine work of creation. Solov'ev's views concerning the mission of free theurgy have already been discussed.

In his *Three Addresses* in commemoration of Dostoevskii (1881-1883), Solov'ev expresses the hope that poesy, the poesy of the future, will reunite itself with religion, reconstituting the union that existed in the primitive days of our race, when poets were prophets and priests. He discerns in Dostoevskii as contrasted with the artists of materialist realism, the precursor of the art of the future, which will work in free association with religion.

By his antipathy for materialism, Solov'ev had his attention directed to the definition of ugliness. The ugly contrasts with unity and harmony ; it is found in chaos, and in the opposition of chaos to the higher world and to ideas.

Although he thus clings to metaphysical aesthetics, from time to time Solov'ev gives expression to more realist notions on the subject, endeavouring, for example, to furnish a systematic exposition of the gradations of beauty in nature. His classification of natural beauties is based upon the physical classifications of the external world. First comes the quiescent world of light—sun, moon, stars, atmosphere (the rainbow), the sea in a calm, matter (the noble metals, and above all the diamond). Next comes nature in motion. Solov'ev then gives an analysis of beauty in organic life, and tells us that the worm is here the archetype of ugliness ; living beings are beautiful in proportion as their organisation contrasts with that of the worm. In this disquisition Solov'ev avails himself of modern zoological theories, borrowing in especial from the ideas of Darwin.

Solov'ev wrote a few studies dealing with poets he admired. He distinguished three categories among Russian poets, according to the degree to which their art was self-conscious. Puškin's relationship to his creative work was directly organic, not reflective. By reference to the poems wherein Puškin wrote concerning poetry and the poet, Solov'ev endeavoured to show that Puškin's views concerning art and the artist's

mission were still purely naive and uncritical. Solov'ev took a low estimate of Puškin as a thinker, and said that Puškin's Byronism was superficial. In these judgments we may perhaps trace the influence of Pisarev or Tolstoi. Unquestionably Solov'ev failed to understand the significance of Puškin's *Onëgin*, and failed to understand the general significance of Puškin's creative work, for he looked upon Puškin too one-sidedly as a representative of pure art. In Solov'ev's article *The Fate of Puškin*, the poet's death was rightly represented as self-ordained destiny; but the analysis of Puškin's relationship with Madame Kern is incomplete and biased, whilst the poet's fondness for epigram is taken amiss, and Uvarov is commended in comparison. This study by Solov'ev has been deservedly censured.¹

Lermontov and Barjatynskii are poets of reflection. That which in Puškin was the expression of a passing mood, was in the two other poets the outcome of definitive conviction. For them, sceptical and pessimistic reflection became a constitutive element of creation; there was a rift within their philosophy, and this disintegration impaired their artistic activities. Subjective dissatisfaction, says Solov'ev (speaking here, too, in the sense of his doctrine of methodological scepticism), has notable significance as providing the first impulse towards self-consciousness; thus negation is essential, but what is abnormal and futile is to rest in negation, to find satisfaction in personal dissatisfaction. Solov'ev considers that Lermontov shows strong leanings towards Nietzscheanism; towards the psychopathic idea of the superman, which ascribes superhuman importance "to the ego, or to the ego and company." This is the complete victory of egoism and of contempt for mankind. No doubt the principle of individuality is the precondition of the most intensive awareness of the content of life, but the principle is not itself that content, for the strong ego can be void of content. Lermontov was too much the man of genius to remain void. He devoted himself to love; but really, says Solov'ev, in the end he sang only the praise of loving, not the beloved, not love itself. He considers that Lermontov displayed a positively demoniacal wickedness and demoniacal

¹ Solov'ev had good reason for his critical view of Puškin's relationship with his fellows; but it was inconsistent of Solov'ev to speak of Uvarov as the most highly cultivated and talented of Russian ministers for education, as a man whose activities were peculiarly fruitful.

sensuality ("impurity"); he recognises the religious spirit of the poet, and ascribes to him the mystical faculty of so-called second sight, for Lermontov is supposed to have foreseen the circumstances of his death. For Solov'ev, this alleged talent of Lermontov seems a confirmation of his own mysticism.

The third category comprises the poets of harmonious thought, and to this class belong Tjutčev and Aleksēi Tolstoi. Lermontov's disintegration has been overcome; negation has given place to positivism. In Tolstoi, moreover, there has been superadded the factor of the will, of the love of struggle, impelling towards activity. Solov'ev recalls the satire directed against the St. Petersburg officialdom, published in Černyševskii's periodical during the fifties and sixties, and reissued in book form in 1883. The work was professedly written by a certain Kozma Petrovič Prutkov, but was really composed by A. Tolstoi and A. Žemčužnikov. Solov'ev had an affection for Prutkov, whom he imitated; whilst he wrote a brief but sympathetic article concerning A. Žemčužnikov.

It is interesting to note that Solov'ev's literary and aesthetic studies were exclusively concerned with the lyric poets. The only novelists to whom he referred were Dostoevskii and L. Tolstoi, but with them he dealt, not from the aesthetic outlook but from that of the philosophy of religion. The consequence was that he treated of the development of nihilism no more than casually and in brief annotations. He was as little interested in Turgenev's Bazarov as in Oněgin, and the only novel to which he gave detailed attention was Lermontov's *A Hero of our own Time*. To Černyševskii's *What is to be Done* he made no more than a passing allusion, as an attempt to outbid *Fathers and Children*, whilst artistic appreciation was expressed for Gončarov's Oblomov as a universal Russian type. He frequently mentioned Tolstoi; that author's literary judgments were quoted on occasions; and Tolstoi's psychological analysis met with Solov'ev's approval. But on the whole, Solov'ev's interest in Tolstoi concerned only the latter's philosophy of religion, and it was Solov'ev's dissent from that philosophy which ultimately led him into conflict with Tolstoi.

Dostoevskii was not merely congenial to Solov'ev, but was elevated to the rank of a prophet. Proof of the prophetic function was found in the fact (for Solov'ev) that in *Crime and Punishment* the murder committed by a Moscow student was foreseen, whilst in *The Devils* the Nečaev trial was fore-

shadowed. Dostoevskii did not merely look around but looked ahead ; he possessed a philosophic understanding of the movement of Russian society ; he deduced from this movement its inevitable consequences, and passed the right judgment upon them. As a revolutionary, Dostoevskii grasped while in Siberia, and recounted in *The House of the Dead*, that he had erred, and how he had erred ; he came to understand that Russia could be saved in no other way than by a moral rebirth. Solov'ev discovered in Dostoevskii his own theocratic ideal. Dostoevskii's speech at the Puškin festival, with its reconciliation of slavophiles and westernisers, had really formulated the program of the reconciliation of east and west in the church universal.

Solov'ev was on terms of personal friendship with Dostoevskii. In 1878 the two were together on a visit at the monastery of Optina Pustyn. It is remarkable that Solov'ev gave no account of Dostoevskii's attitude towards Catholicism,¹ but Solov'ev had no understanding of Dostoevskii's real nature.

Like Homjakov, Solov'ev occasionally expounded his ideas upon the philosophy of religion in metrical form. His poems convey an impression of truth, and some of them are excellent. Apart from these verses on the philosophy of religion and others of a more directly religious nature, distinguished by their sincerity are the biographical sketches wherein the poet endeavoured to give a psychological description (affective in its colour for the most part) of his feelings at the time of writing. In Solov'ev's philosophy, above all in his theosophy but also in his ecclesiastical history, we trace the poet. His translation of Plato was to some extent the outcome of an artistic impulse. It was the same impulse, doubtless, which led him to translate part of Dante's *Vita Nuova* and the before-mentioned work by Hoffmann.

Solov'ev carried on a vigorous campaign against the decadents and the symbolists. This is psychologically noteworthy, seeing that he himself was a great symbolist, and seeing that the general impression he produces on our minds is that he was a decadent struggling towards regeneration. The pathological aspects of his mysticism and asceticism, the fondness he displayed for the mysterious, the attempt to transcend Kantian

¹ The third address in commemoration of Dostoevskii was delivered in 1883, at a time when Solov'ev had already been strongly influenced in the direction of Catholicism.

criticism and Comptist positivism by gnosticism, his romanticist return towards the old theology and the old religion, may all, I believe, be considered indications of decadence.

§ 148.

IN the year 1899, Solov'ev published in the periodical "Nedělja" an apocalyptic picture of the end of the world. He himself termed this writing a work of genius, and the judgment was endorsed by his friends and adherents.

Solov'ev's apocalypse is certainly of great philosophical interest, and in our general appreciation of this writer it is important to note the manner in which his views on the philosophy of history underwent modification towards the close of his career.

First, however, we must briefly recount the contents of the three discourses.¹

At the close of the nineteenth century, Japan awakens the slumbering energies of China and unites the Mongol races. During the ensuing half-century, Europe falls a prey to the Asiatics. At first the unprepared Russian army is defeated; the Germans gain a great victory; but the French now enter into an alliance with the Asiatics, and the Germans are given honourable conditions of demobilisation. The French army gets out of hand, and Paris, where there has been a rising of the sanspatrie workmen, opens its gates to the bogdyhan [Russian title for Chinese emperor]. The English buy his favour, paying for a pledge that he will not attack England. This subjugation brings the various European nations to their senses; they effect their political unification; the Mongol yoke is shaken off after a decisive victory of European arms has been secured in the plains of Russia. The old European monarchies disappear; the United States of Europe are organised "more or less democratically"; at their head is the superman as life-long president. No long time elapses before this president, who has acquired world-wide reputation by a work entitled *The Open Way to Universal Peace and Well Being*, is, as a mark of general recognition, elected Roman emperor.

¹ Three Discussions concerning War, Progress, and the End of the History, including a short story of the antichrist, with appendixes, published in 1899 and 1900 in "Nedělja," and reprinted in book form in 1900. Two English translations have been published.

The new emperor is antichrist, though an antichrist of an extremely progressive type. He believes in the good, he believes in God and Christ; but his love is given to himself alone. He is abstemious, disinterested, and gentle; he is a spiritualist, an ascetic, a philanthropist, and even a philozoist; but he considers himself greater than Christ, whom he regards with boundless envy and hatred.

In outward aspect, the civilisation of the new United States is dazzling and resplendent, but the inner spiritual life remains unsatisfied. Through the advances in psychology and physiology, the problems of "life and death," of the end of the world and of mankind, are rendered more complicated, but are not solved, all that is attained being a purely negative result. A notable decay of theoretical materialism sets in.

Antichrist establishes his world monarchy and introduces social reforms, by which everyone is remunerated in accordance with his capacities, every capacity in accordance with work and service; there ensues the equality of universal satiety. The satiated, however, as in ancient Rome, desire circuses as well as bread. These are provided for them by a magian (a half oriental, half European, bishop in partibus) with the aid of the acquirements of natural science. Antichrist having at length removed his capital from Rome to Jerusalem, now summons a general council of the Christian population, reduced by this time to forty-five millions. In Jerusalem he is unmasked, and the leaders of the three principal churches, Peter II, John, and Professor Paul (the respective representatives of Petrine, Johannine, and Pauline Christianity; of Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism), unite in brotherly love at a remote and solitary spot. John and Paul recognize Peter as shepherd of the united flocks. The Jews, who to the number of thirty millions have settled in Palestine, rise against the antichrist, who has announced himself to them as a Jew and the messiah. Christ now appears for the last judgment, and the millennium dawns.

It will be seen that in this picture of the future, Solov'ev accepts the widely diffused philosophico-historical view of the pessimists and socialists that a cataclysm is imminent, and that he shows us the development of civilisation brought to a close. Mankind has become senile; European civilisation has by the growth of positivism, materialism, and socialism, been transformed into a Chinese system; consequently the

actual China is destined to devour Europe with all her civilisation and all her progress. Europe will succumb to the "yellow peril," from within and from without.

Solov'ev received the impulse to this vision from Finland in 1894, when he was contemplating the Finnish nationalist movement. We learn this from his poem *Panmongolism*, wherein he sees the yellow peril knocking at the gates of St. Petersburg and of the winter palace. Some years later, he was profoundly impressed by the expedition of the western powers against China. The speech of Emperor William to the soldiers leaving for China aroused his enthusiasm. William seemed to him the successor of the Christian crusaders. Shortly before his death he dedicated to the German emperor his poem *The Dragon*. The new Siegfried was to save Christendom.

Solov'ev's disciples admire the *Three Discussions* as a veritable prophecy, but in my opinion this view is exaggerated. In Russia, relationships with Asia arouse keener feelings than among us in the west, and the so-called yellow peril is more strongly felt. As long ago as 1887, I was frequently told of the danger threatening from the east, and was assured that even among the common people a fear of China was widespread. Mikhailovskii, giving a description of Solov'ev's vision, refers to numerous other Russian and European prophesies of the yellow peril.

The vision of antichrist seems weak to me, and especially weak do I consider the onslaught on Tolstoi. Antichrist is Tolstoi himself. Tolstoi's Buddhistic doctrine of non-resistance exasperated Solov'ev, for Solov'ev had long been of opinion that "cross and sword are one." Solov'ev had hoped at first that he and Tolstoi would be able to work jointly on behalf of Solov'ev's religious ideal, but personal intercourse between the two men was frequently broken off. As far back as 1884 Solov'ev had confided to common friends his doubts concerning Tolstoi's trustworthiness. At length, in the *Three Discussions*, Solov'ev definitely formulated his opposition to Tolstoi.

The description of antichrist recalls Dostoevskii's grand inquisitor, and in the figure of antichrist we may likewise discern traces of the Nietzschean superman. In Solov'ev's delineation, Tolstoi appears not merely futile, null, and prone to fallacy, but a deliberate cheat. Solov'ev pursues his opponent with ardent hatred, which finds expression both in the general picture and in certain prominent details. Without further

ado, Tolstoi's thoughts of suicide are transformed into an attempt at suicide on the part of the dissatisfied superman. His life is saved in miraculous fashion by the devil, who then instils into the superman a man-controlling energy.

This hatred blinded Solov'ev and weakened his artistic faculty. His apocalypse does not for a moment bear comparison with its Johannine exemplar. Solov'ev's writing is didactic, rhetorical, and overladen. In points of detail the quality of his analysis is here and there extremely questionable, as when he tells us that the election of the emperor is undertaken at the desire of the freemasons, who are made to appear the real leaders of European politics. Moreover, the positive element, the description of the Christian leaders, is lacking in strength. The Fichtean and Schellingian formula of the Johannine church of the future is realised in an unduly professorial manner.

Many other objections could doubtless be raised to the historico-philosophical criticism embodied in the work. Above all does it seem questionable to me whether in the figure of anti-christ, Solov'ev has rightly characterised the dangers of the present day. I am confirmed in this doubt when I read the preface to the reissue in book form. Solov'ev here refers to the importance of Islam and panislamism, a matter discussed by him in a further but unpublished prophetic work. He speaks of the possibility that the end of the world may be deferred for another two or three centuries, whereas elsewhere he gives us to understand that the end may be expected in the immediate future. Surely a prophet should be a little less vague about dates!

If we are to regard this polemic against Tolstoi as a literary monument of the revival of prophecy, it must be admitted that the venture is somewhat ineffective. The rules which Solov'ev himself formulated for the recognition of the true prophet are not fulfilled—though we may doubt whether in these rules Solov'ev was entirely successful in defining the concept of the modern prophet. In Solov'ev's writings, the figures of the Old Testament prophets blend with the figure of Socrates (this does not accord very well with his Platonism), and above all he recognises Dostoevskii as a divinely sent seer. But in addition to Dostoevskii, the leading Russian imaginative thinkers are hailed as prophets.

Characteristic of Solov'ev is the opposition to Tolstoi.

Solov'ev, like Tolstoi, is at odds with the Orthodox church; Solov'ev, like Tolstoi, assigns a modest role to the understanding; both thinkers have a special fondness for Schopenhauer and Kant; Solov'ev, too, stresses, above all, the moral aspects of religion and philosophy—and yet Solov'ev discerns in Tolstoi the figure of antichrist!

It seems to me that the antichrist embodies large elements of self-criticism. Solov'ev's polemic writing is often strongly worded precisely because the author is endeavouring to convince himself. Tolstoi is his own uneasy conscience.

During the closing years of his life, Solov'ev succumbed to a pessimistic mood, and this can be discerned in the antichrist figure. In fact, Solov'ev completely abandoned his earlier policy of ecclesiasticism. In the *Three Discussions* the messianic mission of the Russian people and of the tsar has completely disappeared. We do not find that a union of the churches is effected as a precondition for theocracy. The three churches are reconciled during the last days, those immediately preceding Christ's second advent; and the reunion takes place without any assistance from the state. The tsar, meanwhile, and the tsarist realm, have disappeared with the formation of the democratic United States of Europe. No more than forty-five millions of Christians remain, a comparatively small body of believers, who stand firm, however, in the faith, and can therefore effect the union of the churches—just before the closing of the gates.

It is obvious that the earlier ecclesiastical policy has been wholly abandoned, and that the union of the churches takes place in accordance with the principles of Protestant ecclesiastical policy à la Schelling. Russians and the Russian church are somewhat scurvily treated in *Three Discussions*. In further proof of this assertion, I may mention that at the council Solov'ev makes the emperor win over the Russians by providing them with funds for the construction of a universal museum for Christian archeology. In return for this, most of the hierarchs of the east and the north, half of the old believers, and more than half of the Orthodox priests, monks, and laymen, espouse the emperor's cause.

Manifestly a precise census would notably reduce the forty-five millions of "genuine Christians."

In actual fact, Solov'ev had lost his vigorous faith, not only in the tsar but also in the Russian people. We learn from his

biography that as early as 1891 this faith had been seriously shaken when he witnessed the devastations of the famine and the apathetic inertia of society. At this epoch he conceived constitutionalist hopes, but did not cherish them for long. For a time, even, he had thoughts of revolution, a revolution of a somewhat quaint character. He seriously believed that he would be able to persuade General Dragomirov and one of the dissatisfied princes of the church to place themselves at the head of the movement, and that the army and the people would thus be won over. Solov'ev's friends killed this great design by their ridicule.

In 1894, he produced *Panmongolism*, a work in which he had conceived the fall of the third Rome, without however following the example of the old Moscow chronicler, and mooting the possibility of a fourth Rome.

Writing in 1896 upon the relationship of Byzantinism to Russia, Solov'ev again displayed his scepticism concerning the mission of the third Rome.

Coming now to the period in which the antichrist was conceived, we find numerous documentary proofs that Solov'ev had abandoned his messianic designs. In 1898 he penned an essay to controvert the opinions of those who looked for the solution of the Russian and European question to be effected after some centuries by the simple law of superior force, and with the aid of the four hundred millions to which by then the population of Russia was to have increased. Solov'ev declared that many uncertain elements entered into such calculations; he pointed out that in the interior administrative districts of Russia the population had ceased to increase; and he appealed to "reflective and disquieting" patriotism to attend without delay to its duties of conscience.

He had also come to the conclusion that Europe is less corrupt than he had imagined in earlier years, when he had regarded positivism and socialism as affording the most striking manifestations of estrangement from God.

In like manner, he had altered his attitude towards the revolutionaries and the radicals.

In the autumn of 1898, delivering a lecture on Bēlinskii, he represented that writer as an apostle of humanitarianism and of practical Christianity. Bēlinskii's only defect was that he had not found the true faith. Solov'ev blames himself, however, for having allowed his attention to be monopolised

by the still insoluble question of the union of the churches, whilst disregarding those more immediate interests of the present to which Bělinskii was devoted. "Mea culpa," exclaims Solov'ev, "mea maxima culpa!"

During this same year, Solov'ev penned an extremely cordial commemorative essay on Černyševskii which could not be published until after the writer's death. Extolling Černyševskii's character, he showed that the government had committed a crime against "this wise and just man." Solov'ev had hoped to write more fully about Černyševskii.

Coming last of all to the *Antichrist*, we find that in this work the change in Solov'ev's views on the philosophy of history is most conspicuous. Not merely has he abandoned the idea of Russia's mission, but he would seem to have held less favourable views of Catholicism now than of yore. His description of the pope, his reference to the Catholic magian, and finally the flight of the pope (who flees to St. Petersburg to escape the emperor, secures there a friendly reception, but is cautioned against carrying on propaganda in Russia)—all these details would seem to confirm the impression that Solov'ev had grown out of tune with Catholicism and the papacy.

Let me reiterate, in conclusion, that his fierce onslaught on Tolstoi was in truth directed against the rebel within himself. *Antichrist* displays the inner cleavage of Solov'ev's personal experience. On the one hand he is forced to concede that Kant was right, and under the influence of Kantian thought he wrote his *Ethics*, a second edition of this work, very carefully revised, having been published in the same year as *Antichrist*. Here, following Kant, the whole outlook on the universe is based upon morality. On the other hand, Solov'ev could not completely free himself from the opinions of his church and of the slavophiles. Being unable to dispense with the mystical element in religion, he could not break with the church and church tradition as Tolstoi had done. "Not only do I believe in everything supernatural, but, to speak accurately, I believe in nothing else." These words, written in 1887 in the *Letter to Strahov*, give terse expression to Solov'ev's religious sentiments as contrasted with those of Tolstoi. They explain why Solov'ev inclined to the ideas of Dostoevskii, and why he could never wholly agree with Tolstoi. Solov'ev's faith demanded miracle. Belief in the resurrection of Christ was for Solov'ev the most important doctrine of all, for Solov'ev dreaded death, which he interpreted

as the manifest victory of non-sense over sense, of chaos over cosmos. In a letter to Tolstoi, Solov'ev expressed his dissent from the latter's views in respect of one concrete particular, the doctrine of the resurrection.

Kant versus Plato, criticism versus myth and mysticism, such is the momentous contrast.

§ 149.

SOLOV'EV'S general trend and the purport of his philosophical and religious aspirations make him appear as a successor of the slavophiles and a continuer of their work, that of Kirěevskii and Homjakov at least. But in Solov'ev the mystical element is much stronger, is denser, I might say, and more opaque. His criticism and negation of Byzantium and Old Russia has much in common with Čaadaev, for Solov'ev and Čaadaev displayed similar leanings towards Catholicism.

Solov'ev's critical side brought him into association with the westernisers and the liberals, although these by no means approved of his mysticism. Čičerin and Kavelin both protested against Solov'ev's mysticism, being concerned, of course, not solely with the distinction in individual points of teaching, but with the entire trend and mood. Compare, for example, Solov'ev with Mihailovskii; how great is the contrast between the positivist critic, the "profane" man, and the mystical prophet.

Mysticism and the philosophy of religion brought Solov'ev for a time into association with Katkov and Leont'ev, the latter, during his closing years, being much disquieted by Solov'ev's philosophy of history and by his criticism of the Russian church and of the Orthodox church in general. Solov'ev defended Dostoevskii against Leont'ev's accusation of "new" Christianity, but it was characteristic that Solov'ev should have completely failed to recognise the devastating internal struggle with nihilism that was taking place in Dostoevskii's mind.

Solov'ev shunned intercourse with the socialists and the narodniki, for he detested economic materialism and "economism" in general. Religious prejudice (I can use no other term) made it impossible for Solov'ev to understand socialism. If he regarded socialism as nothing more than the extremest manifestation of bourgeois civilisation, it was because his

semblance to Jesus than to the god of Spinoza. Of Jesus, the great adversary of the scribes and Pharisees, there remains little for Solov'ev. In the end, therefore, theology gains the victory over Solov'ev's philosophy; Kant is not transcended, but sacrificed; a utopian philosophy and theocracy are built up, incompetent to lead either theoretically or practically to any desired goal. The absolute all and all-in-one, and its unfolding in the world process, shrinks to the ideal of a papistical church universal; the religion of universalised humanity can offer us in the end nothing more than the vague content of an ecclesiastico-political imperialism; religion, in place of a belief in Jesus, gives us a belief in signs and wonders; a morbid and multiform mysticism is elevated to the position of intimate essence of religion.

Yet the very weaknesses of his philosophy of religion and of his religious outlook, secured for Solov'ev numerous and enthusiastic disciples. These disciples and Solov'ev himself were signs of the times, indications of an incomplete transition from the past. As so often happens, the master's weaknesses were more conspicuous in the pupils. Solov'ev found it difficult to tolerate quite a number of his followers, and engaged in controversy with some of them.

Solov'ev's significance for the development of Russian philosophy was very great.

I have already pointed out that Solov'ev had had a thorough philosophical training. I mean that Solov'ev had studied ancient and modern philosophy thoroughly, and as a specialist. His real significance, however, lay in this, that he was the first Russian to study the Kantian criticism in all its bearings; he was the first Russian who thought the whole question over anew for himself; and he was the first who attempted to transcend the Kantian criticism by a criticism of his own. Solov'ev learned from many sources, and adopted philosophical details from many different writers, but from Kant he derived his epistemological criticism. A number of philosophers of academic status had discussed Kant before Solov'ev; Solov'ev himself heard much of Kant from Jurkevič; but Jurkevič's study of Kant was not fundamental. Solov'ev, as a grateful pupil, was embarrassed by this without realising it—or at any rate, when speaking of Jurkevič, he failed to allude to the matter.

Solov'ev fully realised that the Kantian criticism marked

a turning point in the evolution of human thought, and he realised why this was so. In the ethical sphere, Solov'ev even believed that Kant had established the basis of ethics for all time. It seemed to Solov'ev that the categorical imperative was as certain as are the axioms of pure mathematics.

Solov'ev understood the problem, formulated by Kant, of subjectivism versus objectivism; and he realised that Kant failed to discover the epistemological solution of this problem, remaining entangled in a powerless subjectivism and apriorism. Solov'ev set to work, building upon a Kantian foundation and using Kantian methods, to attempt his own solution. He had learned from Kant that the cognition of the thing-by-itself must really be the cognition of God, must be a creative and purely intellectual intuition, which after all originates in man. Solov'ev's creative and imaginative belief was to replace Kant's creative intellectual intuition. Solov'ev had learned from Kant that criticism led back to faith. He heard with gladness the tidings of this mission; and since Kant did not furnish any cogent doctrines, Solov'ev returned to the faith of the fathers of the eastern church, borrowing the while in addition from Plato, Spinoza, Jacob Boehme, and many others.

The attempt to effect an organic union between criticism and mysticism failed, and could not but fail. Solov'ev was, however, cautious enough to follow Kant in establishing religion, too, upon an ethical foundation. He was, I repeat, cautious. He could not but feel the inadequacy of his attempt, and for this very reason the internal warfare waged by Solov'ev with his critical rationalism against his own traditionalist mysticism, is so instructive and so fascinating. A more detailed study of Solov'ev's philosophical development would describe the vicissitudes of this struggle in its individual stages, would show how Solov'ev's views matured, and to what influences he was chiefly subjected at various epochs; and it would further be necessary to sympathise with his remarkable spiritual cleavage and the moods to which that cleavage gave rise from the time of its first appearance.

From this outlook, Solov'ev's *Antichrist* and his attack on Tolstoi, the religious rationalist, becomes comprehensible. Within the recesses of Solov'ev's own mind, Tolstoi threatened to gain the victory!

Solov'ev's influence upon Russian philosophy was powerful and beneficial, above all because philosophy was not for him

a profession, or an opportunity for the display of academic learning, but was an attempt to understand life and to solve the problems of life. Congenial minds have endeavoured to clarify even his mysticism epistemologically (S. Trubeckoi). Critical historians of Russian philosophy have raised a memorial of their friendship and appreciation in the form of detailed criticism (E. Radlov). I will merely add the opinion of a personal friend and associate of Solov'ev, to whose judgment I attach importance because he is himself an academic philosopher, a professor. Professor Lopatin of Moscow wrote: "He was the first among us Russians to undertake a direct investigation of the problems or objects of philosophy, the first who was not content to discuss the opinions of western philosophers concerning these problems. Thus it was that he became the first Russian philosopher."

Solov'ev lamented that he had no school, no successors.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

MODERN SOCIALISM; MARXISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY; MARXISM AND THE NARODNIČESTVO. THE CRISIS WITHIN THE MARXIST MOVEMENT; THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM. THE SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES.

I

§ 150.

WE now come to the concluding section of the second portion of this study, of our sketch of Russian philosophy of history and of Russian philosophy of religion, and have to expound the leading social and political trends and mass movements—Marxist social democracy, the narodničestvo, the social revolutionary movement, modern anarchism, and liberalism. From the nature of the case, the individualities of men of letters and of leaders will be less conspicuous than in the preceding studies, for we are now concerned mainly with general trends and currents.

We begin with Marxism and social democracy.

Socialism is as old in Russia as in Europe. The socialist ideas of Europe always secured their earliest adherents in Russia.

The humanitarians at the close of the eighteenth and at the opening of the nineteenth century, those who advocated the liberation of the peasantry, had a political and indeed a democratic conception of their humanitarian doctrine, and this was especially noteworthy in Pestel. During the forties, socialist doctrine, if it was not the actual cause of the severance between radicals and liberals, at least made that severance more conspicuous and more definite. Bělinskii, Herzen, and Bakunin on the left, and Granovskii on the right, were characteristic representatives of the distinction between socialism

and liberalism. (In Bělnskii's case this is shown by his youthful drama.)

The Petraševcy (1848) are the Russian analogues of the French revolutionary socialists of the same epoch.

The Russians were influenced above all by the teachings of French socialists; but German philosophy, and notably that of Feuerbach, likewise had its effect in promoting the development of political radicalism and socialism. Towards the close of the forties, the ideas of Marx and Lassalle began to be known in Russia.

After the liberation of the peasantry, socialism upon a theoretical basis of materialism became the credo of the intelligentsia. Černyševskii and his positivist realism matured into nihilism. In the secret society of the Narodnaja Volja, revolutionary aspirations secured their most logical elaboration in the form of a deliberate policy of terrorism. It was significant that the little secret societies should have been styled "communes."

Herzen, Bakunin, and Černyševskii regarded the Russian mir as the social unit of the society which was to be renovated by the social revolution, and this view was elaborated into a complete social and economic theory, the narodničestvo. Simultaneously Lavrov and Mihailovskii were endeavouring to found socialism anew as a philosophical system.

This brings us to the eighties, to the decade of reaction following upon the assassination of Alexander II. Even before the momentous March 13, 1881, a split had occurred in the revolutionary camp, and the Marxist social democracy had been organized under the influence of Marx and Engels, the terrorist tendency being greatly weakened, though not entirely destroyed.

A survey of the development of "Russian socialism" (or "Russian communism") since Herzen, cannot fail to convince us that the Russian socialists, like the French and the German socialists, were looking for a new philosophy and a new ethic. Life was to be entirely renovated; society was to be rebuilt upon completely new foundations.

In the domain of theory, this new foundation was to be positivism and materialism, the converse and the negation of official theocracy. Dostoevskii, therefore, had good reason for equating socialism with atheism and for pointing to atheism as the leading tenet of socialism.

Positivist materialism and atheism had as its ethical aim the creation of the new man, and as its political aim the bringing about of the social revolution. Socialist practice had an ethical basis. Its ideal was a fundamental transformation, a social revolution, which should sweep away once and for all every form of injustice and inequality.

In practice, with one section of the revolutionary socialists, this ideal led to terrorism. The mass rising of the decabrists had given ocular demonstration of the impracticability of mass revolution.

The intellectuals, collectively forming the intelligentsia, were the leaders of the socialistic and philosophic revolution. This revolution was to liberate the *mužik*, the peasantry being then practically synonymous with Russia. *Narodničestvo*, *mužikophilism*, was characteristic of Russian socialism. It was not until a later date that the operatives, that urban influences, became important for socialism; and we have to remember that, after all, the urban operative who came to serve the needs of expanding industry was nothing more than a peasant. Marxism turned its attention to these operatives.

§ 151.

BY the term Marxism we understand in the first place the actual doctrines or works of Marx; but the word also signifies the movement inaugurated by Marx in philosophy, sociology (above all the philosophy of history), and economics; finally we have to think of the Marxist social democracy as a working-class party, and of the political aims and methods of that party.

Marx's doctrines and ideas speedily became known in Russia, and were widely diffused, the first translation of *Capital* being into Russian. Marx more than once drew attention to the fact that the Russians had always been enthusiastically receptive of his teaching, notwithstanding his criticism of Russia and his hostility to that country.

Bělsinskii gave a friendly greeting to the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher" of Marx and Ruge. Prior to the year 1848, information concerning Marx had been sent to St. Petersburg by P. V. Annenkov, author at a later date of a history of literature. We have already made this writer's acquaintance as a member of Bělsinskii's circle. From 1846

to 1848 he was living abroad, and was an associate of the Russian refugees, notably of Herzen and Bakunin. He was acquainted with Marx, and corresponded with him. A detailed report from Marx to Annenkov dealing with Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère* (1846) has recently been published. Among the Russian refugees, notably in Paris, there were towards the close of the forties numerous adherents of the socialism of that day, and Marx may have been personally acquainted with some of them.¹

Herzen and Bakunin were already acquainted with Marx at this date.

In the beginning of the fifties, the activity of all the refugees, those from Russia no less than those from Germany and elsewhere, was paralysed by the reaction after 1848, although Herzen and Ogarev continued their labours. During the early sixties, after the liberation of the peasantry, the number of Russian refugees underwent considerable increase, and their activities became more lively, being stimulated by Herzen's "Kolokol," by Bakunin's work as agitator, and by the struggle between Marx and Bakunin in the International. The repressive movement in Russia swelled the number of the refugees, and favoured the growth of their revolutionary sentiments.

In 1862, Bakunin translated the *Communist Manifesto*. In 1865, Tkačev, in his literary critiques, diffused the doctrine of historical materialism as formulated by Marx in 1859. In 1872 was published Nikolai-on's translation of the first volume of *Capital* (2nd edition, 1898). Bakunin, too, wished to translate this work. Nikolai-on translated the second volume of *Capital* in 1885, and the third volume in 1896.

As early as 1870, Mihailovskii applied Marx's theory to the historical development of Russia; subsequently (1877) he discussed Žukovskii's criticism of Marx; in the nineties, Mihailovskii defended the views of the narodniki against the Marxists.

Lavrov, too, was in friendly relations with Marx and his circle, and Lavrov learned much from Marx.

In 1861, Šelgunov availed himself of Engel's work upon the condition of the English working classes in the compilation

¹ To Herzen's Moscow circle belonged N. I. Sazonov, who subsequently engaged in journalistic work in France, and died there in 1862. Another Russian refugee in France was I. N. Tolstoi, who had been a decabrist and friend of Puškin, but ultimately proved to be an agent of Nicholas' government.

of his own account of working-class conditions in England and France.

Engel's book on Dühring became known in Russia soon after its appearance (1878), and Dühring was eagerly read by the Russian socialists.

From the outset, Marx's theory of value, as a theory of labour, secured acceptance in Russia. The first detailed discussion of Marx in the Russian tongue was published in 1871. This was Ziber's book, *Ricardo's Theory of Value and of Capital in relation to subsequent Elucidations and Enlargements*, a work in which Marx's doctrine was represented as a development of the teachings of Ricardo and Adam Smith. Among Russian economists, Marx's theory of value has numerous and notable adherents down to the present day (Čuprov, Isaev, etc.).

Marx (like Engels) learned Russian, so that he might be able to study Russian works, above all statistical statements concerning economic conditions and their development. Some of his letters bear witness to the result of these labours, letters to Nikolai-on, Sorge, Kugelman, and others, wherein Marx is mainly concerned with the fundamental theme of the narodniki.

Marx's doctrine of historical materialism had a fertilising influence upon Russian historiography and upon Russian histories of literature. Allusion has already been made to Tkačev's literary criticisms. There is a notable quantity of Marxist literary criticism in Russian, though this consists merely of studies of individual authors, for no complete history of Russian literature on Marxist lines has as yet been produced. Certain collective studies of literary history have recently appeared, but none embodying a consistent exposition of historical materialism.

The same observation applies to certain Marxist disquisitions on Russian history.

Last of all we have to consider the matter which is of chief importance to ourselves, the achievements of Russian Marxism in the domains of philosophy and of the philosophy of history, which will shortly be discussed in some detail.

§ 152.

THE split in the Zemlja i Volja in 1879 resulted in the formation of the Social Democratic Party in 1883, the year in which Marx died.

The terrorist Narodnaja Volja crumbled away after the assassination of Alexander II, and the party of the Černyi Pereděl developed into the Social Democratic Party upon a Marxist basis, the social democrats tending more and more to constitute a working-class party.

It is a very difficult matter to furnish in Europe a history of the Russian social democracy which shall even approach to accuracy; the sources of information are inaccessible and have hitherto been subjected to little critical examination, while even in Russian literature but little has been written upon the history of the Russian social democracy. I can, therefore, attempt here no more than an incomplete sketch. Should I make any mistakes regarding facts, I must excuse them by the explanation that the Russian theorists and historians of the Russian social democracy differ among themselves as to points of the first importance in respect of chronological and other data.

The evolution of Russian manufacturing industry and the growth of the operative population during the reigns of Alexander II and Alexander III, rendered possible the development of a spontaneous labour movement with which the socialist intelligentsia made common cause. From 1878 onwards, notable strikes began to occur. The strikes were non-political, for the workers did not formulate any political demands. The opening years of the accentuated reaction during the reign of Alexander III were characterised by an arrest of movement among factory operatives no less than elsewhere, but at this time the government took the first steps in the way of factory legislation.

The organisation of the Social Democratic Party in 1883 was fraught with weighty consequences. This organisation was first effected abroad, members of the Černyi Pereděl coming together under Plehanov's leadership and styling themselves Group for the Liberation of Labour (*gruppā osvoboždenija truda*). In St. Petersburg the first social democratic group was formed in 1885.¹

The political quiescence of the eighties was broken in 1891 owing to the famine and the cholera, and a great ferment occurred among the working classes. The intelligentsia of all trends and of all shades of opinion shook off the apathy of the preceding decade. In 1891 was established the Party of

¹ N. V. Vodovozov, who died prematurely, was the leader of this body.

National Right, which aimed at effecting an alliance between the liberal and the revolutionary elements for the struggle against despotism. This party issued a periodical and a number of pamphlets. It was suppressed in 1894, but the suppression did not entirely put an end to its activities.

The Social Democratic Party gained increasing influence, and in consequence of the livelier political movement which ensued upon 1891 this body became the leading force among the workers. Until then, the remnants and the successors of the Narodnaja Volja, organised in various towns as petty groups, had maintained the upper hand, but in the strikes that became increasingly frequent after 1893 social democratic leadership was already dominant. The great strike of the St. Petersburg textile workers during 1896 may be regarded as the opening of the veritable labour movement.

The conduct of strikes, and the campaign against the entrepreneurs and the government, were undertaken by the League for the Struggle to Liberate the Workers, organised in the spring of 1895. The agitation among the operatives was partly oral and partly written (proclamations).

Of great importance was the comprehensive organisation of the Jewish workers of the west and the south to form the Bund. This took place in 1897. In view of the outlawed position of the Jews, the establishment of a Jewish socialist party was a matter of moment to the working classes, and further, the Bund served to give expression to the revolutionary sentiments of the Jews.

Just as in the working-class organisations the growing social democracy constituted an opposition to the adherents of the Narodnaja Volja, so during the middle nineties did those who were expounding the theories of the social democracy enter into a controversy with the narodničestvo concerning the application of the principles of the philosophy of history to explain the evolution of Russia. In 1884 Struve took the field; in 1895 Plehanov (Bel'tov) played a prominent part; and there were many other notable Marxist writers, some of them confining their activities to the domain of theory (Tugan-Baranovskii, Bulgakov, etc.), and others being in addition practical workers on behalf of social democracy (Věra Zasulič, Lenin, Martov, etc.). I have previously referred to this important literary duel, and shall have something more to say about the matter presently.

In their campaign against the narodničestvo, most members of the intelligentsia took the side of the Marxists, but as soon as a victory had been gained over the narodniki, a great crisis took place within Marxism itself, leading ultimately to the secession of a number of distinguished theorists from social democracy and from Marxism. The writings and teachings of Sombart, Herckner, Schulze-Gävernitz, and Brentano, had for some time been exercising considerable influence, and these secessions were the practical upshot, the beginnings of German revisionism and above all the coming of Bernstein to the front notably contributing. The influence of those English and French socialists who are opposed to orthodox Marxism was less conspicuous in Russia than that of the German revisionists.

The Russian social democrats and their Marxist leaders, notably Plehanov, maintained a continuous and lively intercourse, both literary and personal, with the German social democracy. German influence and the German example were decisive, above all in view of the fact that the German social democracy, the ideas and the organisation of the German movement, were exercising a similar influence upon the French and English labour movements and upon socialism generally.

In Germany, after the repeal of the exceptional laws in 1890, the labour movement and the socialist current greatly increased in vigour; but the movement of the "Jungen" now began, and Vollmar and the Badenese compelled the party leaders of the social democracy to reconsider the question of tactics. It must not be forgotten that Engels had modified his views, especially upon the matter of revolution. Shortly before his death (1895) he had written the important preface to Marx's *Class Struggles in France*, and had here effected a far-reaching revision of social democratic tactics.

An analogous evolution took place in French, Belgian, and Italian socialism. Russian social democracy, while in the act of undergoing consolidation, was thus subjected to a cross fire from the orthodox Marxist and revisionist camps. It was only to be expected that in Russia, too, similar oppositions would speedily come to light.

As early as 1899, Struve gave expression to a direct opposition to orthodox Marxism. That which was at first manifested as critical revisionism, came before long to display itself as an independent philosophical trend, whose positive watch-word found expression in 1904 in the title of Bulgakov's essays

From Marxism to Idealism. But whereas in Germany, Bernstein, all differences of opinion notwithstanding, desired and was able to remain in the party, the Russian revisionists cut themselves adrift from the social democracy.

In addition to revisionism, another independent trend known as "economism" found expression both tactically and in writing; this economism gives expression in Russia to the same opposition as exists in Europe between the political parties and the trade unions. The relationships between economism and revisionism remain obscure in respect of chronology no less than in respect of other matters.¹

In 1898 the first Russian social democratic congress took place, being held abroad. An organising central committee was appointed, and a program was elaborated, wherein the social democrats declared themselves to be a proletarian party (Russian Social Democratic Labour Party). The Jewish Bund joined the organisation.

The growth of the labour movement continued. In 1899 the reorganised Group for the Liberation of Labour set to work afresh, and there was great activity in all radical and liberal organisations. For both these trends, the year 1901 was rich in notable events. During this year there took place no less than 120 strikes. Among these the strike at Obuhov was of peculiar significance, since here for the first time barricades were erected by the workers. By this time the labour movement had become definitely political as well as economic.

Since 1899 the movement among the students had been markedly on the increase. At Kiev in 1901 there occurred an unprecedented academic revolution and a students' strike. The progressive professors, the men of letters, and all the advanced section of the intelligentsia, espoused the cause of the young people against the educational policy of the *nagaika* (the Cossack whip). Bogolëpov, minister for education, was shot by a student named Karpovič; in the following year another student, Balmašev, shot Sypjagin, the new minister for education.

From 1901 onwards terrorism and outrage again became dominant political forces. The traditions of the Narodnaja

¹ I may take this opportunity of giving a concrete example to show how the theorists and historians of social democracy differ in their accounts of important events. Plehanov declares that economism originated in 1897; the date given by Dr. Ida Akselrod is 1899; Akimov tells us that economism came to an end in 1897, the movement having begun in 1895.

Volja were revived; the Social Revolutionary Party was organised (its beginnings date from about 1892); the fighting organisation (*boevaja organisacia*) of the social revolutionaries took the place of the extinct terrorist executive committee. The assassination of Sypjagin was followed in 1904 by that of Pleve and in 1905 by that of Grand Duke Sergius.

As the social revolutionary party increased in strength, and as Marxism became weakened by revisionism and economism, there ensued an increase in the vigour of the narodničestvo, which now entered the theoretic field as the "new" or "renovated" narodničestvo. The contentions by which the narodniki and the Marxists were kept asunder came to the front once more, for in the newly founded Marxist periodicals "Iskra" (Spark), 1901, and "Zarja" (Dawn), 1902, the former being a political and the latter a scientific journal, the Marxists were voicing their answers to the revisionist criticism, whilst the revisionists had entered into an alliance with the narodniki. The chief spokesmen of Marxism at this epoch were Plehanov, Věra Zasulič, L. Akselrod ("Orthodox"), Martov, Starověr (Potresov). Moreover, the vigorous movement among the peasantry which manifested itself in 1902, and the increasing urgency of the agrarian problem, served at first to strengthen the narodničestvo.

Journalistic discussion of the relationship of liberalism to Marxism and to socialism in general, and the cooperation which was desired by members of both these sections of thought, assumed palpable forms in 1902. In June of that year there was published at Stuttgart the first number of "Osvoboždenie" (Deliverance); edited by Struve, this periodical served the aims of the constitutionalist movement, and in especial those of the liberal members of the zemstvos. In 1903 was organised the League of Deliverance (Sojuz Osvoboždenija), which revived and extended the aims of the Party of National Right.

The same year, at the second congress (held in London) occurred the formal split in the Social Democratic Party. In especial, the group which controlled "Iskra" became severed into two distinct trends, the majority being led by Lenin and the minority by Martov.¹ Simultaneously the Jewish Bund severed its connection with the party.

¹ The names of "majoritarians" (bolševiki, bolševisti) and "minoritarians" (menševiki, menševisti) have become current. At first people spoke

At the outset the struggle between the two sections was declared to depend solely upon differences concerning the problem of organisation. The majority wished for rigid centralisation, whilst the minority considered that this centralisation would weaken the party. But in the course of an unduly rapid political evolution, additional differences of tactics and aim became apparent. On the whole, as far as it is possible to formulate these differences precisely, the bolševiki inclined towards the tactics of the social revolutionaries, and their tactical theories determined their general outlook on the situation and their choice of tactical methods. Whereas the menševiki desired that revolutionary energy should first be concentrated and that the masses of the workers should first be educated to understand socialist principles, the bolševiki believed in the imminent possibility of a definitive revolution, urged individuals and the masses towards an immediate struggle, and endeavoured to strengthen the centralist dictatorship as the framework of the future central government. They wished to follow the example of the Narodnaja Volja and to entrust the party leadership to a revolutionary élite.

In actual fact, Russia's internal and external situation was an incitement to a mass revolution. Universal dissatisfaction and a revolutionary mood had been stimulated by the disastrous war with Japan, whilst on the other hand this war had promoted the growth of nationalism, not the liberals alone, but converts from Marxism (Struve), having adopted nationalist views. Through the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements, all the progressive and all the conservative and reactionary forces in the country at length secured expression. The constitution, won by the revolution, rendered it possible to organise political parties, and work in the duma made it necessary for these parties to undertake practical administrative activities.

The bolševiki boycotted the duma and opposed cooperation with the liberals (cadets). Only with the social revolutionaries and with the trudoviki (members of the Labour Party) would they make common cause. The menševiki, on the other hand, were in favour of the duma and of cooperation with the cadets.

of the "hard" iskrovcy and the "soft" iskrovcy, the former designation attaching to the majoritarians. "Iskra" remained in the hands of the minority, and has since been known as the "Novaja Iskra."

The bolševiki went so far as to rejoice at the (first) dissolution of the duma.

Despite these complications, quite a number of social democrats were elected to the first duma, and a still larger number to the second. In the later elections, however, the party was positively decimated. This did not induce the bolševiki to change their tactics. In the year 1906 a serious effort was made to reconcile the two factions, but without success, and the conflict between them subsequently became accentuated.

In the agrarian question, a matter of extreme urgency, and indeed in all questions, the bolševiki, pending the definitive collapse of absolutism, made a working program of their ultimate aim, whereas the menševiki were endeavouring, by critical methods and by their estimate of the existing situation and of the social and political forces of the day, to destroy the illusion of the bolševiki.

The members of the radical left wing of the bolševiki developed into anarchising socialists. In the name of orthodox Marxism they approved acts of expropriation, and they opposed the constitution and parliament, styling themselves or being known as *otzovisty* and *ultimatisty*. (The "otzovisty" are the "recallers," those who wish to recall from office their representatives in the duma. "Ultimatism," as a tactical method, meant that an ultimatum was to be presented to the members of the duma and to the party organisations in general, those that proved recalcitrant being terrorised by a boycott declared by the party executive.)

During this same period the menševiki, too, went through their political distemper. In their endeavour to be a purely proletarian party they penalised the intelligentsia, and the more extreme and radical section among them even demanded that the party should become wholly a mass movement, for leadership, they said, was improper and must be abolished (must be "liquidated," whence this trend was called "liquidationism").

The antipathy to the liberals was simultaneously displayed by the appearance of an anarchist trend which was theoretical rather than practical. This became conspicuous in 1904 in a polemic against the intelligentsia, and since Mahaev was its principal exponent it was denominated "Mahaevism."

The social revolutionaries, likewise, were torn by internal dissensions. Among them, too, there appeared a right and a

left wing, minimalists and maximalists, the cleavage being analogous to that in the social democracy. On the other hand, the unmasking of Azev wrought much harm to the party. The proofs brought forward by Burcev (1908), the admission made by Stolypin in the duma (1909), and Lopuhin's confirmation, inspired mutual mistrust among the terrorists, and made them doubt the soundness of their tactics seeing that since 1892 Azev had been able to pursue his work as provocative agent, his double game with the party and the secret police. The assassinations of Pleve and Grand Duke Sergius had been his work, and presumably he aimed at still higher game.

It was natural, in view of this disintegration and of the mistakes of the revolutionary and radical parties, that after the revolution the reaction should quickly reconstitute its forces. Enough has already been said concerning the matter. The social democrats were not slow to grasp how deplorable was the situation, and they endeavoured to reorganise themselves, whilst the other parties made similar efforts.

The Russian social democracy has changed much since the revolution of 1905, and because of it, learning much during and after the revolution. To the masses as well as to the leaders the revolution furnished occasion for practical political and revolutionary activities. It became necessary for the revolutionaries, not merely to examine the efficacy of their everyday methods, but likewise to reconsider their aims, to ask themselves to what extent the socialistic goal was attainable.

Counter-revolution and reaction deprived all the revolutionary parties of leaders. Those leaders who survived the storm languished in gaol or in administrative exile, except for the many who had taken refuge in foreign lands. The increasing hostility to the intelligentsia was largely the outcome of the perplexities of the working-class organisations thus bereft of leadership. In my account of the reaction I showed that illegal activities were forced upon the social democrats because public and legitimate political organising work was forbidden them. The restrictions imposed by the state created additional obstacles to the centralisation desired by the bolševiki, and the party broke up into amorphous and disconnected local organisations.

Nevertheless a continuous process of organisation and re-organisation went on. The leaderless mass threw up new leaders, for the most part men of working-class origin, who

gained experience in political organisations, yet more in trade union and cooperative organisations, and in the numerous strikes. The workers were consequently in a position to compare detail work in the legislative field with the illegal and so-called "underground" revolutionary activities, and could form their own opinions concerning the comparative efficiency of the respective methods.

None the less, the confusion is still extensive, and its degree may be measured by the fact that Plehanov, the real leader of the men'sheviki, has left his party on the ground that it is too opportunist. But Plehanov is now writing busily, and it may be that the real motive for his withdrawal was the desire for a detachment which would enable him to continue his work in the theoretical field. In the fourth duma, six bol'sheviki were at feud with seven men'sheviki. The men'sheviki were subdivided into the so-called "liquidators" and the "faithful" (*partiicy*) who desired to maintain the party organisation. The small force of bol'sheviki broke up into otzovisty, Leninists, and other sections; the organs of the respective groups continuing to fight one another with notable vigour.¹

The fury of the reaction, the light thrown upon the government by the Azev affair, the disclosures concerning the provocative suppression of the second duma, the relationship of the tsar to the crafty rogue Rasputin, and various other matters, are an incessant demonstration to the social democracy that it is necessary for it to close its ranks and to organise a central executive committee.

II

§ 153.

THE understanding of Russian Marxism will be facilitated if we make it clear to ourselves that Marxism in Russia is faced by special philosophical and socio-political tasks. Russian socialism has a tradition of its own, and Russian history has

¹ In 1912 there came into existence the organisation committee of the bol'sheviki and the central committee of the men'sheviki. These two committees lead the secret organisations, which are increasing in number. It counts among the absurdities of the reaction that the two clandestine organisations should be permitted to issue daily newspapers. "Luč" (Light) is the bol'shevik organ "Pravda" (Truth) the men'shevik organ. In addition there are a number of scientific reviews and specialist periodicals.

brought into being conditions of a quite peculiar kind, with which Marxism has to concern itself.

German Marxism has made its way into all the countries of Europe, and its tactical and theoretical principles have been widely adopted. As a socio-political system Marxism had to prove its validity in the struggle with extant social and political conditions, and in competition with other social and socialistic theories. England had its parliamentarism and its trade unionism, and in that country there has been little trace of a revolutionary movement since the days of the chartists. France, on the other hand, possesses the tradition of the great revolution and of several other notable revolutions; it has numerous socialistic systems and parties; it is a republic *sui generis*. In England and France, therefore, Marxism has made headway slowly, and only by small degrees has it been accepted by the working classes and their leaders. In Russia, Marxism found the field occupied by Russian socialism and its traditions of nihilism and terrorism, the traditions of the revolutionary *narodničestvo*. The assassination of Emperor Alexander II constitutes, as it were, a boundary stone between Russian socialism and Marxist socialism. In Russia, absolutism is dominant, absolutism in a markedly theocratic form; the country is predominantly agricultural, for manufacturing industry is found as yet in scattered oases only, and we cannot speak here of industrialisation as it is known in western lands. Owing to all these circumstances, Marxism in Russia has had to undertake peculiar tasks.

It was mainly a practical question of tactics which, after the split in the *Zemlja i Volja* in the year 1879, led a section of the revolutionaries and socialists into the Marxist camp. The supporters of the *Černyi Pereděl* made it their direct concern to study more closely the socialist movement in foreign countries. Plehanov, the leader of this group, says of himself that by 1880 he had already in large part become a social democrat (he does not say that he had become a Marxist).

It was not by chance that Plehanov and his followers turned above all to Germany to study social democracy and to learn from the German movement. The Marxist recruits followed in the footsteps of their leaders, and it must be remembered that it had long been customary to supplement Russian culture by studies in Germany. Moreover, at this epoch the labour movement in Germany was extremely vigorous

and was arousing general interest. The reconstituted empire, led by Bismarck, deliberately took up the campaign against socialism in the name of legitimate monarchy, so that from this aspect Prussia is a more advanced Russia. A year before the organisation of the Černyi Pereděl, Bismarck had introduced the exceptional laws, and thus it came to pass that the first Russian social democrats had before them the example of German Marxism in a revolutionary mood, as they had expected and perhaps desired from the first.

None the less, the development of Marxism in Germany took the direction of reformist revisionism and parliamentarism, and by German influence the Russian Marxists were likewise urged in the direction of revisionism. As early as 1894, Struve declared that he was not wholly orthodox.

Apart from differences of tactics, the Marxists were distinguished from the socialistic narodniki in respect of the historical and philosophical explanation of the evolution of Russia, the chief problem being whether Russia was already in a position in which she would be able to realise the socialistic order, although the country had not passed through all the stages of economic evolution that were known to Europe. Above all it was a disputed point whether Russia would have to traverse a capitalist stage in order, in accordance with the Marxist law of evolution, to pass from capitalism to socialism.

Finally there was a struggle upon the philosophical plane. It is true that the Russian socialists and radicals were materialists; like Marx and Engels, they were disciples of Feuerbach; adhesion to Comte and positivism was common ground. But Marxism, with its historic or economic materialism, involved a distinct trend.

In addition, it was the so-called subjective method which separated the Russian socialists and radicals from the Marxists. The Marxists adopted a thoroughly objectivist standpoint. Eliminating, or at least ignoring, the individual consciousness, they took the masses and the laws of their historical evolution as valid arguments for the realisation of socialism. The significance and the foundation of socialism were differently conceived in the two camps. The controversy was one of ethics versus history.

To-day when we speak of the narodniki we mean above all the philosophical defenders of the narodničestvo in this conflict with Marxism. But the term has a wide meaning

in addition, for narodničestvo likewise signifies the parties and sections of the new narodničestvo and the social revolutionaries which have come into existence since the revolution and the promulgation of the constitution. Some of the Marxists, with a certain malice, will not give the social revolutionaries any other name than "narodniki."

§ 154.

IN the old byliny (epic folk-poems) of Russia, one of the favourite heroes is Ilja of Murom, the peasant. When the country is in straits, Ilja awakens from his apathy, displays his superhuman energy, and saves the situation.

Of all the European states, Russia is alike economically and socially the most predominantly agricultural, and we have to note in this connection the peculiar characteristics of Russian agriculture, which on the whole, and above all in the remoter areas, is still in an extremely primitive condition. It is natural that the great concern of Russia, the chief concern alike of the government and of the political parties, should be the peasant and his destiny.

Interest in the mužik and in agriculture had already awakened in the days of Muscovy. From the time of Peter onwards the government perforce became more and more occupied with the matter, for the national finances demanded an increasing revenue. The great landowners, as we have learned, took a selfish advantage of the situation, using their powers, not in the interest of the state, not in the interest of the peasantry, and not indeed in their own true interest.

The mood prevailing at the close of the eighteenth century secured literary expression in the idyllic and pastoral poetry written during the reign of Catherine, by the Anacreontically inclined L'vov and others. Doubtless European example exercised a contributory influence. Just as the French disciples of Rousseau were, à la Chateaubriand, making a cult of the Red Indians, so did the Russians discover the mužik.

Great honour was then paid to the mužik. Even before the days of Herder, his songs were being collected and were receiving due literary appreciation, and this aesthetic recognition was followed by an appreciation of folk-performances in other fields. In the days of the enlightenment and of the popular philosophy, proverbs were regarded as incorporating an

excellent, if not the most excellent, philosophy of the sound human understanding, as incorporating the true wisdom of life. Subsequently the customs and the economic institutions of the peasantry were looked upon as the embodiment of the best possible social institutions. Finally, for the intellectuals, the *mužik* came in addition to represent the religious ideal.

Yet Ilja of Murom, the Russian hero, was nothing but a serf. The aspirations of the humanitarians Radiščev and Pnin, the hopes of the decabrists and of the liberal thinkers, writers, and statesmen during the reign of Nicholas I, were not realised until 1861. Ilja's fetters were not struck off until long after his western congeners had been free men.

The new Russian literature reflects the growing interest in the *mužik's* fate. Beginning with Puškin, modern Russian authors have depicted an idealised rural life, and from the sixties onwards an increasing number of writers have dealt with all the activities of the peasants. Allusion was made to this literary development in connection with our analysis of the liberation of the peasantry and of the agrarian crisis.

"C'est la campagne qui fait le pays, et c'est le peuple de la campagne qui fait la nation." These words of Rousseau in *Emile* are the creed of the *narodničestvo*, in so far as that movement is simply an expression of the fact that Russia is preeminently agrarian, and that therefore all thoughts concerning Russia and Russia's destiny turn upon the *mužik*. Government and administration are busied with thoughts of the *mužik*; art and literature, history and the social sciences, centre in the *mužik*; the *mužik* constitutes an important section of every political program.

The *narodničestvo*, therefore, was likewise the basis of Russian socialism, the *mir* and the *artel* becoming the hope of Russian communism. Beginning with the slavophiles, the *narodničestvo* recurs in Herzen, in Bakunin, in Černyševskii and his successors; the secret societies of the revolutionaries and the terrorists raise the war-cry, Land and Freedom.

The *narodničestvo* is not a unified doctrine, and was never advocated by a single leading authority, as socialism was advocated by Marx. Groups of various shades of opinion, and at a later date various political parties, have endeavoured after their respective fashions and in divers domains to expound the fundamental ideas of the *narodničestvo*.

Of political importance in the beginning of the seventies

was the movement of the intellectuals, and in especial of the younger intellectuals, who endeavoured to educate the people and to win them on behalf of a program of social and political reconstruction. It is frequently contended that Lavrov was the originator of the movement "towards the people." True enough that Lavrov, in his *Historical Letters* (1868-1869), insisted upon the duty of self-sacrifice on behalf of the folk, and thus did much to promote the movement "towards the people." But that movement had been directly advocated by other writers before Lavrov. It originated out of the peculiar situation which ensued upon the liberation of the peasantry. The intellectuals, if they wished to realise their social and political ideals, had to turn for help to the enfranchised peasants. The movement was favoured by the literary idealisation of the peasant.¹

Simultaneously with the political movement there originated the ethico-economical movement introduced by A. N. Engelhardt. The intelligentsia was to withdraw to the country and was to engage in rational agriculture ("to establish itself upon the soil").

Towards the close of the seventies occurred the development of the radical and revolutionary narodničestvo led by the Narodnaja Volja. After the assassination of Alexander II, the revolutionary mood became weaker, and at the same time, owing to the increasing strength of Marxism, the narodničestvo was compelled, not merely to revise its doctrines, but above all to formulate them with greater precision. The development of manufacturing industry and the growth of the towns were contributory causes of the change, for an increasing number of peasants became operatives. It is usual to speak of a crisis in the narodničestvo, setting in during the eighties and attaining its climax in the middle nineties, when the Marxists were endeavouring to furnish statistical proofs that the teaching of the narodniki was fallacious.

¹ In 1861 Herzen issued to the students sent down from the university the watchword, to the folk. In 1862 Bakunin urged upon the young "the heroic action of drawing near to the folk and reconciliation with the folk"; and from Bakunin originated the phrase "towards the people." Pisarev commended physical toil as a means for genuine approximation to the folk.

§ 155.

JUZOV (Kablitz) attempted to provide a philosophic basis for the narodničestvo, not however with much success. He was a diligent translator of Spencer and the English empiricists (Bain and Mill), and he published detailed studies of the raskolniki, whom he considered to embody the genuine Russian essence. Juzov accepted Spencer's and Comte's emotionalism, and in his consideration of the national essence and of national character, he found these to subsist psychologically in the realm of feeling, in the dominance of emotion over understanding.

By his campaign against intellectualism he was led to take up a position adverse to the intelligentsia and to their endeavours on behalf of popular education. Drawing a sharp distinction between the nation and the state, he lapsed into a hazy apolitism, conceiving the mir and the artel to furnish sufficient support for the folk and for its economic activities in the domains of agriculture and home industry. Juzov's *Principles of the Narodničestvo* (1882, etc.) thus inclined to the side of the reaction under Alexander III, and was opposed to the radical and revolutionary trend of the narodničestvo.¹

The more critical adherents of the narodničestvo did not follow Juzov's lead, being inclined rather to accept the views of Lavrov, Černyševskii, and Mihailovskii. On the other hand, some of the narodniki were especially interested in the economic aspect of the problem. In deliberate opposition to Marx and the Marxists, they attempted to show that the economic and social evolution of Russia was quite peculiar, was distinct from and independent of that of Europe. Notable was the manner in which the teaching of the narodničestvo was likewise defended by the historians of literature.²

¹ Abramov, a talented writer of belles lettres, represented in his work the same trend as Juzov. During the middle eighties Selgunov stigmatised "Abramovism" (Abramovščina) as a reactionary development of the narodničestvo.

² In this connection, mention should be made of Ivanov-Razumnik, author of a number of works bearing on the history of literature, wherein he defended the attitude of the narodničestvo as against Marxism. The most notable of these books were, *A History of the Russian Social Spirit* (1908), and *The Meaning of Life* (1910). But he insisted on the need for a "critical" narodničestvo, and accepted the experience philosophy, while basing his views upon Kant, especially in ethical matters. "Russian socialism" and Marxism, he said, were not opposites, but Russian Marxism must certainly be contrasted with the narodničestvo. K. Kačorovskii was another writer who discussed the theory and history of the mir (*The Russian Village Community*, 1900 et seq.).

The later narodniki modified the doctrine which had been first advocated by the slavophiles and Herzen. To a large extent they accepted Marx's theory of value and agreed with his history and criticism of capitalism, but they modified his statement of historic evolution. Marx had declared that the historical evolution of mankind was a necessary development from primitive communism through the intermediate stage of capitalism into the higher and definitive form of communism. The narodniki considered that the Russian mir and artel represented primitive communism, but they believed that Russia could attain the higher and definitive form of socialism and communism without passing through the stage of capitalism. Capitalism had indeed developed in Europe, but would not be able to establish itself in Russia. The narodniki admitted that the muzik had not sufficiently developed the mir and the artel, had not turned them adequately to account; it was necessary therefore to educate the peasant, and this was the mission of the intelligentsia.

The narodniki did not overlook the fact that in Russia, too, certain capitalistic developments had taken place; they perceived that foreign capital had found its way from Europe into Russia. But they considered this capitalism an artificial product; they looked upon it as a continuation of the exploitation which European capitalism had undertaken in the case of all the less civilized peoples to the detriment of these. To the narodniki, Russian capitalism seemed purely destructive; it was not favouring political development, as European capitalism had done; it could not possibly undergo a vigorous evolution, for the foreign markets were already occupied, and the demand in the home market was weak. Russia, therefore, now that the liberation of 1861 had stimulated more intensive economic, social, and political activities among the peasants, would make its way forward with the aid of agriculture and home industry; it would never be capitalised, and therefore would never be proletarianised. In like manner, the narodniki believed that there would never develop in Russia a system of large-scale landed proprietorship working on capitalist lines. Russian agriculture in conjunction with Russian industry, both passing to a higher stage of development, would constitute a natural, organic, socialistic whole.

The later narodniki, adopting methods contrasting with those of the earlier members of their school, endeavoured to

provide a firm inductive foundation for these basic doctrines, engaging in a statistical and historical study, and attempting to show that the economic and social conditions of the eighties and nineties furnished support for their outlook. It was the especial merit of Voroncov that, in contrast with Juzov, he aimed at the inductive verification of his teaching by the use of statistics, especially those furnished by the zemstvos.

The Marxists, for their part, were engaged in the onerous task of effecting a scientific survey of the history of Russia's economic evolution. Having secured as accurate statistics as possible concerning the economic conditions of Russia (number of factories, operatives, etc.) and concerning the position of the various classes, and having studied the development of industry and commerce, they endeavoured to prove, and indeed succeeded in proving, that Russia, notwithstanding the mir, notwithstanding the artels and the home industries, was already carrying on its economic life on a capitalist basis, and that the proletarianisation of the operatives and peasants was by now far advanced.

This criticism and counter-criticism of the narodniki (Voroncov, Nikolai-on, Karyšev, etc.) and the Marxists (Plehanov, Struve, Tugan-Baranovskii, etc.) was the chief concern of Russian theorists and politicians and of the wider circle of the intelligentsia during the early and middle nineties. The liberals took sides against the narodniki, although they were not in all points in agreement with the Marxists.¹

¹ The utterances of Marx and Engels upon the question discussed in the text are not without importance. These two writers were no less hostile towards absolutist Russia than had been the European liberals of 1848. As previously recounted, Marx became personally acquainted with a number of Russians, and the influence of these could not fail to confirm him in his unfavourable views. In the first volume of *Capital* (1867), Marx engaged in a vigorous polemic against Herzen. In the second edition (1872), this adverse passage was suppressed; Marx commended the Russian translation of *Capital*, spoke favourably of the before-mentioned works by Ziber, and extolled Černyševskii for his critique of Mill. As early as 1870, in Marx's letter to the Russian section of the International in Geneva, a word of praise had been given to Černyševskii and to Flerovskii (Condition of the Working Classes in Russia). In his letters to the Russian editor and translator of the first volume of *Capital*, Nikolai-on (Danielssohn), Marx, in 1873, declared himself opposed to Čičerin's theory concerning the origin of the mir. In 1877, Mihailovskii, writing in the "Otečestvennyja Zapiski," basing his views on Marx's history of European capitalism, had anticipated a sinister future for Russian economic evolution. Writing, however, to the editor of this periodical, Marx declared that if Russia should continue to pursue the path entered in 1861, that country would rob itself of the finest opportunity that any nation had ever had of eluding all the vicissitudes of capitalistic organisation. Marx further declared in this com-

§ 156.

IN matters of detail the narodniki frequently differ considerably one from another. Some incline to be conservative and slavophil, whilst others are socialistic and westernist in trend. These differences depend upon the extent to which they make concessions to Marxism, or upon the other hand attempt to interpret Marxist doctrines in their own sense.

The great difference between the economic and social structure of Russia as contrasted with the rest of Europe, and the peculiarities of Russian economic evolution, rendered the doctrines of the narodniki possible. Seeing that Russian

munication that his history of European capitalism (in the first volume of *Capital*) was not a historico-philosophical theory of the general course of evolution, an evolution which all nations must inevitably follow. In 1882, writing an introduction for the Russian translation of the Communist Manifesto (the translation by Věra Zasulič) Marx and Engels insisted that the mir ought not to be broken up, as the village community had been in the west, for it might serve as the starting point of a communistic development, but could do so only on condition that the Russian revolution should give the signal for a working-class revolution in the west. Writing to Nikolai-on in 1892, Engels recalled Marx's words of 1877, and declared that the Russian peasant was already feeling the traditional Russian agrarian conditions (those of the mir) to be a fetter, as in former days the peasant had felt similar conditions to be in Europe. "I am afraid," continued Engels, "that we shall soon have to look upon your mir as no more than a memory of the irrecoverable past, and that in the future we shall have to do with a capitalistic Russia. If this be so, a splendid chance will unquestionably have been lost." Engels anticipated the proletarianisation of the mužik, but anticipated likewise the ruin of the great landed proprietors, who would be compelled by the burden of their debts to alienate their lands. Between the proletarians and the impoverished landed proprietors there was pressing in a new class of landowners, the village usurers and the burghers from the towns, who would perhaps be the ancestry of the coming agrarian aristocracy. In this letter and in other letters of 1892, Engels admitted that large-scale industry in Russia was being artificially cultivated, but he rightly pointed out that similar artificial methods were being used to promote industrialisation in other lands. As soon as Russia ceased to be a purely agricultural state, she must necessarily adopt artificial methods of industrialisation (protective measures, etc.). Engels pointed out to Nikolai-on the inevitable consequences of the capitalisation of Russia, underlining the analogies with the other countries whose economic development was described in *Capital*. In 1893 Engels entered into a controversy with Struve, who took a lighthearted view of the evils of capitalisation. Engels believed, with Nikolai-on, that the capitalisation of Russia would, in view of the peculiar institutions of that country, involve an extensive and disastrous social revolution. Nevertheless he did not share Nikolai-on's pessimism. The mir, certainly, was doomed; its continued existence was impossible as soon as some of its members had become debtors (and in fact slaves) of the others. Capitalism, however, would open up new perspectives: new hopes would dawn; a great nation such as the Russian would survive any crisis.

economic statistics are still very imperfect, it is difficult, concerning disputed points, to adopt an apodictic interpretation of the facts, one that should exclude every possibility of doubt. Nevertheless the position of the narodniki has become untenable.

Let us consider the question of the capitalisation of Russia.

The eighties, in the reign of Alexander III (the epoch of the new economic policy which supported itself on French capital), was the era during which the historico-philosophical and economic views of the narodniki secured literary formulation. To others as well as to the narodniki, the febrile industrialisation of the country by the state was looked upon as a hothouse growth.

Russia was largely provided with capital from abroad, so that in this sense the development was "artificial," and was, as the narodniki phrased it, "nursed" by the state. But in a number of European countries, in Austria for example, and of late date in Hungary, foreign capital was introduced, and industrialisation was promoted by the state, no less "artificially" than in Russia. Similar conditions prevailed at one time in Germany, and almost universally.

It is true that the (foreign) capital of Russia was not gradually accumulated as it was in Europe, where the accumulation of capital was effected out of industry, and *pari passu* with the growth of industry. In Russia, however, side by side with the capital invested in large-scale manufacture, the working capital of home industry (*kustar'*) has continued to exist. Small-scale manufacture carried on in houses, has developed alongside large-scale capitalist manufacture, giving rise to specific investments of capital, technical schooling, and so on. The inadequate facilities for communication in most parts of Russia, the large expanse of thinly populated areas, and above all the primitive state of agriculture, have helped to maintain *kustar'* industry; the simultaneous industrialisation and capitalisation of the two chief cities and of certain districts (eight in number) constituting industrial oases—districts which either enjoy an exceptionally favourable geographical situation or have been endowed by nature with coal, ores, naphtha, etc.—have favoured the growth of *kustar'* industry.

The Marxists drew attention to the fact that in Russia industrial concentration and the concentration of capital were taking place to a greater extent than in Germany and other

European lands, and references were made to the similarities between Russian and American economic development.

No doubt this so-called concentration must be accurately explained in the light of Russian conditions, its distinct forms and causes must be grasped. A difference must be made between the concentration of operatives and the concentration of labour on the one hand, and the concentration of capital on the other. For example, the plethora of operatives is referable to their inadequate qualifications and to their poor capacity for work, for the majority of them are still peasants and semi-peasants, whose "concentration" is of a quite peculiar kind. Again, the concentration of capital has quite a different significance when great capitalists are still few in number, and when these appear to act as concentrators because from the very outset it has only been possible for men with large capital to undertake industrial enterprise. Since there does not exist in Russia a middle class corresponding to that known to Europe, the owners of a moderate amount of capital are likewise unknown. Nevertheless, in Russia, too, there has occurred an increasing development of trusts and cartels, whilst in addition there exist in that country the monopolies which are already of old standing.

Russia is becoming industrialised and capitalised; manufacturing industry, home industry, and agriculture, being transformed and developed by industrialisation and capitalisation. The home market is not so weak as the narodniki declared. This is evidenced by the increasing imports in spite of high duties, and by the increasing deposits in the saving banks. Russian exports of manufactured goods are as yet scanty, but even here the increase is noteworthy.

It is hardly needful to adduce serious arguments against the views of those among the narodniki who desire by all possible means to keep Russia a purely agricultural country, and who, with that end in view, go so far as to discountenance political activity and to boycott the constitution, for it is so obvious that in the domain of agriculture the control, cooperation, and initiative of the duma has led to an improvement in agricultural methods. If the narodniki said that parliament would destroy the mir, we have to remember that it is open to question whether it is really to the interest of the muzik that the mir should be retained. Moreover, it was not the duma, but the government hostile to the duma, which

nearly brought about the destruction of the mir by the innovation of November 9, 1906. Again, though the defects of this measure are numerous, it cannot justly be said to have been injurious on the whole. Finally, it is certain to-day that agriculture and stock-raising are making notable and rapid progress, partly owing to the introduction of cooperative farming, and partly owing to the technical training in agriculture furthered by the government.

The historically conditioned peculiarities of Russian agricultural life will persist, just as Russian literature and art, Russian science and philosophy, Russian religious and social conditions, remain peculiar, notwithstanding the influence of the west, and notwithstanding the identical tendencies of evolution.

The narodniki could not shake their minds free from the mythical conception of the soil as "mother earth," or "little mother earth."¹ Doubtless the narodniki had studied economics, most of them, indeed, were Marxists, or rather, to be precise, most of them expressed their ideas in Marxist terminology. They analysed the special problem of land rent, but continually diverged into the mythical conception and estimate of the soil. The narodniki were the successors of the old physiocrats, who regarded agriculture as the primitive and natural economy, opposing thereto manufacture, commerce, and the other occupations of the "classe stérile" as unnatural. According to this view, agriculture and manufacturing industry, country and town, peasant and manufacturer, soil and capital, are irreconcilable opposites; the history of human development is a capitalist aberration which at the last moment Russia may be able to avoid.

In the light of these doctrines, strictly applied, fruit—fresh fruit—would be the only "natural" product of the soil, the only "natural" nutriment. Indeed we may go further, and say that only certain varieties of fruit could serve our turn, for fruit trees, just like cereals, have for the most part been improved by selection, while as for bread, this is an extremely complicated artifact. Indeed, it was the soil which first provided the stone from which the most primitive tools were made, and all that chemistry and chemical manufacturing industry can do is to elaborate the gifts of the soil.

¹ The Russian term "zemlja" denotes the world, land, and soil; in the doctrine of the slavophiles and the narodniki, these three significations merge.

The first peasant needed tools, which were not provided him by nature in the form in which he used them. Cereals are to-day to a notable extent a manufactured product, even if we consider them simply as produce, and not as commodities in the marketable sense. It is true that the narodnik may object that the working of capitalism has been to turn the soil into a mere instrument for the production of land-rent, thus annulling the old conception of the soil as the nourisher ; but even from this outlook it is necessary to strive for the technical perfectionment of agriculture, seeing that increase of population enforces this endeavour.

Besides, the narodniki have forgotten the question of stock-raising. Is stock-raising likewise perfectly natural? What is its relationship to the bringing of the soil under cultivation? Which was the earlier development, which is "more primitive"?

Again, and similarly, we must enquire why home work, and above all the so-called home industry, should be considered more primitive and more natural than technically perfected factory industry.

The history of agriculture is part of the general history of industry, and it is utterly fallacious to separate the two spheres of labour one from another, to oppose them one to another as Ormuzd to Ahriman.

But in addition to the economic problem, the socio-political problem, the problem of the apportionment of the soil presses for solution. It is really hard to see how the mir, the artel, and home work (whether as home industry for the capitalist market or as home industry for the supply of family needs), could solve the social question in the socialist sense. We have merely to turn the pages of Russian history to note on almost every page how unjustly the soil has been apportioned. We have to ask, Why did "holy" Russia, despite its mir and artel and kustar', fall into capitalist temptation at all, why did the Russian Ivan abandon his steppe to seek the modern Jerusalem?

Confirmation of the objections I have adduced is furnished by the agrarian program formulated by the narodniki after the revolution of 1905. The analysis of this program is beyond our present scope, but I may be permitted a brief reference to it in so far as it furnishes an additional argument against the fundamental positions of the narodniki.

As early as 1905, the "young" narodniki came forward with a new program. This program for the "nationalisation" of the land was nothing more than a scheme for an authoritarian state socialism, which aimed, by the systematic restriction of capitalism, at creating for the first time an ideal mir, the mir that was to save Russia. It is not difficult to understand how the young narodniki yielded to the lure of state socialism when we remember that many of the old narodniki (Nikolai-on, for instance) had placed their hopes on state socialism and its agrarian bureaucracy. When we speak of the state, however, we must think of the extant Russian state of Peter the Great, an institution which the narodniki were often no less ready to ban than the slavophiles had been.

This state now received the approval of the "folk-socialists," an offshoot of the narodničestvo formed after 1905. Pěšehonov, who was their spokesman, reasoned soundly when he displayed to the young narodniki the defects of the arbitrary repressive measures which would degrade the commune to an agrarian ghetto; yet he, for his part, distinguishing between "possibilities" and simple "desires," compounded with the historically extant monarchy, hallowed as it was by centuries, and assigned to it a decisive and leading role in agrarian reform. In regard to details, the "nationalisation" of the land was to be carried out in accordance with the teachings of Henry George, for Pěšehonov forgot that Henry George had based his ideas of reform upon the institutions of a state utterly different from the Russian. Or are we perchance to believe that Pěšehonov was prepared to approve the revolution and the constitutionalism it had inaugurated?

However this may be, Pěšehonov lays great stress on the consideration that the revolution must be social and not political, and he continually relapses into the apolitical socialism of the narodničestvo. He maintains, for example, that the demand for the eight-hour day will not be effectively realised until every worker has his own portion of land, for then the workers will not be dependent upon the factory. It is plain that Pěšehonov is here endeavouring to put a narodnikist gloss upon the social democratic demand which the folk-socialists have adopted. He refers to the unsuccessful strike of the St. Petersburg operatives, which the employers converted into a lock-out, simply letting the strikers starve. The operatives failed because they had no "land." Pěšehonov

forgets that well-organised workers win their strikes, not through "land," but through the possession of ample reserve funds and through discipline. But far more important, and far more characteristic of narodnikist "socialism," is Pěšehonov's recognition that factories are to continue to exist after the nationalisation of the land. How is it possible, we must ask, when once the land has been nationalised, when every worker (not merely every peasant) shall have received his share of land—how is it possible that these tillers of the soil can be expected to leave their land and to go to work in the factories?

It is plain that the folk-socialists constitute an intermediate link between the liberals (cadets) and the social democrats. Their program is a compromise, whose interest for us lies above all in this, that it is derived rather from the west than from the Russian east. Economically, it is mainly a scheme for ameliorations; socially it is a program for land reform, wherein the ideals of Henry George are reduced within the limits of the practically attainable.

The narodniki entertain uncritical, mythical views concerning the moral worth of the peasant and of rural or village life. It is a fallacy to regard the Russian peasant as at once the economic and the moral saviour of Russia. The country and the rural population, no less than the town and the urban population, possess shortcomings, errors, and vices. Recent critical investigations into the moral condition of rural areas, such as have been made in Germany (and, be it noted, by men of religious and conservative views), should surely put to flight for ever this traditional romanticism and Rousseauism.

A critical survey of Russian rural life would furnish precisely similar results. This is proved by the descriptions we owe to belletristic writers among the narodniki. Some, it is true, like Zlatovratskii, represent the peasant as a moral hero; but others, Glěb Uspenskii and Korolenko for instance, exhibit the mužik as human, all-too-human. Further, the descriptions we owe to such writers as Rěšetnikov show us rural life in positively repulsive colours. For the rest, even the romanticists involuntarily disclose the seamy side of Russian village life.¹

¹ I may allude once more to Mel'nikov, for his descriptions of the raskol have frequently been eulogised in the spirit of the narodničestvo. But his writings indicate the existence among the raskolniki of marked elements of

Thus even Tolstoi, who believed himself to have been led by the *mužiks* and the sectaries to the discovery of true religion, disclosed in his *The Power of Darkness* the moral corruption of the *mužik*. It is enough in this connection to mention Čehov and Gor'kii !

Finally, if we were to believe the descriptions of the *mužik* which have been printed of late in clericalist organs, the Russian saviour and messiah has become an anarchistic hooligan.

In *Smoke*, Turgenev characterises the uncritical *narodničestvo* in the following terms: "The cultured Russian stands before the Russian peasant, makes a profound reverence, and says, 'Heal me, for I am perishing from moral corruption,' and the *mužik* makes a reverence no less profound, and rejoins, 'Help me, I am perishing from ignorance'."

As early as 1862, Turgenev justly indicated to Herzen the political conservatism of the *mužik*, insisting that beneath the sheepskin were concealed the germs of the same bourgeois spirit which Herzen had discerned in the western bourgeoisie. In his prose poem *The Worker and the White Hand* (1878) Turgenev depicts a workman who would like to have the luck-bringing halter wherewith a member of the intelligentsia who has gone down among the people has been hanged—hanged on account of his activities in the cause of the workers. Mihailovskii animadverted upon the "optimism" of Zlatovratskii. It must be admitted that the Russian peasant has changed of late, and has changed for the better, but the improvement is not due to the labours of the *narodniki*. The mir notwithstanding, the Russian village has since 1861 undergone rapid economic and social transformation; during this period the *kulak* (literally "fist," the name given to the village dealer or middleman) has acquired and enlarged his sinister reputation; the Russian village, as is conspicuously indicated by the great rise in prices, has been drawn within the vortex of capitalism.

The young *narodniki* recognise that Russia has already been capitalised and industrialised, and they recognise further that capitalism exhibits for Russia and releases for Russia energies that are not merely negative and destructive, but are in addition positive, organic and formative.

Thus the economic differences between the *narodniki* and sexual decadence, such as a Merežkovskii could well have utilised in his accounts of the sectaries.

the Marxists are overshadowed by the wide divergence between the two camps in the historico-philosophical domain. The two trends are distinguished in respect of the philosophic foundations they attach to socialism, and as a political party the narodniki have since 1905 exhibited numerous transitional stages between the left and the right. Some of them incline towards liberalism, others towards Marxism and social democracy. Of the latter, again, some are revisionists, others orthodox revolutionary Marxists. As previously explained, the social revolutionaries, like their predecessors the adherents of the Narodnaja Volja, are likewise counted among the narodniki.¹

III

§ 157.

FOR the understanding of Russian Marxism it will be advantageous, in view of the intimate mutual connection between Russian and European Marxism and especially between Russian and German Marxism, that we should give a brief account of the state of Marxism in Europe, concentrating our attention upon German Marxism. We shall discuss the crisis within the Marxist movement—for such is the aptest designation of the state of Marxism.²

¹ In illustration of these transitional phases it may be pointed out that after 1905 Voroncov joined the trudoviki. This group was distinguished from the folk-socialists by its tactical methods. As a writer, however, from 1900 onwards, Voroncov became connected with the liberal periodical "Věstnik Evropy," which previously he had fiercely attacked. Thus the views of the narodniki underwent development, and their position was modified. Of late Pěšehonov has been advocating a working alliance between the two socialist parties, between the social revolutionaries and the social democrats.

² In 1898 I gave a summary of the scientific, philosophical, and political situation within the Marxist movement. A more detailed consideration of the same theme will be found in the work which I published in German in 1899, *The Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism*. My analysis has been confirmed by the subsequent history of Marxism, a history with which I have dealt in a number of essays. In the "Zeit" of Vienna during the years 1899 to 1901 appeared: Bernstein's *Suppositions*, Kautsky's *Critique of Bernstein*, *The Millerand Affair*, *The Party Congresses of Stuttgart and Lübeck*, *The Revision of the Hainfeld Program*. In the "Wolfschen Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft" during the years 1904 to 1907 were published: the *Viennese Marx-Studies*, *Lassalle* by H. Oncken, the *Ethics* of A. Menger and of Kautsky, *Vandervelde's Socialistic Essays*. In the "Zeitschrift für Politik" for 1912 was published, *Syndicalism and Democracy* (Lagardelle and Sorel). I append this list of my own writings to justify myself for introducing a summary of my views into the present study.

According to Marx, the organisation of society in the epoch of civilisation, beginning in Greece with the dominance of Athens, and in Italy with the rise of Rome, fundamentally consists in the continual opposition and struggle between two classes; this struggle, he contends, makes up the essence and comprises the content of history; the mass of the working population is kept in subjection by the idle but dominant class, is kept in one form or another of social or political servitude. The state is the political expression of the dominant and oppressing class. In the modern era, class contrasts have become accentuated in the struggle between the proletarian masses and the capitalists. The proletarian masses undergo increasing impoverishment owing to the way in which the product of their labour, value and surplus value, is continuously absorbed by the capitalist entrepreneur; this process will continue until possessions become concentrated in the hands of a very small number of capitalists, and then will come the cataclysm, the definitive revolution, whereby the proletarians will reestablish communism. For in Marx's view, society in its most primitive stage was communistically organised, and primitive communism was swept away when the era of private property began. Extant capitalism is the terminal phase of private property, and in the comparatively near future will yield place to communism. This already imminent communism will doubtless differ in certain respects from primitive communism; it will be a complicated but deliberately thought-out system of social organisation. The coming of the communistic era can be foreseen by the scientific historian; and communism itself, therefore, is in part rooted in the historical process. Practically, socio-politically, the transformation inalterably determined by the objective dialectical process of historical evolution will be brought about in the following manner. In the very last phase of the capitalistic epoch the workers will gain control of the state (the dictatorship of the proletariat), will abolish the state, and will conduct society to the higher communistic stage of evolution. This stage will close the era of historical evolution.

Marx did not furnish a detailed account of the history of this evolution, but in his analysis of capitalist production and of the circulation of goods and commodities he endeavoured to elucidate the application of the dialectical process of evolution to the present day, to the most recent phase of history.

It was left for Engels to undertake a detailed application of the Marxist scheme to history at large.

Marx and Engels were so exclusively historians, so exclusively dialecticians in Hegel's sense, that they were not concerned to undertake an exposition of social organisation (to deal with what Comte termed social statics in contrast with social dynamics). The concept of this organisation can, however, be abstracted from history, and we have moreover for this purpose the Marxist formula known as the doctrine of historical materialism.

Marx contends that the totality of the relationships of production, the economic structure of society, constitutes the real basis upon which the legal and political superstructure is built and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. These relationships of production are, in fact, independent of the human will; they have originated historically, in correspondence with a definite stage of the evolution of the material forces of production. In a certain phase of development the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the preexistent relationships of production (i.e. conditions of ownership) within which they have hitherto had their being. These earlier relationships, which were at first evolutionary forms of the productive energies, now manifest themselves as shackles to those energies, and an epoch of social revolution ensues. With the transformation of the economic basis, the whole colossal superstructure is more or less rapidly overthrown. When we are contemplating such transformations we must ever be careful to distinguish between the material transformation in the economic conditions of production, which is effected in strict conformity with the reign of natural law, and the legal, political, religious, artistic, or philosophical (in a word, ideological) forms wherein human beings become aware of this conflict and carry on the struggle. In broad outline Marx depicts the Asiatic, classical, feudal, and modern capitalist modes of production, respectively, as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The capitalist method of production has created the antagonism between the productive forces of society and the relationships of ownerships, an antagonism which will be solved by the material conditions which this same capitalist structure of society has already prepared; for humanity never sets itself problems which it is incompetent to solve, and indeed

these problems can only become intelligible when the material conditions rendering their solution possible already exist, at least in the germ.

Such is the celebrated formula of historical or economic materialism whereby history is represented as a dialectical and objective mass process independent of the individual will. The formula will be found in the preface to Marx's *Critique of Political Economy*, published in the year 1859. The first sketches of this formulation exist in earlier works, but Marx himself, and to a still greater extent Engels and his younger disciples, were subsequently responsible for such extensive variations in the formula that the "real basis" of productive relationships has been supplemented or replaced by technical advances (including the fundamental sciences of mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc.), racial qualities, the geographical environment, the energies that determine the relationships of population, etc. At the same time, historical materialism, in view of the criticism it encountered, was reduced to a method, a heuristic method.

It would be quite incredible that so obscure and inaccurate a formula should have had so powerful an influence, had it not become the scientific basic formula of revolutionary socialism, which in Germany and other countries has effected the national and international organisation of the working masses to constitute the social democracy.

Marxist historical materialism has been philosophically and sociologically superseded. The history of mankind has a significance different from that which Marx impressed upon it with his doctrine of historical materialism based upon the materialism of Feuerbach.

Practically and socio-politically, just as much as theoretically, Marxism abandons its positions, or at least modifies them to a great extent. In especial it is necessary to insist on the fact that Marxist social democracy, above all in Germany and Austria, has had the revision of its doctrines forced upon it by participation in political and parliamentary work. Revisionism has never possessed any theorist whose ability and force rivalled those of Marx. It was the work of practical politics which necessitated revisionism.

In Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, France, and England, the Marxists, during their political activities within their own party, during their work in parliaments, local governments,

trade unions, etc., had forced upon them the conclusion that state and church are no mere superstructure, as Marx contended (Marx's own thought was obscure, since he conceived the superstructure, now as the state, now as political ideals, and now again as law). Moreover, in the work of practical politics the Marxist learned to prize nationality as an independent social organisation side by side with the organisation of state and church—in a word, he came to recognise that the complicated organisation of society cannot be accurately conceived in accordance with the simplifying formula of historical materialism. At the same time the practical Marxist learned that the social democracy and its program were less radically distinct from the other democratic parties and their programs than the founder of the social democracy had assumed and than many of its leaders still assume. Bernstein's phrase "from sect to party" affords a summary watchword of the new view which through the discussion of tactics has come to prevail widely among the Marxists of all lands.

This discussion of tactics relates in especial to the possible participation of the social democrats in the government. If the discussion laid especial stress upon the question of the acceptance of office by socialists and upon the question of voting for the state budget, the restriction of outlook, though comprehensible enough, is uncritical, for participation in local government is essentially of the same nature as participation in the government of the state—quite apart from the consideration that a Berlin town councillor may have more important functions than a minister in Baden.

In the last resort, the discussion of tactics must lead to a revision of the concept of social revolution; the terms revolution, reform, and evolution, must be accurately defined. The social democrat who enters parliament as a deputy, who enters a bourgeois institution, participates in the working of the state which in theory he boycotts and negates. In practice, therefore, he has decided in favour of the tactics of reform, for history has taught him that the time for the definitive social revolution anticipated by Engels and Marx has not yet arrived. In truth the people who expect too much are of as little practical use as were their forerunners the millenarians. In practice, the Marxist who is dominated by the revolutionary mood and aspires to the (definitive) social revolution is faced with a dilemma. According to his program, extant society

is wholly bad ; but he must either recognise it inasmuch as he makes no attempt to improve it, or else he must attempt to improve it and must thereby recognise it—and either course will conflict with the letter of the Marxist doctrine.

But theory, too, confutes Marxism. It is an old story that the materialism of Marx and Engels is untenable ; the entire doctrine of historical or economic materialism is simply unscientific as a form of psychological and metaphysical materialism ; and the whole conception of the " superstructure " is obscure and devoid of meaning.

The positivism of Marx and Engels, no less than their materialism, is epistemologically untenable and incapable of being carried out in practice.

With positivism, there falls likewise historism in its extreme form, the attempt to base socialism as communism in a purely objective manner and by a law of evolution. If Marx and Engels conceive the notion of science and conceive their scientific socialism in this sense of positivist historism, it is because they start from the entirely false assumption that for the masses, for society, for humanity (this concept is not accurately defined by Marx and Engels) and its history, the individual consciousness is a negligible quantity. The theory is in conformity with the teaching of Comte and with his contempt for psychology, but it is fundamentally erroneous. When Marx says, It is not the consciousness of human beings which determines their existence, but conversely it is their social existence which determines their consciousness, this is to say nothing at all, and is moreover to beg the question (by the use of " existence " and " social existence " as convertible terms). There is simply no such thing as a mass consciousness or a class consciousness ; when Engels sacrifices the " beggarly individual " to the mass, and eliminates the individual consciousness as a negligible quantity, he is altogether wrong-headed. Everything which Engels and the Marxists adduce for the elucidation of their conception of ideology as a reflex, an indication, a sign, and so on, lacks clearness, and is erroneous, precisely for the reason that the individual consciousness is not falsified in the sense in which Engels declared it to be falsified when he explained individual motive as appearance, imagination, and illusion.

Postkantian philosophy has made so thorough a study of psychology and sociology, and above all of the philosophy of

history, that, despite certain new attempts à la Dürkheim, we can quietly ignore the mass consciousness talked of by Marx and Engels. The discussion concerning the nature of history has been so diligently and so persistently conducted that we are further in a position to discard Marx's conception of history and his purely would-be-objective historism. The historical dialectic which was transferred from the Hegelian system into the Marxist system as an objective "material dialectic," has no real existence.

Marx and Engels developed historism into an ultra-positivist amorality which is untenable precisely because the individual consciousness cannot be absorbed by the mythical mass consciousness. (The concept of mass is vaguely employed by Marx and Engels, now as party, and now as humanity.) From the notion of the determinism of nature and of history, Marx deduced the unfreedom of the individual will, instead of empirically approaching the problem of the so-called freedom of the will through a psychological analysis of facts. Thus determinism was transformed into fatalism.

In practice, none the less, Marx and Engels made a predominant appeal to the ethical decision of the individual; they continually appealed against capitalism to the revolutionary sentiment; every speech in a social democratic meeting, the entire social democratic party education, is a flagrant disavowal of objectivist amorality; theoretical amorality is overthrown by practical morality. To Marx and Engels, moral preachments are tedious and appear ineffective—but they are themselves preachers, and expect their sermons to change the bourgeois outlook. Marxism as a philosophical and sociological system is, after all, itself nothing but ideology, and this ideology has been conceived prior to the practical realisation of communism. Marxist ideology is not a superstructure but a substructure and an anteroom!

Socialism can have no other than an ethical foundation. The European and Russian predecessors of Marx are perfectly right here. Criticism, science, does not do away with the motivation of actions or with the formulation of aims; utopianism is not rooted in morality, but in inadequate criticism and in the lack of scientific grasp. Consequently Marx's amorality is itself utopian. Unquestionably it is far from easy to grasp and to decide how the course of history exercises a codeterminative influence upon the individual, or to what

extent individual consciousness and will find expression in the mass and in the course of evolution, but this is not to admit that the individual is "beggarly" and of no account. There are differences between individuals; historiographers speak of great men, and associate historical happenings with the personalities of these; to what extent they are right in doing so is a question to be decided on its merits in each case, but anyhow the so-called great men are themselves individuals. Bernstein does no more than give expression to an admitted truth when he desires to establish socialism subjectively not objectively, ethically not historically. Socialism is an ethical problem.

Are we then to return to Kant? That is a different question. It is true that Engels discovered his philosophical mentors in Kant and Fichte as well as in Hegel, and reasons can be adduced for a synthesis of Marxism with Kantianism. Vorländer and others made such an attempt; Tugan-Baranovskii and men of similar views have written on the other side. The cry, Return to Kant, may signify that the Marxists wish to devote themselves to epistemological criticism, and to this extent there is good reason for the adoption of such a watchword. But Kant's philosophy is essentially ethical, and we are compelled to ask how the amoralist and positivist historicism of Marx and Engels can be practically united (I mean of course organically united) with the teaching of Kant.

The orthodox Marxists, as contrasted with the younger socialists and the revisionists, raise the cry, Return to Marx. In many cases, especially in the field of political economy, there may be good reason for the demand. As a philosopher, Marx has been superseded, and revisionism has made no new contribution in this domain.

The Marxists, the orthodox Marxists that is to say, are accustomed to conduct their apologetics in a purely scholastic manner. Scholasticism arises everywhere and always when reputedly absolute concepts and absolute truths have to be maintained and restated in opposition to the progress of thought. For the orthodox Marxists, however, it remains a scandal that the so-called unorthodox revisionism should continue to find a place within the party, should be tolerated there, and should be enabled to maintain its place with the assistance of scholastic and ambiguous resolutions passed at party congresses.¹

¹ The exclusion of the author Hildebrand for his colonial policy, decreed

Socialism is not identical with Marxism, but Marxism is an extremely important and significant socialistic system.

§ 158.

THE Russian social democratic refugees formulated their first program in the year 1884.

Russia, they said (and we read here the Marxist diagnosis), is suffering from the development of capitalism, but likewise from the incompleteness of that development. The outcome of these conditions is the lack of a middle class, one competent to take the initiative in the struggle against absolutism. Consequently the socialist intelligentsia must take over this task, must assume leadership in the fight for liberation; their work is to secure free political institutions for Russia and to found a democratic constitution. In matters of detail the constitutionalist demands of the social democrats were essentially identical with those of the Narodnaja Volja.

The socialist intelligentsia is to lead; but to lead whom? There is no middle class, the peasant is conservative, so there remain only the operatives, the proletariat. This last must be organised by the socialist intelligentsia, prepared for the struggle against absolutism, but also for the struggle against the bourgeois parties of a coming day.

In addition to the preparatory work, the program recognises that there is need for a terrorist campaign against the absolutist government. The relationship to the terrorist party of the Narodnaja Volja is expressly based upon the divergent conception of the social democrats regarding "the so-called seizure of power by the revolutionary party and regarding the aims of the immediate activity of the socialists within the working class."

The mere name of the new group, which was known as the Group for the Liberation of Labour, recalls the phraseology of the Gotha program¹ which served in 1875 as the basis of a fusion between the Marxist "Eisenachers" and the Lassallists. In certain other respects, too, the Russian program is reminiscent of the German, but the most important resemblance of

in April 1912 by the executive committee of the German Social Democratic Party, having been referred to a special arbitral committee, was confirmed by four votes against three.

¹ Cf. English translation, *The Gotha Program*, Socialist Labour Press, 1919.

all lies in this, that both were compromise programs. The Russian program was that of the terrorist executive committee, restated in Marxist terminology; it was really Marxist in so far only as concerned the nature of its hopes for the future, seeing that for the present it recommended the tactics of the terrorist Narodnaja Volja.

Plehanov, who with Věra Zasulič and P. Akselrod, was the leader of the group, subsequently admitted the inconsistencies of the program, and agreed that unduly extensive concessions were made to the narodniki. Personally he endeavoured to make good the defect and to expound clearly the principles of social democracy.

In articles and other writings published during the eighties, Plehanov followed the lines of the *Communist Manifesto*, doing this notably in *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883) and *Our Differences* (1884). Subsequently, during the nineties, he was guided rather by the tactics of the German social democracy.

Plehanov was critical of his socialist predecessors, the Bakuninists, the Blanquists, the Lavrovists, and the Narodnaja Volja. He described Herzen, Bakunin, Tkačev, and Černyševskii as narodniki, and he rejected the doctrines of the narodničestvo. He anticipated the further development of Russian capitalism, already fairly strong by 1884, and at the same time he hoped that the socialist ideal would be realised through the work of the Social Democratic Labour Party. An ex-narodnik and ex-member of the Narodnaja Volja, he regarded as mere utopianism the hopes that had hitherto been centred in the Russian mužik. It was, he said, positively childish utopianism to imagine that ninety per cent. of the members of a national assembly elected by universal suffrage would decide in favour of the socialist (communist) program. The only goal for Russian socialists who desired to keep their fancies within bounds must be, he said, to secure a democratic constitution upon the basis of universal suffrage, and to prepare the elements for the future socialist party of the workers. To this end, the sympathy of society at large was essential, and he therefore warned his fellow socialists against needlessly alarming men of moderate views by the display of the "red phantom." The peasant mentality was not socialist, and therefore the preliminary work must be done by the socialists among the intelligentsia and by the urban operatives. It will be seen that Plehanov assigned to the

"socialists" the role which in 1848 had been assigned by Marx and Engels to the "communists."

In all the older revolutionary trends, from Herzen onwards, there had been, thought Plehanov, a strong admixture of anarchism. In his view, however, the main purpose of the political struggle must be to awaken the political consciousness of the workers and to educate them against absolutism. Baricades and bombs were not the only weapons in the political campaign.

These views had already been enunciated in the essay of 1883 on *Socialism and the Political Struggle*. They were reiterated in 1902 in the opening number of the review "Zarja." He here elaborated the distinction between his own "political" program and the program of Herzen and Herzen's successors, pointing out once more the anarchism that characterised these earlier revolutionaries. At this date, Plehanov had already come to accept the parliamentary tactics of the German social democracy, and subsequently therefore was consistent in his opposition to the boycotting of the duma. In conformity with these views, Plehanov declared himself opposed to the jacobin and anarchist theory of the "seizure of the reins of power," contending that in view of the unpreparedness of the masses this seizure could end only in a fiasco and would display itself in essentials to be nothing beyond an ephemeral conspiracy. When Plehanov thought of the seizure of power he had in mind that the seizure was to be effected by the masses sufficiently prepared for the social revolution, that is to say by the masses of the operatives. But Plehanov held that as far as Russia was concerned the hour for such a seizure was still far distant.

This opposition to anarchist Blanquism likewise inspired Plehanov's philosophical treatise against the narodniki, a work entitled *Concerning the Evolution of the Monistic View of History*. In this book, Plehanov laid the principal stress upon determinism, endeavouring to clarify the concepts of freedom and necessity. Speaking generally, as against the chance-it and trust-to-luck of Blanquism, he advocated a positivist insight into the law-abiding course of historical development as the essence and superior merit of the materialist conception of history.¹

¹ Plehanov was born in 1857, and joined the revolutionary narodniki whilst still a student at the mining academy in St. Petersburg. From the outset he

§ 159.

THE history of the Russian social democracy is an effective refutation of Marxist historical materialism.

The forerunner of the Social Democratic party, the Group for the Liberation of Labour, was a literary association to popularise and diffuse the ideas of Marx. Plehanov's isolation after the disintegration of the party was itself an argumentum ad hominem, for it showed that philosophical ideas are not dependent upon economic relationships to the extent implied by the doctrine of historical materialism. Willingly or unwillingly, Plehanov and the orthodox Russian Marxists were a section of the socialist intelligentsia. In like manner, Marx and Engels were the teachers and organisers of the German social democracy, and according to them, too, the role of the social democratic intelligentsia was one of intellectual leadership. Hunger, said Marx, makes no history; but further, hunger makes no politics and no parties. Marxist ideas are not a mere superstructure, for they anticipate economic development. The Marxist program relates to social and political work which has yet to be performed; it is an anti-

preferred to work among the operatives. He was a member of the Zemlja i Volja, and after the split in that party was one of the leaders of the Černyi Pereděl. In 1880 Plehanov sought refuge in Europe. Here for a time he collaborated in the periodical issued by the Narodnaja Volja, but his antagonism to Blanquism severed him from his sometime friends, and he thus became the real founder of the Russian social democracy and the "father of Russian Marxism." It was remarkable that in 1895 he should have been expelled from Paris as an anarchist. In 1889 he had been expelled from Geneva, but before long was readmitted. The granting of constitutional freedom in Russia enabled Plehanov to return home. When the social democrats broke up in 1903, Plehanov, though taking the side of the minority, adopted a peculiar position which led, as previously described, to his leaving that faction and taking up a somewhat isolated position. After 1905 Plehanov published his *Diary of a Social Democrat*, composed after the manner of Mihailovskii and Dostoevskii. He also issued collected essays, comprising literary criticisms (*The Narodniki in Belletristic Literature*, viz.: Naumov, Glëb Uspenskii, and Karonin; Nekrasov; Gor'kii; Ibsen); essays on Bëlinskii, Černyševskii, Herzen, and Pogodin; and philosophical articles, polemic for the most part, directed against the various opponents of historical materialism. In addition to the two works against the narodniki, I may mention his translation of Engels' book on Feuerbach, and his contributions to the Russian translation (1903) of Thun's *History of the Revolutionary Movement in Russia* (first published in German in 1883). In the German language he has contributed numerous articles to the "Neue Zeit." Independent works in German are *Contributions to the History of Materialism* (Holbach, Helvetius, and Marx), 1896; N. G. Tschernischewsky, 1894; *The Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, 1910.

cipation of the future ; it is not an ideological superstructure, but an anteroom.

Just as little as the intelligentsia, as a class and as a living representative of mental work, fits into the Marxist two-class system, so little, too, can the state, its political and administrative functions, and political life in general, be conceived as ideology in the Marxist sense. The weakening of tsarist absolutism, the establishment of the duma, and the legalisation of political electoral work and political party work in general, have an independent and high value of their own for Russia and for Europe. The alliance of the socialists with the liberals was necessary and right. Is it proper for a socialist to carry on propaganda among the peasantry and not among the bourgeoisie ? Struve did good service by going to the bourgeois as before him the narodniki had gone to the people ; the reasons he may subsequently have found for abandoning Marxism are another story.

In 1883 and 1884 Plehanov was perfectly right in holding fast to the *Communist Manifesto*, and in deducing therefrom rules for the political struggle and for cooperation with the liberals and the bourgeoisie. But in the nineties, and subsequently during the revolution, abandoning the teachings of the *Communist Manifesto*, he preached the later theories of Marx and Engels, and preached them in a manner altogether too one-sided.

The *Communist Manifesto* does not yet exhibit the doctrine of historical materialism in its full bloom, for the writing derives from the earlier phase of Marx and Engels, when they were political radicals, political revolutionaries, and not as yet Marxists. Later only did Marx and Engels formulate historical materialism with precision, and ascribe a decisive significance to the economic basis. The weakness of the political revolution of 1848, the triumph of reaction, the apolitism which, as far as practice was concerned, was forced upon the refugees, led Marx to conceive his historical materialism ; his English experiences were responsible for his mistaken overestimate of the importance of economic conditions. From the English outlook, regular political activity appeared comparatively worthless. It was the parliamentarism of universal suffrage which ultimately taught Engels to esteem political activity more highly, and to oppose parliamentarism to revolutionism.

This political development of Marxism and of the German

social democracy exercised a confusing influence upon Plehanov and the Russian Marxists.

In the *Communist Manifesto* Plehanov had discovered arguments for the political struggle and for the alliance with the liberals; he found here also an argument against mere economism (Russian economism was no novelty); the *Communist Manifesto* harmonised with the transition from the terrorism of the Narodnaja Volja to Marxism. The later phase of Marxism, however, was out of harmony with this transition, and this later phase therefore provided Plehanov's disciples with their arguments on behalf of economism, their arguments against political activity, against the duma, against the state in general.¹ None the less, Plehanov's disciples could discover arguments for politism also in Engel's writings during the latest of his evolutionary phases.

The establishment of the duma involved a number of theoretical and practical inconveniences for the Marxists. The first question they had to consider was whether they should recognise the duma or boycott that institution, and the answers they gave were divergent.

The agrarian question promptly came before the duma in a concrete practical form. The electoral system guaranteed the peasants a definite number of deputies, and in the duma the narodniki were able to discover whether they had been right in believing that ninety per cent. of the peasants were socialistically inclined. The result of the elections was in the first place an argument against the narodniki, but the Marxists

¹ The distinction between the conceptions of the *Communist Manifesto* and those of the later phase of Marxism, are very well characterised in Engel's preface to the fifth edition (1891). Explaining the designation "communists," he says: "Those among the workers, on the other hand, who, convinced of the inadequacy of purely political revolutions, demanded a thoroughgoing transformation of society, spoke of themselves at that time as communists." Thus we see that "purely political revolutions" are contrasted with the thoroughgoing [i.e. communistic] "transformation of society" [not merely of the state]. In the manifesto, Marx and Engels declaim against economism. In the section on bourgeois socialism we read: "A second, less systematic but more practical form of socialism endeavoured to disincline the workers for any sort of revolutionary movement by the demonstration that no political change could be of any use to them, but only a change in the material conditions of life, in economic relationships." It is true that Russian economism was of a somewhat different character from the economism to which Marx and Engels were referring in the manifesto, for the former doctrine was the outcome of trade union organisation, and was in part the doctrine of those who contended that trade union organisation was the only thing which mattered; but "apolitical" syndicalism teaches us that trade unions can also cherish political and revolutionary aims.

were likewise compelled to consider the agrarian program with more attention than it had hitherto received from Marxists in Germany and elsewhere in the west.

The problem of nationalism, too, had now to be faced by the Marxists. It became evident that the identification of every kind of nationalist sentiment with chauvinism and official patriotism was fallacious. As long as the Marxists, living abroad, had little intercourse with the other refugees from Russia, a concrete internationalism among the members of the various Russian stocks was possible enough. But as soon as this international could engage in legalised activities in Russia, and as soon as the constitution guaranteed national as well as political freedom, the problem of language and the problem of nationality became actual for the Russian Marxists as it had become actual for the Marxists of other multilingual lands (notably for those of Austria-Hungary). Discussion concerning the language in which the proceedings of the duma were to take place, concerning the official language, concerning the language of public instruction, and so on, was now essential. As in the west, so in Russia, constitutional government first made people fully aware of the problems of nationality and speech, giving as it did an ocular demonstration that nationality is something more than a "reflex" of the capitalist economic order.

Hardly had Marxism, during the middle nineties, undergone general diffusion among the Russian intelligentsia, hardly had the one-sided philosophy of history of the narodniki been transcended, when the rise of revisionism ensued, and this not solely through the work of Bernstein. It was impossible that the inaccuracy of historical materialism and that the changes in the evolution of the Marx-Engels doctrine and of the social democracy should remain unnoted in Russia. The crisis in the Russian social democracy is the necessary outcome of the cleavage which the actual course of development forces upon Marxist theory. Historical empiricism does not conform to historico-philosophical deduction. Hence the vacillations, the inadequacies, and the perplexities of the Marxist leaders, above all during the revolution; hence, too, the insufficiency of the social democracy during the revolution and thereafter down to the present day. The Marxists gained the victory over the history of philosophy of the narodniki, but they were incompetent to understand the history of Russia in one of its most critical phases.

§ 160.

MARX and Engels had no clear and unambiguous formula of revolution. Although in the Marxist system the idea of revolution is of decisive importance, neither he nor Engels attempted to define the precise significance of the concept. Adopting the radical revolutionary trend in the mood that prevailed before and during the year 1848, Marx and Engels declared themselves and declared socialism to be pre-eminently revolutionary, and yet they offered no exact analysis of this most important element in their system. We cannot attribute the neglect solely to regard for the censorship of absolutism, for they were manifestly disinclined to say much about this serious theme. "A revolution is something to effect and not to talk about; for resolute practical men, the details are a matter of course; the prospects of success must be clear, or the attempt at revolution will not be made—this is the main point." Summarily expressed, this seems to be the attitude of these writers towards the revolution, as far as I can ascertain it from the scanty, casual, and unsystematic utterances of Marx and Engels upon the subject.

An attempt at a philosophy of revolution is found in the writings on Feuerbach compiled in the year 1845, but the results are meagre.

Starting from the theoretic revolution of Feuerbach, Marx accepted Feuerbach's views by recognising that religion was anthropomorphism and by considering the religious world to be a mere reflex of the mundane world. But Marx considered that after Feuerbach had demonstrated these facts, the chief task was still left undone, for it was necessary to put an end to the contradiction inherent in the mundane world itself. Men, he said, had constructed for themselves a religious world in the clouds because their earthly basis did not suffice them. The contradiction between the religious world and the mundane world was, in fact, the contradiction within the mundane world. The disintegration of the mundane world must be understood and transcended, and this could only be effected by the political revolution. Marx censured the philosophical materialists because they had hitherto conceived reality solely as object or as perception, but had not conceived it subjectively as practical, human, sensuous activity. The idealists had developed the active side, but only on the abstract plane,

because they would not recognise real sensuous activity. "Philosophers have done no more than give different *interpretations* of the world; but what we have to do is to *change* it." This change could not be effected in accordance with Owen's recipe that men are the products of circumstances and education, for this would imply the division of society into two parts, one of these superior to society. Owen had forgotten that circumstances are modified by men and that the educator must himself be educated. The modification of circumstances, and the alterative activities, can be conceived and rationally explained in no other way than as revolutionary practice.

Marx's terminology is obscure; there is no sociological precision about the way in which he speaks of "circumstances" and of the "world" which is to be "changed"; without further ado the change is identified with a "revolutionary transformation" and with the "practical and critical" activity of revolution. At this early stage he is already conceiving historical evolution in too objective a manner. He represents the individual and the subject as "an abstract individual," who, however, in reality belongs to a specific social form. For Feuerbach and the older materialists, this social form had been "bourgeois" society; the newer materialism of Marx recognised only human society or socialised humanity.

The defects of extreme objectivism are conspicuous in this theory of revolution. Engels extols Marx on the ground that he did not simply brush aside Hegel, but adopted the revolutionary side of the dialectical method, transforming the Hegelian conceptual dialectic into a materialist dialectic. Here, however, our sole concern is with the concept of revolution, which Engels and Marx attempted to deduce in a purely objectivist manner from the alleged dialectic of the world process. As an answer to this attempt it suffices to insist that there is no objective dialectic, that nature does not exhibit dualism or dialectical trialism, that the evolution of the world cannot be conceived either dualistically or trialistically. Marx and Engels merely foisted the subjective on the objective, projecting into the outer world the conceptual and psychological oppositions and contrasts and the solution of these, and then quite uncritically formulating the result as a sort of metaphysical law of the universe.

In the development of the individual there occur conflicts and crises which manifest themselves in the form of oppositions,

but these are purely individual oppositions. In like manner there are logical, conceptual contrasts of different degrees and kinds. But it is necessary to determine precisely how far and in what sense it is permissible to speak of oppositions in social life and in history ; we must not uncritically introduce psychological and logical contrasts into the sphere of sociology. Still less is it legitimate, in anthropomorphic fashion, to introduce psychological and logical oppositions into nature and the universe.

Marx makes an improper use of logical and psychological analogy when he bases his catastrophic theory upon the reputed opposition between two classes. Marx himself occasionally advocated a sounder view.¹

As time passed, the views of Marx and Engels upon revolution underwent modification, for they came to conceive the social struggle in the spirit of the modern doctrine of evolution. They no longer represented this struggle solely in political and strategical terms as a violent physical struggle, for they looked upon it also as a bloodless economic struggle, thinking here of strikes and above all of the general strike—the struggle in this form being likewise conceived as revolutionary. To put the matter in general terms, they now conceived revolution rather as the gradual evolution of the definitive social state. In this double sense Engels frequently spoke of his party as “ the most revolutionary party known to history ” ; in this sense it was asserted that capitalism was “ revolutionising society ” ; and so on.

Eventually Marx and Engels accepted Darwinism, and were thereby led to modify their Hegelianism and their use of the Hegelian dialectic, although they failed to take clear note of their change of outlook. The modern cosmologist no longer regards the developmental process as revolutionary or catastrophic, but looks upon it as an evolution effected by infinitesimal and innumerable quantitative and qualitative modifications. Geological and cosmical catastrophe is looked upon as the terminal outcome of numerous gradational changes.

¹ For example, in the criticism of the Gotha program the bourgeoisie is not described as a unified class, nor was the existence of such a unification suggested even in the Communist Manifesto. Kautsky, too, in his writing published in 1889, the *Class Oppositions of 1789*, attacked the views of those who hold that in accordance with the theory of historical evolution by class struggles there can be no more than two camps within society.

Many historians conceive historical evolution in like manner, and in the name of evolution such writers oppose the idea of political revolution. Such is the outlook of the revisionist reformists, of those who tell us that our aim must be to promote reform, not revolution.

The evolutionist argument against political revolution is not self-evident and is not entirely valid. Revolutions may well be a part of evolution ; in actual fact, revolutions have occurred and do occur ; but, despite this, evolutionists and historians espouse the theory of gradual evolution. Moreover, modern evolutionists incline to recognise the existence of an evolutionary process wherein progress is effected by leaps, and from this outlook the idea of revolution may likewise be defended in the domains of history and politics, although it is true that evolution by leaps may also be interpreted in the reformist sense.

As a matter of methodology it is necessary to point out that cosmological and botanical analogies cannot be taken as proof by the sociologist. Political revolution must be sociologically explained as a social and historical fact.

After 1848, during the first years of reaction, Marx had frequent occasion, in his political articles, to speak of the revolution of 1848 and of revolution in general, but he failed to define the term more precisely. For example, in articles upon the eastern question (1853 to 1856) he spoke of the explosive energy of democratic ideas, of man's natural thirst for freedom, and the like. Revolution and democracy in Europe were contrasted with absolutist Russia. In the *Communist Manifesto*, in the attack on Proudhon, in the series of articles entitled *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, the definitive social revolution was assumed to be close at hand.

Marx's outlook was ever purely practical. He deprecated the " capricious attempts to foment revolution " made by many socialists and even by some of his own followers. In his essay upon the trial of the Cologne communists he showed that the overthrow of a government could be no more than an episode in the great struggle that was imminent, and that the matter of real importance was to make ready for this last and decisive contest. Capitalism, he said, was a mightier and more terrible power than political despotism. In like manner Engels distinguished in 1890 between the " fundamental transformation of society " and a " mere political revolution " ; whilst shortly

before his death (1895) he questioned the very possibility and need for revolution.

In Marx, therefore, and also in Engels, we have to note that a clear distinction is made. For Marx the definitive, terminal, "ultimate and decisive" revolution, the total transformation of the conditions of production and ownership, the negation of negation (in the Hegelian formula), was entirely different from lesser and indecisive revolutions. He did not clearly explain how far these lesser revolutions would be advantageous to the great revolution, but in accordance with the *Communist Manifesto* we may assume that such revolutions, too, were to be regarded as valuable. Granting this distinction, it is obvious that the critical question, the one that is decisive for the revolutionist, remains to be answered. When will the terminal revolution begin? How are we to recognise the decisive hour? Who shall determine that the decisive hour has struck?

To Marx it seemed self-evident that the terminal revolution must be unified, must be a mass revolution. In his literary and political contest with Stirner and Bakunin, Marx, from this outlook, sharply contrasted socialism with anarchism alike tactically and as a system. The Marxist conception of the mass movement eliminated the individual and individual consciousness, and at the same time an amoral estimate was formed of the purely objective historical process.

At Amsterdam in 1872 Marx declared that in the United States of America and in England a social revolution could be effected by legal means. For England, in particular, Marx subsequently mooted the buying out of the landlords as a possibility in lieu of forcible expropriation. The catastrophic theory was thus modified in the evolutionary sense, and simultaneously a high value was placed upon a political constitution—in the case of America, upon a republic.¹

In the frequently quoted preface to Marx's *Class Struggles*, Engels showed in 1895 that the revolutionist was not concerned

¹ In his elucidations to the Erfurt program, Kautsky states that the definitive revolution may assume the most varied forms in accordance with changing circumstances, and will not necessarily be associated with violence and bloodshed. He admits, for example, that the transition to the collectivist organization of society can in no case involve the expropriation of the lesser manual workers and the peasants; it is only large-scale industries that will need to be socially owned and controlled; all that Marxism demands is that the means of production shall become social property.

solely with the question of revolution, but must also be a politician and tactician. Parliamentary activity, everyday political work upon the basis of universal suffrage, were proclaimed to be the "sharpest weapon," whilst street fighting was declared practically impossible. "The revolutionist would be insane who should select for the erection of barricades the new working-class districts of the north and east of Berlin." The immediate task of the party, said Engels, was to be found in "the slow work of propaganda and in parliamentary activity." The right to revolution might be left to foreign comrades. "We, 'the revolutionaries,' can advance far more rapidly by legal means than by extra-legal and revolutionary tactics."

These explanations of Engels were interpreted at the time, and are still interpreted, in various senses by orthodox scholastics of Marxist trend; but even the ultra-orthodox Kautsky and Mehring wrote contemptuously in the "Neue Zeit" of "revolutionary romanticism" and of "revolutionary philistinism," whilst the revisionists unhesitatingly advocated reformism and rejected revolutionism.

Concomitantly with their recognition of parliamentarism, the Marxists came more and more to advocate the economic organisation of the workers, to promote trade union and cooperative organisation, and to encourage self-help among the working classes. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the seizure of political power, politism in general, receded into the background as the new economism came to occupy the stage.¹

Connected with the discarding of revolutionism is the remarkable silence of orthodox Marxists concerning communism. Communism is the most essential, or at least the most important, social demand of Marxism, but to-day this demand is hardly voiced, or at any rate finds no place in the foreground of the program.

Within the social democracy there is an opposition movement against revisionist reformism, and the question of

¹ In his work, *Le vie nuove del socialismo*, the reformist Bonomi points out that Marx advocated the ultimate seizure of political power in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the precondition of the economic transformation of society in the socialist sense, simply because it was impossible for him to foresee the material uplifting of the proletariat that would be effected by the trade union movement and by the gradual conquest of political power through the working of universal suffrage. It was not true, as Marx had contended, that the state was merely the executive organ of the bourgeoisie, for the state could likewise serve the labour party.

revolution is elaborately discussed in the party organs. The discussion is still far from its close.

To-day, in point of tactics, three trends may be distinguished in Marxist social democracy, for the radical opponents of reformism have split into two camps.

Kautsky, the literary opponent of revisionism, rejects reformism, and is able to appeal to Marx and Engels (first phase) on behalf of radical revolutionary tactics. Kautsky maintains the thesis that the party can for the nonce do no more than make ready for the definitive mass revolution, in order that, when the fitting moment arrives, it may be prepared to establish dictatorship and to inaugurate the social revolution.

But other representatives of a more radical tendency, other opponents of revisionist reformism, object to this outlook on the revolution (an outlook which is in the main that of orthodox Marxism), that this quiet preparation for the terminal revolution necessarily involves passivism, and that however radical it may be in theory it must inevitably in practice culminate in reformism. The representatives of the adverse conception of revolutionism demand that the need for direct action shall be continually inculcated upon the masses; they insist that the party executive must itself assume the revolutionary initiative, and must not content itself with the mere administration of the party organisation. In conformity with the revolutionary program of French syndicalism, mass action is advocated as the supplement and corrective to parliamentarism; in the trade unions and the cooperative societies and in all the democratic organisations, the revolutionary sentiment must not merely be sustained and fortified, but must be given practical expression whenever opportunity arises; in default of this radicalism, the spirit of those who advocate the terminal aim and the definitive revolution, tends to degenerate into a mere parliamentary opposition, and in the economic field into the advocacy of economic reform within the existing order.

§ 161.

IN the writings of the Russian Marxists we discern the same difficulties and uncertainties which, in respect of tactics, and above all as regards the question of revolution, perplexed Marx and Engels and their German successors—for the Russian Marxists were mainly influenced by German Marxist theory.

When the diffusion of Marxism took place in Russia during the middle nineties, revisionism and antirevolutionary reformism found their place in the new movement.

Down to the present day Plehanov has continued the discussion concerning tactics which he began in the eighties. The principles and the leading arguments have remained unchanged; but the social and political situation has undergone modification, and new, specifically Russian, problems have come to the fore. During the reaction of the eighties a species of enforced apolitism was widely diffused, and the discussion with the narodniki was historico-philosophical rather than political in character. During the nineties, however, political trends increased in strength, until at length at the opening of the new century the era of isolated acts of terrorism began, culminating in the mass revolution. The introduction of the constitution, the new constitutional problems pressing for solution, and the lively experiences of the last decade, have given increased interest to the discussion of the tactical problem.

We know that Marx carried on a campaign against Bakunin and Bakunist revolutionism. Plehanov, after the split in Zemlja i Volja, continued this campaign against the followers of Bakunin and the supporters of Bakunist methods. At first his opposition was conducted against the Narodnaja Volja, subsequently against the social revolutionaries, and finally against the revolutionaries in his own party. The creation of the дума gave a practical turn to the dispute concerning the importance and efficacy of politism and economism respectively, for the question now took the form, "Are you for or against the дума?" The first answers were purely abstract, but in practice it soon became apparent that the question comprised a considerable number of concrete subsidiary problems. Those who wished to decide whether on the one hand the дума should be theoretically and practically boycotted (in the latter case by "active," i.e. forcible, hindrance of the elections), or whether, on the other, the дума should be recognised, were compelled to consider the relationship of the socialists to other parties and to the programs of these, to consider the question of political alliances, and so on.

Plehanov and his supporters could not fail to point to the purely practical and utilitarian aspects of the new constitutionalism. The дума actually existed, and the question was how it could be turned to account for socialist ends. The

argument could be reinforced by appeal to the German example and to German theories, notably those of Engels.

The duma elections necessitated a revision of opinions concerning the essential nature of mass organisation, and disclosed the inadequacy of the method of secret organisation. During the close of the nineties, vigorous discussions were in progress concerning *kružkovščina*.¹ Subterranean secret societies and conspiracies, and the Machiavellianism and Jesuitism apt to be associated with such activities, are in fact essentially undemocratic. Publicity is the precise converse of aristocracy and aristocratic absolutism.

In the disputes between the majority and the minority this question played a considerable part. Lenin protested against conspiracies, but Lenin's adversaries accused him of being himself a conspirator, and declared that there was an aristocratic taint about the central committee of professional revolutionaries advocated by this leader of the majority. The social democratic party was in actual fact led by a central committee which acted in association with local committees. To a predominant extent the leaders of the party were intellectuals, and this gave the social democratic organisation the character of an undemocratic and aristocratic secret society. In this connection, we have, of course, to bear in mind the nature of Russian conditions, which rendered it impossible to constitute a comprehensive united organisation such as exists in European lands, for in Russia there are obstacles to the union and association of the workers such as do not exist to the same degree in Europe. Owing to the defective development of means of communication, a comprehensive and elastic union of the masses is hard to secure. The industrial centres are widely separated; the towns are smaller and less populous than in Europe; there are fewer operatives, and the proportion of those who have had some political culture is much smaller. Further difficulties are imposed by the repressive policy of the government, which refuses to permit the radical parties to organise on lawful lines. Last of all (and the importance of this factor must not be underestimated), owing to the widespread illiteracy of Russian operatives they are far more de-

¹ *Kružkovščina* is derived from *kružok*, a small circle of persons, and denotes the pettifogging activities of such a circle. It is frequently applied by Marxists to the revolutionaries. Many terrorists have spoken adversely of *kružkovščina*, Tkačev being especially adverse.

pendent upon cultured leaders.¹ The fact that among Russian operatives the great majority are uneducated, suffices per se to make the instructed workers into an aristocracy.

The struggle between the centralists and the autonomists within the Russian social democracy is thus based upon the nature of working-class conditions. The autonomists borrowed Liebknecht's argument against centralisation, saying that in an over-centralised party the destruction of the central executive involved the destruction of the entire party, and they referred in confirmation of this contention to the history of the *Narodnaja Volja*. However this may be, Ostrogorskii's demonstration, and still more recently that furnished by Michels, of the essentially oligarchical character of mass organisation even in the case of working-class parties is confirmed by Russian experience.²

There are moral as well as utilitarian motives for the rejection of secret societies and the methods of the conspirator. Persons of frank and manly nature are repelled by the dishonesty, the Machiavellianism, and the Jesuitism so often associated with underground activities.³

The amnesty associated with the promulgation of the constitution, and the return to Russia of many of the revolutionary refugees, served for a time to strengthen the party of those who favoured political activity by lawful methods. The subsequent reaction, however, and the efforts of absolutism to discredit the duma by rendering the activities of that body sterile, served once again to strengthen the opposition to politism. The remarkable agreement, in this instance, between radicalism and absolutism, is worthy of attention!

An attack on the methods of secret societies led to an attack on terrorism. Upon the basis defended by Plehanov, the orthodox Marxists came to condemn terrorism as anarchist tactics. This was the line taken, in a series of articles against

¹ At the unifying congress held in 1906, thirty-five of the delegates were of the working class, while one hundred delegates had had a university and secondary school education.

² Consult Ostrogorskii, *La démocratie et l'organisation des partis politiques*, Calman Lévy, Paris, 1903; Robert Michels, *Political Parties, a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, Jarrold, London, 1915.

³ Plehanov tells us that as a member of the *Zemlja i Volja*, in opposition to the majority of his comrades, he disapproved of the tactics employed in the before-mentioned peasant rising at Chigirin.

the social revolutionaries, by no less a person than Věra Zasulič, one of the co-founders of the Social Democratic Party.

She endeavoured to prove that individual outrages could not destroy absolutism, nor even weaken it, but that, on the contrary, they actually favoured absolutism by natural selection among its tools. Individual terrorist acts were mere demonstrations, not a means of combat. They might perhaps gratify the sentiment of personal vengefulness, but it was not the mission of the Russian revolutionist either to take vengeance for the masses or to defend the masses; it was his task to act *among*, not *for*, the masses. He must inspire them with enthusiasm, must carry them along with him. Věra Zasulič considered that the terrorist social revolutionary organisation was merely a bureaucratic regulation of spontaneous personal outbreaks of sentiment, and she condemned systematic terrorism no less emphatically than she condemned spontaneous acts of vengeance on the part of individuals.

The situation was certainly a strange one. The terrorist of 1878 penned in 1902 an ardent philippic against terrorism, whilst her party, in the dispute with the bolševiki, recognised terrorism as a temporary method of revolution!*

Men with a political intelligence can hardly doubt which method is likely to be more effective politically, the terrorist slaughter of a despot, or the parliamentary decision of a majority, a competent majority, to reduce the civil list to the maintenance of the president of a republic. But it is true that such a parliament presupposes the political education, not of the deputies merely, but likewise of the electorate, to a degree still unknown in Europe. It is therefore all the easier for us

* The social revolutionaries quoted Marx as an authority in support of terrorism. In April 1881, writing to his daughter, Marx referred to the specifically Russian tactics of the terrorists, saying that these were "true heroes, without any melodramatic pose," and referring to their methods as "historically unavoidable." But Marx said nothing in this letter as to the political efficacy of terrorism, and still less is it possible to extract from it an argument for terrorism now that the duma exists. In 1900, Kautsky declared that terrorism, which had opened with the shooting of Trepov by Věra Zasulič, was a glorious struggle on the part of a handful of heroes. But he went on to say: "Although the individual terrorists were heroes, and although their unselfish hazarding of their lives in an unequal struggle for the great cause makes a profound and elevating impression upon our minds, nevertheless the system of terrorism was a product of the weakness of the social forces opposed to tsarism. As long as the adversaries of tsarism had no other means of attack than terrorism, though they might be able to kill individual ministers and even tsars, they were unable to overthrow tsarist absolutism."

to understand that Plehanov's main demand for Russia was that there should be a revolution in men's minds.

Without an effective revolution in men's minds, in millions and millions of minds, the radical program of socialism cannot be realised. Whereas, in his comments on the Gotha program of 1875, Marx had justified the failure of that program to demand a democratic republic for Germany, as regards the Russia of the years 1905 to 1913 the question was debated whether the demand for a socialist or at least for a democratic republic ought not to form a permanent rubric of political agitation.

Plehanov's great merit was that he laid bare the weaknesses of the revolutionary parties, and in especial the weaknesses of the social democracy; and that he counterposed blind radicalism with his realistic criticism of the existing situation and of the factors of political power. He laid due stress upon the consideration that evolution has a law-abiding character and a constancy, in virtue of which (in accordance with a well-known saying) the labour pains attending the birth of the new social order, though they can be mitigated and though their duration can be reduced, can never be wholly avoided.

Involuntarily, therefore, Plehanov was led to give his support to the reformism of the revisionists. Emphasising the reign of law in socio-political no less than in capitalistic evolution, condemning terrorists tactics, exposing the blindness of the incautious radicalism which would not look ahead, and recommending cooperation with the liberals, he reinforced constitutionalism and its advocates, and assisted the revisionists in maintaining their program of reformism.

It is this that makes Plehanov's relationship to Russian reformism so interesting. Struve, who simultaneously with Plehanov during the middle nineties took the field as a Marxist against the narodniki, found his main argument against revolutionism and terrorism in his insistence upon the constancy of historical evolution. Nature, he said, makes no leaps; the variations in social life are not discontinuous variations. In addition, Struve contested the validity of Marx's theory of increasing misery, and he was of course right in maintaining that it was impossible for a degenerate class to effect the great social revolution. In essentials this argument is identical with the evolutionary conception.

The earlier Russian Marxists passed through the school of Mihailovskii and Lavrov, already contemplating evolution as the opposite of revolution, and thus paving the way for revisionism and reformism.

I have already pointed out that these evolutionist arguments by no means exhaust the problem of reformism versus revolutionism, and that still less can they be said to solve it. Struve appeared to feel this, and he therefore attempted to rescue reformism by rejecting revolution in toto as epistemologically incomprehensible. But Struve's formula is one difficult to establish, and at any rate Struve did not succeed in establishing it. Epistemologically the revolution becomes comprehensible enough as soon as it exists. In the collective work entitled *Věky* (signposts), the sometime ex-Marxists, Struve among them, took up another position. The revolution of 1905-1906 was made the occasion for the publication of their philosophical confessions, wherein not this revolution alone, but also the entire revolutionary spirit of the intelligentsia, the spirit which had animated the intelligentsia for years, were discarded as theoretical and moral confusionism. The revolution was condemned, not epistemologically, but ethically—as nihilism.

Theoretically, the revolution is comprehensible enough, but the question is whether revolution is ethically permissible. Primarily, of course, we think here of a forcible revolution attended by bloodshed; but the question applies more generally to every revolution, in the field of theory as well. Marx and Engels have an easy task of it here with their amorality, and Engels declares that the right of revolution is the only historic right, seeing that all modern states have in fact come into existence through revolutions.

In reality the question is less simple, but for the time being our sole concern is with the way in which the Marxists envisage the problem. The orthodox Marxists claim the "right" to revolution (since they are amorality the word right must be placed in quotation marks). Some of them, in this connection are thinking of the future definitive revolution, whilst others have in mind an uninterrupted revolutionism. But the orthodox Marxists have not yet discussed the problem of revolution in a way that can be considered even partially satisfactory.¹

¹ An attempt has been made by A. Bogdanov. This writer, too, is a revisionist in so far as he desires to harmonise Marxism with Mach (and also

§ 162.

THE contradictions noticeable in the Russian Marxists' views concerning the general question of revolution are especially conspicuous in their appraisal and analysis of the Russian revolution of 1905-1906.

with Dietzgen). Upon the foundation of "empiriomonism" (monism, be it observed, not criticism!) revolution arises out of the contradictions of social life, out of the struggle of the productive energies of society against the ideological forms; revolution is social criticism and social creation, it is the harmonisation of human existence. Philosophy results from the recognition of a conflict between human experience and the historically transmitted ideas and conceptual forms. Marx was the first, says Bogdanov, to understand the true nature of this conflict, for Marx recognised that men regarded their social and historical life as determined by the understanding, divine or human as the case may be, and it was this conception of social and historical life which led to the formulation of socialist utopias. Marx perceived that existence determined consciousness, not conversely, and was thus the first to found a true philosophy. With Auguste Comte, Bogdanov conceives the utopian stage of philosophy as religious and metaphysical fetichism, and he discovers the essence of this fetichism in the dualism which results from the individualistic atomisation of the social whole. The dualism of Descartes is outspoken, whilst the dualism of Spinoza is masked. Accurately regarded, Spinoza's "god" is merely the "crystallised reflex" of the interconnection of all the elements of a society organised upon a basis of exchange—an interconnection of which we are elementally aware. Fetichistic dualism must give place to scientific monism. Monism is equivalent to philosophy, that is to say to genuine philosophy. The revolution, harmonising life, will create new motives and a new material for the harmonising of cognition. The old philosophy was often no more than instinctively revolutionary, and was frequently conservative; but the new philosophy, having become self-conscious, is purely revolutionary. When class contrasts disappear, when the class struggle has come to an end, the revolution will be resolved into the continuous and harmonious progress of society, and philosophy will be resolved into the continuous and harmonious progress of the monism of science. According to Bogdanov, modern philosophy must be based upon natural science, for natural science is merely the systematisation of technical experience, the systematisation, that is to say, of what Marx termed the productive energy of society. Bogdanov therefore, in contradistinction to Plehanov, accepts the ideas of Mach, finding in the logical consistency of this writer and in his unsparing positivist annihilation of all intellectual fetiches, the indispensable philosophical revolution. Bogdanov gave expression to these ideas in the preface to the translation of Mach's *Analysis of Sensation*, and in a number of other writings (notably in the essay, *Revolution and Philosophy*). I need not undertake a detailed criticism of Bogdanov's views, which are in essence no more than an exposition of the Marxist glosses on Feuerbach, and are tainted with all the errors of positivist materialism and amoralism. The connection between the revolution and philosophy is not clearly elucidated, for surely there is a great difference between revolutionising people's minds in the way suggested by Plehanov, and simply clubbing them on the head. Monism misleads Bogdanov into instituting a deductive parallelism between revolution and philosophy which conflicts with the empiricism customary in natural science. (Be it noted that Marx was not a student of natural science,

The subject was eagerly considered. It was natural that contemporaries, a number of whom participated personally in the events, should be interested in searching out the causes of the revolution. The question they usually asked was, whether and to what extent the revolution was socialistic, whether it was a working-class revolution, a peasant revolution, or a bourgeois revolution; and they wished to estimate the value of the revolution from the socialist outlook, to ascertain whether and to what extent it had advantaged or injured particular classes and above all the working class, whether and to what extent the revolution had favoured or hindered the attainment of the socialist goal. The discussion was instructive, but was somewhat confused. Participation on the part of the workers in its events does not make the revolution socialistic. The concepts, bourgeoisie, liberalism, intelligentsia, etc., have many meanings. No attempt was made to ascertain precisely how great a part the capitalists played in bringing about the revolution, side by side with, and after a certain point independently of, the great landowners; no attempt was made to determine when either of these two classes intervened, or when and why either of them ceased to participate. But it is equally difficult to ascertain the precise share of the Marxists and the social revolutionaries in the revolution.

I am not thinking solely of direct and active participation in the struggle. We are also concerned with the question how far the revolutionists received sympathetic help from various strata of the population. It is further necessary to examine what were the consequences of the revolution, what trend the movement took, and why.

Finally, the individual facts and the revolution as a whole

and yet Bogdanov tells us that Marx inaugurated the true philosophy !¹) When Bogdanov tells us concerning Marx, that in Marx philosophy discovered itself, became aware of its own position in nature and society, a position "above nature and society, but not outside them," we cannot but feel that, despite Bogdanov's general veneration for positivism, he departs here from a strictly positivist and monistic outlook. Bogdanov has also written "novels of fancy" wherein he describes the future of society by depicting life on Mars. Here we are told of a "universal science of organisation" which will afford a ready solution of the most complicated tasks of organisation after the fashion of mathematical calculations in practical mechanics. Manifestly the inhabitants of Mars, in their amoralist objectivism, take very kindly to these calculations. It need hardly be said that the "universal science of organisation" is founded by a disciple of Marx, the Martian Marx, however, passing by the name of Xarma. I can understand why Plehanov reproached Bogdanov for being no longer a Marxist.

ought to be considered historically and philosophically in their general bearing on the historical evolution of Russia.

Russian works available in translation afford us some insight into the discussion. Čerevjanin's book, *The Proletariat and the Russian Revolution*, 1908, written from the standpoint of the men'sheviki, concludes that the economic development of all classes of the population, with the exception of the feudal nobility, must lead to the formation of an opposition to the government, and must ultimately culminate in revolution. In this anti-absolutist coalition the working class unquestionably plays the leading role, but it experiences reverses and hinders the further development of the revolution because it does not understand how to work hand in hand with the liberal bourgeoisie. Čerevjanin considers the enforced concession of the eight-hour day, and all extreme demands and actions on the part of the operatives, to have been tactical errors, whose only result was to sow dissension between the workers and the liberals and thus to promote the victory of reaction. For Čerevjanin, the boycott of the duma was another characteristic example of this erroneous tactic, and the boycott was a contributory cause of the further tactical errors committed by the labour leaders.

It is, of course, quite easy after the event to point to the errors of the revolution. There need be no hesitation about admitting that not the workers alone, but the liberals also, made numerous and extensive mistakes. On the whole, however, a study of the revolution induces the impression that the movement was better conducted than might have been anticipated in view of the lack of firmly established and well-trying organisations. In my opinion, the council of workers' deputies in St. Petersburg, despite some weakness and vacillation, deserves commendation for its general conduct of the cause; but it is plain enough that the first successes had a somewhat intoxicating effect upon the working-class leaders and that they overestimated the strength of the revolutionary forces while they underestimated the power of the government.

Judged as a whole, the revolution of 1905-1906 was advantageous to the development of Russia, was a notable warning to the government and an impressive lesson to the revolutionaries.¹

¹ Cf. A. Tscherewanin, *Das Proletariat und die russische Revolution*, 1908. Čerevjanin's overstrained criticism, which is based upon a too literal application

IV

§ 163.

WE must now devote a brief section to considering the position of Marxism as a part of the most recent trends in philosophy and above all in the philosophy of religion. The influence of Marxist philosophy was peculiarly powerful in Russia. By the Russian Marxists, therefore, an exceptionally keen attention has been paid to philosophical problems, and it is easy to understand the reason, seeing that since the days of Herzen the fundamentals of socialism have been eagerly debated. Before Marxism came to Russia, its philosophical groundwork had already been prepared in that country. Hegel, Feuerbach, French and English positivism, materialism, all the philosophical elements out of which Marxism is constituted, had made themselves at home in Russia. For this very reason, Marxism did not long retain its grip upon the Russians.

The matter is partly explained by the fact that Marx had failed to give a systematic exposition of his philosophical foundations, and had exhibited them merely in the concrete in his political and economic studies. Marx had doubtless aimed at becoming a teacher of philosophy, and his first essays in literature dealt with this field of knowledge, but his subsequent development and the course of events modified his plans, so that towards 1848 he devoted himself to revolutionary political activities and revolutionary journalism, these activities culminating in his critical and revolutionary economic studies.

In Germany, Marx's adversaries have for a long time concerned themselves almost exclusively with his economics, the philosophical content of his writings receiving inadequate attention.

Moreover, Marx never formulated his philosophy clearly and unambiguously. His commentators are not agreed to what extent he remained a Hegelian, and to what extent he must be considered a Feuerbachian, a positivist, and a materialist. Misled by Hegel's failure to recognize the principle of con-

of Plehanov's political doctrines, may be usefully corrected by a perusal of N. Trozky, *Russland in der Revolution*, 1909. Trocki was a member and one of the leaders of the council of workers.

tradition, Marx contented himself with epistemologically uncritical positivism and positivist historicism, and this is why his formula of historical materialism remains so nebulous.

Engels, in his criticism of Dühring's philosophy, attempted to systematise the philosophy of Marxism, but the work Engels was attacking, Dühring's *The Revolution of Science*, is, epistemologically considered, nothing more than a naive exposition of naive realism. Seeing, therefore, that the Russian orthodox Marxists, Plehanov in especial, but also Lenin, took their theory of cognition from Engels (as Plehanov is careful to explain), we cannot expect much valuable fruit from the philosophical discussions of the Marxists.

"The father of Russian Marxism" is, in fact, satisfied with Engel's naive realism.¹ Nevertheless he believes himself to be an orthodox Marxist in proclaiming materialism as monism, in approximating it as closely as possible to Spinozism, and even in positively identifying it with Spinozism, for he maintains that the materialism of Marx and Engels, and also the materialism of Feuerbach and Diderot, are no more than a variety of Spinozism. At the same time he defends the materialistic foundation of dialectic, wherein he discovers the true essence of historical materialism, of the Marx-Engels philosophy.

It need hardly be said that there is no justification for the identification of Marxism with Spinozism, as the Marxists have admitted (Stein, for example, in his book on Spinoza). Spinoza assumes a parallelism between being and thought, whereas in the Marx-Engels philosophy the relationship is regarded as causal, for existence is assumed to determine thought. As a parallelist, Spinoza is a rationalist, and indeed an ultra-rationalist. Marx, on the other hand, is an ultra-empiricist. Moreover, Plehanov may learn from Engels how

¹ In Plehanov's latest polemic writing, *From Defence to Attack*, Kant's thing-by-itself and subjectivism are disposed of with the assertion that modern science does not merely study things by its analysis, but actually produces things, and that what we can ourselves produce cannot be said to be uncognisable. Here is Plehanov's epistemological basic formula; "We give the name of material objects (bodies) to such objects as exist independently of our consciousness, act upon our senses, and thus awaken in us definite sensations, these sensations, in their turn, being a fundamental element of our ideas of the outer world, that is to say, our ideas of the aforesaid material objects and of their mutual relationships." Mihailovskii was likewise a materialist, but Mihailovskii at least did not fail to recognise the subjective element of **apperception**.

as early as 1844 the latter, in his critique of Carlyle, following Feuerbach, rejected Spinozism as pantheism. Plehanov's belief in an objective dialectic based on materialism is equally void of foundation, for there is no such thing as an objective dialectic. Plehanov weakens his own position by his fondness for advocating dialectic as a method. He learned this from Engels, but both he and Engels were in error. Historical materialism is merely materialism; as such, in interpreting history, it may formulate its own method, but it is not itself a method. Struve, therefore, successfully maintained as against Plehanov that dialectic has no proper place in Marxism (materialism). It is true that Plehanov offers two proofs on behalf of objective dialectic. He says that motion and becoming involve an inward contradiction, Zeno, the founder of the Stoic philosophy, being again raised to honour; and he introduces into the concept of becoming an antirevolutionary contrast, which is itself however subjective, conceptual, not objective.

Against the revisionists, who advocate a return to Kant, Plehanov adduces Jacobi's argument against Kant. If we base ourselves on Kant we are faced with a dilemma. We have to choose between Feuerbach's materialism ("I am a real, a sensual being, and the body in its totality is my ego, my essence"), and Fichte's solipsism. But solipsism is absurd (no one can contend that my mother exists only within me), and we are therefore compelled to accept materialism.

It is needless to refute a disjunctive statement of this sort or to waste time discussing arguments of such a calibre. We may reject Kant and Fichte, we may reject Kantian apriorism and Kantian subjectivism; but it does not follow that subjectivism is wholly false, and that materialism as naive realism or objectivism, is sound. The whole aim of recent philosophy has been to revise Hume and Kant, and to provide a critical foundation for empiricism—"critical" in the Kantian sense. The Marxists have hitherto taken no part in this work of revision, but no one who seriously attempts it can possibly remain a materialist.

Plehanov is doubtless right in his energetic rejection of extreme subjectivism as scepticism. Bělsinskii, Bakunin, the slavophiles, Mihailovskii, etc., took the same sound view. Plehanov sees in the scepticism which has been diffused since the eighteenth century a manifestation of decadence, and we have in fact to do here with decadence, with the degeneration of

the lay and ecclesiastical aristocracy of the eighteenth century, and with the degeneration and decay of the bourgeoisie in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Plehanov further contends that scepticism has nothing to do with theological ("extra-human") doctrines. The bourgeois ideologues are "instinctively" aware of the approaching destruction of their class, and this explains their feeling of profound discontent, which finds expression in scepticism, pessimism, etc. Proletarian ideologues, on the other hand, are animated with a vigorous feeling of the joy of life, and every one of them exclaims with Hutten: "It is bliss to be alive!" The proletarian knows nothing of scepticism.

Thus Plehanov rejects Hume as well as Kant, for Hume's philosophy is incompatible with Marxism. With Hume, the modern Humists, and especially Mach, must be discarded. Plehanov vigorously animadverts upon Bogdanov and other Marxists who accept the philosophy of Mach.

Lenin, too, though an opponent of Plehanov, defends Marxist materialism in a writing against empirio-criticism. Lenin considers that the ideas of Avenarius, Mach, and their Russian successors, are merely a reiteration of the masked solipsism of Fichte and Berkeley. The adoption of subjectivism involves the burial of the healthy human understanding with its belief in an objective world subordinated to the reign of law. But thereby religion, one of the main props of the bourgeoisie and of bourgeois dominion, is favoured. Consequently empirio-criticism is a reactionary philosophy.

Lenin's book is written in a racy style: Avenarius, Schuppe, and the others are smartly handled; but no further light is thrown upon the essential questions in dispute. Lenin makes no advance beyond Engels.

§ 164.

THE old dispute in Russian philosophy between objectivism and subjectivism is the nuclear point at issue between the Russian orthodox Marxists and the revisionists. Bernstein, who insists that socialism must be founded, not objectively but subjectively, upon the basis of a proper direction of the will and upon individual motivation, thereby gives an accurate epistemological formulation to his opposition to Marxism. The Marxism of Marx and Engels is decisively

objectivist. The individual and the individual consciousness are wholly absorbed in the mass; the individual consciousness must yield place before the mass consciousness. Russian orthodox Marxists take the same standpoint, and therefore attack the subjectivism of Mihailovskii and Lavrov and these authors' endorsement of ethics and ethical aims. Objectivist Marxism is objectively historical and amoralist.

Russian revisionism was inaugurated by Struve, who declared himself in favour, not only of ethical but also of metaphysical individualism. Struve defended the individual consciousness and the idea of substance, giving a more than Kantian prominence to soul-substance and the freedom of the will.

From positivism and materialism Struve made an abrupt return to metaphysics. The acceptance of metaphysics implied the acceptance of religion and mysticism. Before long it was hardly possible to speak of the movement as one of Marxist revisionism; the revisionists had simply become "idealists," the name used by friend and foe alike to denote those who tend towards the opposite pole from materialism and positivism ("from materialism to socialism," Bulgakov).

For Russians the watchword, Return to Kant, embodies a comparatively vague philosophical program, for there has hitherto been little accurate study in Russia of the Kantian philosophy. In the present volumes it has been possible to refer to Solov'ev alone as possessing a knowledge of Kant. For the Russian revisionists (and indeed for the German revisionists) the name of Kant is little more than a catchword. The reference is really to neokantianism or, to speak yet more strictly, to the various German philosophers of the present day whose thought is related to that of Kant. F. A. Lange, Schuppe, Riehl, Cohen, Windelband, Rickert, Stammler, and others, have been the teachers of the Russian revisionists.

Properly speaking, therefore, Russian revisionism falls back upon Mihailovskii. The revisionists accept Mihailovskii's subjective method. The orthodox Marxists regard this as a reversion to the narodničestvo, or at any rate Plehanov identifies subjectivism with the narodničestvo. But as far as metaphysics and the philosophy of religion are concerned, the revisionists find Mihailovskii inadequate, and therefore these sometime Marxists have returned to Solov'ev and Dostoevskii.

So general has been this turning away from Marxism as

an embodiment of materialism that even the orthodox Marxists have begun to abandon their Marx. Avenarius, Mach, and empirio-criticism, have become the authorities of many of the orthodox, whilst Dietzgen begins to replace Engels. Plehanov disputes the validity of these new authorities championed by his comrades, and so does Lenin, but it cannot be said that either Plehanov or Lenin is wholly right, for Marxist positivism can readily be associated with the ideas of Mach or Hume. Still, we are concerned with ethics as well as with epistemology and metaphysics, and from the ethical outlook Marxist amorality is incompatible with Humism. It would seem, however, that even Plehanov must have been attacked by the revisionist intellectual anaemia—for why else should he make out Marx to be a Spinozist?

For the Marxists the struggle between subjectivism and objectivism has no mere theoretical significance, but is, rather, practical and ethical. With good reason since the days of Hume and Kant subjectivism has been in essentials a moral philosophy. In the dispute between the orthodox Marxists and the revisionists, the ethical problem comes to the front, the question whether our estimate of socialism and the socialist program is to be ethical or amoralist and historical. The orthodox Marxists are especially concerned with founding and defending revolution and the revolutionary mood, and for them the revolutionary mood is the touchstone of philosophy. From this outlook Plehanov defends materialism as objectivism against subjectivism, contending that subjectivism leads to scepticism, and therefore weakens and destroys the revolutionary spirit.¹

¹ In the epilogue to the Russian translation of Thun's work on the Russian revolutionary movement, Plehanov expressed his objections to the so-called subjectivist method of Lavrov. The task of science, he said, and therefore the task of scientific socialism, was to explain the subject (in so far as explanation was requisite) by the object. Russian progressive thought had become more and more objectivistic in proportion as it was richer in the revolutionary spirit, whereas it had become increasingly subjectivistic in proportion as it was poor in revolutionary content. Černyševskii and Dobroljubov, he contended, had certainly not been subjectivists. This is perfectly true, but they were far from being extreme objectivists; they recognised the significance of ethics and gave their socialism an ethical foundation, whilst the narodovolcy and the terrorists agreed with them in representing the duty of revolution as an ethical imperative. Rosa Luxemburg, writing in "Iskra" an article criticising Lenin (1904) discerned subjectivism in the fondness of Lenin's adherents for centralism. The ego, crushed by absolutism, took its revenge by enthroning itself as a conspirators' committee, as an almighty "popular will."

In his philosophical opus magnum, *The Monistic View of History*, Plehanov discusses the ethical problem, although the work is properly concerned solely with the question of freedom and necessity. How, asks Plehanov, can the consciousness, how can voluntary decisions, how can motivation, be explained in a purely objectivist manner? How can voluntary decisions, above all, be even partially conceived as a mere "reflex" of the object? With this question, the objectivism of Marx and Engels is shivered to fragments, and despite all his Marxist orthodoxy, Plehanov takes refuge in Spinoza.¹

§ 165.

WHEN we talk of "from Marxism to idealism," we have to understand by idealism, religion as the definite opposite of materialism. In Russia, materialism signifies, irreligion or antireligion, and in the narrower sense, atheism.

The return to religion effected by the revisionists was partly determined by the example of the German revisionists. For the most part, however, the Russian revisionists followed the current represented by Solov'ev and Dostoevskii. To-day, as I have said, it is no longer possible to speak of Struve, Bulgakov, and similar writers, as revisionists. But there do exist

But the subjective ego was soon forced to recognise that the "object," i.e. the absolutist knout, was the stronger party. Rosa Luxemburg, therefore, following the teaching of Marx and Engels, declared that the mass-ego of the working class was the true determinant of history. I leave undiscussed the problem whether and how the mass-ego can exist without the individual ego, for I have merely referred to the passage in order to show how the orthodox Russian Marxists condemn subjectivism in all its forms and for every conceivable reason.

¹ Be it noted that Plehanov does not in truth, as does Engels, completely eliminate the subject. In his translation of Engels' Feuerbach (1892) Plehanov declares, just like Descartes, that his own existence at least stands for him above the possibility of doubt, for this existence is guaranteed by "an absolutely insuperable" inner conviction. In his polemic against Kant he contends that, objectively regarded, Engels' position is that in the historical process of transition from one form to another, reality comprises Engels as one of the necessary instruments of the imminent revolution; whilst subjectively regarded, we perceive that Engels found this participation in the historical movement as agreeable, and that he looked upon it as his duty. The objective historical process is agreeable to the individual, who considers participation in it to be his duty—thus Plehanov, in this matter likewise, is not an amoralist of orthodox rigidity, for Spinozist parallelism has him in its toils. This is why I say that Plehanov, too, was a revisionist. Is it not to him that we owe the term "the red phantom"? Did not Lenin ridicule Plehanov's revolutionism by saying that its motto was, "Kill with kindness"?

Marxists friendly to religion, of whom Lunačarskii is the best known—not to speak of Gor'kii, who has coined the term "creator of God" (not "seeker after God!"), a term used by opponents to designate the trend. At the head of the Marxists hostile to religion stands Plehanov, and Plehanov tilts with especial vigour against Lunačarskii, who has defended his position in a two-volume treatise.

The discussion has been somewhat unedifying and discursive, but may be briefly summarised as follows.

The question is frequently asked, what is the relationship between socialism and religion, and it is necessary to point out how the history of socialism shows that socialism and religion are not mutually incompatible. With regard to the special question whether socialism can or cannot be reconciled with Christianity, we have to ask what is meant by Christianity, the teaching of Jesus or the extant ecclesiastical forms, and further we have to ask which system of socialism is meant. Some desire to prove that materialism is essentially incompatible with Christianity and religion, whilst others believe that Marxism can be reconciled with religion in general and with Christianity in particular.

Another formulation of the problem occurs when socialism itself, or the social democratic movement, is spoken of as a religion, as the new religion. This line has been taken by Dietzgen, to whom others besides Marxists and declared socialists appeal as an authority upon the matter. In the works of Filosofov, for example, I find such an appeal to Dietzgen, and a reminder that Dietzgen had lived in Russia for several years. Filosofov is one of those who recognise the great importance of socialism, and for that reason are loath to admit that religion and socialism are antagonistic.

Again, it often happens that socialism (or social democracy) is represented as a new stage in the development of the religious consciousness, a stage to which ecclesiastical religion will have to adapt itself.

In connection with all these formulations, it is necessary to insist upon a more precise definition of the concept religion, and above all it is essential to distinguish the principal elements of religion in general from extant ecclesiastical religion.

Frequently when people speak of the religious factor in socialism, they mean the faith, the believing energy, the conviction, and the hope, of the socialists. Plehanov extols this

believing energy of socialism as contrasted with the scepticism of the bourgeoisie, and declares that the proletariat is peculiarly unsceptical. Before Plehanov, nearly all the socialists, and in particular the revolutionary socialists, valued and demanded this energy of belief. In such a sense, for example, the nihilists were "religious," were persons animated with faith. We recall, too, how the earlier writers, beginning with Bělsinskii and Herzen, demanded faith and condemned scepticism. But it is necessary to distinguish between faith and religious faith, between belief and religion.

Intimately related with this mood of faith is the enthusiasm of the socialists, admired even by their adversaries—an enthusiasm which may on occasion pass into fanaticism.

Another notable trait is the self-sacrificingness and the active fraternity of the socialists. Those to whom the essence of religion lies in morality will gladly term socialists "religious persons."

We have further to consider the mystical tendency and the belief in miracle, factors which play a notable part in Russia in constituting the idea of religion. Whilst the orthodox Marxists cling to Marxist rationalism and its associations with the enlightenment, the Marxists with religious inclinations (to whom Plehanov, of course, refuses the name of Marxists) turn towards mysticism which is, they insist, a necessary supplement to purely scientific, one-sidedly scientific, Marxism. From this outlook, ceremonial and symbolism are recognised as important. (For Lunačarskii, for example, productive energies are the Father, the proletariat is the Son, and scientific socialism is the Holy Ghost.)

Finally an appeal is made (as by V. Bazarov, whose philosophic starting-point is Engel's empiricism) to religion as an authority which will be competent, in virtue of its higher religious power, to maintain order in a disintegrated society that is breaking up into separate classes and castes.

In this study of the relationships between Russian socialism and religion, it is interesting to note that Christian socialism is practically unknown in Russia. A certain number of priests have joined the liberal movement, and a few even have entered the Social Democratic Party; this party carries on an agitation among the sectaries and old believers, but there are few traces of Christian socialism. Whereas in France, England, Germany, and everywhere throughout the west, socialism

first manifested itself as Christian or religious socialism, Russian socialism was from the outset a philosophic movement, influenced by western philosophic doctrines.¹

In his philosophy of religion, Plehanov follows Feuerbach, whose anthropomorphic theory he supplements for the first stages of evolution by Tylor's animism. But for Plehanov the essential ideas of religion are the reflex of the productive forces of society and of material conditions in general. (For him philosophy, too, is a reflex, law is a reflex—in fact we have too much reflex altogether!) Plehanov does not merely deny revelation but he contests the existence of an inborn subjective need for religion. He follows Comte in holding that religion is essentially a lower stage in the theoretical elucidation of the world; that the main theological doctrines (for example, that of the creation of the world by God, a conception itself based upon the analogy of primitive or more advanced technical acquirements) are hypotheses to be abandoned as reason gains strength. For Plehanov, therefore, there is no inner connection between morality and religion. Morality, as a systematic formulation of the mutual relationships of human beings, arises antecedently to religion, and is not subordinated to religion until a subsequent stage of development, when duties are represented as the commands of the godhead. When despotism prevailed, God was conceived as a despot, but the god of the deists has his heavenly constitutionalist parliament—thus literally does Plehanov reecho the teaching of Feuerbach. Religion, says Plehanov, is destined to disappear, and is already disappearing in proportion as man comes to understand social life and its relationships, and in proportion as he acquires power over nature and himself.

It is plain that Plehanov supplements Feuerbach's philo-

¹ Social democracy, with its parliamentary minimum program, can more readily be accepted than can theoretical Marxism by a practising clerk in holy orders. We must of course take into account the differences of creed. A Protestant pastor in Germany or America differs from a Russian pope. Work among the sectaries is political in character, is an advocacy of social reform. (See, for example, "Razsvět" [Dawn], a periodical edited for the social democracy in Geneva, during the year 1904, by Bonč-Bruevič.) Lunačarskii claims Bulgakov as a Christian socialist; also Solov'ev and Tolstoi, although he admits that Tolstoi should rather be termed a Christian anarchist, and that Solov'ev was not really a socialist. Nor is it accurate to speak of the sometime Marxists as Christian socialists. They have abandoned Marxism, and Plehanov, in his polemic against these adversaries, has good reason for speaking of them as "Mr. So and So," no longer as "Comrade So and So."

sophy of religion by Comte's positive philosophy. Whereas Feuerbach conceived religion as the religion of humanity, agreeing here with the later developments of Comte's philosophy, Plehanov divorced humanity from religion. Religion for him was purely ephemeral, and he could not agree with Feuerbach and Schleiermacher in the view that there exists a natural need for religion.

Plehanov shares the prejudice of Comte and the positivists when he represents religion as a lower stage of evolution. How can religion be replaced by the positive philosophy if it be completely different from the positive philosophy? Comte confused theology or myth with religion, and it was upon the basis of this confusion that he formulated his three stages, which conflict with history and with the idea of evolution and progress. A priori it is extremely improbable that religion will now cease to exist and will leave science victor on the field, seeing that religion has continued to develop since the very beginning of history. Mankind has already existed for thousands of years, perhaps for hundreds of thousands of years, and throughout this long period religion has unceasingly developed. Will it now pass away entirely? Is it not more probable, above all from the evolutionist standpoint, that religion will continue in the future to develop side by side with science, just as science has hitherto developed side by side with religion?

Plehanov follows the views of Engels, who (in the before-mentioned critique of Carlyle) declared that all the possibilities of religion have been exhausted, and maintained that no other form of religion could come into existence in the future. This contention was a presumptuous one, and was the outcome of a false philosophy of religion and of history, of an epistemological confusion of religion with myth.

Lunačarskii, who would like to combine his Marx with Avenarius and others, likewise follows Comte and Feuerbach, but comes to conclusions differing from those of Plehanov, for in his view the positivistic phase of evolution is likewise religious. Atheism, says Lunačarskii, is religious; man is put in God's place, and we have the Comtist religion of humanity; God disappears, or, à la Feuerbach, he is transformed into man; "homo homini deus" repeats Lunačarskii after Feuerbach. To put the matter otherwise, democracy is not merely a political system but also a religious system; the aspirations

of the scientific and fully conscious socialist are guided by the idealism of the class and the species. Collectivism is religious ; socialism is a religious system ; Marxist socialism, above all, is " the fifth great religion formulated by Jewry."

Since the days of Herzen the Russian socialists have followed in the footsteps of Feuerbach. Bulgakov, who gave the watchword " from Marxism to idealism," needed therefore strong personal reasons before forsaking Feuerbach. In a work entitled *The Religion of the Man-Godhead in the Works of L. Feuerbach* (1906), a belated contribution to the Feuerbach centenary (1904), the sometime Marxist declares that the Feuerbachian religion of humanity is inadequate. Not the man-god, he says, not the god-humanity, but the God-Man, the Christ, is the true object of religious devotion. As the terminology indicates, Bulgakov, too, is returning from Feuerbach to Solov'ev and Dostoevskii. Bulgakov states the alternatives: " Humanism with Christ and in Christ's name, or humanism versus Christ and in man's own name." Nevertheless, Feuerbach is given a place among the holy ones of the Christian calendar (an honour which Solov'ev had paid to Comte as well), for the social freedom of mankind is and must remain the precondition of the kingdom of God on earth, and Feuerbach, despite his atheism, sincerely cooperated in the upbuilding of this kingdom.

§ 166.

FOR Russia, as for Europe, Marxism is something more than a living memento to the defenders of the old social order, it is in addition a positive creative energy.

Apart from its scientific performances in the domain of economics and economic history, Marxism during the nineties awakened and reinvigorated the Russian intelligentsia. The revision of the narodničestvo and its documentary refutation with the aid of economic and financial statistics was a valuable service, through the performance of which realism first became wholly realistic. The blind hopes based upon the peasant had to be abandoned—though we must admit that the Marxists, in their campaign against the narodniki, endeavoured to prove a good deal more than was susceptible of proof.

The political achievements of Marxism have been con-

siderable. By their defence of politism, Plehanov and his associates established a clearer distinction between socialism and anarchism. For a time, none the less, the influence of Marx was overshadowed by that of Bakunin; only a minority of the Marxists remained equal to their task; but the views of this minority have continually gained ground. During the strenuous days of the revolution, though all the progressive parties were joint leaders in that movement, and though it was approved and supported even by the right wing of liberalism, it was the Marxists in especial who proved their organising capacity.

Marxist social democracy teaches the workers to advance by legal methods; the duma and the constitution are utilised to better and better effect on behalf of the minimum program. Everyday political and administrative work in the individual organisations (the trade unions, cooperatives, etc.), is training up a new generation of operatives, and the organisation of the workers necessitates to an increasing extent the development of political capacity.

The tactical struggles between the "economists" and the advocates of political action become less acrimonious; educational activity is diffusing among the workers a large share of culture, and above all of political culture. To a notable extent, this development is promoted by the consciousness of belonging to a party and to an international organisation. The Russian social democratic workman's outlook upon the social and political activities of the entire world, lifts him to a higher plane, politically speaking, than has been attained by the average liberal. Working-class leaders play the part which, during the reign of Alexander I, was played in the army and in society by those officers who had been in Europe; these leaders, too, have made personal acquaintance with Europe. To this extent, therefore, Marxism is in essentials a renovated radical westernism. In Russia, the land of so many nationalities, the mission of Marxist internationalism cannot but be fraught with blessings.

It is impossible for the nonce to say whether and when the Russian Marxists will succeed in winning over the peasants, but this much is certain, that the agrarian question is of far more pressing importance to the Russian than to the European Marxist.

We cannot esteem the social democracy too highly for the

way in which it has made it a point of principle to insist that science must be applied to political practice, to demand that politics shall be based upon strictly scientific historical and sociological knowledge. In this matter, Marxism follows the example set by Herzen and his successors.

On the philosophical plane, the religious problem presents great difficulties to the Marxists, though it must be admitted that the other parties, and above all the representatives of the church, have the same problem to solve. Mere Feuerbachian negation will not suffice. Doubtless such negation may have been the most effective weapon to employ against theocratic caesaropapism, but the old religion can be defeated only by a new religion.

To a certain extent, Marxism replaces religion by the cultivation of art.

In the literary field, at any rate, the Marxists make their appearance as critics, for in Russian Marxism literary criticism plays the same role as in the other trends. The Marxists have endeavoured to create a comprehensive history of literature, but since the task is still beyond their unaided strength they have had to join forces here with the narodniki, the liberals, and the social revolutionaries.

Among creative artists, the Marxists have a certain right to claim Gor'kii as their own, although the orthodox Marxists incline rather to regard him as a revisionist or a social revolutionary.

In the sphere of the fine arts, Marxism is still weak. Further, it is necessary to note that Marxism as yet has done hardly anything for the popularisation of art. Its endeavours to popularise science have a one-sidedly intellectualist stamp.

It must be accredited to Marxism as a service that it has vigorously opposed the decadent movement in literature, as manifested not only in Saninism, but also in metaphysical, religious, and political aberrations.¹ The works of Andreev, Merežkovskii, and Sologub, were rightly criticised, and an apt estimate was formed of Nietzsche and the Nietzschean cult. The cause of decadence was seen to lie in the social system of capitalism. It was recognised that pessimism, idealism, and mysticism, are merely so many outward manifestations of the widespread *taedium vitae* which is charac-

¹ A collection of antidecadent essays filling two volumes was published during 1908 and 1909, under the title, *The Literary Decadence*.

teristic of the decay of the old era, with its satiety and debility. Plehanov, we remember, regards scepticism (itself, too, an outcome of subjectivism) as a symptom of bourgeois decadence. Bakunin wrote against scepticism in a quite similar manner. So did Mihailovskii, who, in addition, referred to the symptomatic significance of suicide. Quite recently (January, 1912), the epidemic of suicide among the Russian youth was analysed by Gor'kii in an animated attack upon "the fathers" who drive their "children" to suicide. We can readily understand that some of the decadents will turn for sensational stimulation to social democracy and the revolution. The decadent vacillates between the church and the lupanar, and in his physical and mental debility he may also find his way to the barricade.

But however much I admire the democratic aspirations of Marxism and the social democracy, however gladly I accept socialism (not communism!), I deplore the scholasticism of Marxist orthodoxy, and lament the philosophic and scientific sterility of the doctrine.

V

§ 167.

IN our historical sketch we gave an account of the development of the revolutionary parties in Russia, and we have made acquaintance with the radical program and with the essential features of the terrorist revolution which came to its climax with the assassination of Alexander II.

After the tsar's death the members of the Narodnaja Volja remained organised in small local circles. These circles were continually breaking up and being reorganised, and in some cases small new centres of the party came into existence. The relationships of the Narodnaja Volja with the growing social democratic organisation were friendly in some places, hostile in others.

During the autumn of 1901, the various revolutionary elements amalgamated to form the Social Revolutionary Party with a central committee. Side by side with this central committee there was soon formed a more or less independent "fighting organisation" (*boevaja organizacia*). Bogolëpov, Sypjagin, Plevé, Sergius, Šuvalov, and others, were its victims.

The term "social revolutionaries" goes back to Bakunin, and was intended to denote those who aimed at the definitive social revolution; but the name likewise stressed the idea of revolutionary tactics.

In respect of organisation and of program the Social Revolutionary Party was the rival of the Social Democratic Party. The contrast between the two organisations is succinctly shown in the following table:—

SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARY PARTY.

Represents the workers generally, opposes every kind of exploitation of the workers; is not a class party, but a union of the intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the operatives.

The peasants constitute the most numerous contingent of the working class and must be revolutionised; the factory operatives will then follow their lead. The peasant is not a petty bourgeois but a collectivist.

The mir is a socialistic factor; it has defects, but they can be remedied.

The small holdings of the peasantry will not be absorbed by the large estates; on the contrary, the number of small holdings is on the increase.

Private property in land is inadmissible; the land belongs to all (nationalisation of the land). Private property in land, free ownership of land, advantages none but the rich.

Terrorism is ethically and politically permissible as a supplement to the mass revolution; it must however be conducted by the party, and must not be undertaken by individuals upon their own initiative.

All the revolutionary parties should amalgamate.

The organisation of the party is centralist.

The party considers a republic to be a practicable aim.

The дума is to be boycotted.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

Represents the factory workers, the proletariat as a class, which will put an end to the class struggle.

The peasant is inferior to the factory operative in respect of revolutionary energy; he is a petty bourgeois.

The mir has played its part, and is now a moribund and reactionary institution.

The small-holding peasant will be gobbled up by the great landlord.

Freedom of landownership may serve to accelerate the concentration of landownership.

Terrorism is injurious to the mass revolution, and does no good.

The social democrats can make common cause with other revolutionary parties only temporarily and ad hoc.

The organisation of the party is either centralist or autonomist.

The party aims at a republic.

The дума is to be boycotted (majority); deputies should be sent to the дума (minority).¹

¹ The translations of Thun's book and the supplements to that work which we owe to Plehanov and Šiško respectively, facilitate an interesting comparison

This exposition shows plainly that the program of the social revolutionaries is the program of the narodniki in a socialist dress; the folk-socialists (social-narodniki) and the neonarodniki developed *pari passu* and in association with the social revolutionaries. Since the question of tactics was the main interest of the social revolutionaries, since they advocated the fomenting of revolution by terrorist methods, it was natural that they should pay comparatively little heed to economic questions; these matters were left to the narodniki and their leading periodical ("Russkoe Bogatstvo"). The menace to the existence of the mir involved by the law of November 9, 1906, aroused little discussion among social revolutionaries, although from time to time it was frankly recognised that the working of this law would completely destroy the mir within two or three decades, and that the hopes based upon Russian socialism by the narodničestvo were therefore tending to prove illusory.

The experiences that followed the revolution of 1905 wrought much confusion in the ranks of the social revolutionaries, a confusion manifested by the cleavage of the party into numerous factions, whose existence was often ephemeral. We have already learned that the social revolutionaries, like the social democrats, split into maximalists and minimalists; for a short time there was a section known as "initiativists," who advocated radical terrorism as it had been practised by the narodovolcy. There were several social revolutionary periodicals which preached a boycott of the duma, but there was another organ which opposed this boycott. In three of the elections to the duma, the boycott was actually practised, but the second duma was not boycotted.

Upon the question of revolutionary terrorism the party was disunited, and failed to formulate clear views. It was not by its constitution outspokenly terrorist. After certain terrorist activities and after the revolution, at a congress held in June 1906 it was decided to abandon the terrorist struggle until further notice. The party was here yielding to the general sentiment. The first terrorist acts had been at least tacitly approved by persons of all parties and trends, but after the revolution, terrorism was decisively condemned.

between the Social Democratic Party and the Social Revolutionary Party. (Šiško, who died recently, was at one time a member of the Narodnaja Volja and was one of the few seniors among the social revolutionaries.)

The counter-revolution which followed the revolution led the revolutionists to harbour doubts about the policy of individual outrage, for it seemed that these at best must be useless, seeing that even the mass revolution had been unsuccessful. At the same time, terrorism was compromised by the practice of brigandage, a decomposition in the revolutionary organisations setting in owing to the activities of those who practised expropriation in the name of the revolution.

It has previously been explained that an especially severe blow was administered to the party by the unmasking of Azev. When the terrorists could no longer feel sure whether they were not promoting the aims of provocative agents, they could not fail to reconsider the whole question of the efficacy of terrorism.

Since the government was actually willing to sacrifice persons of considerable importance in order to sow panic throughout society, and in order that the reaction might be enabled to pursue its course undisturbed, the revolutionists were compelled to ask themselves whether terrorism, whether the policy of individual outrage, could possibly be a sound and efficient method. After the unmasking of Azev, the Social Revolutionary Party was decimated. Azev had wielded great authority in the party and, as one of the party organs said, had been esteemed even more highly than the revolutionists Željabov and Geršuni. Now, of a sudden, came a crushing disillusionment! There was little consolation to be found in the fact that the party itself had discovered the traitor (Burcev, who unmasked Azev, was a member of the party); nor was it an effective argument that provocative agents had likewise been discovered among the social democrats and in the Bund, for in these non-terrorist organisations provocative agents had never played a leading part such as Azev had played among the social revolutionaries and Degaev in the Narodnaja Volja. When therefore in 1909, at a meeting of the party executive, the resolution of 1906 was revoked, and it was agreed that the terrorist campaign should be continued notwithstanding the experiences with Azev, the impression produced by this decision was that an attempt was being made to gloss over the disintegration of the party.¹ A minority faction, organising

¹ "Azev's participation in a number of terrorist enterprises has not discredited and cannot discredit this fighting method in the eyes of the party. The better the existing situation has become understood, the more plainly has

itself in Paris as a "League of the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left," and carrying on its journalistic and literary activities from the French capital, attempted under the leadership of Burcev, the indefatigable historian and publicist, to carry out an inexorable self-criticism, and thereby to liberate the party and its organisation from "revolutionary philistinism." The creative activity of the individual, and the active struggle of an organised minority of persons of initiative, must, said the members of this group, come into their own. The party must realise that it was no more than a minority, and could be nothing else. There is no revolutionary mass; the mass has always been led by minorities. The party must therefore abandon its centralist organisation; Azev was the product of centralisation. The greatest enemy, in truth the only enemy, of socialism (not only in Russia but elsewhere as well) is autocracy. In concrete terms, the Romanov dynasty is everywhere the prop of reaction; it must therefore be the first object of attack, and must first of all be annihilated. The autocracy, too, is only a minority.

From the maximalist¹ side, objections were raised to this program of the left.

The maximalists contended that the minimum socialist program (the minimum social revolutionary program not excepted) comprised, as a whole, those demands which were realisable under the continuance of the old regime. Of course the minimum was extensible, varying according to the way in which the term "realisable" was defined. The minimum might be conceived either in a reformist or in a revolutionary sense.

the party recognised that whilst the participation of provocative agents cannot prevent a great victory in this field, such participation does serve to impair the energies of the terror at the most critical moment for the government and the revolution, for it prevents the unfolding of the entire strength of this fighting method, prevents the display of all the energy which the party might devote to it; it increases the confidence of the government, and increases therewith the resoluteness of the government at a time when the government has especial need for resolution. While, therefore, the unmasking of Azev has led certain individuals to doubt the efficacy of the terrorist campaign, the party as such merely discovers therein the reason for the failure of the terror to do all that it might have done for the party and the revolution; and it has taught the party what a renascent terror may be competent to do. In this matter, consequently, the party retains its old fighting position."

¹ The reader must not forget that the "maximalists" referred to in this and the ensuing sections are social revolutionaries, not the maximalist social democrats or bolševiki. See pp. 296 and 364.

The maximalists, who began to organise themselves towards the close of 1905, demanded a *social* revolution. They were therefore sceptical regarding the *political* revolution of the left. If, they said, the minority can seize political power, why should it not make social revolution its direct aim? Simple political dictatorship by the minority was repudiated by the maximalists as Marxism and socio-political realism.¹

The maximalists expanded the program of socialisation of the land to include the socialisation of factories and industrial enterprises. In accordance therewith, political terrorism was enlarged to include "economic" (agrarian) terrorism. Expropriation was to be inaugurated by a campaign against the capitalists, carried on by individual action.

The organisation of the party must be democratic. The maximalists rejected centralisation, but demanded nevertheless a "strong centre." Maximalist democracy was to be secured by the federation of autonomous revolutionary communes. There was talk of "the method of communal revolution"; this demand goes back to Bakunin and Proudhon, but I cannot see that those who formulated it had paid due attention to the social characteristics of the modern great town and its administrative tasks. How is such a city as St. Petersburg or Moscow (to say nothing of London) to be revolutionised? On the other hand, how are the Russian villages to be revolutionised? The maximalist program, too, is unduly abstract, unduly schematic; and it is noteworthy that at the first maximalist congress (in so far as a judgment can be formed from the very inadequate reports), sympathy for the program was mainly displayed by the peasants and the representatives of the lesser towns.

The maximalists are declared adversaries of Marxism and social democracy. They speak of the Marxists as "scientific reactionaries," and extol personal initiative, especially that of academic youth. They aim at a union of classes and at cooperation with the declassed intelligentsia.

¹ "The Commune," the organ of the maximalists, was first published in December 1905, and the first congress of the group was held in the following year.

§ 168.

THE stress laid upon revolutionist tactics led the maximalist social revolutionaries to reexamine the traditional views of their party, and this reexamination resulted in an unrestricted approval of traditional ethics and in a rejection of the amoralist outlook of the Marxists. Mihailovskii and Lavrov gained the victory over Marx.

The rules followed by the expropriators show that a distinction was made between social revolutionary expropriations and ordinary theft, and between social revolutionary assassination and ordinary murder. The rule was that in the first place the funds of the state were to be requisitioned, and in the second place the treasure houses of the capitalists were to be attacked. The money thus secured was to be used solely for revolutionary party purposes (to defray the costs of party administration, to provide chemicals, and so on).

It is instructive to note the attitude of Russian public opinion towards expropriation. Even in extremely conservative circles the condemnation of political outrage was far less severe than the condemnation of ordinary theft or murder, and experience of the expropriations would seem to sanction the customary distinction between political and ordinary crime. In the rural districts, indeed, "idealised robbery" was supported by the peasantry, and those who practised it were esteemed heroes.¹

The ethical problems of the revolution and of terrorism have been very vividly discussed by a young maximalist named Grigorii Nestroev.²

Nestroev began his revolutionary career when he was still a student, participating in the students' movement of the year 1899. He soon came into personal contact with Geršuni, Azev, and other well-known revolutionists. In 1902 he was arrested for the first time. After his release he played a practical part in the revolution, and had a notable share in some of the more important revolutionary enterprises. Having again been

¹ A well-known instance is that of Saška Savickii. In 1905 he joined the revolutionary movement. In the end of 1906 he withdrew into the forests of the administrative district of Chernigov, and maintained himself there with the connivance of the country folk until 1909, when he was betrayed by one of his associates, and was shot by the soldiers who were pursuing him.

² Pages from the Diary of a Maximalist, with a Preface by V. L. Burcev, Paris, 1910.

arrested, he was sent to Siberia, and thence escaped abroad.

His personal experiences confirmed Nestroev's ethical outlook, and led him to take an ethical view of the revolution.

In conformity with Stepniak, Nestroev justifies revolution and terrorist methods by considering them to embody reprisal and punishment. In this connection he would like to make a clear distinction between anarchism and maximalism, but does not succeed very well. All that he is able to suggest by way of distinction is that anarchism practises terror in its lesser forms, for the anarchists kill policemen, spies, and so on; maximalism wishes to avoid this needless and purposeless bloodshed, desires above all to avoid the wastage of its own energies, and is therefore concerned to practise "central terrorism," that which is directed against the highest peaks of absolutism, against the centre of all the centres. Hence organisers of genius, "creative terrorists" like Geršuni, abundant means, and large groups, are essential.

The quality of the revolutionists is of decisive importance, for nothing but quality can protect the party against the Azevs.

Nestroev is sufficiently critical to find fault even with the Napoleons of the revolution. In the case of one of them (M. J. Sokolov) whom he admires, he points out that Sokolov put too light a value upon life—his own and others. To this revolutionist the saying is especially applicable, that the Russian terrorists can strive for death but not for victory. Nestroev complains that his hero, though leader of a democratic organisation, was a born dictator. Finally, Sokolov is charged with carelessness in the choice of instruments.

In addition, Nestroev draws attention to the romanticism of many of the terrorists, their love of danger and even death. "To such a man the beauty of life seems to consist in death for death's sake, in action for action's sake."

Nestroev depicts for us certain types of revolutionists whom he characterises as "individualistic." To one of these, shortly before his expected execution, the question occurs, Are all means permissible for the construction of the temple of the future? He is tempted to save his own life by betraying the party and the revolution, but he withstands the temptation by invoking the concept of honour, and goes to meet death. Another considers the example of Azev and similar persons. The methods of the provocative agent, he says, are dangerous

only to the weakly, not to the strong, and I am one of the strong. One who rejects the concept of duty as part of the religion of the master class cannot admit the need to recognise the idea of revolutionary duty. I am not, he says, a slave to conventionalities, but neither will I be a slave to party morality. I will seek new paths, on which I will march boldly forward.

Nestroev had frequent opportunities for the study of the new brigandage and its advocates; he was acquainted with the "revolutionary robbers" and the "gamins of the ideal." Such a lying and thievish mob-revolutionist once declared that he could not live a quiet life, and that he loved danger, for he enjoyed the sensations it brought. This individualist, of course, had long ago abandoned all ethical valuations. Why is lying dishonourable, he would ask. What is moral uncleanness? And so on. His metaphysics culminated in the proposition: "What is man?—a piece of flesh and that's all." In view of such an interpretation and such a practical realisation of principles which he himself approves, Nestroev enquires whether the revolution, even should it prove victorious, can do any good when it contains such elements.

In Siberia, among persons of this type there were formed "proletarian communes" and groups of expropriators, dis-senters being convinced with the knife.¹

The "dead house", and its abnormalities, concluded Nestroev, have a bad influence upon men. But in addition, his experiences as a refugee made Nestroev take serious if not positively pessimistic views. He found the commonness of human nature especially conspicuous among the refugees; the differences and oppositions of personal life were in glaring contrast with party principles; there was a great gulf fixed between the peaks and the plain.

In his preface to Nestroev's diary, Burcev expresses the hope that the work will restore to the Russian revolutionaries the prestige they enjoyed before the revolution of 1905-1906. In actual fact, Nestroev's criticism aims at distinguishing the true revolution from the false; but we are left enquiring, What is the criterion of true revolution?

¹ This is the problem which disturbs Nestroev. Speaking

¹ In Russia, as well as in Siberia, many of the camp followers of revolution took to thieving, organising quasi-syndicates for this purpose, communistic societies of thieves.

of his personal development, he tells us that at first he joined the social democrats, but was repelled by their anti-terrorist campaign against the social revolutionaries and the anarchists—for Nestroev felt himself to be an anarchist. He therefore went over to the social revolutionaries, considering that in this party his own watchword, "A life for a life," adopted from Stepniak, was effectively realised. Lavrov's *Historical Letters*, Mihailovskii's writings, Thun's *History of the Revolutionary Movement in Russia*, and Stepniak's *Underground Russia*, confirmed him in his decision.

But Nestroev grew tired of the ordinary social revolutionaries, and developed into a maximalist. We have learned what were the practical demands of the maximalist section of the social revolutionaries, and can now come to a definitive judgment.

The program of this section lacks definiteness in its details and as a whole; we see in it a non-organic synthesis of anarchism and Marxist socialism.

Nestroev formulates the task of maximalism in five demands: promotion of the class consciousness of the workers; their organisation into a class; the revolutionising of the will; the destruction of the fetichism of private property; the destruction among the people of the sentiment of legality, and the strengthening of the sentiment of revolt.

Not one of these demands conflicts with Marxism. There is not even any contradiction between Marxist rationalism and the voluntarist idea of revolutionising the will, although Nestroev is somewhat prejudiced against the leadership of the intelligentsja. What distinguishes Nestroev's maximalism from Marxism is his distinctively ethical outlook. Socialism definitely represents to him the ethical "thou shalt," the sense of moral duty, that which is ethically desirable.

But the question arises, how far that which is ethically desirable can also be considered possible. Now we learn from Nestroev that from the point of view of possibility, maximalism is justified provided that the social revolution can be realised *forthwith*. Apart however from the considerations which led Nestroev while in Siberia to doubt whether revolution was salutary, we are compelled to enquire whether maximalism has not, first of all, to weld its adherents into a class and to educate them for the revolution. And will not this education take a very long time before we can hope that the

definitive revolution will be actually realised and accepted by at least a notable minority of the European nations? How, then, is the definitive social revolution to be effected *forthwith*?

The problem, therefore, is not theoretical merely, but ethical and thoroughly practical. Nothing but the widest knowledge of men and things, the widest understanding of all social and political forces, can enable us to decide whether a definitive social revolution is as yet possible. I do not lay claim to such a knowledge, for I confine myself to the numerous experiences since 1905 and say that these lead me to the conclusion that neither in Russia nor in Europe is such a revolution possible *forthwith*. By this reasoning Nestroev would be compelled to deny the justification of maximalism, but his own philosophical view is an opposed one, for he contends that what ought to be, is and must be possible. "Thou canst, for thou oughtest."

§ 169.

THE philosophical and scientific achievements of the social revolutionaries cannot be so precisely defined as those of the Marxists, for the social revolutionary program is less definite and exclusive. In philosophy and sociology, the social revolutionaries take their stand upon the views of Lavrov, and above all upon those of Mihailovskii; but they likewise regard Černyševskii and Herzen as authorities; whilst as concerns economics and the philosophy of history they are narodniki. In individual cases, it is not easy to decide whether a writer is a social revolutionary or a narodnik. The main difference is that the narodniki or neonarodniki treat more of theoretical, the social revolutionaries more of political matters. Upon the social revolutionaries, no less than upon the narodniki, Marxism exercises much influence, even when they are attacking the Marxist doctrine; and in their onslaughts on Marxism they are glad to enter into an alliance with revisionism.

As typically representative of their views I select Černov and his *Philosophic and Sociological Studies* (1907).

It is plain that Černov derives his philosophical views from Marx, or, if he does not take them directly from Marx, that he is influenced by Marxist ideas as restated by Lavrov and Mihailovskii. Indeed, he describes himself as an "ardent and honest" admirer of Marx; but he attempts to build a

bridge between Marx and the "ethico-sociological school" (Lavrov and Mihailovskii), the piers of his bridge being Riehl and Ward. Now as regards the evolution and ripening of ideas, such bridges may exist; but there is no justification for this particular bridge. Černov abandons the economic and metaphysical materialism of Marx and Engels, and accepts the empirio-criticism of Avenarius (adding the ideas of Mach)—but what have Riehl and Ward to do with the matter? It is obvious that Černov has learned epistemological criticism in the school of Riehl, and thus his native realism develops into empirio-criticism; Ward's "dynamic sociology" attracts him to the "active-dynamic" school of sociology and to active realism in general.

When Černov desires to construct a "synthetic" social revolutionary philosophy, we are compelled to ask whether he does not succumb more than he would like to admit to the eclecticism which is so much censured by himself and the other members of his party.

Černov commends empirio-criticism for its antagonism to all metaphysic, to all that is supranatural and transcendental, commends it for its view that man cannot get beyond "pure experience." He adopts this doctrine in order to prove that Mihailovskii's positivism was essentially a foreshadowing of the empirio-criticism of Avenarius and Mach. Černov is a declared monist, and even in his outlook on history he regards his own views as more monistic than economic materialism, wherein he detects a certain remnant of dualism. Ideas are simply extant as an important part of reality, and must therefore be recognised as social forces. Černov concedes, however, that ideas are not properly speaking primary forces (he borrows from Ward here); man is dominated by feeling, the emotions are the motive power, and the intelligence is merely the directive energy. But why, in this matter, should Černov base himself upon Ward, seeing that not Spencer alone, but also Mihailovskii's teacher, Comte, taught that the intelligence was a secondary factor? Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* had bewitched him. It seemed to him but a short step from the "dynamic" to revolution, although the idea of the dynamic as expounded by Ward, and Ward's whole sociology, contain but little admixture of revolutionary elements.

Subjectively, the dynamic appears in Černov as voluntarism. Like so many voluntarists, Černov's definition of truth

is utilitarian ; the preservation of the individual is the " root " of theoretical truth. Černov has failed to reflect that from this standpoint he might readily lapse into the detested metaphysics and even into religion, for from this outlook it might easily be made to appear that religion is useful for the preservation of the individual and of the species (compare, for example, Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution*).

Černov pleads for unity of theory and practice. In support of this he can appeal to Herzen, and he is influenced, too, by his fondness for monism. Further, he bases himself on Marx, who represented " practically critical " activity as revolutionary practice. For Černov, socialism is at once an instrument of research and a measure of value ; it is a revolutionary philosophy, simultaneously the philosophy of reality and of activity ; the " active-dynamic " school of sociology is for him the scientific equivalent of practical revolutionary socialism.

In contrast with Marx and Engels, Černov recognises the existence of a universally valid morality. The conscious, critically thinking individuality (of Lavrov) does not accept class morality, for this is of purely accidental origin, the outcome of birth, environment, etc., whereas socialism must recognise a universally valid morality. Positivist, historical foresight does not suffice as a guide to action, does not suffice the revolutionary. Foresight relates solely to the temporary result of the decision ; but the socialist has ideals, and the ideal is something more than foresight. Foresight is the outcome of observation, whilst the ideal goal is prescribed by feeling. The revolution, in Černov's sense, therefore contains subjective ideal factors, whereas Marx entertained a fatalistic optimism based upon a claim to the foreknowledge of historical events.

In this matter, as in general, Černov does not get beyond the sphere of psychology. We can see that he is influenced by the antihistorism, the voluntarism, and the emotionalism of Nietzsche (and of Schopenhauer, etc.). But he does not attempt an epistemological foundation and appraisal of morality ; he does not try to explain why emotion is better, more right, than intelligence, or to which feelings the assertion applies. Speaking generally, we may say that Černov's

¹ The Russian term for " reality " is " děistvitel'nost," that for " action " or " activity " is dějanie ; this facilitates Černov's comparison.

empirio-criticism does not pay due attention to the theory of cognition. It is true that he attempts to discard apriorism, but he does not succeed in getting any further than Mihailovskii with the empirical explanation of the axiom. To-day, to do no more than this is to do too little.

Seeing that Černov emphasises the importance of ethics as contrasted with the amoralism of Marx, he ought to have considered the ethical problem more closely. Above all the problem of revolution ought to have been more precisely formulated from the outlook of the Social Revolutionary Party, seeing that this is preeminently the problem which has to be faced in practice. Other writers have of late considered the theory of revolution, and very notably has this been done in the novels of Ropšin. The maximalist discussions of the topic, discussions to which I have previously referred, are likewise worthy of attention.

In actual fact, in a series of articles published in the recently founded party magazine "Zavěty" (testaments), Černov has dealt with the question. He sees quite rightly that the revolution of 1905 has above all a moral significance for the new ethic. Černov, just like Bakunin, demands a new ethic, the ethic of the new man, of the new humanity, the ethic which is one of the primary aspirations of the social revolution.

Černov is much interested in the thought of Nietzsche, but does not identify his new man with the superman. On the contrary, it appears that the new ethic makes essentially the same demands as the old, the only difference being that the new ethic lays especial stress upon the social aspects of life. The new ethic, like the old, demands personal improvement, but efforts at personal improvement must always be directed with an eye to their bearing upon the social whole, and must not be undertaken merely in the interest of the individual.

Černov likewise terms his ethic "dynamic," but the new name denotes in truth a very old thing, the new morality aims at giving room for the strong and vigorous expression of individuality. At the same time, the concept of the dynamic is defined on the ethical plane after the Comtist example by saying that social statics constitutes the moral maximum, social dynamics the moral minimum; ethical maximalism is the demand for the universalised ideal harmony of mankind, of all the members of the human race; the moral minimum is the bridge to the maximalist ideal.

Černov's attempt to combine socialistic ethics with sociology and history deserves commendation. It is clear, and the demand has long been current, that the socialist, one who desires to play an active part in political life, should, like every politician, be thoroughly conversant with the elements of political science. In view of existing conditions in Russia, Černov did well in that he attempted to provide an ethical foundation for politics and to give politics an ethical trend. We are faced, it is true, by the time-worn puzzle which was considered by Černov's predecessors when they discussed the problem of freedom and necessity, and above all the problem of historical necessity. As repeatedly occurs, we are confronted with the essential question, what is the importance of the individual within the social whole, a historically evolving whole; and we have to enquire whether the individual's voluntary decisions are free decisions.

On the one hand Černov lays stress upon the strong personality, but on the other he insists that we must give due weight to the social whole. Since the whole develops, since the ideal maximum is not yet attainable, Černov is prepared to compromise "with life." The right compromise will be recognised by its being a step towards the ideal, and not away from the ideal.

I do not think it can be said that the difficulties formulated by Nestroev the maximalist are overcome by Černov's new socialistic ethic. Černov declares that ethical maximalism completely excludes the use of force; but ethical minimalism permits the use of force. The revolutionary has to answer the definite question, May I, shall I, must I, kill or appropriate? Černov replies: Ethical maximalism forbids the use of force in any form, for ethical maximalism leads with inexorable logic to Tolstoian non-resistance; but ethical minimalism permits revolution and terrorism when these are steps to the ideal. The revolutionist will naturally enquire, Is this particular deed, is, let us say the revolution of 1905, such a step? Černov's reply is that in this matter sociology and history must provide the answer for socialistic ethics. It need hardly be said that the reflective revolutionary will find the reply inadequate, and he will press the question whether he, a definite individual, not a revolution in general, nor a historic epoch, nor any similar abstraction, may, shall, and must decide in favour of action in a particular case.

We cannot discover in Černov's writings any clear and definite answer to this question. Here the "new ethic" fails us. We are merely told that the maximalist ideal "must be carried into effect by the consciousness and the will of all, or at least by the majority"; but on further examination it transpires that this "majority" does not signify the majority of, say, the Russian people, but signifies the majority of the party which is united into a collective whole by its pursuit of a particular ideal—an ideal which can be realised by joint action. We are further told that the principle of majority involves the submission of the minority and of the individual, for these must yield to the desires of the majority, and must recognise the morally coercive energy of the common action.

Poor arguments, these! The periodical in which Černov published them had, apropos of the seventieth anniversary of Mihailovskii's birth, made a formal declaration that the social revolutionaries, including Černov, regarded themselves as Mihailovskii's disciples. But Mihailovskii would never have consented to such an abdication of individuality, and to-day he would have envisaged the problem of revolution far more energetically. Černov had under his eyes, not merely Nes-troev's diary, but the works of his comrade Ropšin as well, and these deserved better treatment! For the rest, Černov has written about Ropšin, and this is a matter to which we shall return after the discussion of certain other important ideas or trends.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

MODERN ANARCHISM: KROPOTKIN. ANARCHISM AND SOCIALISM

I

§ 170.

IN our account of modern Russian anarchism we shall first describe the system of Petr Kropotkin.¹ For the most part Kropotkin is a disciple of Bakunin, but is a less highly strung revolutionist than his predecessor, his anarchism being more temperate, or shall I say less rugged, than Bakunin's, not only in form but in content. Bakunist pandestruction is in Kropotkin's hands a sociological and ethical criticism

¹ Prince Petr Kropotkin sprang from the family of Rjurik, and was born in the year 1842. From 1857 to 1862 he was in the pages' corps at St. Petersburg, and from 1863 to 1867 was in the army as aide-de-camp to the viceroy of Transbaikalia. Retiring from military service, from 1868 to 1872 he studied geography, geology, and the natural sciences in general, making a name for himself as geographer by his observations upon Asiatic orography. In 1872 he visited Europe and came into contact with the International Working-Men's Association. In 1874 he was arrested as a member of the Caikovcy; and in 1876, having escaped from the infirmary of the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul, he took refuge in Europe. Here he entered into close association with the Bakunist wing of the International, and laboured to promote the organisation of anarchism. In 1883, having been arrested by the French government for his participation in the second anarchist congress at Geneva, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment after a trial wherein much irrelevant matter was introduced as evidence. Pardoned in 1886, he removed to London. A well-known book is his *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, 1900. He has given numerous expositions of anarchist doctrines, briefly in the *Scientific Basis of Anarchy* ("Nineteenth Century," 1887), and in fuller detail in *La morale anarchiste*, 1891. See also his *Paroles d'un révolté*, ouvrage publié, annoté et accompagné d'une préface par Elysée Reclus. In Russian Literature, *Ideals and Realities*, 1905, Kropotkin deals with the leading figures of the Russian literary world. In *The Great French Revolution, 1789-1793*, Kropotkin describes the revolution from his own outlook. Consult also: *Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution; Fields, Factories, and Workshops; The Conquest of Bread*.

and negation of the old social order, which the revolution is destined to abolish.

According to Kropotkin, this old order is the dominance of the few over the many, and above all the dominance of a small number of capitalists. The love of our neighbour is officially preached, but remains mere dead preachment, just as we are habitually told that we are never to lie whilst misrepresentation and sophistry constitute the whole basis of our social life. It is impossible, therefore, that this life can be retained, and it must be altered from the foundations upwards. But the question of its transformation does not depend merely upon the material conditions of existence, and the change must involve the entire domain of human activity. The new world can only be upbuilt by a new faith. This new world signifies the political and social freedom of all.

Anarchism, for Kropotkin, is a method, is a natural philosophy of socialism, a philosophy in fact. Just as Marx proclaimed his socialism as science, so does Kropotkin speak of anarchism as science.

Kropotkin's anarchism is directed against the power and dominion of the state, being essentially astatism and apolitism, but at the same time it is directed against authority in every form. Kropotkin stigmatises the wielders of power, the guardians of the law, and the pious, as the hereditary enemies of thought. Opposing reason to authority, he rejects the Bible and the gospels, Kant (the categorical imperative), Bentham and the utilitarians (self-interest rightly understood), and all hitherto extant religious and moral education. Like Bakunin, he demands a new morality and a new faith, meaning thereby, not a new religion, but a new philosophy.

As happens to so many of the anarchists, Kropotkin's astatism involves him in grave perplexities. Let us suppose, he says, that a group of individuals have combined to carry out an undertaking. One of them proves disorderly and work-shy; what is to be done? Is the group to be dissolved; is it to be given an overseer who will dictate punishments or keep a time-book of work done? Kropotkin solves the difficulty in the following way. "The comrades will say to the comrade whose conduct is injuring the undertaking: 'Good friend, we should like to go on working with you, but since you often fail to turn up, and often neglect your work, we shall have to part company. Go and seek other comrades

who will get on better with you.' " Extremely amiable, but somewhat childish. Lenin's comment would be, " Kill with kindness ! "

Bakunin spoke of his anarchism as revolutionary socialism, and sometimes as social or socialistic democracy. Kropotkin terms his own doctrine " anarchistic socialism," for he distinguishes anarchism from socialism solely in respect of method.

Kropotkin represents the relationship between anarchism and socialism in the following way. Socialism has sprung from three sources and in a threefold manner. Social democracy (state socialism) originated from Saint-Simonism, anarchism from Proudhonism, autonomist trade unionism and municipal socialism from Owenism. These systems represent three trends, three methods, three routes towards a common goal ; anarchism is far more closely akin to Owenism than to Saint-Simonism. Anarchising socialism and social democracy are distinguished one from another by their divergent estimates of organisation or of state socialism. Kropotkin is opposed to centralisation. Like Bakunin and Proudhon, he demands the autonomous federation of the individual associations, which he does not conceive as territorial, but rather as consisting of a moderately large number of persons belonging to different localities. Kropotkin adduces the postal service as an example of the anarchistic organisation of the future. Just as the posts between the different states can be carried on exceedingly well without a central office, so can the autonomous lesser social organisations be federatively linked and internationally combined. But Kropotkin forgets that the international postal treaties are regulated and guaranteed by the state.

Kropotkin rejects, not merely centralism, but individualism as well. He refuses to recognise the rights of the individual, since these do not signify equal rights for all, but the rights of the few over the many. Above all, Kropotkin dissents from Nietzsche, whom he regards as a hopelessly vague thinker, and where not vague, narrow. Rejecting Nietzsche, he rejects also the Russian individualist aristocrats like Merezhkovskii.

To some extent, Kropotkin agrees with political radicalism in his estimate of the state ; he opposes the state on principle. The radicals, he says, hope that the republic and universal suffrage will bring salvation, but their hope is vain. Parliament cannot help the weak, nor can it reconcile opposing

forces ; majority rule means always the rule of mediocrity ; the electoral method is not the way to find those who can represent the people. The whole of political life is permeated with falsehood ; the root of the evil lies in the very principle of the state ; consequently all the functions of the state are to be reduced, not to a minimum, but to nil. Anarchism is annihilation of the state, is anarchy, Kropotkin declares, following Bakunin.

Kropotkin has much to say against social democracy, but he never really tries conclusions with social democracy. Like Bakunin, he is adverse to Marxism and to Marx, but gives no sufficient grounds for his antipathy. He fails to pay sufficient attention to the evolution of the Marx-Engels doctrine and to Marxism ; he fails to see that Marx, too, was opposed to the state, and was an enthusiastic advocate of revolution. Kropotkin's utterances upon the leading question of historical materialism are extremely vague.¹

Kropotkin's views are distinguished from Marx's above all in the recognition of morality. He negates the old morality,

¹ The bread question is occasionally described as the matter of most essential importance, but this does not involve for Kropotkin an acceptance of historical materialism. In his work on the French revolution we read : " Two great currents prepared and made the Great French Revolution. One of them, the current of ideas, concerning the political reorganisation of states, came from the middle classes ; the other, the current of action, came from the people, both peasants and workers in towns, who wanted to obtain immediate and definite improvements in their economic condition. And when these two currents met and joined in the endeavour to realise an aim which for some time was common to both, when they had helped each other for a certain time, the result was the Revolution. . . . To arrive at a result of this importance, and for a movement to assume the proportions of a revolution, as happened in England between 1648 and 1688, and in France between 1789 and 1793, it is not enough that a movement of ideas, no matter how profound it may be, should manifest itself among the educated classes ; it is not enough that disturbances, however many or great, should take place in the very heart of the people. The revolutionary action coming from the people must coincide with a movement of revolutionary thought coming from the educated classes. There must be a union of the two." Note the vagueness of the concepts. Ideal current=revolutionary thought=bourgeoise=cultured classes ; and again, activity=the masses=peasants and proletarians=the people=the economic situation. The concurrence of activity and thought seems to be ascribed by Kropotkin to a mere happy chance. The whole conception is inaccurate and obscure. The cultured classes participate in revolutionary action as well as the people. Obviously more precise elucidation is requisite ; we want to know when and how revolutionary ideas originate, how revolutionary activities come to be superseded by these ideas, what phases are displayed by revolutionary activities, and so on. Nor is Kropotkin right in representing Marxism as a rechauffé of the state collectivism of Pecqueur and Vidal. Similar erroneous contentions are frequent in Kropotkin's writings.

but his outlook is not amoralist either in the sense of Marx-Engels or in that of Nietzsche. Like Bakunin, Kropotkin wishes to found a new ethic. For Kropotkin, that is good which is useful to society, and that is bad which is harmful to society. He troubles himself little to enquire whether this definition is adequate, just as he fails to formulate with precision the concept "society." Without further ado, he identifies that concept with the concept "race," and he uses the term "humanity" with the same signification. An opponent of Bentham and the other utilitarians, Kropotkin himself is unable to get beyond the utilitarian foundation of his ethic. He is a rationalist utilitarian, a disciple of the English utilitarians of the eighteenth century. He goes back, above all, to Adam Smith, teaching that men are endowed with natural sympathy, which suffices as a principle of morality. This natural sympathy is simultaneously a sense that we are all members of one another, and that consequently the sound organisation of society is a spontaneous product. Kropotkin discerns this social sense of mutual dependence among the lower animals also, and he therefore considers the formation of societies to be a natural law. Mutual aid is a natural law for beast as well as for man. The struggle for existence, the class struggle, are not the only laws of nature and society.

Kropotkin terms this natural social order, mutualism. In this matter Kropotkin dissents, not only from Darwin, but also from Spencer, for whereas Spencer had taught that the great progress of future society would be realised by effecting a coincidence between the happiness of the individual and the happiness of the community, Kropotkin contends that there has not from the first been any conflict between the interest of the individual and that of the community; there has always been a harmony of interests, for had it not been so the human race would never have been able to maintain itself, and no animal species would have been able to attain to its present level of development. Kropotkin forestalls possible objections to this idea of preestablished harmony by admitting that alike among men and among animals there have always existed numerous individuals unable to comprehend such harmony and mutuality. But the failure, he says, is due merely to a lack of understanding, to narrowness and stupidity; and there have always been individuals able to

recognise the true nature of the case and therefore able to lead a perfectly social life.

Like so many positivists and evolutionists, Kropotkin fails to reconcile ethics with historical development. For him ethics is a positive science, its function being merely to note facts. There is no ethical imperative. The anarchist studies society, and endeavours to understand its past and present trends. His ideal does no more than specify in which direction evolution is actually advancing. It seems hardly necessary to point out that such a sociological guide to action is extremely vague and unpractical. Kropotkin recognises four great historical stages: the social order of primitive tribal communism; feudalism; urban communities; and finally the centralised organisation of the state, which will be replaced by the stateless communistic federation. Now if we assume this account of historical development to be accurate, what follows as regards the practical activities of Kropotkin himself? Are his concrete doings based upon such an outlook?

In this evolutionist solution of the problem of liberty, Kropotkin follows Guyau, whom he extols as the founder of anarchist ethics. Kropotkin eludes the imperative by a positively foolish turn of phrase. Since he is compelled to insist upon the right and even the duty of revolution and tyrannicide, he adopts the hypothetical form, saying that every stalwart man begs us to kill him if he should become a tyrant. Of course the use of "if" does not really evade the imperative, but Kropotkin imagines he has eluded the difficulty when he declares the moral sense to be a natural endowment, no less natural than the sense of taste or smell. Morals, therefore, need neither sanction nor obligation (*une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, as Guyau puts it). When, therefore, Kropotkin makes use of the term "right," he promptly explains that it means nothing more than the consciousness of a good action. Kropotkin recognises no right, no law, no coercion. The natural inclinations of human beings serve to explain human actions; every one treats others as he wishes to be treated by them.

Kropotkin likewise adopts Guyau's ethical measure of intensity. The more intense a man's moral sense, the more does he do for society; and the more a man lives for society, the more intensively does he live. This follows from the

previously explained mutuality of the individual and of society. Kropotkin therefore condemns the morality of simple equality, condemns a life in which everything should be meted out to all by the same measure. Such a life would be grey, monotonous, devoid of strong impressions, lacking great joys and great sorrows, a vegetative life of mediocrity, life in a rotting swamp. "Be strong!" cries Kropotkin to his neighbour, and he demands that life shall be lived to the full; we must strive to give more than we receive, to produce more that is great, beautiful, and powerful. "To live means to spread one's energies abroad; to live means to strive for the attainment of perfect freedom; mere justice, mere equality would be the death of society. The anarchist must be strong and active; he must do great things; must do the greatest!"

Kropotkin, perhaps, hardly realises that he, the communist, is borrowing from Guyau's aristocratic doctrines, and even from Nietzsche's aristocratic radicalism.

Aristocratic, too, is Kropotkin's theory of revolution, at any rate in so far as revolution is the great deed he demands from the anarchist.

For Kropotkin, revolution is merely a form of natural evolution. Revolution represents the period of accelerated evolution, the period of torrential progress of the new order of society. Revolution is just as natural and necessary as is the slower manifestation of evolution.

It cannot therefore be the task of the sociologist and politician to discover how revolution is to be avoided. His aim must be to learn how revolution can be made to yield the greatest results.

Here Kropotkin takes a different line from Bakunin. Whereas Bakunin is quite unconcerned about plans for the future, and merely demands negative passion, the instinct of pandestruction, Kropotkin insists that we must have a definite plan, a distinct aim, and that we must choose the right method of revolution. Kropotkin wishes to restrict civil war to the utmost; the number of victims must be as small as possible; we must endeavour to minimise the reciprocal embitterment of the contending parties.

There is only one means to secure these practical human restrictions. The revolting and oppressed portion of society must be perfectly clear in its own mind regarding the aims and methods of the civil war, and must possess the enthusiasm

requisite to carry it on to the goal. Kropotkin, therefore, in contradistinction to Bakunin, does not desire to have any secret revolutionary organisations. The mass revolution must be the outcome of the deliberate agreement of all.

The revolution will be assured of success when the social class against which the struggle is being carried on shall have been brought to recognise the validity of the new ideals of the *révoltés*. Already the members of the dominant classes have ceased to appeal to the rectitude of the old regime, and they appeal merely to its utility. Consequently the imminent great revolution is already half won.

Turning to recent history for an example, Kropotkin refers to the Paris commune of 1871 as a mistaken and spurious revolution. Whereas Bakunin regarded this manifestation of civil war as the first "striking and practical" expression of revolutionary socialism, and whereas Marx likewise gave his cordial approval to the commune, Kropotkin condemns it as an awful example of a revolution devoid of definite aim. On the other hand he describes the great French revolution with loving admiration. As an anarchist, he cares nothing for the parliamentary institutions brought into being by the revolution, but he delights to note how the lower strata of the population, the peasantry no less than the urban proletariat, were won over to the revolution. Obviously, he is thinking of the possibility of an extensive peasant uprising in Russia, such a movement as that of which Bakunin had dreamed. Severe, on the other hand, is his condemnation of the bourgeoisie of that day, and above all his condemnation of the Girondists, so that the account he gives of the Gironde and its political aims differs greatly from that which we owe to liberal historians. But Kropotkin idealises the communists of the council of the Paris commune (Roux, Varlet, etc.) and Chaumette as genuine representatives of the working class. It is plain that Kropotkin is not a scientific historian, and that his historical works are written to further his socio-political ideals.

Kropotkin recognises the right and the duty of individual acts of violence as well as of mass revolution, but in accordance with his revolutionary principles he demands that an individual act of violence shall only be undertaken in the last resort, as an act of self-defence. For example, he exculpated Perovskaja and was on the most friendly terms with Stepniak,

having cordially commended the novel wherein Stepniak described the life of the terrorists. Tyrannicide, said Kropotkin, is morally permissible, we have a "right" to undertake it, because the terrorist asks us in advance to slay him also should he ever become a tyrant, a viper to his fellow men. "Treat others as you would wish them to treat you in similar circumstances." To slay a tyrant is just as justifiable as to slay a viper.

Kropotkin is himself a fresh illustration of the psychology of the Russian revolutionary. Humane as a man can be, a gentleman in the best and finest sense of the word, when he speaks of "vipers" Kropotkin is concentrating in that expression the revolutionary mood of a lifetime. The phrase embodies his personal experiences, his unjust persecution by the government and the court, the way in which his beloved brother was compelled to seek by suicide an escape from the intolerable conditions of Siberian exile; it embodies his view of Russian conditions as these had been determined by the existence of serfdom (conditions which had poisoned home life for Kropotkin during childhood). Thus does it come to pass that a man who by temperament and philosophic training is one of the kindest of his day can justify and recommend the slaughter of a tyrant as though he were a viper. Such is the mood in which Kropotkin has described and stigmatised the white terror. (See § 36, and Kropotkin's *The Terror in Russia*.)

To complete this sketch we must briefly consider Kropotkin's relationship to his Russian predecessors and contemporaries, and his attitude towards Russian literature and its leading trends. For Kropotkin, his system of anarchism is a general philosophy of life.

Kropotkin's chief teacher among the Russians was Bakunin, regarded by Kropotkin as the founder of modern anarchism or antistate socialism. A few of the distinctions between these two thinkers have already been mentioned. The most notable difference is that Kropotkin is less strongly and less directly influenced by Feuerbach, so that Bakuninist "antitheologism" makes its appearance in Kropotkin in a somewhat mitigated form.

Bakunin died just at the time of Kropotkin's escape from prison, so that the two men never met. But Lavrov was a personal friend of Kropotkin, and Kropotkin considers that

Lavrov's *Historical Letters* supply the correct solution of the problem of the relationships between the folk and the individual. Lavrov, writes Kropotkin, "was too widely learned and too much of a philosopher to join the German social democrats in their ideals of a centralised communistic state, or in their narrow interpretation of history."

Kropotkin agrees with Černyševskii's socialism. Kropotkin, too, wishes the liberated peasants to get possession of the land, and he looks upon the mir as the groundwork of the coming federative autonomy. He agrees with Černyševskii in the latter's estimate of the nihilists, and above all he is enthusiastic in his admiration for Černyševskii's feminine types. He accepts the solution offered in *What is to be Done* of the problem of marriage and divorce. In Puškin, too, he extols that writer's respect for women.

Kropotkin was a young man of twenty when the struggle was raging round Turgenev's Bazarov and the problem of nihilism. Accepting nihilism, Kropotkin interpreted it as anarchist philosophy.

From this outlook Kropotkin followed Herzen, and made a great distinction between terrorism and nihilism, insisting that the nihilist is a far profounder and more significant figure than the terrorist. Thus Kropotkin was not satisfied with the Bazarov type, for, as has been explained, his own ideals were those of Černyševskii as expounded in *What is to be Done*.

In respect alike of matter and of form, Herzen exercised great influence upon Kropotkin. As writer and philosopher, Kropotkin likewise owes something to Turgenev, and yet more to Nekrasov and Tolstoi. Ethical anarchism is his link with Tolstoi. Nekrasov charms him by the apotheosis of the mother-woman and of the Russian peasant woman. For the same reason, Kropotkin is especially attached to other Russian authors to whom we are indebted for a good analysis of the Russian woman (Hvoščinskaja, Panaev). Dostoevskii's outlook, on the other hand, is essentially alien to Kropotkin, who, as rationalist and positivist, detests mysticism. He considers Raskolnikov a poor typification of the nihilist, and he disapproves of Gončarov's analysis of nihilism.

Kropotkin forms a low estimate of Saltykov, finding him too undecided in politics. The poet Ogarev, on the other hand, is one of Kropotkin's favourites, and he is likewise fond of Gor'kii and Čehov. Concerning Gogol, Kropotkin agrees

with Bělinskii's later judgment. "Gogol was not a deep thinker, but was a great artist. . . . Art in Gogol's conception is a torch-bearer. . . . Gogol was the first to introduce the social element into Russian literature."

Among the writers on philosophy and politics, those who, besides Černyševskii, exercised most influence upon Kropotkin were Bělinskii, Dobroljubov, and above all Pisarev. Kropotkin speaks of Bělinskii as "a teacher and an educator of Russian society, not only in art, . . . but also in politics, in social questions, and in humanitarian aspirations." Mihailovskii was congenial to Kropotkin as adversary of Darwin and as critic.

Kropotkin is a narodnik in his high esteem for the Russian folk. Herein he agrees with the more progressive among the slavophiles. In the mir, he discerns the social principle of federation. Prior to the Tatar dominion, Russia was not an absolutist state but a federation of distinct folk-communes. After the introduction of Mongolian tsarism, and after the establishment of the official church, these folk-communes remained the asylum of popular rights (in contradistinction to the right of the state and to the laws imposed by the state) and of the federative idea.

Therewith is connected, too, Kropotkin's aversion to the intellectuals. He extols Čehov and Hvoščinskaja because these two writers have depicted and analysed the complete mental and moral bankruptcy of the intellectuals. He sympathises with Gor'kii's rebel tramp, looking upon this figure, not as a Nietzschean superman, but as a strong and unselfish hero of the people, who is in revolt against society.

When we turn to the European influences that have affected Kropotkin, we have in the first place to speak of positivism. If Kropotkin be especially inclined to adopt Guyau's formulations, this is merely because Kropotkin has already directly and indirectly assimilated Comte's positivism from his Russian teachers. Kropotkin learned much from English thinkers, and notably from Bentham, Mill, and Spencer; Darwin's views underwent modification at his hands; in conformity with Marx, he definitely rejected the doctrines of Malthus. Kropotkin has spent the greater part of his life in England, and the English influence upon his mind is especially marked.

German philosophy had little direct effect upon Kropotkin. Nietzsche was akin to him as an evolutionist; he shared with

Nietzsche the device "be strong," but gave it a humanitarian significance. The idea of the superman did not attract him.

The French socialists, finally, were familiar to Kropotkin, but he has had less acquaintance with Marx and Engels. He has diligently collaborated with other modern anarchists (Reclus, etc.) in the work of anarchist organisation, and upon the various party organs.

It is needless to attempt a more detailed appreciation of Kropotkin. His is a most congenial personality, but he does not shine as a thinker. For example, he advocates the abolition of the division of labour; but it will suffice him that the author shall do his own typesetting—though assuredly a consistent abolition of the division of labour would not call a halt at the compositor's case. The manner in which he gives his approval to luxury in modern society, his explanation of the categorical imperative (the habitual drinker, too, has an irresistible impulse), and so on—in all these things his thought is weak.

Nor is Kropotkin always accurate in his statements of facts; his literary work and his book on the French revolution offer more than one proof of the truth of this assertion.

II

§ 171.

IN view of the great importance of anarchism for the understanding of Russia, the nature of the movement demands fuller consideration.

In the first place we must note that anarchism has recently gained ground both in the theoretical field and as a practical movement, above all as a mass movement, and that this development is noticeable both in Russia and in Europe. In Russia, since about 1901, the growth of anarchism has been so considerable as to lead to the organisation of declared anarchist groups, not only among Russian refugees, but actually within Russia, though these latter are of course secret societies.

In the programs of these groups we find indications of the revolutionary excitement of the epoch, and we note their affinity to the program of the radical parties. We must not forget that simultaneously with this growth of anarchism

occurred the strengthening of the social revolutionaries, and that at the same time the social democrats exhibited a more radical trend, which culminated in the formation of a distinct radical faction, that of the bolševiki—the members of the left wing of the bolševiki are actually called anarchising socialists. The maximalists severed themselves from the social revolutionaries, and although the maximalists cannot be classified as anarchists, the influence of European anarchism is unquestionably traceable in their views; but both the social revolutionaries and the bolševiki have publicly and repeatedly protested in the strongest terms against anarchistic campaigning methods (individual acts of assassination, expropriation applied to private persons, and the like). Under anarchist influence the so-called Mahaevcy have broken away from the social democracy. Volskii (the pseudonym of a Pole named Machajski), the founder of this trend, offers an agglomeration of syndicalism, anarchism, and Marxism, in conjunction with a fierce polemic against the intellectuals.¹

In the growth of anarchism since 1901 I discern a manifestation of the radical mood which led in 1905 to the revolution, and which after the counter-revolution impelled to the revival of the revolution. Beyond question the latest Russian revolutionary movement is characterised by an anarchistic mood. After Bakunin, the only notable advocates of anarchism for a time were Kropotkin and Prince Čerkezov. Since 1901 anarchism has assumed a more moderate form.²

¹ Volskii was at first a Marxist. His book, *The Mental Worker*, was published in Geneva in 1904. In this he attacks social democracy and the anarchism of Kropotkin as unduly bourgeois.

² Prince Čerkezov is one of the ablest theorists of Bakuninist "federalistic-communism," and was a supporter of the older *Narodnaja Volja* and its terrorism. As participator in Karakozov's attempt he was sent to Siberia in 1866, and escaped in 1876. Consult his criticism of Marxism, W. Tscherskesoff, *Pages of Socialist History, Doctrines and Acts of the Social Democracy*, 1902. In 1903 began the publication of the anarchist periodical "*Hlěb i Volja*" (bread and freedom, a modification of the old formula *Zemlja i Volja*, land and freedom); on the whole this paper represented the ideas of Kropotkin. The journal "*Beznačalie*" (anarchy) which appeared in 1906, was more radical and more individualistic. The periodicals "*Novyi Mir*" (the new world) and "*Burevėstnik*" (the stormy petrel, the title is that of a well-known poem by Gor'kii), originating in 1907, were syndicalist. In the same year there came into existence an organisation entitled Russian Federation of Revolutionary Anarchists. The principal items in the program of "*Hlěb i Volja*" run as follows: anarchism is opposed to government of every kind, and is therefore opposed to attempts to establish a Russian constitution; it consequently rejects, in addition, the organisation of the party in central committees; it

The strengthening of anarchism as a manifestation of the revolutionary mood is partly traceable to foreign influences. In Europe, too, during the last years of the nineteenth century the growth of anarchism was manifest. We see this in Spain, in France (syndicalism), in Italy, in Germany (the "Jungen" and the "Localists"); even in England and the United States the anarchist movement gains ground. The growth of anarchism is witnessed by the organisation of the anarchist Libertarian Communist International, with its international correspondence bureau (Amsterdam, 1907).

It is noteworthy that this movement is not confined to the intellectuals, but has likewise affected the working classes. It is therefore predominantly communistic, and adopts the well-tried methods of agitation and organisation that have long been practised by the social democrats.

Discontent with parliamentarism and revisionism is an obvious spur to apolitism and revolution, and it is easy to understand how the idea of syndicalist "direct action" must

recognises nothing but free groups, whose unity is secured by a community of principles and aims and by joint revolutionary endeavours. The grouping of the anarchists and of their party is effected solely by voluntary agreement of the individuals within the groups and of the groups one with another. Consequently cooperation with other parties is excluded. The aim of all the free associations is merely this, to promote among the people a vigorous development of the revolutionary spirit, the spirit of revolt; the other requisites, conspiracy and revolution, will come in due time. The ultimate aim of anarchism is to bring about the social revolution, through which the state and capitalism will be replaced by anarchist communism. The social revolution must be a folk-revolution. Anarchism rejects social democracy and the social revolutionary movement. It is true that the social revolutionaries demand the socialisation of the land; but the anarchists will have nothing to do with land nationalisation, for they consider that the land must be owned by the peasants, not by the nation. With regard to terrorism, "Hlëb i Volja" insists that this must subserve economic as well as political ends. The terror, therefore, must be directed, not solely against the government, but also against the capitalists, the great landlords, etc. But, the terror must likewise be anarchistic, viz. free; it must not be controlled by the party; the decision whether a terrorist deed is to be performed is a matter for the individuals who undertake it. The terror as conducted by a central committee is a duel between two governments, whereas the terror ought to be a struggle carried on by the people against the government. Novomirskii (a pseudonym, meaning "man of the new world") has played a prominent part as representative of individualist anarchism. Starting from French syndicalism, he conceives communism as a stage of transition, and for him anarchist communism in particular is merely a phase in the evolution towards anarchism. In philosophy Novomirskii is a voluntarist, an opponent of Marxist rationalism. He follows Kropotkin in regarding the duty of revolution as a natural sacrifice. He considers a fine death to be of greater value than a fine life; death is for him no more than a higher stage of a strong and intensive life.

flourish in an epoch when industrial strikes are of almost incessant occurrence.

Simultaneously there has taken place a growth in anarchist literature. There are now more theorists of anarchism than hitherto, and above all the problem of statism and of the definitive revolution is discussed more directly and more exhaustively than of old. In this connection I may refer to Reclus, Grave, Cornelissen, Nieuwenhuis, Cafiero, Fabbri, Landauer, Friedberg, Tucker, and also to the theorists of syndicalism, Sorel, Lagardelle, etc.

It may further be noted that, in recent days, many learned works have been devoted to anarchism and to the history of anarchism. Numerous theorists and historians have dealt with Nietzsche, Stirner, Bakunin, and the International.

An associated development is the way in which, during the same epoch, those philosophers and poets who may be designated anarchists have gained a wider influence. The already great vogue of Nietzsche, Stirner, and Ibsen continually increases; and before all of these in importance comes Tolstoi. In addition must be mentioned the names of certain younger writers such as Mackay and Tailhade. Of course the ideas and ideals of such men are not always accepted in their true significance in the wider circles of the proletariat. To adapt Heine's mot concerning atheism, anarchism begins to smell of cheese and beer.

This theoretical and political movement, too, has exercised an influence upon Russia.

The first anarchist journals in the Russian tongue were published abroad, and were directly inspired by foreign anarchism. Simultaneously the literature of anarchism was made known to wider circles, and especially to the working classes, by translations (Eltzbacher, etc.). French syndicalism, too, was eagerly studied.

Especially influential in Russia have been, in addition to the works of Tolstoi, those of Nietzsche, Stirner, and Ibsen. A number of recent writers have adopted anarchist views under the influence of these and other European exemplars. I may refer to F. Sologub with his solipsist paroxysms; and to L. Šestov, an imitator of Stirner and Nietzsche, following the latter in style as well as in ideas.

Dostoevskii must be mentioned in this connection, in so far as the conceptions of individualistic anarchism incorpor-

ated by him in the figure of Ivan Karamazov are given a positive turn by the anarchists and are accepted by them.

§ 172.

IF we wish to grasp the significance of anarchism in general and of Russian anarchism in particular, we must endeavour to define the concept with more precision, and this will be easier now that we have made acquaintance with certain anarchist systems.

From the methodological point of view, we must be careful to avoid being influenced by the suggestions attaching to the name and by the prejudice that is so widely felt against anarchism. Anarchism has to-day become a catchword for all the more radical types of opposition to the existing order, so that to many persons the word has such a ring as was formerly associated with the words communism and socialism. Even "revolution," bogey as it is, seems less alarming, although for a very large section of society all these designations (revolutionary, communist, socialist, and anarchist) are employed quite indifferently to denote the Evil One in his socio-political manifestations. Of late the ill repute of anarchism has been accentuated by the vehement hostility of the Marxists and of the Marxist wing of the social democracy. It is natural for people to say that anarchism must be a terrible thing when even the social democrats condemn it.

We must further take into account the differences between the various anarchist systems, for we must distinguish between these as regards their principles, just as we had to distinguish between the different systems of socialism. The meaning and importance of the specific programs can only be grasped in relation to the whole system to which they belong. If we consider, for example, Eltzbacher's classification, we find that he presents to us empirically the teaching of seven representatives of anarchism (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and Tolstoi), but fails to throw an adequate light upon the connection between their ideas, in respect either of the historical development or of the actual nature of these. Though he gives us a juristic exposition of their views upon law, state, property, and tactics, he does not succeed by this method of examination in elucidating the differences between the anarchist systems. He tells us, for

example, that both Stirner and Tolstoi are opposed to law, the state, and property—but these two thinkers base their respective views of such questions upon foundations so utterly divergent that it is quite impossible to regard them as representatives of a single undifferentiated anarchism. Again, when Most and Tolstoi “anarchistically” defending the same thesis, both protest against patriotism, it is by a purely verbal identification that we apply the term “anarchism” to their respective doctrines.

Anarchism signifies the negation of archism (if the neologism may be permitted). An-archism (Bakunin) discloses itself as opposition to archism, and there will therefore be as many anarchisms as there are archisms. The most usual interpretation of anarchism in the political sphere is to conceive it as astatism, when we are told that society should exist without the state. But we need a definition of the term state before we can have any clear idea as to what is meant by astatism. In many cases the concept “state” is used in an extremely abstract way, and when this is done the term anarchism, conceived as astatism, likewise remains abstract. We have to ask whether the anarchism we are considering is solely directed against the absolutist state, or whether it is equally hostile to a constitutionalist state, or to a republic. Further, we have to analyse the idea of the state, distinguishing between dynasty, government, parliament, militarism, law, the administration (central and local). In our examination of the doctrines of individual anarchists, we must attempt to ascertain precisely what each one of them means by the state, and which elements of the state they wish to abolish. It is further necessary to ascertain to what extent and in what way the state does actually exercise over the various social organisations (the church, the nation, etc.) the primacy of which the anarchists complain; we have to ask whether the state is really as important as the anarchists contend.

Not merely do anarchists reject the state, but they repudiate political methods in their entirety. The term apolitism is often used to denote this repudiation of political activities, the predominant objection of the anarchists being to participation in parliamentarism.

Going yet further, anarchists oppose authority in all its forms, refusing to recognise anything as valid beyond logic and the individual reason. Of late, however, there has been

a tendency to subordinate reason to feeling, will, and instinct. The anarchists have advanced as philosophy has progressed, and have turned away from rationalism towards voluntarism.

To authority, the anarchists counterpose a demand for liberty, upon which they lay more stress than upon equality or even fraternity.

As against the state and authority, anarchists proclaim individualism, and anarchism is often defined as individualism. The term is extremely ambiguous, and it is above all necessary to distinguish between individualism and subjectivism, for these two words are often encountered in association. Individualism is mainly an ethical and socio-political concept, whereas subjectivism belongs chiefly to the spheres of psychology and epistemology. Individualism concerns the relationship of the individual to the social whole or to the entire universe, and deals therefore with an ethical, socio-political, and metaphysical relationship; but when we think of subjectivism we are thinking of the subject as contrasted with the object, and our attention centres upon what we mean by the subject psychologically and epistemologically (and, of course, metaphysically as well).

We must distinguish, further, different degrees and kinds of individualism and of subjectivism. These terms are ordinarily used in their extremer sense.

Extreme individualism (unless the term be employed to denote nothing more than a well-developed and vigorous personality) often signifies a neglect of the social whole. Otherwise expressed, the individual is set in opposition to the social whole and is considered superior to that whole. Individualism then manifests itself as aristocracy.

Extreme subjectivism or solipsism is at the same time extreme individualism; but the converse of this is not true, for extreme individualism need not necessarily be subjectivism. Solipsism is necessarily aristocratic.

If individualism be opposed on principle to the state and to its organisation of society, the question arises how anarchism conceives of the organisation of society, whether it recognises organisation of any kind, and if so how that organisation is to be carried on. Since as an actual fact a number of individuals exist side by side (for the absurdity of solipsism is self-evident) the anarchist cannot ignore the fact. Logically, the relationship of the individual to the organised social whole

cannot be assumed *apriori* to be one of opposition, of anarchistic opposition, and we find as a historical fact that anarchism originated in the later stages of political and social organisation. A non-organised whole may more readily be conceived as an opposition to the organised whole. But we must not without further ado identify the concept "organised" with the concept authoritative. On the other hand, a non-organised whole must doubtless be conceived as anarchistic in the sense in which the term is used by most anarchists.

As a rule the advocates of anarchism admit that social organisation is essential; but they detest every kind of organisation, and above all every kind of political organisation, that implies the use of compulsion or of coercive methods. What anarchists regard as permissible, what they desire to achieve, is a kind of social spontaneity, a spontaneous organisation; and in connection with this idea we have to enquire whether the anarchistic organisation will be derivable from natural affection (sympathy, humanitarianism), from egoism, or finally from some other motive.

Nor must we be misled by anarchist terminology. We have to ask whether the organisation regarded as admissible by anarchists be not itself in ultimate analysis something of the nature of a state. When, for example, Proudhon advocates a federative organisation of society, has what he suggests nothing in common with the state? If there be but a minimum of state, if there be but a minimum of political centralisation, we have, after all, a state. Autonomy and federation are simply inconceivable without some appropriate type of centralisation. Organisation is essential; and organisation, however free, remains the organisation of individuals, and therefore produces a social whole.

Anarchists do not as a rule accept the doctrine of economic materialism, and they differ from the Marxists in that they refuse to regard classes and the class struggle as the driving force of social evolution. Many anarchists think of organisation as subject to repeated or continuous change. The concept is by no means clear, but what they seem to have in mind is the existence of mutable and transient associations of individuals or groups; they think of free agreements entered into *ad hoc* for the fulfilment of certain social functions and for the satisfaction of certain social needs.

It is often admitted that during the period of transition

there will have to be some sort of coercive organisation controlled by anarchistic parties and leagues such as will be determined by the extant type of social organisation.

We must distinguish between the ultimate condition of anarchism, the ideal which the anarchists aspire to attain, on the one hand, and the means proposed by anarchists to enable them to advance towards that ideal.

The ultimate aim of anarchism is not difficult to specify. It is that there should be secured an absolutely free union of individuals, enabling them to satisfy their economic, biological, and mental needs in the absence of any kind of state and of any form of coercion. It is, however, less easy to classify the means recommended by anarchists, for this is a matter upon which far less unity prevails. There is much less agreement among anarchists than there is among socialists concerning the means by which they hope to attain the goal.

Anarchism demands the disorganisation of the extant social order, founded upon coercion. Anarchism is revolutionary on principle, is the negation on principle of the old order. The anarchist conceives of revolution as mass revolution, and he regards the definitive revolution as an immediate practical possibility.

By a minority of anarchists this revolution is conceived as involving neither bloodshed nor the use of force. Certain anarchists, in fact, reject force, on principle. They desire a revolution, but it must come without constraint; disorganisation is to be reorganisation; they advocate education, reform. Anarchists of this type, of whom Tolstoi is a typical example, are termed "ethical anarchists."

Some, of course, advocate reform in addition to revolution. Bakunin aimed solely at disorganisation, and never troubled his head about reorganisation; and even to-day most anarchists think and feel as he thought and felt. Anarchism is therefore negative. Anarchists of this complexion approve of terrorist guerrilla warfare, of individual outrages. Anarchism is still looked upon as propaganda on behalf of outrage, although its advocates now incline above all to favour strikes, and notably the general strike, as the instrument of anarchist revolution. The more consistent among the anarchists favour individual outrage in the most rigid sense of the term, contending that the deed must not be planned by the anarchist group, but must be the purely spontaneous act of an individual.

We are not informed to what extent it is possible to apply this principle in all its strictness.

Anarchism approves all means of disorganisation whereby revolutionary enthusiasm and the revolutionary spirit can be maintained and strengthened. Anarchism is revolutionism elevated into a principle.

Anarchists reject national organisation as well as the state. They are likewise opposed to patriotism, be this conceived in the narrower political or in the wider nationalistic sense. Nationality is the enemy no less than the state.

Similarly, ecclesiastical organisation, the church, and above all the state church, are repudiated. So-called ethical anarchism, however, frequently admits the permissibility of a sort of church, but this must be no more than an ethical union, not properly speaking religious. Certain anarchists, again, are astatists merely, and have no objection to other associations than those which partake of the nature of the state, or at least do not object to them on principle.

The question of economic organisation remains to be considered. The newer anarchists are communists or collectivists. In this domain the anarchists have to face the same problems as the socialists—the division of labour, the organisation of labour, the distribution of the product of labour, and so on.

The anarchist demands the renovation of society; he demands a new man and a new humanity; this involves the problem of the "new ethic." It was thus that Bakunin envisaged the task. Pisarev and Nietzsche might demand a revaluation of the old values, might look for the coming of the superman, or might formulate their wishes as they pleased; but they could not escape the inevitable ethical implication.

For the anarchists the problem of problems is this. Can the existing unjust social order, established and maintained by force, be forcibly swept away, so that the new order, in which force will be unknown, may take its place? Will the physical-force anarchist, the forcible expropriator, of to-day, be the peaceful brother of to-morrow? Anarchism is opposed on principle to the use of force; is it then permissible for the anarchist to slay and to expropriate; can Beelzebub cast out devils? The philosophic theorists of anarchism do their utmost to establish the right to kill. But they cannot get

beyond the ancient utterance, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Universally the anarchist formula is, All things are lawful.

But the very anarchists make a distinction between anarchist outrage and ordinary crime. The bomb outrage of Emile Henry (1894) was condemned by Elysée Reclus as an ordinary crime, and even Most considered the assassination of the empress Elizabeth useless. On the other hand we must not forget that anarchism is a menace to the very anarchists themselves, that Kropotkin and Reclus were threatened with death by anarchists.

Many anarchists attack monogamic marriage, demanding free marriage and free love (a species of communism), but this doctrine can no longer be regarded as exclusively characteristic of socio-political anarchism.

Impelled by Stirner and Feuerbach, the new ethic, that which would annihilate the state and political action, deposes God. Atheism is taken as a matter of course. Ni Dieu ni maître! To the anarchist this seems to follow necessarily upon a recognition of the nature of theocracy. Anarchistic atheism is not satisfied simply with amonarchism, but goes on to demand that astatism shall be universalised. At most, if he be a solipsist, he may proclaim himself God and tsar.

Anarchism readily degenerates into the anarchism of anarchism. The anarchist conception of liberty leads Bakūnin to proclaim chaos. The metaphysic of anarchism becomes indeterminist; miracle plays its ancient role in the anarchist chaos; anarchist philosophers become poets; anarchist politicians develop into utopians.

There are striking relationships between anarchism and the so-called decadent movement. We see this in Nietzsche and in such poets as Tailhade. It is natural that anarchist ideals and methods, crime above all, should serve as a stimulant to weary souls.¹

Even a very incomplete knowledge of anarchist literature will teach us that we must not take decadent grandiloquence at its face value. There is for example a booklet entitled *The Right to Sin*; its frontispiece is a titan bearing a rock;

¹ In Brussels there was at one time an anarchist Café au Tombeau, where the tables were shaped like coffins and the utensils like skulls and sepulchral urns.

but the contents of the volume are utterly tame, and all that is demanded is the right to subvert the old order.

§ 173.

OUR ideas will be clarified by a closer examination of the relationship between socialism and anarchism.

We have learned from the comparison between Bakunin and Marx (§ 94) that there are numerous points of contact between anarchism and socialism, so that we are forced to doubt whether the contrast between the two doctrines is as far reaching as Marx and the Marxists believe. We must not be led astray by the enmity between the anarchists and the Marxists, for hostility is often most intense between the parties and trends that are most closely akin. We cannot without further examination accept Marx's campaign against Bakunin, Proudhon, and Stirner, or Liebknecht's polemic against Most, as proof that socialism and anarchism are essential opposites. In practice, it is only during recent years that the opposition has been so strongly emphasised by the Marxists (exclusion of anarchists from socialist congresses, antisocialist congresses held by anarchists).

The history of anarchism and socialism shows that these two systems were not at first sharply distinguished. The two trends did not diverge until after the exclusion of Bakunin from the International in 1872, when there was a severance of socialist Marxism from anarchist Bakuninism. At first, moreover, the quarrel was more personal than one of principle.

The development of Marx and Stirner was contemporary, and we can point to similar parallels at an earlier day, as between Godwin and Babeuf. Notwithstanding the official exclusion of anarchists from the international congress in London (1896), in the various political and other organisations of France, Italy, and Russia, the anarchists and the socialists did not invariably become segregated; they continued to work together without being fully aware of their differences. Many anarchist publicists have endeavoured of late to annul the distinction between anarchism and socialism. They admit that at the outset, and so long as anarchism was advocated mainly by philosophers and poets, anarchism differed from socialism, especially as concerns questions of organisation and economic policy; but to-day, they contend, the difference

is disappearing, for the anarchists, like the socialists, are organising the working masses, and are themselves members of the working class. Such are the arguments of the Dutchman Cornelissen, the Italian Fabbri, and many others. While admitting that earlier, and even to-day, anarchism has often got upon the wrong track, the aim of these writers is to conceive of anarchism as a trend or section of socialism.

On the socialist side, on the other hand, can be heard the voices of those who endeavour to mitigate the official condemnation of anarchism. Current terminology indicates that the relationship between anarchism and socialism is intimate. For a considerable period the terms "anarchist," "socialist," and "revolutionary" were employed quite promiscuously, and even to-day there are sociologists and political writers who use the names and concepts as interchangeable. The anarchists speak of themselves as revolutionary socialists, revolutionary anarchists, anarchising socialists, libertarian socialists, and "Jungen." Anarchist periodicals pass by such names as, "The Revolutionist," "Poor Conrad," "The Poor Devil," "Knowledge," and so on—all names which might just as well be used for socialist papers.

In a closer examination it would be necessary to compare specific socialist systems with specific anarchist systems, and to make a detailed analysis of the developmental history of these. For our present concern it will suffice to compare the extant definitions of anarchism and socialism, meaning by socialism in this connection the doctrine of the social democracy, Marxism in its latest phase.

Both sides are agreed in considering that the main distinction between socialism and anarchism is that the latter is more individualist than socialism, and in fact the opposition between extreme individualism and socialism is especially important.

Originally the word socialism was minted quite distinctively in the sociological sense of socialisation, and it still retains that signification to-day. Marxism is the declared enemy of extreme individualism, especially of individualism in its subjectivist and solipsist form.

Metaphysically considered, solipsism bluntly declares, "I am God, I am the Lord and creator of the universe." Naturally this autoapothesis is limited by practical possibilities, by power, which is small. This is why Nietzsche craves for

power! The solipsist, if he be in earnest, cannot fail to be aware of his weakness, cannot fail to recognise the absurdity of his epistemological and metaphysical isolation.

For the ethical and social appraisal of subjectivism, of extremist subjectivism or solipsism, Stirner and his absolute egoism are still adduced by some as a model and by others as an awful example. Even if Stirner's identification of solipsism and egoism be regarded as sound, this does not provide an ethical criterion for the characterisation of subjectivism in all its form. The solipsist is not perforce an egoist and nothing more. Schopenhauer, for instance, despite his solipsism and nihilism, declares that sympathy is the foundation of all true morality. Nietzsche, in like manner, by no means rejected morality when he preached "the revaluation of values" and "beyond good and evil." But, in his view, sympathy degraded the superman to man.

Moreover, there is egoism and egoism; there are varying degrees and qualities of egoism. The egoist and egoistic subjectivist, unless he be an absolute solipsist (and in truth there can be no such being), may, for all his absolutism, egoism, and sense of the sovereignty of his own personality, nevertheless recognise that others have rights; he may become, let us say, a constitutionalist and even a parliamentarist.

Subjectivist German philosophy has in truth laid much stress on ethics. All subjectivists are incurable moralists and preachers of morality—witness Fichte, Schopenhauer, Stirner, and Nietzsche. Here we have a fingerpost whose legend cannot be mistaken!

But if solipsism and solipsistic individualism be absurd, the extreme objectivism of Marx and Engels is no less absurd. There is simply no such thing as a mass consciousness or a class consciousness, no folk-spirit, no *sensus communis*, no general will, if the term consciousness is to be understood in a psychological sense; what exist are class views, mass views, or what we may term collective judgments and views generated by the mutual interactions of individuals.

I have previously pointed out (§ 44) that Fichte's "ego" is less alarming than it may seem. Nevertheless, it was against Fichte's solipsism that Schelling formulated his nature pantheism; in Hegel's hands this pantheism became historical, and in those of Marx it became social as well. But social pantheism is a psychological and logical absurdity. Society

is not a unified organism and there is no unified social consciousness.

Marx formulated his extreme social objectivism in opposition to the extreme subjectivism and individualism of Stirner; but Marx, no less than Stirner, preached egoism and annulled ethics, though rather from an amoral than from an antimoral outlook.

Psychologically no less than epistemologically and metaphysically, ethically no less than socially, we reject individualist solipsism and socialist solomnism (I really must ask pardon of the philologists!).

For anarchism just as for socialism, the fundamental problem is the relationship of the individual to society. What is the individual? What is society? I and the world, I and society, subject and object—this is the problem which, since the days of Hume and Kant, philosophy has been endeavouring to solve.

I and thou, we and you? We and you—some, many, the majority, all?

Society is a peculiar organisation of organisations, comprising the separate organisations of state, church, and school, the organisation of the nation and of the economic unit, the lesser organisations of parties and classes, and so on. The social whole is made up out of the socialisation of organised individuals, and therefore the problem cannot be formulated "aut individual aut society," but must necessarily be formulated, "individual *and* society." There is no individual without society and no society without the individual. Extreme individualism, individualism in the solipsist sense, is absurd; but no less absurd is extreme socialism, the socialism which in its pronounced objectivism solomnostically negates the individual. The individual must not and cannot be sacrificed to society, and society must not and cannot be sacrificed to the individual. It is not individualism and socialism that are mutually exclusive, but solipsism and solomnism, or, in the concrete, Stirner and Marx, for both are wrong.

I need not now fear that I am using empty words when I declare that individualism, as an endeavour to secure the utmost possible development and perfectionment of one's own personality within society, is justifiable, and must be made possible and regarded as desirable in every political

system, the socialist system not excepted. In this sense we accept individualism and its aspiration for liberty.

With sovereign pride and contempt many individualists enunciate the "*odi profanum*." The publicity, the community, which socialism demands, do not touch the innermost recesses, the holy of holies, of the individual soul; all that democracy requires is that everyone should work in, with, and for the community; it puts no hindrance in the way of this work being purely individual. Democracy does not hamper men of genius, does not restrict the activities of poets, writers, and artists.

Society and socialisation endure in space and time, so that it is impossible for the individual to enter into a brief and experimental union with society. *Nolens volens* the individual is permanently associated with the social whole, and an ephemeral treaty such as some individualists desire is impossible in practice. The solitude, the isolation of the intellectual forces, essential to every individual, is something utterly different from the forcible isolation of the solipsist, which necessarily culminates in metaphysical disaster.

Whatever definition socialism may offer of the concept of "the mass," the point of practical importance to socialism is its definition of the concept "organisation."

Socialistic organisation is usually conceived as comparatively centralised. Doubtless equality and fraternity are demanded as well as liberty; but socialists insist upon the need for discipline, and centralisation is hardly possible without a certain amount of coercion, or in the absence of a unified authority. The anarchists, on the other hand, lay special stress upon liberty, and upon various forms of federation.

Socialism, and above all Marxism, wishes to train its adherents to order, order and liberty being conceived as existing simultaneously; the anarchists, on the other hand, ask for liberty first, contending that order will be the spontaneous outcome of liberty.

Marxist socialism is by hypothesis working-class socialism, is proletarian. Anarchism has been proletarian only as voiced by certain representatives of the doctrine, and not until quite recently has anarchism proclaimed itself proletarian. Now, indeed, as against Marxism and social democracy, it claims to be the genuinely democratic representative of the proletariat, whereas the Marxists stigmatise anarchism as the doctrine of the mob.

Marxism is more distinctively an economic theory than is anarchism. Not merely do we find that the socialists as students pay far more attention to economics than do the anarchists, but we note further that in practical work in the social and economic fields the Marxists lead the way. Bakunin and Kropotkin are both weak as political economists. Kropotkin, for example, fails to note that the free groups of workers which he counterposes to the socialistic centralisation of larger social bodies must inevitably lead to a sort of middle-class economy.

Marxism is declared communism. Bakunin, like Proudhon, was opposed to communism, and aspired to a federative collectivism. To-day many anarchists are communists and detest collectivism, which many socialists, on the other hand (the revisionists), demand as a mitigation of the original communism. In any case, there are now two notable trends in anarchism, respectively individualist and communist.

Socialism, too, is astatism. According to Engels-Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a primary aim, but only in order to secure the abolition of the state. Marxism, however, has grown more and more political, and to-day parliamentarism is the most powerful weapon in its armoury.

Socialism, like anarchism, is opposed to nationalism, though quite recently it has here and there assumed nationalist forms.

Socialism is likewise revolutionary, preaching the class struggle and a definitive social revolution, using the strike as a revolutionary instrument, and cultivating the revolutionary mood. Anarchism, however, is more revolutionary than socialism, for anarchism endorses the revolution in all its forms, individual terrorism not excepted, whereas socialism rejects individual terrorism on principle.

The Marxists contend that anarchism is utopian, in so far as the anarchists believe the definitive social revolution to be already a practical possibility; and they consider that many of the means recommended by anarchists are less effective than these contend. Originally, and for a considerable time, Marx and Engels were likewise utopians, but their pupils tend more and more to the adoption of evolutionist tactics, seeing that historical development has failed to verify Marx's teaching of the intolerable contrast between the capitalists (the bourgeoisie) and the proletariat—has failed to verify the theories of the collapse of capitalism, of increasing misery,

and of crises. The anarchists, on the other hand, defend themselves by appealing to the (unanarchistic!) authority of Marx.

As a philosophic system, Marxism, with its materialism, positivism, and evolutionism, can hardly be distinguished in point of principle from anarchism; but Marxism contains a more notable element of historicism. Anarchism is philosophical rather than historical, and the anarchist programs pay less attention to positive science.

Marxism is peculiarly characterised by its amorality, which is dependent upon solomnism. Anarchism is moralistic.

Very few anarchists accept historical materialism in its strict Marxist form. Moreover, the anarchist philosophy of history differs from the Marxist, and the ultimate aim is differently conceived. The class struggle and its final abolition are for the anarchists mere means to an end, an end which lies quite beyond any class aims, an end which comprises the complete economic and mental enfranchisement of the individuality. The goal is, a condition where authority shall be unknown.

In respect of religion and metaphysics, both trends alike are atheistic and materialistic. Socialism is definitely determinist, anarchism undeterminist rather. For both systems the problem of necessity and free will is one of great importance.

§ 174.

IF we are to define the relationship of Marx himself to anarchism, it is necessary to insist once again that Marx developed. The thought of Marx and Engels in the first phase differed from that in the second phase, and this applies especially to their outlook on revolutionism.

To put the matter briefly, the Marx of the *Communist Manifesto* and of the period that elapsed until the publication of the first volume of *Capital*, was more anarchistic than the later Marx. In the earlier phase, Marx was strongly revolutionary, and preached a more decisive astatism; his earlier writings contain stronger expressions against militarism, parliamentarism, and patriotism. It is doubtless open to dispute whether revolutionism is in fact stronger because it finds stronger and more emotional expression. But this much is certain, that in 1848 and for a great many years afterwards,

Marx felt as a forty-eighter, and that he gave free expression to these feelings. Marx and Engels continued for a very long time to regard the definitive social revolution as an immediate possibility; and in truth at the bottom of their hearts they remained in this respect utopians to the last. In this sense, let me repeat, Marx was more anarchist early than late. It is noteworthy that as late as 1872, when he succeeded in bringing about Bakunin's exclusion from the International, Marx did not shrink from the designation anarchist.¹

To this extent, therefore, the French syndicalists who are so fond of appealing to Marx have right on their side. Indeed not only the syndicalists, but many declared anarchists as well, are convinced Marxists.

In any case, the Marxists cannot fight against anarchist revolutionism on principle; the only questions at issue between the socialists and the anarchists are those concerning tactics, concerning the value of particular methods in a particular place and at a particular time. Such, as we have seen, were the differences dividing socialists and anarchists during the Russian revolution.

The revisionists, too, approximate in certain respects to anarchism, for they abandon Marxist solomnism, emphasise the importance of individualism and subjectivism (proclaiming the return to Kant), and insist upon the validity of ethics as against historicism in its extreme form. Certain revisionists, therefore, have at times advocated an understanding with the anarchists.

But by their insistence upon politism and by their watering down of revolutionism into reformism, the revisionists come into conflict with anarchism—though even here the conflict is only with those anarchists who preach a forcible revolution. Tolstoi, Tucker, Friedeberg, and not a few other anarchists, are opposed to the attempt to bring about revolution by force.

¹ "Tous les socialistes entendent par anarchie ceci: le but du mouvement prolétaire, l'abolition des classes, une fois atteint, le pouvoir de l'état, qui sert à maintenir la grande majorité productrice sous le joug d'une minorité exploitante peu nombreuse, disparaît et les fonctions gouvernementales se transforment en de simples fonctions administratives."—Marx, *Les prétendues scissions de l'Internationale*, 1872.

§ 175.

I MAY sum up my view of the relationship between anarchism and socialism by saying that communist anarchism is a system of socialism, whereas individualist anarchism, especially in its extreme form, is unsocialistic. The individualist anarchists are at one with the Marxists in holding that anarchism (individualist anarchism) and communism are essential contradictories. Such is the view taken, for example, by Tucker and by Plehanov. Both these writers contend that Kropotkin is not an anarchist, for, they say, he desires the socialisation of the means of production. This demand, contends Plehanov, cannot be realised without some sort of legislative authority.¹

The newer and more practical anarchism has obviously originated from socialism, and in particular from Marxism.

It is noteworthy that many anarchists have been Marxists and members of the social democracy (Sorel and other syndicalists). Consequently socialism appears to them to be a transitional stage towards anarchism, or they consider anarchism to be one of the socialist systems, a variety of socialism, and so on.

We can in fact note the existence of numerous transitions between practical anarchism and socialism, and conversely; and there are also combinations and syntheses of both systems.

Frequently anarchism is distinguished from socialism as more radical and revolutionary. But we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by a name. For example, anarchists protest against the way in which socialists overestimate the importance of parliamentarism, but we find that many within the socialist camp likewise detest this overvaluation. Where socialism undergoes decay or disorganisation, a more radical and revolutionary type of socialism becomes apparent; but a similar development may be manifest in the early days of a socialist movement, before it has gained strength. Conversely, where socialism assumes a comparatively revolutionary form, the anarchist movement is apt to be weak.

The differences that have been enumerated are not in truth

¹ The relationship between anarchism and socialism, as he sees it, is indicated by the Russian Marxist Tugan-Baranovskii in his classification of socialist systems, which is as follows: (1) centralist socialism; (2) federalist socialism; (3) corporative socialism; (4) anarchism.

differences of principle. Moreover, there are different types and degrees of radicalism and of revolutionism. Often enough radicalism is blind, and we cannot consider every revolution a step towards the goal. Marxist socialism has an advantage over anarchist radicalism in that the former has devoted more scientific attention to the philosophy of history and to economics, and takes the revolution more in earnest. But this must not be held to imply that venturesome and blind radicalism may not often prove more successful in choosing the right moment for action. When the need for action comes, daring and caution will always choose separate paths.

Finally, it is necessary to insist once more upon the fact that anarchism has developed as well as socialism, and that anarchism has to-day become more socialistic and communistic than of old. But the anarchist systems, when we examine their scientific content and their foundation, are seen to be more inchoate and more utopian than socialism.

In the camp of anarchism, considered theoretically, ethically, and politically, we find far too many advocates of negation and chaos. I am thinking here especially of Bakuninism, of the anarchism of anarchism.

In the literary and artistic fields, socialism, Marxist socialism at any rate, is on principle opposed to decadence.

§ 176.

IT is generally recognised that anarchism prevails more widely in Latin than in Teuton lands. Spain, Italy, and France are anarchist countries, whereas in Germany, England, and the United States anarchism of native origin is rarer and less revolutionary. England, the United States, and to some extent Switzerland, are bold enough to give harbourage to foreign anarchists. We shall enquire later whether there are material causes for these territorial differences.

Russia, too, is widely regarded as peculiarly anarchist.

Many authors, Russians among them, believe that they can explain Russian anarchism by saying that the Slavs in general and the Russians in particular are qualified by nature to play an anarchist part. By anarchism these authors mean an inborn incapacity for the activities of state life. Some Russians, too, contend that Russians have no faculty for understanding legal ideas. Certain authors, however, when

they talk of anarchism in this connection, are thinking rather of an inborn tendency towards democracy and liberty.

In support of such a view, people point to Bakunin as the founder of the new anarchism, and they point also to Tolstoi.

Let us first enquire into the facts. I touched upon the matter in my account of Old Russia (§ 1, v). If we examine the more recent socio-political trends, we observe that the slavophiles incline to minimise the importance of the state, but the same thing is done in the west by all those who desire to fortify the church as against the state. Běliniskii and Herzen both had revolutionary inclinations. Herzen was for a time a declared anarchist, though his views moderated later. Bakunin was a most outspoken anarchist, and even more anarchist was his adept Nečaev; moreover Bakunin's anarchism was strongly revolutionary. Černyševskii and the nihilists were revolutionists, and the same may be said yet more definitely of the declared terrorists, but these last must not be described as anarchists merely because they espoused terrorism as a practical method.

Mihailovskii in earlier years was in theoretical matters an adherent of Proudhon, and was therefore an anarchist. On the other hand, there was little of the anarchist in Lavrov.

The Marxists and the social revolutionaries are revolutionists and terrorists. Within these two camps, anarchism undergoes subdivision into distinct trends. But only since 1901 has anarchism exhibited any notable development in Russia. Other recent Russian writers besides Kropotkin have been theorists of anarchism.

Finally we have to remember the existence of Tolstoi and his ethical anarchism.

To sum up, we may say that Russia does not appear to be more anarchistic than France or Italy. It must not be forgotten that Bakunin and Kropotkin learned their doctrines from Proudhon and the other western anarchists; that Stirner, Nietzsche, and Ibsen are Teutons; that the English and the Americans have respectively Godwin and Tucker. New England and new America are just as much products of revolution as is new France.

As regards Russia, we must not forget the liberals and the westernisers, who endorsed the existence of the state (cf. the opinion, recorded in § 72, of the jurist and historian Gradovskii).

Russian anarchism, taking the form of astatism and apolitism, is the revolutionary struggle against absolutism.

Tsarist absolutism works injury to the state. The political refugee is in practice forced to adopt an astatist outlook, for the foreign state in which he dwells, even though it grants him asylum, remains foreign, and is not felt by him to be his state and recognised as such. Absolutism enforces apolitism upon the subject who is granted no rights, upon the man for whom public activity and initiative are rendered impossible. Moreover, in rural districts and in small provincial towns the Russian state is almost out of sight. Political life is concentrated in large towns and in western Russia. In eastern Russia, and still more in Asiatic Russia, the state seems to be non-existent, and in practice an official anarchism prevails, which is explicable by the deficiency in state servants and soldiers. The main forces of the state are concentrated in western Russia. Again, the Russian state differs from the western state because the former in many places does not possess the requisite number of officials.

Finally, the revolutionary lives in his own narrow circle, which becomes for him a model of the social institutions of the future. Owing to the inadequacy of communications in Russia, there is forced upon the individual autonomous organisations a kind of free federation by tacit consent.

These concrete conditions largely explain why, as has been shown, the Russian lamb has grown to become a tiger.

The inadequacy of the Russian state church has given rise to the so-called ethical anarchism, which is in fact anti-ecclesiastical anarchism. Here, of course, we think of Tolstoi.

But the opponents of religion in general, the atheists, those who contrast most strongly with the ethical anarchists, must likewise be classed as anarchists in so far as for them atheism is the metaphysical basis of anarchism.

Anarchism has recently come into contact with certain religious and above all mystical currents, so that there now exists a "mystical anarchism."¹

¹ Some reference must be made to attempts at the practical realisation of religious and ethical anarchism. There have been many colonies established by the adherents of Tolstoi, but they have been shortlived. An interesting attempt of the kind was one initiated in 1886 by certain intellectuals, who founded the colony of Krinica on the Black Sea. The founders wished to allow individuality to develop without any coercion either religious or political,

and also in freedom from the pressure of any philosophic system. An account of this experiment has recently been published by one of the participators, and the book has already run into a second edition (G. Vasilevskii, *The Colony of Intellectuals at Krinica*, 1912). The book reveals that the attempt has been a fiasco. The principle of unrestricted individuality had to yield before the corporative and communal spirit, and the colony is at the point of dissolution. Still, it persisted for two decades. (Krinica was the continuation of an earlier experiment in the administrative district of Ufa.) No very clear account of the philosophical views of the colonists seems possible. We trace the influence of Rousseau, of Tolstoi, and of primitive Christianity.

CHAPTER TWENTY

LIBERALISM

I

§ 177.

LIBERALISM as a historical and philosophical trend and political system arose in opposition to theocracy. Characteristically, the name "liberal" originated in the land of the inquisition.

As an opposition to theocracy, liberalism strives to secure the secularisation of churches and of all institutions. To this extent it has in practice always supported an extension of the powers of the state, despite its opposition to state absolutism. Liberalism was a struggle against two evils. Regarding the state and its omnipotence as the lesser evil of the two, liberalism upheld the state. This peculiar duplex attitude has often been momentous for the liberals.

Liberalism manifested itself as rationalism; deism, the philosophy of enlightenment, freethinking, are of the essence of liberalism. Liberalism was an attempt, with the aid of authorship and journalism, to organise the so-called sound human reason as a public authority. Locke may be regarded as the first interpreter and systematiser of liberalism; during the eighteenth century, Voltaire and the encyclopaedists were the representatives of liberalism in the philosophic field.

To a considerable extent, even the churches adopted liberalism. With Protestantism, came the epoch of rationalist theology; upon the Catholic side, Febronianism originated, gallicanism was strengthened, and above all the dissolution of the Jesuit order by the pope in the year 1773 was of the greatest symptomatic significance.

Ethically, eighteenth century liberalism was guided by the humanitarian ideal. In this connection we think of Rousseau and Voltaire, of Lessing and Herder, of most of the noted belletristic writers of the day, and of the moral

philosophers (Hume, Adam Smith, etc.). Liberalism, following Schiller, conceived such men as in Rousseau's view Christ had been, to be the embodiments of the humanitarian ideal. That ideal was conceived, extensively, as an endeavour to secure the ethico-political unification of all mankind.

Thus interpreted, liberalism aimed at freedom in all domains. Hence its various watchwords; freedom of belief, conscience, and thought; free speech; freedom of teaching, science, and education; free schools and a free press; free trade and free industry; free contract between employer and employed; and so on. Freedom was regarded as the greatest possible expansion of individuality in the sense of ethical personality. The philosophic expression of liberal individualism was found in Kant's insistence upon equal respect for one's own individuality and for that of others, and in his maxim that we must never treat another human being as a mere means to our own ends.

Opposing the church and theology, liberalism, as voiced by most of its representatives, tended to be utilitarian and hedonist, adverse to the ascetic ideal.

In the domain of law, liberalism adopted and developed the old doctrine of natural law in the spirit of enlightenment and of humanitarianism.

The political outcome of this liberalism was the recognition of the rights of man and of popular sovereignty as fundamentals of the power of the state; constitutionalism and parliamentarism (majority rule) were the further necessary consequence of the establishment of the power of the people through the system of universal suffrage. The power of the aristocracy and of the clergy was restricted simultaneously with that of absolutism. Characteristic is the fact that the modern-written democratic constitution originated in imitation of the agreement concerning religious liberty (in the American colonies).

Absolutism was further weakened by the doctrine of the partition of forces. Some even of the monarchs cherished liberal ideas (the so-called enlightened despotism of Joseph II, Frederick the Great, and Catherine II). In France, above all, the monarchy had to recognise constitutionalism; and after the revolution, in absolutist Prussia, too, Stein and Hardenberg instituted liberal reforms.

Liberalism logically presses on towards democracy. Abbé Sieyès assigned a great future to the third estate, to the bour-

geoisie. The bourgeoisie had effected the revolution in order to rebuild public institutions from the foundation. The Catholic religion was abolished by the municipalities (not by parliament); the clergy were secularised; the nobles were deprived of their privileges; state and church were democratised; the republic was introduced.

The great revolution was continued in the risings of 1830 and 1848.

Liberty, equality, fraternity, were the watchwords of the democratic revolution.

The historic sense awakened during the eighteenth century. The philosophy of history was the manifestation of the newer evolutionary outlook upon history and society. The idea of progress was enthusiastically adopted, and in the name of progress a demand was pressed for a revolutionary change in the old order. During the last months of his life, Condorcet composed his enthusiastic *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*. The socialists continued these revolutionary speculations.

The state was now regarded as the protector of property, and free competition was looked upon as the best motive force of economic life. Adam Smith supplemented the humanitarian ideal by economics, which in his hands became a doctrine of consistent egoism and hedonism.

Laissez-faire became the leading socio-political principle, being interpreted by the radical Bentham in the English phrase, Be quiet. Bentham and his friend John Stuart Mill had indeed to admit that due regard must be paid to the needs of the fourth estate; but these writers could not conceive that the workers were able and entitled to lead themselves; bourgeois employers were the natural leaders of the working class!

The liberal bourgeoisie effected important social reforms. Serfdom was abolished, the peasant was made independent, industry was freed from the oppression of the guilds, women and children were partially liberated from the harsh dominance of the patriarchal system. In this respect, too, liberalism was a precursor of socialism.

It was, however, in the social domain that the political limitations of practical liberalism were made manifest. In the days of the great revolution, the first advocates of economic equality and democracy, the first experimenters in communism,

were put to death by the democratising bourgeoisie. Although Rousseau, Meslier, Morelly, Mably, and other writers, had condemned private property and inequality of property, the republic declared property sacrosanct, just as absolutism had declared the monarchy sacrosanct. Attacks on the principle of private property became a capital offence!

§ 178.

THE revolution was superseded by the restoration, and the so-called romanticism which followed the revolution was largely characterised by a strengthening of religious sentiment and above all by recatholicisation. Napoleon entered into the concordat with Pius VII; the inquisition was set up anew in Spain; the Jesuit order was reinstated; Alexander I, Francis I, and Frederick William III entered into the holy alliance to assist divine providence (§ 15); in England, Catholic emancipation was carried through.

Liberalism underwent transformation. In the philosophic field liberalism became a supporter of positivism, that peculiar mixtum compositum of progress and reaction. The liberals associated the doctrine of evolution with positivism.

Positivism, with its historism and relativism, provided liberalism with weapons against radical assaults, whether from the right or from the left. The idea of progress was toned down, and the tolerance advocated by Locke was now extended towards the ideas and trends against which liberalism had previously fought.

Thus to an increasing extent liberalism became a system of half-measures.

The antirevolutionary school of jurists opposed historical law to natural law, and countered revolution with the doctrine of legitimism. After the revolution, the appeal for liberty was replaced by the demand for order; liberty, it was said, must arise out of order. The demand for equality was quietly dropped, or in some cases scientific reasons for the change of sentiments were adduced, reasons based upon Darwinian considerations.

Before 1848, to reactionaries of the type of Metternich and Tsar Nicholas the term liberalism was synonymous with the term revolution.

The church, which had been fought and in places even .

abolished, was now upheld, and under the pretext of toleration its doctrines were prized as the chief means of defence against radical democracy, the obscure and ambiguous proposition that religion is a private matter being gladly represented as liberal. The liberalism of earlier days aspired after a natural religion, but modern liberalism no longer concerns itself with religion as a matter of principle, being satisfied with the political aim of separating state and church, or with Cavour's formula of a free church in a free state. The philosophic systems, and materialism above all (which after 1848 developed strongly in opposition to the reaction of the counter-revolution), were adopted only by the more radical wing of the liberals. Materialism was the official philosophy of the socialist movement, which was now making headway.

Characteristic of the trend of liberalism towards the right is the attitude of the Jews vis-à-vis the official church. Since the Jews are an oppressed race it is natural that they should incline towards liberalism, and many Jews have therefore become socialists; but the Jews of the capitalistic stratum pay homage not only to the state but to the official church as well.

Nevertheless the process of secularisation proved irresistible. The republic was reestablished in France, and turned against Rome (le cléricalisme c'est l'ennemi); the kulturkampf raged in Germany; nolens volens, Austria had to fortify her position by liberal legislation and by the introduction of a constitution. Protestant theology has of late exhibited a number of liberal trends, of which the historic trend is the most characteristic. In the Catholic church, too, liberalising tendencies have been manifest, culminating in the contemporary modernist movement. But during the same epoch the papacy has grown stronger and has ventured the proclamation of new dogmas, such as the dogma of infallibility.

It is not surprising that the founder of positivism should have returned to fetichism, and that the author of the *Life of Jesus*, which was the most radical manifestation of the Hegelian left in the days before 1848, should in the beginning of the seventies have concocted *The Old Faith and the New*, the catechism of liberal theology and religion. Strauss was a typical representative of the new bourgeoisie. Benjamin Constant, the indefatigable theorist of liberalism, had indeed

anticipated Strauss. Having worked for thirty years at his book *De la Religion*, he declared in the end that liberalism was inadequate, and that religion alone could provide a sure foundation for social life. He had, of course, no other religion to offer than that of his *Adolphe*, a sentimental amalgam of Rousseau and Jacobi, of Kant and Scottish philosophy. Constant insisted further that philosophy could not replace religion, for philosophy did not leave room for faith and would therefore never be accepted by the people—religion was essential to the populace, and Voltaire recognised that there must be a religion for his tailor. Even Locke, who had so long ago and so ardently advocated toleration, desired that for the sake of social order atheism should be made a capital offence. Constant followed Locke in this matter, but liberalised Locke's teaching.

After 1848, liberalism aimed more and more at the promotion of governmental efficiency. Whilst the old liberalism had adopted Sieyès' saying, "le roi règne mais ne gouverne pas," the new liberalism inclined to favour Napoleon's dictum that the monarch is no mere "cochon à l'engrais." Bismarck's antiparliamentarian creed, and Prussian and Austrian constitutionalist practice, were more honoured than English parliamentarism. The night-watchman theory of the state was abandoned by the liberals, now that they had been admitted to a share in the powers of government. They supported an extension of state authority, abandoning their earlier and more radical tenets of antimilitarism and democracy, and advocating political centralisation as contrasted with the earlier liberal aspiration for autonomy and self-government.

Liberalism has thus arrived at the apotheosis of the state. Belief in the state is upon the same footing as belief in God, now that constitutionalism has transformed the liberals themselves into parts of this mundane god. A certain liberal, and what is more an American and a republican, Burgess, the teacher of constitutional law, has in conformity with the old English maxim that the king can do no wrong, seriously declared the state to be infallible. The state, be it noted, is infallible, not the president, but the state as principle, the state as an institution, the state as the liberal god.

To the liberalism of the manufacturing classes, imperialism has been thoroughly welcome, and the liberals have understood very well how to adapt their formulas to imperialist ideas,

even while continuing to give lip-service to Kant's plea for perpetual peace.

This evolution of the liberal bourgeoisie will be more readily understood when it is remembered that the fourth estate, the working class, has become emancipated from liberalism, and has adopted socialism, above all Marxist socialism. The masses are now lost to liberalism. Modern capitalism and the plutocracy have come into existence. The parvenus of the plutocracy have been taken into favour by the old aristocracy; the dynasties are finding in the modern stock exchanges and in the Rothschilds something to replace their Jewish financiers of old days. The state is becoming an industrial state. The capitalist is not merely an entrepreneur, a director and organiser of labour; he is a wealthy man, often exceedingly wealthy, so that the abyss between riches and poverty widens; the worship of the golden calf tends increasingly to be the true religion of the bourgeoisie and of those who wield political power; militarism is now a lucrative economic system of enrichment; protective tariffs and agrarian duties bring about conciliation between the rival and hostile half-brothers, between the manufacturers of the great towns and the junkers of the rural areas. It need hardly be said that the question of protection is not really one of principle; prior to 1870, when the great landed estates still produced for export, the German conservatives were free-traders, but now they are protectionists. The liberal view of protection is similar, and it is only within national limits that modern liberals insist upon free competition as a matter of principle—free competition against the working classes.

The Chinese writer Ku-Hung-Ming, in *China's Defence against European Ideas*, says with considerable truth: "The European liberalism of the eighteenth century was civilised, but modern liberalism is no longer civilised. The liberalism of the past read books and understood ideas; modern liberalism reads nothing but newspapers, and uses the great liberal phrases of the past as catchwords, as a mere cloak for selfish interests. Eighteenth century liberalism fought on behalf of right and justice; the pseudo-liberalism of to-day fights on behalf of rights and trading privileges. The liberalism of the past fought on behalf of the cause of humanity; the pseudo-liberalism of to-day endeavours to promote the vested interests of capitalists and financiers."

This liberalism constitutes the reserve force of aristocracy and plutocracy; liberals of this calibre unhesitatingly vote repressive laws against socialist workers. The old watch-words, liberty, equality, and fraternity, are left to the social democracy.

The old liberalism was national in character, but genuinely liberal, and with cosmopolitan inclinations. But when the national minorities in the historically extant multilingual states had gained strength through liberal constitutionalism and parliamentarism, and when the doctrine of popular sovereignty was given a definite folk-signification, when the nationalist idea became definitely democratic vis-à-vis the state, liberalism swung over to the side of the state, proclaiming everywhere the official doctrine of patriotism. Metternich's reaction had led to an oppression of the nationalities in Austria and Germany. In Austria, after 1848, the liberals followed in Metternich's footsteps, even endeavouring to effect a forcible denationalisation.¹ The liberal capitalists found no difficulty in turning political chauvinism to account economically. In this connection I may quote once more from Ku-Hung-Ming, who refers to a liberal aspirant who betrayed his party and his government to espouse the cause of reaction: "When Kang-Yu-Wei was compelled to take to flight, and when the lives of some of his adherents were forfeit, Tuan-Fang had not a moment's perplexity, for with all the shamelessness of light-hearted youth he exhibited a complete change of front and had recourse to the scoundrel's last refuge—patriotism. Immediately after Kang-Yu-Wei had fallen and the empress dowager had grasped the reins of power, Tuan-Fang composed a popular patriotic song, extolling the glories of the empress dowager and her government. In this wise he saved himself from the consequences of his association with Kang-Yu-Wei."

Open-minded liberals are no longer under any illusion concerning the decay of liberalism.

Intellectually, liberalism has become a dangerous system of dilettantism; ethically it is often lax and positively

¹ The idea of nationality was discussed in § 59. It was there shown that the nationalist program is differently formulated in different countries and by divers national stocks. In 1848, for example, the Austrian Germans were less nationalist than the Germans in Germany proper. Individuals, too, changed their views, from time to time. Prior to 1848, Ruge was no less opposed to nationalism than Marx.

anarchistic, and therefore opposed to the authority of church and state.

Politically, liberalism tends more and more to break up into a number of factions, and in the parliamentary struggle it is therefore weak in its front against the uniform mass of the social democracy and also against the governmental reaction. Being void of real content, liberalism tends increasingly to cling to formal principles; the liberal parties lack independence and initiative. As an educational and economic force, liberalism becomes more and more negative; the earlier aspiration for liberty is replaced by a political moderation which is delighted to accept as freedom the fairly endurable measure of unfreedom that now exists. The cry for toleration as voiced by early liberalism was a call to arms against theocratic coercion, but the modern liberal conception of toleration grows ever more negative.

Thus liberalism is the codification of half-measures, persistent compromise in theory as well as in practice. We may quote Goethe: "When I hear people speak of liberal ideas I am amazed to see how readily human beings are satisfied with empty sounds; -an idea cannot be liberal. It may be vigorous, efficient, self-contained, in order that it may fulfil its divine mission of being productive; but it is quite beyond the mission of an idea to be liberal. Where we must seek liberalism is in the feelings, in the living sphere of the affective life."

Historically considered, the lukewarmness and vagueness of liberalism are thoroughly characteristic of a transitional trend; these features explain its persistence, its mutability and its adaptability.

§ 179.

CATHOLIC politicians reproach liberalism with being the offspring of Protestantism and the parent of socialism and anarchism. They bring the identical charge against modern philosophy.

There is considerable truth in the accusation. In actual fact, liberalism grew to greatness in England, and, under English and American influence, in France; the liberal regime in politics was transplanted from England and America to the continent of Europe.

Liberalism is differently tinted in various countries and as advocated by various nationalities. English, American, German, French, Italian, and Spanish liberalism are divergent types.

The relationships of liberalism, of the primary principles of the liberal doctrine, to anarchism and socialism are obvious.

According to Bouglé, French liberalism was "dead and buried" in 1902; the same diagnosis concerning liberalism comes from England, Germany, everywhere. Of late years, therefore, there has been in progress among liberals a serious self-examination, which has culminated in the conviction that liberalism must rediscover its democratic past, and must renew its earlier aspirations towards liberty. The liberals must cease to dread freedom. "The only cure for liberty is more liberty" (Macaulay).

As regards German liberalism, various counsels are offered for promoting a democratic renaissance. Naumann cherished hopes of a union between democracy and emperordom. More important is the demand that the liberals should join forces with the social democracy.

It can hardly be said that any precise formula has been offered for this alliance, but from time to time a transient cooperation has been effected, such a cooperation as has been recommended by L. Brentano, and earlier by Barth, Mommsen, and others.

From the social democratic camp advances in the same direction have been made by the revisionists (in the "Sozialistische Monatshefte" and elsewhere). The revisionists point to the numerous members of the so-called new middle class, and contend that these could make cooperation between the social democrats and the liberals a practical possibility.

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the political importance of such cooperation for Germany and for the world at large; the importance is self-evident in view of the numerical strength of the German social democracy.

In France, Italy, and even England, the course of political evolution has brought the liberals nearer to socialism.

In considering these plans for cooperation on the part of liberals and social democrats, we must not forget that Marxism and socialism, too, have undergone theoretical and political changes, and have in a sense become liberalised (if the word be rightly understood). For the time being, however,

the orthodox Marxists regard liberalism as twin brother of the anarchism they so strongly condemn. This adverse judgment is all the more powerful in its effect seeing that the liberal opponents of Marxism (Diehl, for instance) take the same view.

All that I need say in conclusion is that when the possibility of a renascence of liberalism is mooted, I am not thinking so much of the relationship of liberalism to Marxism as of the socialisation and democratisation of liberalism.

II

§ 180.

"LIBERALISM is the latest of the religions, but its church is of this world, not of the world to come; its theodicy is a political doctrine; its roots are in the earth; it knows nothing of mystical peace formulas, for its need is to make peace a practical reality. Liberalism, at first victorious and subsequently defeated, disclosed the sundering breach in all its nudity. The distressing consciousness of this breach is manifested in the irony of the contemporary world, in the scepticism with which modern man scatters the fragments of his broken idols." Such was the characterisation of liberalism penned by Herzen in the year 1852, when his mood was one of despair owing to the collapse of the revolution. The same mood had in the previous year led him to express the conviction that liberalism would not make itself at home in Russia, that liberalism was quite alien to the Russian nature.

Herzen erred, for liberalism had had a home in Russia since the days of Peter. After Peter, Catherine II was likewise representative of liberal ideas, for she had direct philosophic associations with Voltaire and Diderot, though her regime was less liberal than that of Peter. Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot secured in St. Petersburg numerous and enthusiastic readers and adherents, so that the French enlightenment reinforced the enlightenment already inaugurated by Peter and his successors. We find in St. Petersburg and Moscow the freethinking philosophy of the eighteenth century, the rationalism and the humanitarian philosophy of the enlightenment; this philosophy directed its shafts against serfdom,

and encouraged thoughts of political liberty and political reforms. In addition to the Voltairians there were liberals of a religious turn (Radiščev and the freemasons), and there were liberals who declaimed against the moral corruption of Europe. French liberalism, with its individualism and its aspirations towards freedom, took Russian society by storm; democratic and even republican programs were conceived. Alexander I, no less than Catherine II, had a certain sympathy with the republican ideal.

The revolution and the terror aroused a reaction in St. Petersburg no less than in Europe (of this matter and concerning this date it would be incorrect to say "aroused a reaction in Russia"); nevertheless, cultured men occupying influential positions were still found to cherish an honest belief in the possibility of liberal reforms even in Russia, and such men endeavoured to realise their ideals (Speranskii). Alexander I was co-founder of the holy alliance; the wars against Napoleon confirmed the satisfaction with the old regime; the reaction became patriotic and nationalist. The romanticist movement, with its search for an asylum in the past, made its appearance also in Russia. Karamzin, who had at one time been an admirer of enlightened Europe, may be regarded as spokesman of romanticism and reaction.

But it proved impossible to repress liberal aspirations; repression served but to generate a more energetic resistance. Ideas, well-grounded ideas, cannot be repressed. Benjamin Constant and similar writers of the day secured Russian readers. The cult of liberalism was carried on in secret societies; the decabrist revolution was an attempt after the French model; some even believed in the possibility of a Russian republic (Pestel).

In the reign of Nicholas I the nationalist and patriotic reaction grew stronger and was more fully conscious of its aims. New legal and administrative foundations were provided for the theocracy, with its programs of orthodoxy, autocracy, and Russian nationalism.

Yet the reaction under Nicholas worked no real harm to liberalism. Čaadaev stepped forward with his bold negation of theocracy. It is true that there now originated the influential slavophil movement, whose trend was conservative; but the westernisers were thereby stimulated to redouble their efforts to diffuse western liberalism. To Bëlinskii the

term "liberal" seemed practically synonymous with the term "man." The liberal current of the day was not solely manifested in the writings of the literary critics, but found able journalistic exponents as well (Polevoi). Abroad, the ideas of the decabrists were propagated by N. Turgenev and by Herzen. The Russian refugees, organising their efforts, endeavoured to break the fetters of the censorship.

During the reign of Nicholas came the blossoming time of modern Russian literature. The great writers of this epoch, Puškin, Gogol, Turgenev, Gončarov, etc., were liberals; all, that is to say, led and sustained individualistic aspirations towards freedom, even though some of them could not altogether lay aside conservative habits of thought. Modern art in general (for the remark does not apply solely to imaginative literature) can no longer be deliberately conservative and theocratic in its leanings. Such has been the valuable and momentous outcome of the evolution following upon the French revolution.

Agrarian and economic development, too, had perforce to take a liberal turn. Whether at the hands of the crown, the landowners, the mercantile classes, or the peasants, more efficient production could only be brought about by scientific method, and especially by the intelligent application of the achievements of natural science. Further, the principles of Adam Smith secured recognition, and were put into practice in internal affairs. Owing to the defective yield of servile labour the liberation of the peasantry was found to be essential. Liberalism was invigorated by the influence of German philosophy, and especially by that of Hegel; towards the close of the forties, the Hegelian left (Feuerbach), positivism, materialism, and the French socialists, began to influence the Russian liberals, so that a number of them now became socialists. The Petraševcy were the first victims of the more radical current. Socialism and anarchism were evoked by the revolutionary sentiments voiced by Herzen and Bakunin, at first while they were still in Russia, and subsequently as refugees. Socialism and Bakuninist anarchism now dominated the mind of youth.

Liberalism became distinguished from socialism and from anarchism in respect of program and in respect of its advocates; Herzen and Bakunin drew apart, not only from the slavophiles, but also from Granovskii.

The liberation of the peasantry, and the effecting of the other reforms that necessarily accompanied and followed that measure, were a notable victory for liberalism. But this was not the first time on which absolutism had entered liberal paths. Since the days of Peter, the bureaucracy had been compelled to recognise liberalism in practice, the constraint, in Russia as elsewhere, being supplied by the administration's own interests, which could be adequately served in no other way. Reactionaries like Katkov realised this clearly enough.

It was natural that these reforms should strengthen radicalism. After 1861, the socio-political opposition became organised in secret societies; and the example of the Polish revolution of 1863 had its effect upon radical circles in Russia.

The reaction armed in its own defence, and many liberals wavered in their allegiance to liberal principles. Katkov, the admirer of English constitutionalism, opened his campaign against Herzen. Čičerin, a typical exponent of moderate liberalism, likewise attacked Herzen. But Herzen found a defender even among the moderate liberals (Kavelin).

The attempt on the life of Alexander II in the year 1866 strengthened the reaction. Such liberals as Nekrasov now made for the sake of the reaction the "sacrificio del intelletto" (Nekrasov, for the rest, was always a wiseacre); but the opposition was by no means intimidated. Society underwent a cleavage into liberal "fathers" and revolutionary "children"; liberals, no less than conservatives and reactionaries, devoted themselves to the analysis of "nihilism." The leader of such liberals was Turgenev, the spokesman of liberal Hamletism, but his admiration for the bold woman terrorist swept him off his balance.

Both before and after 1861, the aristocracy and the gentry continued to make up the bulk of the liberals, but the strength of the *raznočincy* contingent increased. The towns were expanding and were undergoing economic changes, and the capitalistic bourgeoisie and plutocracy were gaining in strength and numbers. The rich bourgeois wanted to lead a quiet life, but at the same time he wanted to play the gentleman.¹ It was natural that the radical should despise the bourgeois

¹ Mendelëev, the distinguished chemist, was a prominent spokesman of the industrial plutocracy. Not merely was he an opponent of communism, but he likewise looked upon constitutionalism as superfluous.

just as much as he despised the aristocrat—for the leaders of radicalism, and above all the best writers on behalf of the movement, were of noble birth.

The public activities of the liberals were mainly devoted to the zemstvos, and these bodies were schools of political self-government. In the zemstvos, the petty bourgeois, the merchant, and the intellectual, could make themselves felt, just as well as the great landlord.

The activities of the revolutionary opposition were now accentuated, with the passive and at times more than passive assistance of the liberals. The government was disposed to make certain concessions (Loris-Melikov), but the assassination of Alexander II brought Katkov and Pobědonoscev into power. The new reaction was not immediately effective in arresting liberal activities, and these persisted especially in the zemstvos. It is true that Dragomanov, as spokesman of the constitutionalist liberals, solemnly proclaimed himself opposed to tyrannicide; but Dragomanov and his associates, no less than the revolutionaries, were compelled to seek asylum abroad.

The radical and democratic trend of Černyševskii was replaced by that of Mihailovskii, a mediator between liberalism and radicalism. Lavrov, though a refugee, and more radical than Mihailovskii, did nothing to hinder the growth of liberalism.

After the death of Alexander II, came a period of vengeful reaction. Katkov and Pobědonoscev were its leading literary advocates, while Leont'ev was its chief liberal opponent.

The Social Democratic Party was constituted in 1883. The political activity of liberalism slackened in proportion as the organisation of the revolutionaries was hindered by the reaction.

The controversy between the Marxists and the narodniki during the middle nineties was advantageous to the liberals, more especially because the liberals for the most part were on the Marxist side. Moreover, discussion had an invigorating influence on all parties alike. A controversy of especial interest was that concerning the relationship of the social democracy and of the revolutionaries in general to the liberals. The relationship achieved practical recognition in the League of Deliverance (Sojuz Osvoboždenija), and this body furnished a platform for joint political activities. Then came the long-

desired mass revolution. With the help of the liberals, the working classes and their radical leaders fought for and obtained the constitution.

§ 181.

THIS brief historical sketch should suffice, for a history of Russian liberalism was given as part of the historical sketch, and a description was furnished of the principal facts bearing on the movement.

The question may be asked, why no noted liberals have received individual treatment such as was given in the case of Kropotkin apropos of anarchism. The reply is that liberalism is so multiform that it would have been necessary to deal with a very large number of individuals. Most liberals of note are persons whose main distinction has been acquired in other fields; they are historians, political economists, jurists, and the like, who turn aside for a time from these special studies. But the socio-political characteristics of Russian liberalism have been described, though briefly.

Russian liberalism, like that of Europe, has had two distinct epochs; and the liberalism of the later phase, that of the days since the death of Alexander II, exhibits all the defects as well as the merits of European liberalism. Lukewarmness, indecision, dread of political initiative, are conspicuous failings. Upon many questions of the first importance, the views of liberals are divided. For example, Čičerin is in favour of natural law, Maromcev (president of the first duma) is in favour of historic law. Similar differences prevail among liberals upon religious matters.

The Russian liberal looks for help, not to his own exertions, not to the people, but to those in high places. Čičerin, like Naumann in Germany, hoped for the establishment of a democratic monarchy; but whereas Naumann, when he spoke of the people, meant the social democracy, and wanted a socialist monarchy, Čičerin proposed to break the power of the aristocracy with the aid of the populace led by the crown. The tsar was to destroy his own aristocracy! Černyševskii in this matter saw much more clearly than Čičerin (§ 102).

The liberal, being a man of half-measures, is inconsistent, and stops half way to the goal.

The "children," therefore, could not feel much respect

for the "fathers." It seemed to the "children" that the Oblomov disease was the outcome of this liberalism, and they regarded their liberal "fathers" as belonging to the category of "superfluous men." Pisarev compared the liberal to the cow which wished to play the part of cavalry charger. Conservative opponents, on the other hand, looked upon liberalism with contempt. Dostoevskii represented the devil as a liberal bourgeois.

Liberalism could point in exculpation to the prolonged operation of tsarist absolutism, forcibly restraining men from public activities and delivering them over to irresponsible inertia.

But some regarded liberalism as a manifestation of the irresponsibility and inertia which, said these persons are inborn in the Russians.

The revolution of 1905 and the inauguration of the duma compelled all the political parties, and especially the liberals, to reexamine the principles upon which their respective programs were based. The first point to be considered was the relationship of liberalism to socialism and to revolutionism. In the liberal camp, even before the revolution, particular attention had been devoted to the attitude towards the state and towards the problem of revolution. The discussion concerning the differences between the Marxists and the social revolutionaries, the practical efforts to secure progressive unity in the League of Deliverance (Struve), and a personal desire to clarify his views upon the crisis in Russian affairs, induced Miljukov to debate these problems. Miljukov, who is now the intellectual leader of the cadets, has had ample political experience, and as historian and philosopher of history he is exceptionally well qualified to give an opinion upon such matters.

Miljukov's idea is that the role of liberalism is to mediate between the revolution and governmental circles. He holds that the liberal opposition has peculiar competence as mediator, inasmuch as it is in opposition without being revolutionary.¹ As recently as 1909, at a banquet given by the lord mayor of London in honour of the Russian deputation, Miljukov reiterated the old saying that as long as Russia possessed a legislative chamber which controlled the budget, the Russian opposition

¹ Miljukov, *Russia and its Crisis*, 1905, p. 517. (The text was composed in the year 1903.)

would be "his majesty's opposition" and not opposition to his majesty. After the attempt on the life of Stolypin (September 15, 1911), Miljukov's organ published a solemn declaration to the effect that the Constitutional Democratic Party condemned political outrage, and would countenance nothing beyond normal political evolution.

Liberalism thus recognised the state, and proclaimed its willingness to work directly in favour of the strengthening of the state, expressed its readiness ultimately to cooperate, as a governmental party, in the activities of the state. The emphasis laid in cadet policy upon the importance of maintaining state authority may have been due to the fact that at this time the social democracy was exhibiting anarchist leanings. Possibly, too, the liberal faith in the mechanism of state (cf. Gradovskii's opinion of the westernisers, recorded in § 72) played a part in this development.

Whilst in Germany, too, the cooperation of liberals with social democrats has been recommended (by the liberals), we have to remember that Russian party relationships and Russian conditions in general differ widely from those which obtain in Germany, in England, and in France. Whereas the German social democrats regard parliament as the chief weapon in their armoury, the Russian social democrats are not yet agreed upon this matter. The social revolutionaries (not to speak of the anarchists) are still more dubious as to the value of parliament. The divergence between legal and illegal political opposition is extremely wide, and it is hard for illegal parties to abandon their customary tactics.

We have further to remember that tsarism is altogether different from French republican government, and differs greatly also from Prussian monarchy.

As members of a state party, the liberals have expressed their views very plainly in the controversy concerning the question of nationality.

They have always been non-nationalist, having rightly opposed nationalism as advocated by Uvarov and his successors, and above all as advocated by Katkov.

When the constitution was secured after the revolution, and when the political parties were being organised, the liberals split into two large factions, that of the octobrists and that of the constitutional democrats. The octobrists may be described as the national liberals of Russia. In a general

way, the cleavage may be compared with that which took place in Germany during the year 1866, when the German progressives became subdivided, with the formation of the "loyal opposition" constituted by the national liberals, on the one hand, and the democratic wing, on the other. The war with Japan had an effect similar to that produced by the war of 1866; there was an increase in the sentiment of nationality, and fidelity to the state was strengthened. Not only did the Union of Genuine Russians spring to life, but the liberal octobrists and even the cadets displayed a more lively nationalist sentiment.

Miljukov himself, at the outset, manifested a benevolent neutrality towards neoslavism.

Struve's advocacy of nationalist views (1908) is of interest. As member of the Cadet Party, he insisted that the liberals must maintain the unity of the Russian state, and declared that the intelligentsia must not confuse the state with the bureaucracy, the fatherland with the absolutist autocracy. He admitted the equality of the various nationalities under Russian rule, but would not endorse the idea of federation. The Russian language and Russian civilisation were to serve as a link between all the peoples of the empire; the state must defend the Russian majority against the nationalist errors of the minorities. The intelligentsia must hold fast to the conception of "Great Russia." The strength of the state vis-à-vis the foreign world offers no hindrances to internal political development, that which aims at domestic welfare; the intelligentsia, therefore, must become permeated with the idea of statehood, and must abandon its futile radicalism. "The revolution has served to impress upon me a conviction as to what is the real significance of the state." The revolution he said, had been shipwrecked by its antistatism.

Besides Struve, other convinced liberals have endeavoured to formulate the national ideal and above all the slavic ideal (as contrasted with neoslavism, which was advocated by the reactionaries).¹

Struve's nationalism is certainly much nearer to the program of the octobrists than to that of the cadets. I cannot

¹ I may refer here to the slavist A. Pogodin, whose formula may be briefly summarised as follows: "Union of the Slavs upon the basis of civilising work; union of the peoples of Russia upon the basis of equal rights, upon the basis of the free development of all."

feel that references to Bismarck and to that statesman's policy make Struve's arguments in favour of "Great Russia" more congenial and more democratic. His identification of state and nationality is extremely characteristic. Struve's ideas are too closely akin to Uvarov's official nationalism, and he is thus led to construct a barrier between the liberals and the socialists. The liberals themselves recognised this, and disowned Struve, though the latter could appeal to the authority of Pestel.

It was very natural that after the granting of the constitution the question of nationality should bulk so largely. Political freedom necessarily signifies the freedom of the nationalities, and constitutionalist Russia has therefore to face the problems which have remained unsolved in Austria-Hungary since 1848. Nationally, linguistically, and racially, Russia is the least unified state in the world. The Polish question and the Jewish question have always been acute; to these are superadded the Finnish, the Ruthenian, and other national problems. The fact that the dominant nation does not even command a majority throws a new light upon the old question of centralisation versus autonomy and federation.

The radicals, following Carlyle, may despise the duma as "National Palaver," but, after all, parliament is a school of languages; the tongue that has been mute under absolutism can now make itself heard; public utterances in parliament, in electoral meetings, in political associations, and the like, is a new and integral part of constitutionalism. Thus in Russia, as elsewhere, the constitution has made the language question a matter of practical politics and has aroused general interest in the problem.

In Russia, as elsewhere, we find that the problem of nationality is interconnected with other questions of primary importance. In the multilingual areas, above all, nationality is not merely a political question, but is an economic and social question to boot. For example, the Polish question and the Little Russian question have agrarian aspects; the exceptional treatment of the Poles and the Jews necessarily affects the economics of agriculture, for neither Pole nor Jew can acquire land (cf. § 68). Again, the problem of nationality has ecclesiastical and religious aspects; the Poles, the Finns, the Germans, the Caucasians, etc., do not belong to the

Orthodox church. The "genuine Russians" are especially fond of drawing attention to this feature of the problem of nationality.

Socialism, no less than liberalism, has to solve all these problems; and in the attempts made to find solutions the political, social, and philosophic differences between the two outlooks and philosophies are conspicuously displayed.

Such elucidations and delimitations are made practically rather than theoretically, and often under pressure of immediate need; but in Russia, as in Europe, there are to be found liberal theorists who supply philosophical criticism of the liberal program, considering that program in relation to contemporary developments in Europe, and endeavouring to replace the old liberalism by a new, to reform liberalism. I may refer, for example, to Novgorodcev, professor of the philosophy of law at Moscow. In his earlier writings, and notably as editor of a collection of essays entitled *The Problems of Idealism* (1902), he has announced his adhesion to the modern idealist movement, but has adopted a sound democratic foundation, declaring in favour of natural law. He has also done well in taking his start from Kant.

In agreement with the French and the English theorists of renovated liberalism, Novgorodcev hopes for a rebirth of liberalism in Russia.¹ He demands the democratisation of liberalism, and he advocates reform whereby the extraparliamentary initiative of the people may be organised and strengthened (the introduction of the referendum, etc.). He also favours the socialisation of liberalism, but it must be admitted that he fails to explain clearly what he means by this demand.

The question of the socialisation and democratisation of liberalism is one of peculiar and seasonable importance for Russia, seeing that Russian liberalism from the first accepted the ideals of socialism, even if some vacillation was subsequently noticeable. This is precisely what differentiates modern Russian liberalism from European liberalism, and especially from German and English liberalism. I have done my best to insist upon the inner kinship between liberalism, socialism, and anarchism; and in the accounts given of the individual thinkers I have endeavoured to convey precise information in each case regarding their socio-political trend and their

¹ Novgorodcev, *The Crisis in the Contemporary Consciousness of Law*, 1909.

political evolution. The reader may recall what was said concerning the movement of Herzen's ideas from liberalism to socialism and anarchism, and back again to liberalism. Bakunin's mental development and that of the other noted thinkers was considered from a similar outlook.

But the problem of modern democracy is not exhausted by formulating a demand for the socialisation and democratisation of liberalism. Novgorodcev shows how this problem of democracy necessarily involves the problem of education, and above all of moral education; and he makes an effective point when he refers to the peculiar difficulties with which, in this respect, republican France has to contend. Obviously, too, the ecclesiastical and religious problem is interwoven with the problem of morality. From this outlook, Novgorodcev has not thrown much light on Russian conditions; but many other liberal theorists and politicians have devoted attention to such matters.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE CRISIS IN REVOLUTIONISM; THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

I

§ 182.

IN 1909 was published *A Collection of Essays concerning the Russian Intelligentsia*, this being the subtitle. The main title was *Věhy* (Signposts). The little volume was issued from Moscow, as if by geographical affiliation to claim connection with the slavophiles (and following therein the example set by Pobědonoscev's *Moscow Collection*!). Several of the authors have been referred to elsewhere in the present work. The most noted among them, in addition to Struve, Bulgakov, and Berdjajev, were: Kistjakovskii, a sociological writer of European reputation; Geršenzon, the literary historian who has paid especial attention to the slavophil movement; Frank, a writer on philosophy; and Izgoev, a writer on philosophico-political topics. Some of those named have published comprehensive works to convey their views on the subjects now under discussion.

A book on the intelligentsia is sure of a hearing. To use an expressive colloquialism, *Signposts* "caught on." Edition followed edition; a brisk controversy was evoked; lectures were delivered pro and con; newspapers and other periodicals defined their attitude. Further, two detailed replies were published, one from the liberal, the other from the social revolutionary camp.

Signposts may be characterised, to begin with, by saying that it secured a friendly reception from theological critics, and that Archbishop Antonii of Volhynia wrote an article commending the book shortly after its appearance. He extolled the heroism of the authors, who had, he said, called

Russian society to repentance, had issued to the Russians a summons on behalf of faith, work, and knowledge, had exhorted them to unite with the people and to enter into the heritage of Dostoevskii and the slavophiles. Antonii reminded his readers of Saltykov's street arab, who had called after the German bourgeois, "You have sold your soul to the devil for a groschen!" But we Russians, said the archbishop, have let him have our soul for nothing, so we can demand its return. Reading the book in sleepless nights, the hierarchy had regained faith in Russian society, and had acquired the conviction that Russia was not lost to Christ.

The archbishop's rejoicing over the repentant prodigal is not difficult to understand, for nearly all the authors of *Signposts* had been Marxists, and some even had been members of the Social Democratic Party.

Struve answered the archbishop. His rejoinder was an adroit parry to Antonii's cheerful adulation, the adulation that came from a man who, if I mistake not, had by one of the essayists been described as the most interesting figure in the black hundred group. Struve reminded the prince of the church of what Dostoevskii had said, that, since the time of Peter the Great, the church had been suffering from palsy; and Struve declared that he and his friends were filled with concern because the Orthodox church was so utterly subordinated to the state and to the aims of state policy.

Shortly afterwards, Berdjaev issued an open letter to the archbishop, declaring himself a penitent son of the church, but at the same time putting such awkward questions as to the spiritual poverty of the church, as to its violence, its condonation of capital punishment, and the like, that the reader was forced to wonder how the questioner could possibly have "come once more to recognise the church" as his "spiritual mother."

Signposts contained little more than a recantation of Marxism and social democracy. The docket "from Marxism to idealism" was tantamount to a condemnation of the revolution and even of political activity. The revolution of 1905-1906 and the subsequent events had been the test of the intellectual foundations of the intelligentsia, and these foundations, the values that had been esteemed by the intelligentsia for more than half a century, had been proved essentially unstable and fallacious.

The authors of *Signposts* abandoned the earlier philosophy of the intelligentsia. The Russian intelligentsia must withdraw from the outer to the inner life; the spiritual life must secure a theoretical and practical primacy over the outward forms of the life of the community; the inner life of the personality was the sole creative energy of human existence; it was impossible for the political order to be the basis of genuine social creation.

As their spiritual fathers and teachers, the authors of *Signposts* acknowledged Čadaev, Solov'ev, Dostoevskii, Homjakov, Čičerin, Kozlov, S. Trubeckoi, Lopatin, Losskii, and Nesmělov; on the other hand sentence was in effect passed upon Bělinškii, Herzen, Černyševskii, Mihailovskii, and Lavrov.¹ Thus the writers make a distinction between Russian and un-Russian philosophy. Russian philosophy is animated by the spirit of Plato, by classic German idealism, and by mysticism; essentially, its interests are religious; its mission is to mediate between religion and science. This Russian philosophy aims at the objectivation of mysticism.

Mysticism and positive science, we are told, are by no means mutually exclusive. The European west has succeeded in bringing to maturity a science that is neutral in religious and metaphysical matters.

Concerning the nature of Russian mysticism in particular, the writers inform us that it harmoniously combines the Dionysiac and Apolline elements, but needs to be objectivised and normalised in the philosophical aspect. Positive religion (i.e. the Orthodox faith) is full of the higher mysticism.

Conversely, the philosophy of the intelligentsia is the expression of nihilism, which on utilitarian grounds denies the existence of any absolute values. Nihilism is therefore atheism, and this means anthropo-idolatry. The members of the intelligentsia are the militant monks of a nihilistic religion of purely mundane wellbeing.

In political matters the intelligentsia is anarchistic, for it lacks the sense of the state and is devoid of a feeling for law.

Finally, we are told that the intelligentsia has grave moral defects. Reference is made to the sexual laxity and corrup-

¹ Kozlov (ob. 1901) was professor of philosophy in Kiev; Lopatin is professor at Moscow university; Losskii is professor of philosophy at St. Petersburg University and has written works in German; Nesmělov is professor at the seminary in Kazan.

tion of youth and to the prevalence of masturbation, and in the same connection the writers speak of the increasing frequency of suicide, also on the part of the young.

It is needless to undertake a detailed criticism of *Signposts*, for most of the problems with which it deals have been discussed elsewhere in these volumes. Moreover, the writers make no serious attempt to establish their chief propositions, which appear merely as unsupported assertions.

It was not difficult for adversaries to discover numerous weaknesses in *Signposts*. There are frequent contradictions, as between the various authors; the style is often hyperbolic, and there are many overstatements upon matters of fact; the theses are not precisely formulated; the whole work gives the impression of an improvisation. The validity of these criticisms was recognised by some of the contributors, and in the course of the discussion the book evoked they modified and toned down their views. None the less the work had considerable significance, for it showed that quite a number of writers, much as they might differ upon points of detail, were agreed at least in this, that it was necessary to abandon the road trodden by the radical intelligentsia since the days of Bëlinskii and Herzen, and to enter a new domain of united thought and activity. In a word, *Signposts* urged the intelligentsia to face the religious problem. A purely political revolution is futile, said the writers, for it can have no more than political consequences; such consequences are not worthy objects of desire, for the aspirations towards them is based upon false philosophy and false sentiment.

Indisputably since the revolution the radical intelligentsia has been passing through a crisis. This crisis has involved all Russia, and the great problem that has to be faced may be formulated thus: Was the old path a wrong one; must a new path be entered; if so, where is that new path to be found?

Most of the writers in *Signposts* were by no means clear upon the last matter, and for this reason the real philosophical backbone of the book is furnished by Bulgakov's essay, for Bulgakov simply returns to Dostoevskii, and with Dostoevskii to the church. Like Dostoevskii, Bulgakov counterposes faith in God to atheistic nihilism, and the worship of Christ to the Feuerbachian worship of man. The intelligentsia must discard socialism in all its forms, for socialism is materialistic

and atheistic. If the intelligentsia will abandon atheism, the chasm between the intelligentsia and the folk will be bridged over, and the disastrous apostasy in political, national, and religious affairs will come to an end. Bulgakov unreservedly accepts Dostoevskii's ideals, adopting that writer's explanation of the contemporary Russian crisis, and in especial Dostoevskii's explanation of the epidemic of suicide among young people, which is ascribed to the prevalence of atheism.

Bulgakov does not develop these ideas in detail, and plainly assumes that his readers will be familiar with Dostoevskii's writings. But he makes it sufficiently clear that the revolutionaries are to replace atheistic heroism by Christian heroism. "Seek humility, proud man," he exclaims with Dostoevskii; "return to Christ, return to Orthodoxy!"

The new path suggested by *Signposts* is thus a very old one, but this antiquity does not render the possibility of an agreement to follow it a matter of any less urgency.

It cannot be said that the detailed replies furnished by the liberals and the social revolutionaries did much to favour understanding and agreement, for they hardly touched the main issue, the ecclesiastico-religious problem; and moreover their treatment of all matters of detail was unduly abstract. Miljukov, for example, showed very well that religious evolution in Russia had been favoured by the influence of western ideas, but his conclusion was unduly liberal, if I may use the expression. To-day, said Miljukov, there are new possibilities of religious development. But we want to know, What possibilities? We wish to know, further, what part the liberal party has to play in this development, and what decisions the liberals must take upon religious and ecclesiastical affairs.¹

§ 183.

IN the early days of the movement, liberalism was inspired by the spirit of the enlightenment, was rationalist, deist, freethinking. Liberals sometimes denied religion on prin-

¹ The liberal replies to *Signposts* were incorporated in a collection of essays published in 1910, entitled, *The Intelligentsia and the People*. Most of the writers were men of European reputation: Petrunkevich, Arsenev (literary critic), Gredeskul (historian), Maxim Kovalevskii, Miljukov, Ovsjaniko-Kulikovskii (historian of literature), Slavinskii (belletristic writer), Tugan-Baranovskii.

ciple ; in other cases they were content to reject theology and ecclesiastical religion.

Then came the reaction against eighteenth-century rationalism ; romanticism arose, with its insistence upon imagination and the life of feeling. Liberals, too, were involuntarily swept away by the current, and many a liberal became a person of motley views, half rationalist and half romanticist.

Romanticism effected the restoration and established the sway of reaction, and liberalism underwent an analogous evolution. Despite his rationalism, the liberal began to support the church in the social and political spheres, for the altar upholds the throne and the bourgeoisie, and the church dominates the masses. It became a liberal doctrine that religion must be preserved for the people. The liberal, the aristocrat of culture, might retain his private opinions, but religion was absolutely essential for the folk !

In Russia the attitude of liberalism towards religion was similar to that adopted in Europe. The more radical among the liberals were opposed to religion on principle, whilst the less radical declared against ecclesiastical religion and adopted, more or less, the creed of Rousseau and his Savoyard vicar (Radiščev, Granovskii) ; the earlier slavophiles went so far, at any rate, as to idealise ecclesiastical religion. When socialism began to develop side by side with liberalism, the left wing of the liberals adopted the socialists' negative outlook upon religion and the church, whilst the liberal centre and right wing evaded any discussion of the principles of religion. We may recall that Solov'ev published his later views in the chief liberal organ. But at this stage it remained a matter of course for the liberals that they should fight theocratic ideas and theocratic policy.

The significant beginning of the constitutionalist era was the issue of the patent of toleration. The war with Japan, entered into with such high hopes in February 1904, soon proved disastrous. Pleve was assassinated ; the zemstvos began to stir, and the liberals made common cause with the revolutionaries ; in November 1904 Svjatopolk-Mirskii was appointed to succeed Pleve, and thoughts were entertained of summoning a zemskii sobor. On December 25th the ukase to the senate was issued demanding " provisional suggestions for the perfectionment of political institutions " ; a committee of high officials was thereupon appointed, and this body dis-

cussed among other questions that of freedom of conscience. The first tangible concession on the part of the theocracy was the ukase concerning toleration promulgated on April 30, 1905. The theocracy recognised clearly enough that certain renovations in the Uvarovian foundations were essential, but this matter, however characteristic, cannot be discussed here. My concern is to describe the disputes that ensued among the dignitaries who were discussing the necessary reforms. Information upon this subject is afforded by a recent publication containing the correspondence between the liberals and the reactionaries (*Historical Correspondence concerning the Destiny of the Orthodox Church*, 1912).

The leaders on the two sides were Witte for the liberals and Pobēdonoscev for the theocrats. Witte admits that the church has been bureaucratised and subjected to hierarchical control, that the dioceses have lost their ancient right of electing bishops, that the congregations are decaying. He deploras that the clergy should lend themselves to misuse as police agents and detectives; he recognises the inadequacy of the lifeless church schools; he shares the views of those who have regarded Peter's reforms as uncanonical, and who have demanded that the church be rendered independent of the state, this independence being secured (above all) by the reestablishment of the patriarchate. He is aware that the congregations have lost their liberties owing to political centralisation and owing to serfdom (Uvarov, likewise, had recognised this connection). Witte eloquently defends the freedom of the church and of religion, advocates local self-government in ecclesiastical matters as against centralisation, and suggests the revival of the conciliary principle.

Antonii the metropolitan, who dreads the autonomy of the sects, prudently defends the freedom of his church; whereas Pobēdonoscev is all fire and fury when he defends the existing order against the onslaughts of Witte. To the procurator, the synod is a permanent council; the centralisation of the church and the establishment of hierarchical authority have been essential; independent congregations are now impossible; and so on. In a word, all is for the best in the best of all possible churches.

It seems strange to find Witte defending the liberty of the church. It was Witte who had fought against freedom for the zemstvos, on the ground that such freedom would be

a menace to autocracy. It was Witte who proved vacillating and indecisive as first premier, his only ideal being to maintain and fortify the state authority. The same ideal underlay his plea on behalf of the Russian church. He was not concerned about religion for its own sake, but hoped to strengthen the state by strengthening the church!

The modern liberal believes only in the state and its providence; but in an hour weighty with responsibilities Witte recalled religion to mind, for the infallibility and providence of his secular god seemed to him a broken reed in view of the personalities through whom that deity's activities secured expression.

Bulgakov contends that the mission of the intelligentsia is to secure a return to Christ—to Christ, not to Kant or to Hume. For Bulgakov, Christ means the Orthodox church, though he is forced to admit that all is not in order in the official church. His desire is that malcontents shall not leave the church, shall not exult over its defects, but shall endeavour to reform it from within. Moreover, to one who has faith in the mystical life of the church, the historically extant outward form of the institution cannot possibly be a stumbling-block.

It had been my impression that Bulgakov's conversion was the outcome of genuine religious need, and I was therefore eager to ascertain what had been his attitude towards the electoral alliance between the synod and the reaction. In his account of the elections to the fourth duma he speaks of the conduct of the synod with much indignation. He even goes so far as to say that Russia is actually perishing under our eyes, that "Holy" Russia has allied herself with the basest elements of the mob. Russia, he continues, is poisoned by a twofold nihilism, the nihilism of the intelligentsia and the nihilism of the bureaucracy, and the latter is the worse. He deplures that hitherto his attacks have been too exclusively directed against the former, but consoles himself in the end with the reflection that "belief in the church is not inseparably connected with the status quo of her extant local organisations."

These are remarkable concessions from a defender of the church. Bulgakov makes us feel that he finds the church too narrow for him, but that he is able for the time being to salve his conscience by talking of the churches as "local

organisations." The association between the synod and the "black hundred" was not fortuitous, however, for the church is unprogressive and reactionary by tradition and on principle. "Sint ut sunt aut non sint," applies to the third Rome no less than to the second.

Struve seeks a similar expedient, saying, "the Christian faith has no intimate connection with any specific political forms and institutions." But apart from the consideration that the authors of *Signposts* were concerned, not with ideal Christianity, but with the actual Christianity of the Russian church, Struve is merely evading a straightforward answer to the religious problem.

Miljukov, too, notwithstanding his hostility to Struve and the others, shuns the issue of principle. He tells us that Tolstoi and Tolstoi's religious crusade are a proof of the existence of "new possibilities" of religious development in Russia. Yet we cannot but remember that Tolstoi was excommunicated from the church of Pobédonoscev, and that he would have been sent to Siberia had it not been for the personal intervention of the tsar; we have, moreover, to enquire, what are the "new possibilities" of religious development of which Miljukov is thinking.

Let me quote once more from Feuerbach. "I would not give a rush for political liberty if I were to remain a slave of religious fancies and prejudices. True freedom can be found there only where man is free also from the tyranny of religion."

Most of the Russian liberals adopted the same attitude towards religion as had been adopted by their European prototypes. Fundamentally they followed the teaching of old Tatiščev, who had advised his son never to renounce religious belief publicly and never to change his creed. Pirogov, the philosopher and pedagogue, gives expression in his diary to these rules of Descartes in the following words: "As long as I make no attempt to leave the bosom of the state church, as long as I raise no hand against that church, as long as I pay it all due respect, in a word, as long as I do nothing which can be construed as hostile to the national and state religion which I and my family profess, my personal faith, a matter which I keep to myself, is no one's business but my own."

Thus in the religious sphere Russian liberalism has become a system of indifferentism, and therein lies the secret of its weakness. Liberalism is not sceptical merely, but indifferent;

and indifferentism, not scepticism, is the true unbelief. This liberal unbelief clings to the church in which it has ceased to believe just as the tsar clings to the church.

II

§ 184.

THE social revolutionaries' reply to *Signposts* appeared contemporaneously with that of the liberals, and was entitled *Signposts as Signs of the Time* (1910),¹ an apt name. *Signposts* was stigmatised as the most reactionary volume that had been issued from the press for many years, and Struve and his associates were taxed with falseness and equivocation. In points of detail the comprehensive work contained much that was good, but the main issue (the religious problem) was left unconsidered. Speaking generally we may say that the social revolutionary "anti-signposts" were directed to the wrong quarter. From the social revolutionary camp there was issued almost simultaneously a critique of revisionism which was enormously superior to *Signposts* in respect of its analytic depth.

In January 1909 "Russkaja Mysl" (Russian Thought), a Moscow review edited by Struve, began the publication of a novel entitled *The Pale Horse*. The work takes the form of a diary extending from March 6th to October 5th of a single year. The author, V. Ropšin, was a man previously unknown. The implication of the title is conveyed by the first of the two mottoes: "... and behold a pale horse; and his name that sat on him was Death..." (Revelation vi. 8). Neither this motto nor the other, "But he that hateth his brother is in darkness, and walketh in darkness, and knoweth not whither he goeth, because that darkness hath blinded his eyes" (1 John ii. 11), can be regarded as attractive to the ordinary reader, for they suggest that the novel is to be a contribution to the prevalent mysticism, to the apocalyptic mysticism of Merežkovskii and similar religious decadents. But the opening pages arrest our attention. We learn that the diary is kept by the leader of a terrorist group of five persons who are to assassinate the governor of a provincial town. A terrorist

¹ Most of the authors wrote anonymously. Two of the articles were almost certainly from the pen of Černov, whilst Šiškov contributed one.

who quotes the apocalypse and the disciple whom Jesus loved is a new type. A new feature, too, in terrorist fiction is the liaison between the hero and Erna, the chemist of the group. The relationship between George and Erna comes into the category of what is known as free love, and we are told at the very outset that when George holds Erna in his arms he thinks of another woman, Elena. The diary opens with the account of these love relationships, but passes immediately to the consideration of its main ethical problem, that of the right to kill: "Why shouldn't one kill? And why is murder justified in one case and not in another? People do find reasons, but I don't know why one should not kill; and I cannot understand why to kill in the name of this or that is considered right, while to kill in the name of something else is wrong. . . . I am not conscious of hate or anger when I think of him. At the same time I do not feel any pity for him. As a personality he leaves me indifferent. But I want him to die. Strength will break a straw. I don't believe in words. I do not want to be a slave myself, and do not want any one else to be one."¹

As I read, I feel that I am making the acquaintance of a new type of terrorist, and of a real terrorist, not an imaginary one. My Russian correspondents inform me that Ropšin, a young man of about thirty, married to a daughter of the poet Uspenskii, was the leading spirit in the assassination of Plevé and in that of the grand duke Sergius. In the periodical "Byloe," devoted to the history of the revolution, Ropšin's mother has given an account of the author of *The Pale Horse*. His real name, it appears, is Savinkov. Arrested and condemned for his participation in the before-mentioned assassinations, he escaped from prison a few days before the date fixed for his execution, and now lives abroad as a member of the Social Revolutionary Party.

Ropšin's George (and this, again, is something new in a terrorist) thinks and feels precisely after the manner of Ivan Karamazov. Whilst Ivan was a typical representative of the opposition intelligentsia, was a philosophic revolutionist, George combined the rôles of philosophic revolutionist and practical revolutionist. Dostoevskii, it must be remembered,

¹ The quotations are made from the English version of the novel, V. Ropšin, *The Pale Horse*, translated from the Russian by Z. Vengerová, Maunsel, Dublin, 1917, and Allen and Unwin, London, 1918.

employed the figure of Ivan to manifest his hostility to the revolution, but Ropšin accepts on behalf of his own generation Dostoevskii's analysis of the revolution.

Dostoevskii represented the ethico-political alternatives of force and love as religious in character, as the alternatives of unfaith and faith, as the alternatives of murder or suicide on the one hand and life on the other. Ivan and his half-brother Smerdjakov are contrasted with Aliosha. Ivan and Smerdjakov commit parricide; Smerdjakov kills himself; Aliosha is the apostle of life to the young men of his generation.

Ropšin puts Dostoevskii's philosophy into the mouth of Vanja, one of the members of the group:

"Now, tell me, have you ever thought of Christ?"

"Of whom?"

"Of Christ, of the God-Man Christ? Did you ever ask yourself what you ought to believe in and how you ought to live? In my lodgings, in the driver's yard, I often read the Gospels, and I have come to the conclusion that only two ways are open to men, no more than two. One is to believe that everything is permissible. Please, understand me—everything, without exception. Now that leads to the making of such a character as Dostoevskii's Smerdjakov, provided that a man has a mind to dare and not to shrink at any consideration. After all, there is logic in such an attitude: since God does not exist, since Christ is but a man, there is no love as well; there is nothing whatever to stop you. The other is the way of Christ which leads to Christ. Tell me, if there is love in a man's heart—I mean real, deep love—could he kill or not?"

Vanja is a mystic. He feels that his death is drawing near; before death the soul concentrates its energies and looks beyond the limits of sense and of the every-day understanding. There is something more than reason, says Vanja, but we have blinkers on.

George is a rationalist extremist. Just as Ivan extolled Euclidean reasoning, so does George extol arithmetic; like Ivan, he now believes in nothing, neither in God nor in Christ, nor even in the watchword of his party, in the war cry, "Land and liberty!" These for him are mere words. Can fifteen desjatinas of land (he asks in the phrase of Kropotkin) make a man happy? Socialism, he says, is only Martha, and Martha is only half the truth. The other half of truth is Mary—

—and where is Mary? George admits that the man is happy who believes in Christ, who believes in socialism, who believes in anything at all, and his chief longing is for religious faith: "I would pray if I could!" But George is a sceptic through and through, and his path therefore does not lead towards any goal; he is a rudderless ship; life is to him nothing more than a puppet show at a fair. "What is my law?" he asks, and replies, "I am on the boundary line between life and death, and there, where death rules, there is no law, for law relates to life alone."

If he could think like his comrade Vanja, he would not kill. But since his mission is to kill, he cannot think like Vanja. Besides, Vanja, the Tolstoian, is none the less prepared to kill.

George accepts Nietzsche's superman, more especially since an anticipatory sketch of the superman was given by Dostoevskii. The superman of Nietzsche and Dostoevskii loves no one, not even himself. "I am alone. If there is none to protect me, I am my own protector. If I have no God, I am my own God." George's reasoning recalls Feuerbach's "*Homo homini deus*"; and since the days of Herzen, Feuerbach's teaching has inspired revolutionary philosophy with atheism. Dostoevskii counterposed the God-Man to Feuerbach's man-god. George knows this, but follows Feuerbach and Ivan, not Aliosha. In Ivan's company he follows the first steps of Faust. Just as Faust is preserved from the sinister phial by the sound of the Easter bells, so is George's mood softened at Eastertide, and he philosophises upon Christ's resurrection. It then seems to him that he can and must believe in miracle, seeing that for one who believes in miracle there are no difficulties, and violence is therefore needless.

Like Ivan, George craves for life, for a full life. He would like to live "as the grass grows," without questionings, without pangs of conscience, without thought. That is why he loves to read ancient authors, to read the works of those who did not seek for the truth, but simply lived. Similarly in Siberia, after his escape from prison, he recovered his delight in life. During the first days after his escape there was dead indifference in his heart. He did mechanically all that was necessary to avoid being recaptured, but why he did it he could not tell. A day came, however, when he was walking alone in

the evening, and realised that the spring was all around him, that life was before him, that he was young and strong and in perfect health. George loves nature, which has on him a tranquillising effect and fills him with the joy of life ; then he becomes all contemplation, and must not think.

Thought, that is the trouble ! Like his predecessors, the old German romanticists, George would like " simply to live, as the grass grows." In Nietzschean fashion, he would follow instinct only, and follows instinct, continually seeking after woman. He lives with Erna, but seeks and ultimately finds Elena as well. Elena's word to him is, " Give up thinking, and kiss."

George is not Faust alone, he is also Don Juan. He has read Arcybašev's *Sanine*, the Don Juan of the disillusioned revolutionists. But Ropšin's Don Juan (be it accounted to Ropšin's credit) is more human. Nevertheless, the mood of Solomon overcomes him ; he finds life wearisome, saying, " All is vanity and lies ! "

George follows Dostoevskii, Nietzsche, Goethe—he follows Goethe's Faust, relives Faust. We are told in the histories of literature that Faust is the representative of the modern type of man. But did not Faust, too, kill ? Did not he stab Gretchen's brother ? Must not Faust be held accountable for the death of Gretchen's mother and for the death of his own child ? Was he not cowardly in the way in which he allowed Gretchen to go to her death ? And did not Faust wish to put an end to his own life ? The modern type of man ? Do not we see in Faust an exemplification of Dostoevskii's formula, that he who abandons the ancient faith, he who throws the old aside, is confronted with the brutal alternative of murder or suicide ? By Dostoevskii, this spiritual state is termed atheism, and in his Faust-Ivan he demonstrates its consequences. Is Faust, the whole Faust, really the modern man ?

The first attempt on the governor's life is a complete failure. At the second attempt, though the bomb explodes, the governor is unhurt, whilst in the explosion and subsequent pursuit ten persons are killed or seriously injured, and Fedor, who had been designated by the group as the practical leader on this occasion, kills himself to avoid capture. The third attempt is successful, but Vanja, the thrower of the bomb, is arrested and eventually hanged.

From the purely utilitarian outlook, no less than ethically

and philosophically, George is compelled to ask himself whether to achieve the death of a governor is worth so much sacrifice, and whether the sacrifice furthers the end, brings nearer the attainment of political and social liberty. Moreover, he doubts whether it is still right to practise terrorism now that Russia has a constitution.

Not merely, however, is George oppressed by the problem of the right to life and death, and by his doubts concerning the utility and purposefulness of terrorism; but further, the terrorist's outlawed existence is utterly repulsive to him. Without a country, without a name (for he is always appearing under some new alias), without a family, George has to lead a life of fraud and falsehood. There chase one another through his brain thoughts concerning God and human destiny, concerning the future of Russia and of humanity; he would like to sit down and quietly think out his own attitude towards the ideas of Dostoevskii, Nietzsche, Goethe, Tolstoi, etc. But his connection with the revolutionary party compels him to lead the life of a spy; all his thoughts and all his activities must be concentrated upon a single point; like Tihomirov, the revolutionary leader who abjured revolution at the close of the eighties, George feels the pettiness, deploras the restrictedness, of his mental horizon.

What to him is governor X or governor Y? Hecuba—and yet something more. When the first attempt miscarries, George's mood becomes tinged with gall, and from the moment when the governor has given him a friendly greeting in the street he conceives a personal hatred for the man. A strange sentiment of revenge overpowers him, and it becomes clear to him that he does not wish to lead a peaceful life; that blood-letting charms him for its own sake.

George, therefore, does not merely kill his political opponent. He challenges Elena's husband, feeling certain that his bullet will lay the man low. He cannot endure that he should not have exclusive possession of Elena. Elena does not believe in eternal love, and he has himself expressed to Erna his disbelief in such love, but in Elena's mouth the sentiment seems utterly wrong to him!

We are given an insight into a moral chaos. George feels, none the less, that to kill in the war with Japan and to slay Elena's husband are two different things, for the latter killing is something which he does solely for himself, is the

act of an egoist. In the end it becomes perfectly clear to him that he has no ties with any one in the world, that he cares nothing either for any individual or for the world at large. The emissary from the central committee seeks him out. The party has a difficult task to entrust to George. But George suddenly decides that he will have nothing to do with the matter, that he does not wish to kill. "Why kill?" he asks. The emissary, probably a man who has spent his days in prison or in Siberia, seems to him only an old fellow in his dotage. "He looked anxiously at me and stroked my hand affectionately like a father. But I knew for certain: I was not with him, nor with Vanja, nor with Erna. I was with no one." He decides that he will cease to live. Memories of childhood and of his mother's love cannot teach him to love his fellow men. The world has become accursed to him. He had a desire of old, and accomplished his task. Now the desire is gone. The ultra-rationalist sickens from infirmity of will. "I am alone. I will leave the dull puppet show." The beautiful autumn day beguiles him for a moment, but when night falls George will say his last word. "My revolver is with me."

Ropšin gives a gruesome confirmation of Dostoevskii's formula, the alternatives of murder and suicide. Erna takes her own life, not merely because the police-spies are upon her trail. Fedor kills his pursuers and finally himself because, like George, he sees no meaning in the life he has been leading. "I will reserve the last shot for myself . . . that will settle it"—such is the mood in which he undertakes the affair. If he is not killed in the struggle, he will kill himself. Vanja is of a very different type. He kills, but knows even as he does so that he is committing a great sin. He hopes that he too will be killed by the bomb that he throws, conceiving that his own death will be an appropriate punishment for his crime. He submits quietly to arrest that he may atone with his own death, for he has no wish to continue living after he has committed murder. He was a peculiar Christian or half-Christian. In a letter to his friends which he managed to smuggle out of prison he wrote: "I did not feel in me the strength to live for the sake of love, and I understood that I could die and ought to die for the sake of it."

According to Vanja, and he is here reproducing Dostoevskii's thought, it is easy to die for another, easy to sacrifice one's

life for mankind ; but it is far more difficult to live for mankind, to live in love from day to day, from minute to minute. In his mysticism, Vanja supplements this theory by modifying the words of the Gospel. "Just remember," he says, "the words 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.' And he must lay down more than his life—his 'soul.'"

The logic is chaotic. Vanja presumes upon the boundless mercy of Christ, and hopes for pardon in the other world. He is superstitious, and George the rationalist is likewise superstitious.

Beyond question, Ropšin had in mind the frequency of suicide among the revolutionary intelligentsia. He must have been acquainted with the discussions concerning this matter which have formed a leading theme of recent literature. He may have been conversant with Mihailovskii's analysis. His own decision is entirely accordant with Dostoevskii's formula. He makes suicide appear as the logical end of the rationalist, the basis of whose mentality is his ego—an ego conceived as naught.

Stepniak's novel was written only twenty years before that of Ropšin, but how great is the difference between the characters portrayed in the two books, how widely sundered are the respective conceptions of the terrorist revolution. It is true that Andrei and George in Stepniak's book (presumably Ropšin was thinking of his predecessor's work when he chose the name of George for his hero) occasionally ask themselves whether they have the right to kill. The question was continually being asked by the opponents of the revolution, and Stepniak was certainly acquainted with Dostoevskii, but the enquiry is unhesitatingly answered by "a life for a life." Such is the creed of Stepniak's hero, and such was the explanation (if not the justification) of his own terrorist act. Shortly before his death (he was run over by a train in London in 1895) he wrote the following words in a girl's album: "Remain true to yourself and you will never know the pangs of conscience, which are the only real unhappiness [in life]." Stepniak, Brandes assures us, knew nothing of the pangs of conscience.

Stepniak's revolutionists have faith; they believe enthusiastically in Russia, in socialism, and in the social revolution; they are atheists, for atheism is one item of the nihilist program, but they have replaced belief in the old God by belief in

Russia and the mužik. These atheists have not yet become man-gods, they have not yet become aristocratic supermen to whom everything is permissible. They carry on their war like formal belligerents, and are permeated with the conviction that their sacrifice is an act of duty. Environed by an atmosphere of death, these revolutionists regard themselves as victims of the sacrifice, feeling themselves in truth to be already dead. Such a man leaves his young wife without hesitation, but it is to go to his death, for his relationship to women in general and to his wife in particular is very different from that of Ropšin's George. George is a polygamist, a decadent polygamist, but Stepniak's revolutionist is a strict monogamist. We feel that in many cases the relationship between man and wife may have been in conformity with the ideal propounded by Tolstoi in the *Kreutzer Sonata*. Ropšin's George debilitates his nerves in accordance with all the rules of sexual pathology. Characteristic is the manner in which, simply from boredom, he visits the public places where women offer themselves for sale. (Does it not seem likely that Ropšin was familiar with Alphonse Daudet's *Une petite paroisse*, which contains an analysis of a decadent anarchist soul?)

In a word, the revolutionist of earlier days was quite objectively devoted to his party and to the cause of the people; free from subjectivism, devoid of scepticism, his faith rose to the pitch of fanaticism. The latter-day revolutionist is subjectivist, infidel, individualist to the uttermost limit of social isolation, a sceptic through and through. The man of the earlier type was a follower of John Stuart Mill, of the writer who, despite his utilitarianism, demanded the sacrifice of life; in offering up his life to an ideal, such a revolutionary felt himself to be a consecrated victim. The modern revolutionist does not believe in any ideal; he has carried out the thoughts of Feuerbach and Stirner to their logical conclusion; the desecration of all that is holy has culminated in cynicism. He will kill, but his act is a personal one; he feels personally injured by his opponent, the deed must shake him out of his own apathy, and the adversary's death acts on him as a stimulant. The earlier revolutionist had no thought of suicide, but would kill himself unhesitatingly to avoid falling into the hands of the police, or to spite the prison administration. For Ropšin's George, on the other hand, suicide is desirable in

itself, is the means by which an escape can be secured from this dull variety entertainment which is life.

Much more might be said on this topic, but my present aim is merely to display the significance of *The Pale Horse* in relation to the contemporary crisis in revolutionism.

I have little space to devote to Ropšin as artist and man of letters, for the philosophic content of his book has so largely absorbed my attention. His style contrasts with that of the more modern decadents. It is extremely simple; he loves short, staccato sentences, this being in keeping with the diary form. As a whole and in its details the work is skilfully composed. For example, George's relationships with women are indicated at the outset, and the ethical and religious problem as propounded by Dostoevskii is placed in the foreground of the discussion. Ropšin's analysis of nihilism is at the same time an analysis of the Karamazov disease; Ivan Karamazov is Faust and Don Juan rolled into one. Revolutionary technique, which plays a great part in Stepniak's writings, is but cursorily sketched by Ropšin, whose leading interest is in the metaphysics of revolution. We feel that for the author these metaphysical problems have been matters of personal experience, that he has himself lived the Faust-Ivan life.

I must not be taken as implying that in George, Ropšin is merely describing himself and his own experiences. He deliberately distributes his personal experiences among the various characters, among George and his comrades. Dostoevskii employed a similar method. Much in the book is personal experience, but Ropšin is not analysing himself merely, for he considers also the psychology of his associates and of the whole revolutionary movement since the close of the nineties.

In *A Mother's Reminiscences*, S. A. Savinkova tells us that her two sons went to St. Petersburg in 1897 to study at the university. The two young men took part in the demonstration in Khazan Square. They were arrested, and one night the prescribed domiciliary visit was made at their parents' house. The mother hastened to the capital and was able to secure certain mitigations; but again and again the effects of her intervention and of that of influential persons (Lopuhin is mentioned among others) was overborne by the arbitrary powers of the police. The upshot was the ruin of the whole family. The father, a judge in Poland, died insane; the

elder brother was sent to Siberia, and killed himself there ;¹ the younger escaped shortly before the date fixed for his execution. Thus like an avalanche does a terrible destiny develop out of a students' demonstration, thus does the ruthlessness of absolutism force the most peaceable of men into revolutionary opposition, thus does absolutism as it were compel the very sceptic to the hesitating use of the automatic pistol.

I am unable to say how far *A Mother's Reminiscences* contains an accurate record of events, but the book suffices to show how Ropšin's conception of the fourth apocalyptic rider Death, whom Hell followed, was a necessary outcome of the pathological state of revolutionary and absolutist Russia.

The Pale Horse is a notable work both from the literary and philosophical point of view, but progressive criticism was extremely reserved in its attitude, partly perhaps because the writing was published in Struve's review. In 1912, however, a second novel by Ropšin, *The Tale of What was Not*, was published in "Zavěty," the new social revolutionary review. Discussion and polemic concerning Ropšin's writings now became general.

No fresh philosophical contribution is furnished by this second novel, but the philosophy of revolution is exhibited, or it might be better to say experienced by revolutionists, in a different situation. Ropšin describes the mass revolution and the subsequent constitutionalist epoch. The revolutionists bring forward their ideas on the barricades and during the proceedings of the new duma. Ropšin is wholly occupied with his own problem. He makes no attempt to show to what extent the terrorist tactics of the social revolutionaries contributed to bring about the mass rising ; he merely describes how his party was drawn into the general revolt, and how this revolt was crushed by the triumphant reaction. The disaster is accompanied by an internal process of dissolution, for general disillusionment ensues upon the recognition that the party has been led by a provocative agent (Ropšin's Azev passes by the name of Berg), who destroys the central committee and therewith the whole party.

Philosophically, Ropšin restates his dilemma thus. Either it is lawful to kill always, or not at all. Nothing but belief

¹ Kropotkin's brother, in like manner, died by his own hand in Siberia.

in God, in the Christian God, in Christ, is competent to break the sword. Either we must follow Dostoevskii's Smerdjakov-Ivan and say "all things are permissible," or else we must follow Tolstoi and accept his gospel of non-resistance.

Bulgakov's return to Dostoevskii and his criticism of the revolution are far less effective than Ropšin's analysis of terrorist anarchism. On the barricade, Andrei Bolotov (once more the name of one of Stepniak's heroes is chosen) philosophises à la George after the death of the superintendent of police: "Look here, Sergii, I can't make it out. . . . They shoot us down, hang us, exterminate us. We in return hang, burn, and strangle. But why, because I have killed Slezkin, should I be regarded as a hero, and why should he be regarded as a contemptible wretch and a good for nothing because he hangs me? That's all humbug. Either one should not kill, and in that case both Slezkin and I are breaking the higher law; or else killing is permissible, and then we cannot say that one of us is a hero and the other a contemptible wretch, for we are both simple human beings who happen to be at enmity. Now answer me this. Do you admit that this Slezkin whom we have killed, hunted us from conviction, and not simply to make money out of it? Do you admit that he was not self-seeking, but did what he did for the sake of the people, holding (erroneously, of course) that it was his duty to fight us? Do you admit these things? It may well be that among a hundred or a thousand Slezkins, one at least is such a man as I suggest. In such a case, what is the difference between Slezkin and me? In my view, either we may always kill, or we may never kill. Does this mean that we may not, and yet we must? Where shall we find the law? In the party program, in Marx, in Engels, or in Kant? To say this is nonsense—for neither Marx, nor Engels, nor Kant ever killed anyone. They never killed, do you hear me, never. Thus they do not know, cannot know, what you and I and Volodja know. Whatever they may have written, it remains hidden from them whether we may kill or may not kill. But I know, with an absolute conviction, that a Slezkin ought not to be killed, whatever the circumstances, whatever I may be myself, and whatever I may think of him."

Noteworthy is Ropšin's analysis of expropriation. The revolutionary idealist, who confiscates state funds on behalf of the revolution, passes, resist as he may, beneath the sway

of the bandit Muha, and has in the end to admit that between himself and Muha there is no essential difference. "The next thing after God is money," is held valid also by provocative agents, of whom two types are described by Ropšin. Dr. Berg, the leader, sells himself to the police because he has a taste for luxury. The young Nietzschean, on the other hand, seeks "protection," ostensibly in order to serve the party, a similar attempt having previously been made by the Narodnaja Volja; moreover there is at work in his mind a complex of "emotions" and stimuli. Of course the rascal, although he continually has Nietzsche upon his tongue, and is always quoting Zarathustra, is likewise in pursuit of money as the source of agreeable "emotions." The sailor who has recently joined the party, a man who has survived the disgrace of Tsushima, brother of the leader Andrei who is eventually executed, learns the spy's secret, and insists that he shall either kill the superintendent of police or be killed himself.

The details are powerful. The naval officer joins the party to continue the fight for Russia and honour; he is no philosopher, or analyst, and his simple formula is that of Stepniak, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Alexander has no decisions to make, for he lacks experience, and has not the whole revolutionary movement under his eyes. The youngest brother (*Three Brothers* is the sub-title of the book) with boyish enthusiasm, hastens from school to the barricade, and is shot on the way thither. But Andrei is familiar, not only with Nietzsche, but with the whole literature of the revolution, and aims at having a philosophy of revolution.

Ropšin shows us how the revolutionists do their deeds hesitatingly and in defiance of inward resistance. He shows us once more how suicide is esteemed the last resort. All these things we have learned from *The Pale Horse*. But *The Tale of What was Not* is a work of wider scope.

§ 185.

THE publication of Ropšin's second novel and the simultaneous appearance of the second edition of *The Pale Horse* put an end to the irresolution of the critics, whether of his own party or of the opposing camps. So unexpected, so incredible, seemed such a philosophy of revolution as the work of a social revolutionary, that people had been slow to

realise the full significance of the ideas expressed in *The Pale Horse*. In a letter to the party review, Ropšin now defended himself against the reproach implied by his literary and philosophical comrades' silence concerning his first book. That work, he said, was merely an attempt to solve a moral problem and was not intended to deal with tactical questions; the figures that moved through its pages were purely imaginative creations and were not descriptions of any definite persons.

Shortly afterwards, in November 1912, the same review published a letter signed by twenty-two of its contributors, a protest against *The Tale of What was Not*. The novel was stigmatised as a false and biased description of the revolutionary movement, the author's outlook was declared utterly alien to the movement, and it was contended that his work ought never to have been issued by "Zavěty."

The editors of that periodical rejoined that doubtless there was good ground to complain of the accuracy of Ropšin's delineations, but that the columns of the review were open for the presentation of the other side of the case. They protested against any attempt to expel Ropšin from the party.

Simultaneously with the before-mentioned protest appeared a review of *The Pale Horse* from the pen of Černov; and a little later, in February 1913, Plehanov joined in the discussion. To us, of course, social revolutionary and social democratic criticism of Ropšin's philosophy of revolution is of especial interest and importance.

Černov, with whose "dynamic" philosophy and ethics we have already become acquainted, is found, on close examination, to have nothing new to say about Ropšin's book. Ethical maximalism, he tells us, insists that violence shall be done to no man; a deduction from this, continues Černov, is Tolstoi's doctrine of non-resistance. But ethical minimalism refutes Tolstoi's theory, for the maximum must be realised step by step (see above, p. 376).

This amounts to very little, and contributes absolutely nothing to the solution of the problem or of the doubts expressed by Ropšin. That author's question is perfectly definite. Have I the right to kill anyone, be his position high or low, who represents the authoritative order of the existing state? May I do this on my own initiative, or in pursuance of a party decree? In the second novel we are shown very clearly that Ropšin's terrorist longs to sacrifice

himself. But he realises that in addition to sacrificing himself he has to kill others, and he enquires whether his voluntary sacrifice of himself gives him the right to rule Russia. Such a right cannot be founded on machine guns, any more than it can be founded on the Holy Mass, or on loyalty to the autocracy.

Bēlinskii's and Herzen's answer to Černov would have run as follows: "Before the moral maximum can be realised, the times of the moral minimum must be fulfilled." Bēlinskii, and subsequently Herzen, protested vigorously against the notion that the ideal, that free resolve, can be made dependent upon the time and upon historical facts. Besides, how is the moral maximum to be realised? For each individual the question takes the definite form, May I kill? If the moral maximum signifies a condition characterised by the non-existence of coercion, will not its realisation be more speedily effected if individuals should decide from the first to abstain from the use of force?

In any case, Ropšin challenges Stepniak's justification of terrorism by an appeal to the law of retaliation. The device, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, seems to him to smack too much of the Old Testament, and to be manifestly unjust.

Other members of the Social Revolutionary Party besides Ropšin were inclined, especially after the Azev disclosures, to doubt the utility, not merely of terrorism, but of the whole method of party organisation, and in particular of the rigid system of aristocratic centralisation. The committee appointed to investigate the Azev affair reported that provocative methods had not made their appearance by chance, for the party constitution fitted it to be the blind tool of an individual. In the party periodicals, increasing expression was given to the view that terrorist methods were unsound.

Černov's "moral minimalism" is not merely vague and obscure, but even from the purely utilitarian outlook it fails to throw light upon the problem of terrorism and revolution.

Plehanov's critique is no less inadequate. First of all, adroitly enough, Plehanov heaps coals of fire upon Ropšin's head and upon the heads of that writer's adversaries (social democrats among the number) by defending Ropšin against the charge of having no independent style. Ropšin had been accused of being a mere imitator, of aping Merežkovskii in

his first novel, and Tolstoi (especially *War and Peace*) in his second. Some critics had gone so far as to speak of flat plagiarism.¹ It seems to me that Ropšin's critics were attempting in this way to evade the discussion of the main problem, and Plehanov would appear to hold the same view; yet he, too, evades the issue, sheltering like Černov behind the screen of objective history. But Plehanov has the advantage over Černov in that his program entitles him to appeal to objective historicism.

Plehanov, however, makes one concession to ethics. He admits that "the need to provide an ethical justification for the struggle is no light matter." Ropšin's problem, as stated in the alternative that either we are always justified in killing or else are never justified—this, says Plehanov, "is indubitably a most serious question." But he goes on to show us how Ropšin's doubts, or those of his hero, originated. Ropšin strayed into the paths of subjectivism, instead of keeping along the straight road of historical objectivism. But subjectivism, as Plehanov and his congeners are never weary of telling us, leads to scepticism; and subjectivism has made of Ropšin a revolutionary Hamlet.

Plehanov therefore refers Ropšin to Hegel and to his "algebra of revolution." Hegel had shown how the historical process had evoked struggle in society and had prescribed the functions of that struggle. On one side is the divine right of the existing order; on the other is the equally divine right of the individual consciousness and of subjective freedom, which rises in revolt against the antiquated objective norms. Hence the conflict, a tragedy wherein the best men of the day often perish. "But though men perish in this tragedy, no one is to blame. As Hegel says, those on each side are right in their own eyes."

With this "algebra of revolution," with such phraseology, Plehanov expects to uproot and to abolish Ropšin's Hamletism! It is not enough that Ropšin's heroes should be willing to

¹ In the text an account has been given of Ropšin's chief philosophic predecessors. Certain supplementary details may be appended here. The saying that a man must lay down more than his life, that he must lay down his soul, is to be found in almost the identical words in Arcybašev's *Sevyrev the Worker*. I am not sure which of the two books was published first, and whether we have to do with borrowing or parallelism. (The *Pale Horse* was published in January 1909; *Sevyrev the Worker* was likewise issued in 1909 as the third volume of a collection entitled *Zemlja*.)

sacrifice themselves, should be ready to die ; what they need is a more accurate understanding of the historical process ! It would be impossible to give a plainer demonstration of the futility of historism, to show more clearly how fond the exponents of that doctrine are of playing hide and seek.

As exemplar of the subjective struggle against the objective norms, Plehanov adduces Socrates, and he tells us that the struggle between subjectivism and objectivism is waged in the field of science. But assuredly a very moderate " understanding of the historical process " suffices to convince us from a study of this very example that Socrates and Ropšin's George have nothing whatever in common.¹ Both, certainly, are in revolt against the traditional environment, but whereas Socrates deliberately accepts the poisoned draught handed him by the representatives of coercive authority, George kills certain men even while he doubts whether they are in fact his oppressors. In the *Apology*, Plato demonstrated the innocence of Socrates and the guilt of his adversaries. Ropšin, in his novels, displays to us the doubts he has come to entertain regarding terrorist methods. History cannot help us, nor yet Hegel, who tells us both sides are in the right. " Is it right for me to kill a man ? "—there is the simple question, and what any historian or philosopher of history may have written concerning the historical process as an objectively given whole, is utterly irrelevant. What is the " historical process ? " Is there any such process, over and above the individual consciousness of particular individuals, who continually, and amid varying conditions, have severally to face the ethical problems of life ! Ropšin, we are told, has not a sufficient understanding of the historical process. Perhaps not ! Perhaps not ! But does the historical process, as Plehanov contends, determine the functions of the social struggle ; and if so, how ? Characteristic of the superficiality of historism and its objectivist amorality is the continued evasion of the question of personal decision, of personal responsibility for action, for action in general, and not merely for

¹ If Plehanov wished to turn to Hegel for a contribution to the " algebra of revolution " (the reader will recall that the phrase was used by Herzen), he should have given a philosophico-historical account of the relationships between the revolution and the enlightenment. But it is true that the Hegelian enlightenment (philosophy as mainspring of the French revolution, the differences between the Catholic and the Protestant peoples in the revolution) does not harmonise well with historical materialism.

terrorist and other revolutionary deeds. Let Plehanov tell us, what history, what the study of history, can do to meet the difficulty of Ropšin's George, to answer the question whether, here and now, the specific George is right to kill the specific governor. How can the "historical process" give any help; and what is this "historical process"?

The importance of Ropšin's revolutionary scepticism is unaffected by the criticism to which his writings have been subjected. Ropšin, as compared with his predecessors, effected a deeper sounding of the problem of revolution, and touched the ethical bottom of the matter. Moreover, he threw a clear light on the purely utilitarian valuation of revolution, which occupies much space in these discussions. In addition, Ropšin's personal authority as a social revolutionary leader gives his philosophy of revolution the requisite practical and political outlook.

For the Social Revolutionary Party, above all, the publication of Ropšin's works denotes the existence of a great crisis. If we take further into account the changes made in the social program of the narodničestvo, we are justified in saying that in the Social Revolutionary Party, Russian revolutionism has come to a parting of the ways. Ropšin himself hesitates at this parting of the ways, and herein lies the tragedy of his situation, that while he recognises the fallacies of terrorism he cannot make up his mind to abandon the method. He knows that the maxim "everything is permissible" is false and wrong; he is forced to admit that he has no right to kill. Yet he kills, knowing that he does wrong, for, "One must have courage enough to say, This is wrong, cruel, and terrible; but it is inevitable."

¹ Whilst this work was in the press, there was brought to my notice a critique of Ropšin's second novel from the pen of the before-mentioned Ivanov-Razumnik, the historian of literature. He sees plainly enough that Plehanov's historicism is superficial, but he succumbs to the same historicism, although (in opposition to Marxism) he professes subjectivism. Ivanov-Razumnik does not recognise any ethical imperative; there are, for him, no universally valid ethical norms. But in his view there does exist what he terms a "psychological norm." To quote his own words: "This psychological norm grows with the growth of mankind. We cannot kill our personal enemies right and left, for the same reason that we cannot practise cannibalism. We are restrained, not by logical reasons (which are non-existent), nor yet by any ethical norm, but by *direct sentiment*. Neither logic nor ethic is determinative, but simply the psychology of men and of mankind." We remember that Pisarev used a similar argument. But whereas Pisarev regarded the disinclination to kill as a matter of individual taste, Ivanov-Razumnik refers it to "growth," that is, to the historical evolution of men and of mankind.



PART THREE
(A Summary)

**DEMOCRACY VERSUS THEOCRACY;
THE PROBLEM OF REVOLUTION**



CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

§ 186.

IN this summary I propose to discuss the chief problems, to formulate the leading ideas, suggested by a survey of the material that has been placed before the reader. I have endeavoured to furnish as many facts as possible, and in the first instance to allow the facts to speak for themselves. We may now attempt to grasp the significance of these facts for a philosophical explanation of Russia.

Caadaev, as the first philosopher of history, was placed in the forefront of the thinkers of his school. The historico-philosophical interest dominates his writings in a manner which differentiates him clearly as a theorist from the practical politicians who preceded him, from such men as Pestel, Speranskii, etc. Russian philosophy of history developed by a natural evolution out of political aspirations, and its scientific constitution is connected with the development of the philosophy of history in Europe. Due attention has been paid to the fact that scientific historiography and the philosophy of history were eighteenth-century developments associated with the great revolution (§§ 39 and 40). In like manner, Russian philosophy of history originated after the decabrist rising, and was organically connected with the whole revolutionary movement (§ 46). The general sub-title of this summary, "The Problem of Revolution," has not been chosen haphazard, for this is preeminently the Russian problem.

Russian thought, Russian philosophy, does not manifest itself solely as philosophy of history, for it is likewise very intimately concerned with the religious problem. It is not thereby distinguished from European philosophy. Opposition

to ecclesiastical theology has transformed modern philosophy into the philosophy of religion (§§ 41 and 41A).

Thus the general course of evolution (alike in Russia and in Europe) justifies our choice of these associated developments of the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion to throw light upon the study of Russia. But it is necessary for me to anticipate the objections, that I have failed to give a complete account of the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion, and that for the proper understanding of Russia we must draw upon a knowledge of philosophy in its widest ramifications.

It is true that I have ignored many of the representatives of professorial philosophy, many exponents of philosophy at the seminaries, and other philosophical writers. But those who take the trouble to examine sketches of the history of Russian philosophy will find that, while many noted Russian names are not to be found in the present work, on the whole my choice of representative thinkers will appear justified. And that is the real question—whether the thinkers I have selected do truly characterise Russia.¹ My own opinion is that the substance of their doctrines and the historical succession of the writers I have selected as representative, combine to justify my choice.

It is not fortuitous that not one of these men ever secured a professorial position at a state university, and the fact is extremely characteristic of Russia. (Solov'ev fruitlessly endeavoured to obtain a professorship, as Kirěevskii had done before him.) Moreover, in all lands where freedom is unknown, the official representatives of science, and above all of philosophy, are on the whole conservatives and supporters of the government, especially in those domains which are closely connected with politics by direct or indirect ties. Science and philosophy are not identical with official science and philosophy, with the teachers appointed by government, or with the teaching caste to which these belong. It suffices, in this connection, to become acquainted with the ideas of Pobėdonoscev (who was a professor) and with

¹ For those who do not read Russian, practically the only survey of Russian philosophy hitherto available has been the section on Russia contributed by Kolubovskii to Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des XIX Jahrhunderts*, and this is merely bibliographical. Of Russian works I have alluded in § 38 to Radlov's sketch. I may also mention Grusenbergs, *Skizzen der gegenwärtigen russischen Philosophie*, 1911.

those of the other conservative thinkers whose views I have summarised.¹

An account of the views of some of the leading economists, sociologists, and historians, would be both interesting and instructive. But the writers chosen suffice for our purpose, all the more seeing that in the studies of which the present work is the first instalment the author proposes to give a sociological analysis of the work of Dostoevskii and of modern Russian literature from Puškin onwards.

No stress has been laid upon the so-called formal (i.e. methodological) problems considered by professional philosophers, though these have not been entirely ignored.

§ 187.

THE account of the character of Russian philosophy given in § 38 has been confirmed by the detailed treatment of the ideas of representative Russian thinkers. One conclusion emerges with especial force, and it is that Russian philosophical thought lacks epistemological foundation. As Radlov puts it, the leading Russian thinkers manifest no interest in epistemological problems; they are concerned with social and political questions, with the questions of the day; Russian philosophy has a markedly practical character, and it is chiefly devoted to the study of ethical problems.

Politics is based upon morality, it is the function of politics to elucidate and to realise ethical principles on behalf of and in the social whole; but morality is associated with religion and the church. There is, consequently, no contradiction involved in the two assertions I have made, that Russian philosophy is predominantly the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion, and that Russian philosophy is preeminently practical and ethical.

Ethics, ethical principles, must naturally be based upon a sound theory of cognition. If, therefore, we say that Russian philosophy has not adequately examined its epistemological groundworks, this implies that Russian ethical thought exhibits similar defects.

The lack of a sound theory of cognition in Russia is pecu-

¹ In Russia, prior to 1905, at the seminaries—Pobédonoscev notwithstanding—philosophy was in a sense freer than at the universities. At the former it was not so markedly subject to the direct pressure of the government.

liarily associated with the meagre influence that has been exercised in that country by the writings of Kant. It is true that the Russians, after becoming acquainted with the French philosophy of the enlightenment, turned therefrom speedily and characteristically to German philosophy. When this happened, however, Schelling, Hegel, and Feuerbach were their teachers, rather than Kant; to Fichte, again, they paid little attention, whereas the influence of Schopenhauer was considerable. Auguste Comte and his positivism cooperated with Hegel and Feuerbach; positivism in its various forms (Marxism was one of them) held the field.

I am not contending that Kant remained utterly unknown. We have learned that in the ethical sphere Solov'ev and Lavrov were Kantians. Tolstoi, too, in great measure adopted the Kantian ethic. But there was little understanding of Kant's theory of cognition, of his critique of pure reason. Recently, however, the so-called neokantianism has wielded considerable influence in Russia, so that of late the epistemological problem has received more adequate consideration on Kantian lines.¹

§ 188.

THE world-wide importance of Kant depends upon the Kantian criticism. Epistemologically considered, criticism as a philosophical doctrine signifies critical and cognitive reflection of a sceptical character, as opposed to the blind faith that has hitherto prevailed. Criticism is the opposition of philosophy to theology, opposition based on grounds of principle. Regarded, finally, from the outlook of universal history, Kant, as opponent alike of theology and of the scepticism of Hume, signifies that with the coming of Kant mankind is ripening to an age of reflection, and that men are beginning to abandon the myths that have hitherto dominated

¹ The history of Kantian thought in Russia is exceedingly interesting. Karamzin was one of the earliest admirers of Kant. Opponents of the Königsberg philosopher soon took the field; in 1807 Osipovskii of Kharkov criticised Kant's doctrine of space and time. Kant's fundamental ethical principles, on the other hand, secured acceptance; and Kunicyn, in St. Petersburg, based natural law upon Kant. Jurkevič opposed Kant, whilst Kavelin took Kant as guide in ethical matters. The most notable works on Kant containing critical discussions of the theory of cognition are those of Karinskii, professor at the seminary in St. Petersburg. More recently, A. I. Vvedenskii and Losskii have written on the Critique of Pure Reason; these writers' books have been translated into German.

their minds, to abandon mythology and therewith theology (which is a further development of mythology). Consequently modern philosophy since Kant has been predominantly philosophy of history and philosophy of religion; the modern man has begun to consider the course of his own development cognitively and critically. Kant provides the epistemological basis of the antitheological enlightenment, and his successors devote themselves to the analysis of mythology and theology. This, from the standpoint of universal history, is the significance of the closer study of myths initiated by Vico, and continued by Hume, Comte, Feuerbach, Spencer, and our immediate contemporaries. The theologians endeavour to maintain theology against the onslaughts of philosophy; philosophers incline to forget the profound mental labours undertaken by modern theologians to defend their doctrines and methods against philosophy, they tend to ignore the literature of apologetics.

I must again refer the reader to §§ 41 and 41A. Our aim here is to deduce the consequences to Russian thought of the facts and ideas detailed in those sections.

The Russians failed to accept Kant because they were and still are more inclined towards mythology than the Europeans. Under European influence, Russians could be induced to negate myth, to negate theology, but they could not be induced to criticise myth and theology. Russian thought is negative, but not critical; Russian philosophy is negation without criticism.

This explains why Russian negation remains believing negation. The educated Russian abandons the faith of his childhood, but promptly accepts another faith—he believes in Feuerbach, in Vogt, in Darwin, in materialism and atheism. We have seen how Bēlinskii, Herzen, and their successors struggled to escape from scepticism to faith. In the case of all these writers I have had occasion to insist upon their lack of criticism. I showed, for example, how Lavrov declined from Kant to Bruno Bauer.

Extremely characteristic is the unbridged transition from the old faith to the new. The mental development of Bēlinskii offers a classical example. We see in him what negation is without criticism, without epistemological criticism.

This longing for faith as an escape from scepticism is no mere search for a religious belief. Other things will do in

default of religion, but the Russian must always have something to believe in. It may be the railway (Bělsinskii); it may be the frog (Bazarov, the nihilist); it may be Byzantinism (Leont'ev); and so on. Leont'ev actually forces himself away from scepticism, positively talks himself into belief.

Russian thought further displays its tendency towards myth in this respect, that down to to-day in Russia far more than in Europe, poets are the true educators of the people. Puškin, Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoevskii, Tolstoi, Čehov, Gor'kii—these are the thinkers of Russia. It is the thinker as poet, not the thinker as man of science, to whom Russia listens. Now the poet stands nearer to myth than does the philosopher.

Whilst Russia, therefore, has numerous literary critics, the country knows little of epistemological criticism. And when, in Russia, the problem of criticism is philosophically considered, the consideration is confined, characteristically enough, to the ethical aspects of the matter.¹

¹ In exemplification I may refer to Lavrov, a writer much influenced by Kant, and will quote a passage from the fifteenth of the Historical Letters, which is entitled Criticism and Belief: "Will not the personality, if it be devoted to criticism and nothing else, tend ultimately to forfeit the energy indispensable for action? Criticism presupposes uncertainty, vacillation, the spending of time in weighing arguments pro and con. . . . If a political storm break over society and the leaderless masses become engaged in a wrong path, taking friends for foes and foes for friends, and through irresolution throwing away the advantages of power and enthusiasm, is it right for the first citizen who grasps the situation to renounce the opportunity because he critically refrains from drawing conclusions? . . . All this is perfectly true. And yet criticism is something which man must perforce undertake if he is to have a reasonable claim to be considered a fully developed personality. . . . A citizen who has held so completely aloof from the course of public affairs that he is taken by surprise when a mass movement occurs, is no effective factor in the commonwealth. . . . One who studies the motley play of history is thereby trained for the struggle, when the time comes to struggle. He needs criticism, not when the hour for action approaches, but in readiness for action. . . . The severer, the more perspicacious, the colder, and the more comprehensive, his criticism has been, the more powerful and the more ardent will now be his faith. Faith can move mountains, faith and nothing else. . . . It is not enemies that are most dangerous to militant parties; their chief danger arises from those of little faith who stand in their ranks, from those indifferentists who assemble under their banner and often proclaim their watchwords more loudly than the most zealous among the leaders; the people who omit the work of criticism when it is still time to criticise, but who devote themselves to criticism when the time has come for action; those who are irresolute, who stand about doing nothing, or abandon the battle-field, when the actual fighting has begun. . . . Only in a limited sense, therefore, can it be said that there is any opposition between faith and criticism. What a man believes is a thing he no longer subjects to criticism. But this does not mean that what is the object of faith to-day may not have been subjected to criticism yesterday. Indeed, only those beliefs are rational, only those beliefs are enduring, which

Now we can understand why the Russians preferred Schelling and Hegel to Kant and Hume. Schelling, as against Kant, introduced mythology into philosophy; and Hegel, despite his opposition to theology, furthered both theology and mythology by his dialectic with its suspension of the principle of contradiction.

In this connection, too, certain separate doctrinal items brought forward by Russian thinkers acquire meaning and importance. I may refer, for example, to Solov'ev and his commendation of the "fantastic imagination" in poesy, which Kirěevskii had rejected (the fantastic imagination, be it noted, not simple imaginativeness, not the "exact fantasy" of Goethe!). See Vol. I, pp. 245 et seq., Vol. II, pp. 269 and 270.

§ 189.

AS a rule the fundamental problem of the theory of cognition is represented in contrast with rationalism and empiricism. In Russian philosophy, too, we find this contrast sustained, German philosophy in general and Kant in especial being rejected by the Russian defenders of empiricism.

Since Bělinskii, and above all since Herzen, empiricism has been proclaimed as the starting-point of philosophy. Herzen and his successors declare themselves positivists and materialists, but none the less they cling to the rationalistic Hegel. Herzen enters no protest against rationalism; he merely demands positivist disillusionment, which he counterposes to mysticism, romanticism, and illusion (§ 80). It is not on account of rationalism that Herzen joins issue with Granovskii, nor is it rationalism that causes Herzen's opposition to the slavophiles; the divergencies here are the outcome of Herzen's antagonism to religion, theology, and metaphysics.

But it is precisely here that the Russian empiricists lack epistemological criticism. Kant did not counterpose empiricism to rationalism! Kant advanced from the lines established by Plato, but his criticism was ultimately directed, not against empiricism, but against the extravagances of

have been subjected to criticism. Criticism alone can bring firm conviction. None but the man who has attained to firm conviction can have that vigorous faith which is essential to energetic action. In this connection there is no essential contrast between faith and criticism, but merely a temporal succession. Criticism and faith are two different phases in the development of an idea. Criticism is the preparation for action; faith is the immediate cause of action."

Platonism. Plato was the first philosopher to declare that myth has a place in philosophy; Hume's scepticism and Kant's criticism were launched against myth and mysticism.

Their church made Platonists of the Russians; Greco-Russian Orthodoxy cherished the Platonic mythos; the slavophiles turned naturally to Joannes Damascenus and to Plato. In this matter Solov'ev followed the slavophiles and his church, but Solov'ev had understood Kant, hence his inward conflict representing the opposition between Kant and Plato (§ 144). Kant inclined rather to the school of Aristotle, whose logic was abhorred by the slavophiles. Kant opposed the blind acceptance whether of empiricism or of rationalism, but the Russians failed to grasp this, and hence their unorganised vacillation between Platonism and nihilism. Solov'ev turned from Kant to Plato; the empiricists, turning their backs on Plato, lapsed into uncritical positivism and materialism.

§ 190.

KANT'S criticism as epistemological reflection concerning the range and limits of cognition, was rejected by Russian thinkers, who regarded it as a form of subjectivism. Kant's epistemological activism, his explanation of the process of cognition as an active procedure on the part of the understanding and as an auto-procreation of concepts (§ 44), was not comprehensible to the positivist Russians. The teaching of his church has accustomed the Russian to accept a ready-made and objectively given revelation; and in epistemology, therefore, he remains an extreme objectivist long after he has ceased to accept the data of revelation. The Russian nihilists and empiricists, the Russian materialists and positivists, remain epistemological objectivists. In like manner they remain objectivists vis-à-vis the chosen European authorities—for they are habituated to objective authority.

The Russians classed Kant with Fichte and Stirner. Subjectivism, conceived by them in its extremest manifestation, was resisted by them as solipsism; Bëlsinskii fought Stirner just as he fought Homjakov; Solov'ev discerned subjectivism, not only in rationalism, but also in sensualism, and in his dread of subjectivism sought refuge in myth and mysticism. Everywhere we find the same lack of criticism,

the same failure to effect a careful estimate of the degree of subjectivism.

Subjectivism is regarded rather from the ethical than from the epistemological outlook. In this sense and with this scope, the "subjective method" was recommended by Lavrov and Mihailovskii; but subjectivism was looked upon chiefly as the doctrine of Stirner, and was rejected as egoism. It is because they use this ethical standard of measurement that the Russian Marxists (Plehanov, for instance) conceive subjectivism as a manifestation of scepticism and decadence, and combat it as unrevolutionary.

§ 191.

BĚLINSKII vigorously opposed extreme subjectivism. We have learned that Bělinskii inured himself against Fichte's solipsism by having recourse to Hegel's reality, but have seen that Russian reality brought him back to moderate subjectivism. He looked upon extreme subjectivism as egoism and narrowness, leading to misconduct and crime; on the other hand he regarded extreme objectivism as a form of superstition.

This analysis of extreme objectivism and extreme subjectivism possesses philosophical importance. Bělinskii accurately appraised the psychology of the extreme objectivist who, succumbing to a new mythology, naïvely and uncritically accepts the outer world as a fact and thus becomes its sport. No less accurately did he appraise the danger of extreme subjectivism, of solipsism, maintaining the ethical importance of our recognition of the reality of our fellow-men, of society and history, and of the godhead.

Jesus showed long ago that all thought and all action centres round the problem, how man conceives his relationship to his fellow-men and to God; and while Jesus tells us to love God and to love our neighbour, John amplifies the command in the words, "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Epistemologically, metaphysically, and ethically, the problem of objectivism and subjectivism is the fundamental problem of all philosophy, Russian philosophy not excepted. The Russians, being acquainted with German idealism, felt

very strongly that solipsism involved ethical and social isolation, and therefore rejected the doctrine. Bakunin was the first writer to proclaim that suicide was the logical outcome of this solipsistic isolation; Bëlinskii and Herzen, taking a wider view, considered that solipsism culminated in crime and in murder, but these writers understood crime and murder to be manifestations of revolution. Herzen, too, coquetted with the Byronic view of these matters. Solov'ev accepted Dostoevskii's formula, in accordance with which murder and suicide issue from solipsism. Ropšin, too, agreed here with Dostoevskii. Mihailovskii associated the Faust problem with subjectivism, but considered that the decadent social order of capitalism was the nursery of Faust natures. From Plehanov and the Marxists we have a similar formulation of the problem, these writers passing to the other, the objectivist, extreme, and adopting solomnism.

A detailed consideration of the whole problem will find a more suitable place in the study of Dostoevskii, who devoted much attention to the matter. All that it is necessary to add here is that the Russians, while rejecting subjectivism, insist the more vigorously on the need for individualism. Individuality and its rights are defended against state and church, and in the sociological sphere the attempt is made to grasp the relationship of the individual to the nation. But the epistemological difficulties of the problem are not adequately faced (cf. § 172).

§ 192.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL weakness is, as already indicated, especially noticeable in the ethical domain, in the treatment of the fundamental problems of ethics. Of peculiar importance is the problem, upon what foundation the moral imperative is to be based.

In this respect two tendencies are manifested in Russian thought. Solov'ev holds firmly to the Kantian ethic, believing that the moral problem has been solved once and for all by Kant and his categorical imperative. Lavrov is likewise influenced in ethical matters by Kant, but Lavrov does not ponder the epistemological side so deeply as does Solov'ev.

In ethics as well as in other departments of philosophy, most Russian thinkers have been consistent empiricists, and

have therefore abhorred Kant and his a priorist imperative. Yet these very empiricists, Černyševskii, Lavrov, Mihailovskii, and Kropotkin, whose main demand in ethics is that there should be no imperative obligation, do in practice arrive at an imperative. For Černyševskii, the ethical "scientific" imperative, the imperative firmly grounded upon scientific considerations, is equally valid in the other worlds of stellar space. Mihailovskii appeals to conscience and the sense of honour; he does not consider that consequences can be the measure of ethical value, and the proclamation "To the Younger Generation" is as scornful of utilitarian economics as if it had been written by the slavophiles or by Carlyle. It is precisely these materialistic utilitarians and hedonists à la Černyševskii who cling to absolute ethical rules. Preaching egoism, laughing at the idea of self-sacrifice, they demand unconditional self-surrender on behalf of Russia. "Die for the mir," exclaims Černyševskii, that is, die for the peasant, die for the people. Even to the nihilists, ethics is the chief of the sciences, and in this respect the nihilists are followed by the Russian socialists, the narodniki, the social revolutionaries, the very anarchists.

De facto, therefore, these Russian thinkers are followers of Kant; or (if you will) are followers of Hume, who endeavoured to protect his ethics against his own scepticism. Whilst Kant with his imperative constructed a so-called formal ethic, Hume established an ethic which, though materialist, was none the less absolute.

In this matter Russian philosophy is wholly at one with German idealist philosophy, for both are predominantly moral outlooks on the world. Russia adopts the humanitarian ideal of the eighteenth century, preaches it, and endeavours to realise it in practice.

Hence arises the vigorous demand for a unified philosophical outlook, hence the demand that theory and practice shall be harmonised. "Word and deed" becomes the device, at least the device of the younger generation, of the "children" as contrasted with the "fathers."

It need not surprise us that voices were heard proclaiming deeds rather than words (Bakunin), and representing theory as inferior to practice (Pisarev). For the newest lovers or friends of practice, voluntarism serves as an epistemological pretext.

Those of the younger generation understand by "practice," political practice, or, more definitely, revolutionary practice. Hence arises the problem, how an ethical foundation is to be supplied for revolutionary action.

This practical ethical philosophy imposes upon the Russian philosophers of history the important problem of historicism, by which I understand the contention that socio-political demands have an exclusively historical basis. Historicism is a widely prevalent theory, as is natural in view of the extensive development of the historic sense since the eighteenth century. We have discussed evolutionism from this aspect (§ 39).

The Russians, following Comte, eagerly accepted positivist historicism, being impelled in the same direction by Hegel and Feuerbach. Marxism is historicism in an extreme form, and is therefore amoral *ex hypothesi*.

Philosophico-historical contemplation involves, therefore, the consideration of the fundamental problem of history. Has history a meaning, and what is the relationship of individual aspiration and effort to the evolution of the social whole? Apart from the temporary renunciation by Herzen of the teleological conception of history, Russian philosophers of history have been inclined to recognise that evolution, if it has not followed a plan, has at least proceeded in accordance with law; most of them, too, recognise logic (Bakunin) and ethics. Bëlinkii protests against the blind fatality of time and fact, and defends the notion of personal freedom; Grigor'ev demurs to the subordination of the individual mind to the historical process of evolution; Bakunin demands a new morality; Lavrov and Mihailovskii attempt to give a "subjective" formula of progress; Solov'ev contrasts the prophetic founders of the future with the men of hard fact; the social revolutionaries and the anarchists reject Marxist historicism in their endeavours to bring about socialism and to effect a revolution. In all cases alike, the problem is this: How far can pursuit of a remote external end (an ultimate end) replace the need for a personal ethical decision—or at least in conjunction with such an ethical judgment be a co-determinant of action? I have again and again enunciated my own view of the answer to this question, and that view is further indicated by the fact that, in this summary, I am not devoting an independent section to the philosophy of history.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

I

§ 193.

Russian philosophy, like western philosophy, aims at a solution of the religious problem in general. But, in addition, the ecclesiastico-religious problem demands solution, and to-day this matter is the more important. The Russians, however, follow the western example here also, for they are fonder of discussing the general problem of religion, and under the prevailing conditions of censorship this is the safer course. The earlier thinkers, beginning with Čadaev and the slavophiles, associated the philosophy of religion with the comparative study of creeds, for the comparison of Russia with Europe renders the association essential. In this matter Solov'ev followed the slavophiles.

In a survey of Russian philosophy of religion, the following points are of especial interest.

1. Unanimously, Russian writers conceive religion as belief, as faith. Faith is contrasted with knowledge, with cognition. Solov'ev considers religious faith to be a special instance of belief. (See his theory of the cognition of objects.)

In this sense, religious belief is characterised by its objects. Theism, in particular, is regarded as the preeminent type of religious belief; atheism, of unbelief. The general problem of transcendence (spiritualism versus materialism) emerges in this connection.

Neither psychologically nor epistemologically has the problem of religion been adequately analysed by the Russians. Above all, they have failed to grasp the consequences of criticism for the religious problem, and it must be admitted that

in this matter a bad example was set them by western philosophers, not excepting Kant himself. For Kant declared that he had formulated his criticism in the desire to find his way back to faith. This was one of the numerous examples of Kant's inconsistency. As we have seen, Lavrov followed the bad example when he attempted to elucidate the relationships between faith and criticism solely on the ethical plane, instead of considering the matter above all in the light of the theory of cognition.

Epistemologically, Goethe is right when he insists, as he does more than once, that no one can return to faith, but only to conviction. His meaning is that faith (credulity) constitutes the essence of myth. That which theologians ever extol and demand as child-like faith is nothing but the blind belief, the confident credulity, of the uncritical human being. One who has understood Hume's scepticism and Kant's criticism can no longer "believe"; he must *know*, must seek and find conviction.

Once for all, Hume and Kant destroyed the myths upon which childlike faith can alone be established, and all attempts to reconcile scientific philosophy with theology have, since their day been of necessity fallacious and fugitive. This applies equally to the so-called liberal and mediatorial theology, and to the attempts made by those modern seekers after God who in the end effect nothing but a compromise with the church. In this connection the most recent Russian philosophy is perhaps less dangerous than the corresponding philosophy of the west, for in Russia such Jesuitism is less extensively buttressed by theological and philosophical learning.

Criticism has rendered impossible the cry, "Retrace your steps!" The only way to formulate the problem is to ask, how religion is possible for the critical and scientific thinker, and if possible, what religion (cf. § 41 A).

2. Mythical thought conceives religion in purely objectivist fashion, having faith in an alleged revelation. Russian philosophy is still so mythical and objectivist that even the opponents of ecclesiastical religion are nothing but objectivists. Tolstoi is typical in this respect. Despite his rationalism, he passively accepts the New Testament as an absolute revelation, his criticism of the record being confined to the crudest and most naive of the myths it contains. Such epistemological passivism is eminently characteristic of Russian thought.

3. This objectivism is likewise characteristic of Russian mysticism as direct contemplation of the godhead (Platonism).

By Čaadaev and Solov'ev mysticism is actually identified with religion, and even the adversaries of religion effect the same identification. Mihailovskii and Tolstoi are exceptions here; the former, while rejecting mysticism, refuses to identify it with religion.

4. Russian philosophers of religion do not stress morality as a constituent of religion to the extent that is customary in the west. Tolstoi, influenced by Kant, has gone furthest in this direction. Solov'ev strongly emphasises the moral element of religion (for he, too, is influenced by Kant); but in addition he demands belief in miracle, regarding the dogma of the resurrection as the most important among religious dogmas. Mihailovskii's thought in this matter is also akin to that of Tolstoi, in so far as Mihailovskii regards morality as the essence of religion.

Even the opponents of ecclesiastical religion look upon ritual and ritual mystagogy as the leading elements in religion.

5. Consequently, side by side with ordinary morality a higher religious morality is recognised, asceticism being considered the logical outcome of objectivist transcendentalism and of mysticism. In the ascetic cult, the aristocratic character of ecclesiastical religion finds expression; the cloister and the monk occupy a central position in ecclesiastical religion.

Solov'ev and Tolstoi approve religious asceticism; Leont'ev and Dostoevskii glorify the monk as Christian hero in contradistinction to the heroes of this world.

The adversaries of ecclesiastical religion, on the other hand, attack asceticism. Hence the great importance of utilitarianism (hedonism and eudemonism) in Russian philosophy. The westernisers and the liberals, the nihilists, the socialists, and the anarchists, all espouse utilitarian morality.

6. Religious objectivism and passivism proclaim the church as leading authority. Beginning with Čaadaev and Homjakov, this insistence on the importance of the church continually recurs. Tolstoi is an exception.

The church is a thoroughly aristocratic organisation, being primarily the organisation of the members of the priesthood as mediators on behalf of the laity, the latter being dependent in religious matters. In the Russian church, the aristocratic factor is further strengthened by the circumstance that the

members of the hierarchy are appointed from among the celibate monks, not from among the married secular clergy. In the writings of Solov'ev, no less than in those of Leont'ev, the aristocratic character of priestcraft is conspicuous.

The church is the city of God (the *πόλις θεοῦ* of Origen, the *civitas dei* of Augustine), and as such every social organisation, and in especial the state, must be subordinated to it. In and by itself, and also in association with the state, the church is theocracy (Solov'ev's free theocracy).

For as soon as the church conceives its doctrine and its guidance of life to be absolutely true, and therefore claims infallible authority alike in theoretical and in practical matters, and as soon as men come to believe in this authority and to bow before it, the primacy of the church over the state is the inevitable consequence. In so far as the state adduces ethical arguments for its own existence, in so far as it justifies on moral grounds the necessary existence of the state, an intimate association between state and church must result, for the church regards the moral guidance of society as its peculiar mission.

This intimate relationship is conspicuous in the origin of canon law side by side with the civil law to which the state owes its origin.¹

The church and ecclesiastical religion present themselves as objective, integral, absolute authority; ecclesiastical religion is made to appear the central spiritual force of the individual and of society.

From this outlook we can readily understand why Russian philosophy lays so much stress upon individualism (Mihailovskii's "struggle for individuality"). Equally clear becomes the significance of socialism in general and of social democracy in particular. With the absoluteness of the Marxist doctrine, the social democratic organisation is authoritatively counterposed, not to the state alone, but to the church as well.

For the same reason, Russian anarchism is anti-ecclesiastical and antireligious. This is equally true of liberalism, which upholds nationality as social organisation and authority, against the church and the church's theocratic ideal of nationality.

¹ Rothenbücher's, *Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche*, 1908, contains a discussion on the question whether canon law is really law, and if so, in what sense.

7. The absolute religious authority of the church logically manifests itself as Catholicism. It is implicit in the idea of divine revelation that this revelation should be Catholic, that is to say, should be accepted always, everywhere, and by all. Traditionalism is the essential principle of belief in revelation. Messianism (Čaadaev, the slavophiles, Solov'ev) is part of the very nature of objectivist ecclesiastical religion.

§ 194.

WITH the reforms of Peter there began in Russia the struggle of the rationalist enlightenment against the philosophy and the practice of the church. This struggle and its results form the substance of Russian literature, both philosophical and belletristic.

When we examine the long series of philosophers and writers, we are struck by the fact that independent Russian thought, even when friendly to religion, is hostile to ecclesiastical religion. With Čaadaev begins the phase of absolute negation of the church and its religion. The slavophiles, too, criticise ecclesiastical religion, though somewhat less harshly. This is why Gogol's acceptance of Orthodoxy was so repugnant to his contemporaries, and why Bělinskii gave so lively an expression to his disapproval of Gogol's outlook. Bělinskii himself was averse, not only to ecclesiastical religion, but to religion in general. By way of Bakunin and Herzen we pass to Černyševskii and to nihilism, a doctrine in which anti-religious negation secured its most characteristic form. This negation persists in the doctrines of contemporary Marxists and modern anarchists.

Among the westernisers we find a few thinkers friendly to religion, but on the whole in philosophical matters the westernisers agree with the nihilists. Mihailovskii, the progressive opponent of nihilism, is a noteworthy exception. Solov'ev defends religion, but opposes the church, though his hostility to the church is less marked than that of his great opponent Tolstoi.

Dostoevskii and Solov'ev have converted the successors of the nihilists. Dostoevskii's religious philosophy is definitely antinihilist.

Katkov, Pobėdonoscev, and Tihomirov, outspokenly conservative and reactionary politicians, are unconditional defenders

of religion. Leont'ev, for all that he became a monk, occupies a peculiar position among the reactionary religious philosophers, and the church has certainly no occasion to congratulate herself upon the accession of this apologist.

Thus Russia presents a picture of philosophic and religious disunion. Ecclesiastical religion is opposed by the absolute negation characteristic of nihilism. From its very program, nihilism is not merely empiricism and agnostic positivism, but it is materialism and atheism as well—especial stress being laid upon materialism. Herzen's "great disillusionment" is a consistent renunciation of ecclesiastical religion with its doctrines and its conduct of life; it is an assertion of the epistemological and metaphysical sufficiency of positivist materialism, which sees through the thought-creations of the ego as illusion and fantasy, and therefore looks upon the transient and mortal ego as a thing of no moment. Herzen's disillusionment and Herzen's interpretation of nihilism harmonise perfectly with Stirner's nihilistic iconoclasm. Herzen, like Stirner, deduces the ultimate logical conclusions from the teachings of Feuerbach.

Herzen rightly appraised nihilism as a transitional doctrine. Čadaev had spoken of prepetrine Russia as a blank sheet of paper; the nihilist fought Russia in order to fill the intellectual void with a new content. As Kropotkin expresses it, nihilism is a struggle for individuality.

Saltykov, when his newspaper was suppressed, was utterly overwhelmed by this arbitrary act of authority. He tells us that he suddenly lost the use of his tongue. Awakening one day, he felt that he had gone utterly astray, that he had ceased to exist. Theocratic absolutism in Russia is, in fact, aphasia, is the cessation of thought and the abandonment of individuality.

We can understand why the progressive opponents of ecclesiastical doctrine lay so much stress on individualism, and why Russian socialism is so strongly individualistic. To the progressive Russian, individualism is so important and so dear because it is the converse of Orthodox passivism, of the individualism of the traditional faith of the church. In its radical and embittered negation of theocracy, Russian individualism is apt to pass into anarchism. This is why the opponents of ecclesiastical religion (Lavrov, Mihailovskii, etc.) are such enthusiastic advocates of the idea of progress.

The philosophical and socio-political nature of nihilism has been sufficiently analysed in the preceding pages (§§ 110-114), and we have studied the nihilist declarations of a number of representative thinkers. I may refer, above all, to Herzen; but in succession to Herzen the other writers I have analysed devoted attention to the problem.

As atheism and materialism, nihilism is a complex spiritual and social state.

For all the Christian churches morality forms an integral constituent of religion and of the religious conduct of life. Nihilism, therefore, with its atheism and materialism, with its negation of ecclesiastical morality, has moral and socio-political importance. It is, above all, the practical outcomes of nihilism which have been the subject of lively discussion in Russian philosophy and literature.

Prepetrine Russia had no secular culture, and properly speaking no spiritual culture. For this reason, when European culture made its way into Russia, it at once and necessarily took the form of opposition to what passed for culture in that land. As we have shown, Europeanisation was not effected suddenly, once and for all; but none the less the transition was too abrupt, for the intellectual leadership of the people had hitherto been in the hands of the Russian church, and the church was not only without a philosophy, but without a theology. In Constantinople, in Rome, and even in Germany and England, there had been independent developments of philosophy and theology; for centuries, scholasticism had prepared the ground for scientific and critical thought. There occurred the great spiritual movements of the renaissance and of humanism. In addition, by the reformation and by gradual developments within Protestantism, the way was paved for the coming of the new philosophy and the new science. In Europe, the ideas of Voltaire, Hume, Kant, Comte, Fichte, Hegel, and Feuerbach, were organic links in the evolutionary chain; but the introduction of these ideas into Russia signified a profound spiritual revolution.

Orthodox Russia, in a state of spiritual arrest, was overwhelmed by the flood of French anti-ecclesiastical and anti-religious rationalism. Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Montesquieu, gained a footing in Russia, mainly of course at court and in "society," though some of the works of Voltaire were issued from a village printing press! German influence was

superadded to French, especially that of Hegel and of the radical Hegelian left, that of Feuerbach and Strauss; with Feuerbach came materialism (Vogt, etc.); the positivism of Comte and Mill, and the naturalistic evolutionism of Darwin and Spencer. The Russians, enslaved at home, sought political culture from the liberal and socialist leaders and writers of Europe. Constant, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Proudhon, Owen, and subsequently Lassalle and Marx, furnished the social and political ideals, whilst the ideas of Hegel and Feuerbach were a solvent to Byzantine Orthodoxy. To put the matter in a nutshell, Marxist statist communism was to abolish and replace the medieval agrarian natural economy of theocratic Russia!

Let the reader call to mind Tolstoi's *Confession*, where that writer describes the revolution that took place within his mind when he learned, as a great novelty, that there was no God. In Europe, generations and centuries had prepared the way for this novelty; medieval philosophy and theocratic organisation had been transformed step by step; and none the less Europe was not everywhere prepared for the innovations. But think of theocratic Russia, enter into the mind of the religiously trained Russian, and realise how there came to him, like a bolt from the blue, the message of Voltaire, Diderot, Comte, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Stirner, Vogt, Strauss, and Marx. In Europe as early as the thirteenth century the phrase "de tribus impostoribus" could be fathered upon the emperor; and we know that there were infidel popes. But what must have been the effect of the sudden invasion of unbelief in Russia, a land where the church and its monasteries had hitherto been the highest, and indeed the sole generally recognised, spiritual authority, a land where the state formed the right and left arms of this authority? In England, Mill and Darwin were buried in Westminster Abbey; in Russia, such men as Černyševskii, the adherents of Mill and of Darwin, found their way to the penitentiary or to Siberia!

In Europe, too, liberty was dearly bought by revolutions and reformatations, and even to-day has not everywhere been secured. Such liberty, the outcome of great intellectual struggles and long-enduring mental labour, can already be partially endured in Europe; but in Russia, the influence of European thought, of European mental life, was perforce

revolutionary. Theocracy prohibited and suppressed this thought, this mental life ; but the forbidden fruits of European civilisation were plucked all the more eagerly.

In Russia, therefore, philosophy and science, art and technical progress, were revolutionary instruments ; literature became a social and political leader, and at the same time a "Newgate calendar" ("register of convicts" was Herzen's phrase), a record of the thoughts of exiles and refugees.

The issue of this sudden illumination was the revolution—a mental and political revolution against the dominant theocracy. Negation, pessimism, and nihilism, are the natural consequences of an unbridged transition from Orthodoxy to atheism, materialism, and positivism.

The German has been accustomed for centuries to be left to his own guidance ; the German has passed through the reformation, the renaissance, the humanist movement, and the enlightenment ; the German came to Feuerbach by degrees, through many intermediate stages. This is why the influence of such writers as Schopenhauer, Stirner, and Nietzsche is less devastating in Germany than in Russia. The German has made the acquaintance of other thinkers, he is accustomed to hearing arguments pro and con. But the Russian accepts Feuerbach, Stirner, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Darwin, etc., as isolated and supreme authorities. Hence the negation of theocracy, which implies here the negation of the entire past, and implies therewith the social and political revolution.

In the eighteenth century, doubtless, as previously explained, Voltaire influenced the Russians ; but Voltairism, when compared with Humism and Kantianism, is after all nothing but sceptical lemonade as against the poison which Hume and Kant instil into the veins of medieval faith. If Hume awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber, we may say with equal truth that Kant and German philosophy awakened the Russians from their dogmatic slumber !

Long ere this, Europe had exercised an influence upon Russia ; in the Russian monastery, Peter had opened a window towards Europe ; Voltaire had brought into the country a breath of European fresh air. But Kant and German philosophy shook the Russian monastery and tsarist absolutism to their foundations. Europe had influenced Russia before,

but from the days of Kant onwards the influence was that of the new Europe!*

Every struggle demands its victims, even the struggle of philosophy against theology and theocracy. And the struggle we are now considering is characterised by the indecision which invariably ensues upon the direct contact between an old and a new civilisation. A general process of decomposition sets in, accompanied by abnormal and positively pathological manifestations.

In many instances, radical negation remains mere scepticism. The sceptic lapses into a mood of habitual criticism, but this criticism is itself uncritical, the inner void is again and again filled by the newest ideas and "idealets," but these are again and again discarded. The scepticism ends in a numbing instability, uncertainty, and vagueness. The will becomes enfeebled as well as the reason. The resulting condition is that which Mihailovskii has so thoroughly analysed (and condemned) as the modern Faust-malady. Ropšin shows us that the disease has invaded the camp of the revolutionaries, who prior to this have always preserved faith in the revolution.

Philosophy and theology fight the great fight concerning God. The struggle rages round the question of the revealed God, the main problem being that of revelation and tradition versus experience and science. Russian thinkers have from the religious and moral aspect attempted to sum up this problem as culminating in the weighty and oppressive alternatives of murder or suicide. Acceptance of modern German philo-

* In exemplification of the psychology of the sudden and unbridged revolution in thoughts and feelings, I may quote a writer who is quite unconcerned with philosophical problems, and merely records facts. I refer to Pantelëev, Siberian exile and progressive publisher, who has recently gained considerable reputation as a literator. In his *Reminiscences*, referring to the close of the fifties, he writes: "But now, one fine day, a veritable bomb was hurled at us, in the shape of a lithographed translation of Büchner's *Force and Matter*. We all read it with the utmost enthusiasm, and from every one of us, in a moment, it tore away the last shreds of traditional belief. . . . Notwithstanding the brilliant success of 'Sovremennik,' progressive socio-political ideas had secured comparatively few adherents even among young people; many had adopted them only to abandon them lightly, and even in our day such ideas had to struggle for existence; but the thoughts of Büchner and Feuerbach took the Russian mind by storm, and none of the severities of the subsequent reaction were able to restore to society the naive beliefs of the past."—I quote this passage because Pantelëev, who makes no pretensions to philosophic illumination, gives a frank and unadorned but perfectly accurate picture of the situation.

sophy with its epistemological subjectivism and individualism, the negation of Old Russia, nihilism as atheism, forced these alternatives upon Herzen, Bëlsinskii, and Bakunin. Dostoevskii, above all, devoted his life to the exhaustive consideration of the problem, and for this reason the study of Dostoevskii will lay bare to us the soul of the modern Russian.

II

§ 195.

IN Europe, the term Byzantinism has been used to denote the defects of the Russian church and of Russian ecclesiastical religion; as we have seen, the Russians have themselves adopted the word and have accepted the criticism implied in its use. It suggests excessive formalism, undue clinging to inherited forms and doctrines (cf. Solov'ev's satire upon the Orthodox archeological museum), satisfaction with externals and with materialistic piety (ritual, liturgy, veneration for icons and relics); it suggests a passive demeanour in religious matters in general, coupled with extravagant mysticism (Solov'ev, though himself a mystic, disapproved of Russian mysticism); and suggests, finally, the amalgamation of the church with the state and with nationalism. The slavophiles, despite their friendliness to the church and to religion, here join with Solov'ev in frank criticism.

Protestant theologians of the west, Kattenbusch, Müller, Loofs, and more recently Harnack, take the same view in their comparative judgments of the Orthodox church and of Orthodox ecclesiastical religion—above all in the case of Russia.

The essential characteristic of Russian religion is, in fact, the belief in the other world; for believing Russians, transcendence is no mere philosophical principle, but is actual reality; belief in God and in immortality are truly living faiths. Hence arises the endeavour whilst still in this life to participate in the life to come; hence mysticism, hence addiction to the contemplative life. Russian faith is faith in miracle, faith in thaumaturgy. To Russians, Jesus the God-man, the deity in human form who awakens men from the dead, seems a being close at hand. Transcendence is not conceived spiritually and ethically, but materially;

the soul itself is regarded as but a refined form of matter ; belief in immortality retains the quality of primitive animism, and is a belief in ghosts. Hence the anthropomorphic insistence upon the characteristics of the God-man (this is seen already in Origen, as shown in § 144) ; hence the delight in materialistic ritual and materialistic symbolism. Typical are the purely formalist and materialistic doctrines and customs which find expression in the *raskol* ; and typical, too, is the fact that the state church, despite hesitations and vacillations, has not definitely repudiated and expelled the *raskol* (§ 4). Mysticism is itself materialistic (§ 145).

In practice, living faith in transcendence leads to asceticism. The Russian monk is nothing but an ascetic, a hermit, one who despises the life of this world, whereas Roman Catholic monks have often been attendants on the sick, doctors, teachers, and the like. When Herzen speaks of Christianity as the religion of death, he is thinking chiefly of religion in Russia. Nevertheless, the saying is true also of the Russian monk : *contemptor suaemet ipsius vitae, dominus alienae*.

The passivist demeanour of the Russian is thoroughly consistent ; he blindly accepts the revelation and the practice of the church ; for these derive from the God-man. There can be no progress, no development, for God has revealed in the God-man the highest truths and those that are most important to men. Man can add nothing to these truths, he must simply accept them unquestioningly as a means for moral improvement. Even Augustine considered that, properly speaking, history had come to an end with the appearance of Jesus ; and Solov'ev therefore felt it incumbent on him to seek justificatory reasons for historical development after the days of Christ.

Russian religion and the Russian church are unprogressive on principle. Religious doctrine and religious practice must remain exactly as they were established as early as the third century by the great Greek (Alexandrian) dogmatists.¹

Homjakov was opposed to this "Byzantinism" no less than Solov'ev ; but Leont'ev unreservedly accepted it, and was not unwilling that Russia should remain petrified.

It was natural that the Greeks, philosophically trained,

¹ Some historians consider that the definitive form of Orthodoxy was attained at a date later than that mentioned in the text, but these chronological differences have no bearing on the argument.

should be the founders of Christian doctrine. Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Methodios of Olympus, and the other Greek theologians, drew their ideas, not only from the Old and the New Testament, but also from Greek philosophy, in especial from Platonism and neoplatonism, but to some extent also from stoicism. Nor must we forget that the Greeks were early exposed to Asiatic influences, and that at the time when Christianity was developing, the influence of the religions of Asia was not restricted to the Old and the New Testament.¹ *Pari passu* with the political and cultural detachment of Byzantium from the west and with the development of Byzantium into an oasis of civilisation owing to the inroads of the uncultured nations of Asia and Europe (and above all of the Turks), religious and cultural stationarism evolved as a manifestation of self-sufficiency.

Russia received her church and her religion ready-made from Byzantium. The significance of this was explained at the very outset of these studies. All that need be added here is that while the Russians adopted Byzantine religion they did not adopt Byzantine civilisation. They acquired a rich heritage, but their timidity led them to bury the talent in the ground. Moreover, their powers were not equal to the digestion of Greek theology, and after prolonged attempts they secured in this respect no more than a partial success (cf. §§ 2 and 3).

The Russians were no less isolated than the Byzantines, and it was because of this isolation that, like the Byzantines, they cherished ecclesiastico-religious tradition. At the beginning of the Kievic epoch there doubtless existed a certain cultural community with the west, but this was of brief duration. Russia, cut off from the west, and before long from the east as well, had her cultural and religious development arrested, all the more seeing that the unceasing need for defence against hostile neighbours tended to promote a one-sided development of the political and military activities of the Russian state. Books on canon law and various other subjects entered Russia from Constantinople and from the southern

¹ An excellent though concise account of the facts is given by Seeberg in his *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, 3rd edition, 1910. Consult also Harnack, *Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1913, and *Der Geist der morgenländischen Kirche im Unterschied von der abendländischen*. Additional authorities are mentioned under theological literature in § 47.

Slav countries, but without promoting any effective community of civilisation. The isolation of Russia was intensified by the enmity to the Catholic Poles, and subsequently to the Protestant Germans and Swedes.

The Russians took over Byzantine theology, but did not acquire Hellenism, or acquired so much only as was implicit in the theology. When we compare Russia with the west we may say that the former knew nothing of Aristotle or of the corpus juris; Greek never played in Russia the part that Latin played in the west; there was no humanist movement, no renaissance, no independent growth of the sciences and of modern philosophy, and above all no reformation (or counter-reformation). On the other hand, in religious matters Asia from early days exercised considerable influence upon Russia, and Leont'ev's fondness for the stationary characteristics of Asiaticism was not wholly un-Russian.

The slavophiles extol Russia because she did not produce any counterpart to scholasticism. But Russia was not called upon to defend the doctrines of the church against classical paganism, and had no need to defend those doctrines against her own thinkers. The slavophiles, therefore, are fully representative of the spirit of the Russian church when they attack logic and spurn Aristotle, and when they cling to Plato and his contemplation of eternal ideas and unchangeable verities. Altogether Russian, too, is their thought when they term scholasticism the mother of Protestantism and of rationalist notions in general, and when they wholly condemn rationalism.

Kirěevskii, Homjakov, and Solov'ev are representative exponents of Russian religious thought and feeling, and the same may be said of Leont'ev.

We saw that Russian philosophers of history lay great stress on the importance of the church. But for the Russians the church is not what it is for Catholics or Protestants. To the Russian, indeed to any member of the Orthodox church, the priest is not the teacher and guide in matters of religion, but is above all the miracle-worker, the magician. The Russian looks upon his priest as a live "good conductor" of divine grace, as a passive mediator. The Russian is a consistent passivist. Salvation comes to man without his personal collaboration, and even the priest plays no individual part here. This is why in Russia (as in the east) the monk is held in much higher esteem than the ordinary priest. Priests

marry, and are therefore more closely akin to laymen ; only during the actual performance of his priestly functions does the priest become in a peculiar way a passive mediator in the transmission of higher forces.

To the Orthodox Russian, therefore, the church is not what it is to the Roman Catholic westerner, for the Russian does not regard his priest as an exceptionally religious personality. Roman Catholics think of their church as a mighty and all-embracing organisation ; but to Russians the church is no more than the hierarchical corporation of supreme leaders, who are appointed from the monkish ascetics (more highly esteemed than the secular priests). For the like reason the centralised papacy is impossible in the east, and the existence of the papacy is the most fundamental and most keenly felt reason for the severance from Roman Catholicism. The eastern church has always been federally organised, as a patriarchate.

We are now in a position to understand why the so-called caesaropapism originated in the east. The state was gladly recognised and utilised by the church as helper and protector. In Byzantium, owing to the assaults made on the empire by Asiatic and European enemies, a strongly organised state was a national necessity ; and, in view of the political and national isolation of the realm, the eastern church could not develop along the internationalist lines characteristic of the western papacy. The Roman empire of the west fell a thousand years earlier than the Roman empire of the east ; not until after the lapse of several centuries was the western empire reorganised after the eastern model, reorganised by the papacy, now fortified, and grown into an independent state.

In Russia, too, the church associated itself with the state to establish caesaropapism ; but the Russian Orthodox church, continually struggling against Mohammedans and Catholics, and later against Protestants as well, became national, as contrasted with the international church of the west.

III

§ 196.

IN these studies I set out from the historical conception that society has hitherto been and still is organised theocratically, and that democracy puts an end to theocracy.

It is not in Russia alone that church and state constitute a social integer. Everywhere definite laws exist to regulate the relationships between the two parts. To assure oneself of this fact, it suffices to consider the endeavours that began during the eighteenth century to bring about a separation between church and state. The first such separation was the one effected by the American union in 1787; France followed the example during and after the revolution (1789, 1794-1802); during the nineteenth century came the separation in Belgium (1831); and after the annihilation of the Papal States in 1870-1871, separation occurred in a number of European, American, and Australian states, among which France was the most important (1905).

The liberal program of disestablishment is a socio-political attempt to solve the religious problem; this program was formulated by liberalism in the struggle against the theocratic social order on behalf of spiritual liberty and toleration (§ 177). Locke, the first philosopher of liberalism, was the first advocate of the separation of church and state. Liberalism was to be understood as an endeavour to secure freedom—freedom from the spiritual oppression exercised by theocracy, by the union of church and state. Separation of church and state would afford a guarantee of freedom of conscience. Religion was to be a private matter (the phrase is not happily chosen); vis-à-vis the state, the church was to become an institution established upon civil law; education, including popular elementary education, was to be entirely removed from the hands of the church.¹

In the historical introduction, we considered the character and development of the Russian theocracy. Subsequently, when dealing with individual thinkers, we examined their respective views, not only concerning religion, but likewise concerning the church and its relationship to the state. This involved a comparison between eastern and western conditions, and above all in our account of the slavophiles we found it

* A history of the movement considered in the text will be found in Rothenbücher's work, *Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche*, 1908; the book also contains an excellent survey of the political program of disestablishment. The literature of the subject is rapidly extending. I may refer to: Debidour, *L'Eglise catholique et l'état sous la troisième république*, 2 vols., 1906-1909; Troeltsch, *Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche, der staatliche Religionsunterricht und die theologischen Fakultäten, Rektoratsrede*, 1907; Kahl, *Aphorismen zur Trennung von Staat und Kirche, Rektoratsrede*, 1908.

necessary to discuss in passing the nature of theocracy (§ 55). The consideration of this matter was amplified by a critique of the doctrines of Pobédonoscev, Leont'ev, and Solov'ev.

A summary of principles is now requisite.

Sociologists have clearly demonstrated that in the earlier phases of civilisation the functions of priest and ruler are not differentiated; the power of religion over all the members of society secures the intellectual primacy of the priest as magician, censor of morals, prophet, teacher, philosopher, and man of learning. The chief owes his dominion to his functions as war-lord and administrator of economic and social conditions, but, just like the priest, he bases his right and his power upon the will of God or of the gods; from the earliest times down to the present day he has been ruler by divine right. The chief's command is more direct than that of the priest; the priest has moral and spiritual influence, the chief has force at his disposal; the priest leads and educates, the chief must have recourse to material acts; the influence of the priest is chronic, that of the chief is acute; the priest's power is mental, the chief's is physical, i.e. military.

The relationship between priest and ruler has in different places and ages exhibited numerous variations, many vicissitudes of mutual dependence; priesthood and chieftainship have been perfected, their functions have been differentiated, state and church have developed, and down to our own day society has been dualistically organised and led by state and church. During the middle ages, theocracy matured as an intimate fusion of the two institutions in their most highly developed form. In the secular empire of Rome, the church presented itself as the city of God (Origen and Augustine), claiming spiritual supremacy; and it ultimately came to exercise this supremacy in the two forms of Roman papacy and Byzantine caesaropapism.

In the western half of the empire, through the establishment of the Papal States, the church was able to effect a materialisation of its spiritual supremacy. But this was of less importance than the exercise of supremacy over the kings and the emperor, the spiritual power of the church and its head being recognised as higher and more estimable.

Augustine, already, declared the state to be the work of the devil; and this conception was emphasised in set terms

by Gregory VII.¹ Widespread credulity, and the increasing power of the church, secured supremacy for the pope as spiritual ruler; the church became the city of God, and was generally recognised in practice as a real state. This revolutionary doctrine was systematised by Aegidius Romanus and James of Viterbo, followers of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the schoolmen.

The reformation and the associated revolution in religious and ecclesiastical affairs brought about notable transformations in the medieval theocracy. Great changes occurred in the religious and philosophical outlook, the influence of the renaissance and that of the beginnings of modern philosophy and modern science being superadded to that of the reformation. The reformation marked the attainment of a higher stage in religious thought, shown in the overthrow of priestly power. Morality, the relationship of man to man, was now regarded as the chief concern of religion; the priest lost his privileged position as mediator between man and God; men began to adopt the conception of a reign of law in the cosmos and in human historical development, became impressed with a feeling of personal responsibility, and inclined more and more towards independence in religion and in other spheres of thought. The ascetic ideal was replaced by endeavours to conduct life unascetically; the celibate priesthood disappeared; family life was exalted.

Socio-politically considered, the reformation and the new trend of thought mark the beginning of that process of secularisation which is not yet completed. The first stage was to free philosophy and science from the dominion of the church; next came the enfranchisement of the state and of law; the secularisation of morality and even of religion is still in progress.

Side by side with the Roman church there now came into existence the various Protestant churches, as props to those states in which the reformation had proved victorious. But the states, likewise, in which the counter-reformation had gained the day, now became stronger. In Catholic France and in Catholic Austria absolutism triumphed.

The state, as it gained power, took over various cultural

¹ *Quis nesciat, reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui, deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pene sceleribus mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante super pares, scilicet, homines dominare caeca cupidine ut intolerabili praesumptione affectaverunt.*

functions that had hitherto been in the hands of the church.

Before all, came the work of education; next followed the assumption of various benevolent activities; and to an increasing extent the new state became supreme administrator for the society that had been trained by the church.

In the Protestant lands of the west there thus came into existence territorial churches (national churches, the system of territorial supremacy, and so on), and caesaropapism of a kind, the main distinction between this caesaropapism and the eastern variety being that in the west the church was no longer sacerdotal. The theologian Rothe carries this development to its logical conclusion by insisting that the churches are disappearing, are surrendering their socio-political functions to the state; but before Rothe, Schleiermacher, the founder of modern Protestant theology, had accepted the separation of church and state. Such is the development actually going on in the Protestant world.

But in Catholic countries we see a similar evolution. Since the French revolution, a separation of state and church has been effected almost everywhere, notably in Catholic lands, and above all in France. The rationalist trend of modern thought and feeling and the aspiration to make the whole of life as natural as possible (§ 42) have favoured the spread of radicalism in Catholic countries. As early as the eighteenth century, French liberalism was tinged with radicalism; socialism and anarchism, with their anti-ecclesiastical doctrines and policy, were first organised in France and the Catholic lands. It is where Catholicism is still enthroned that the movement for disestablishment has become antireligious as well as anti-ecclesiastical; in the regions where Protestantism prevails, this movement, though anti-ecclesiastical, is on the whole friendly to religion.

In the eastern empire there was not for many centuries anything corresponding to the decay and ultimate disappearance of secular emperordom in the west. The great reforms tending to promote the consolidation of the empire issued from the eastern capital. Owing to the power of the secular state and owing to the stationarism of the eastern church, that church remained far more dependent upon the state. The church accepted the traditional Roman emperor-worship, as it accepted and incorporated so many other ancient and

pagan institutions, customs, doctrines, and ideas. The Byzantine empire maintained itself for more than a thousand years, whereas the western empire was only reestablished after the lapse of several centuries, and then with the help of the papacy and in Germanic form.

After the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the third Rome, perpetuated Byzantium. In comparison with the west, Moscow, like Byzantium, was distinguished by knowing nothing of any Augustine, of any Gregory VII, of any Aquinas with radical disciples, or of any Boniface VIII, to maintain the prestige of the church vis-à-vis the state. Neither Byzantium nor Moscow produced monarchomachists to defend the right of tyrannicide—but in the west the theological defenders of the supremacy of the church, representing the secular chieftain as inferior and even as morally worthless, gave an initial impulse to the democratic principle of popular sovereignty (in accordance with which the people has the right to elect, depose, or punish the ruler) by defending the right of tyrannicide.

Neither in Byzantium nor in Moscow do we find indications of any struggle between patriarch and emperor analogous to the struggle between pope and emperor in the west. In Byzantium, doubtless, and in Moscow, there were defenders of the supremacy of church and priesthood as against state and secular chieftainship (§ 3), but this antagonism never developed into any such condemnation of secular chieftainship as was voiced by Gregory VII. Despots and criminal rulers like John the Terrible were not deposed. When the boyars struggled against him, it was merely on behalf of the privileges of their caste; they never challenged his right to supreme rule. Thus in Moscow as in Byzantium the emperor was recognised as head of the church in the sense previously explained.¹

¹ Kattenbusch contends that the term caesaropapism is more applicable to ancient days than to recent times. The Russian tsars, he says, are mere guardians of the existing order; they have identified themselves, with the church, not the church with themselves, whilst the latter identification was the true index of caesaropapism.—I have in an earlier chapter referred to the passages in the state fundamental law wherein the relationship of the tsar to the church is defined. Distinctive is the fact that the church consecrates and voluntarily recognises tsarist absolutism, and in return is protected by the state with the absolutist powers thus consecrated by religion. We have seen the efficiency of this protection against hostile churches and against the enlightenment. As we have learned, the emperor does not venture to formulate new dogmas, for in the view of the eastern church this is a closed

IV

§ 197.

CHRISTIANITY was responsible for the fuller development of theocracy and for the completion of the union between church and state. Indeed, the very concept of theocracy originated in the Christian notion of religion.¹

The correct understanding of the problem demands attention to the following points.

i. Love of God and one's neighbour was doubtless represented as constituting the essence of Christianity; but from the first, continually and no less energetically, religion was identified with faith. But faith killed love. For practical purposes, to believe in God signified to believe in the priests represented as mediators between God and the laity. Revealed religion is of necessity a religious and priestly aristocracy; and as such, it is the foundation and the prototype of socio-political aristocracy.

Jesus himself demands blind faith; and indeed, on the solemn occasion of the ascension he is represented as saying that the unbeliever shall be damned (see the textually dubious passage, Mark xvi, 16). This was the basis of Thomas Aquinas' teaching that heretics should be punished with death. On the ground of this text the inquisition becomes comprehensible, and comprehensible too Calvin's death sentence on Servetus. Even Locke proposed that atheists should be put to death.²

chapter; but Kattenbusch admits that Justinian's attitude towards dogma was papistical. Peter abolished the patriarchate (his action in this matter being uncanonical), and such an interference in church organisation was characteristically papistical.

¹ When I speak of Christianity, I am well aware of the vagueness of the term. It is necessary to distinguish between ecclesiastical doctrine and the teaching of Jesus, the teaching which we can discover in the New Testament by a process of analysis that is far from easy. Further, from the church doctrine (which was itself differently formulated and differently interpreted at different times) we must distinguish the concrete ministry of the church and the life lived within the church. Jesus' teaching and example were no more than the leaven; with these were amalgamated the doctrines of Paul and the other New Testament authors, and above all there were likewise incorporated materials from the Old Testament with its heterogeneous elements, contemporary philosophical and scientific culture being further called to assistance. Church doctrine and discipline were the product of this amalgamation.

² The nature of this relationship between love and faith was perceived already by Augustine, for he wrote: "Qui non amat, inaniter credit, etiamsi

"Disobedience is the root of all evil," said Methodios, who in the third century was the most influential teacher in the eastern church.

2. Christianity, with its ascetic doctrines, esteemed the passive virtues more highly than the active; humility was regarded as the highest merit of a Christian. This is why, in the eyes of modern philosophers from Machiavelli to Marx and Nietzsche, Christianity has appeared to be the religion of slaves; and unquestionably the dominion of priests and kings was intimately associated with Christianity.

Love is democratic, faith is aristocratic, and Christian aristocracy was stronger than Christian democracy. The greatest Christian scholastic, like his pagan teacher Aristotle, endeavoured to justify slavery; the church did not abolish slavery, but at most mitigated it, favouring its transformation into feudal retainership and serfdom.

3. Jesus declared that the love of God was of greater moment than the love of one's neighbour, but the result was to weaken the love of neighbours, for the goal of religion was sought mystically, in an illusory and ascetic union with God. The result was that the Christian love of one's neighbour was at most manifested socio-politically in works of benevolence and charity, whilst social inequality and the dependence of the masses was recognised on principle.¹

4. From the very first, church doctrine was directly and expressly employed to favour the religious foundations of the theocracy. Paul, the founder of the church, contributed powerfully to this development, for in the thirteenth chapter of his epistle to the Romans he decisively and unambiguously expounded the notion of divine right. He declared that the powers that be were ordained of God. He wrote, "Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath,

sint vera, quae credit"; nevertheless he considered the church to be the civitas dei.

¹ An extremely instructive document bearing on this matter is the letter from Cardinal Merry del Val to the French politician de Mun. "Il y a dans la doctrine sociale catholique des points délicats sur lesquels il importe d'être fixé, si l'on veut que l'action à exercer sur les masses populaires, au triple point de vue religieux, moral et matériel, non seulement soit régie, comme il est nécessaire, par la vérité, mais n'en vienne pas à se retourner contre elle pour la fausser. Faute de l'esprit que vous avez su imprimer à votre œuvre, ne voit-on pas, par exemple, le domaine de la justice élargi plus que de mesure au détriment de la charité. . . ."

"Le Temps," January 23, 1913.

but also for conscience sake." He declared, again, "Who-soever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation."

5. Paul writes as a Jew, as a man used to the Jewish form of theocracy, but at the same time he compromises with the Roman imperial rule.

Since the Christian church developed within the Roman state, absolutist theocracy was the inevitable outcome of such ethical and political views. The pagan emperors recognised the church as a state church; their Christian successors recognised the pagan apotheosis of the emperors. Theocracy originated in two forms, the Roman and the eastern, and of these the eastern was the primary.

To reflective minds, these considerations will suggest the solution of the much discussed problem whether and to what extent a Christian state can exist at all.

In our estimate of Russian Christianity and its caesaropapism, we are guided by the reflection that Russian Christianity is, as the Russians themselves contend, orthodox in fact as well as in name, is genuine Christianity. It is in conformity with historical development that the principal stress should be laid upon soundness of belief, for this is the derivative meaning of the term "orthodoxy."

"The Orthodox faith is an ascetic faith," says Archbishop Antonii of Volhynia, and caesaropapism furthered asceticism just as much as it furthered faith.

Russian Christianity is, in truth, older than western Christianity alike theoretically and practically; it is the more primitive and purer form.

But for this very reason we can understand why the leading Russian thinkers were averse to Christianity as they knew it. We can understand why Bëlinkii associated the idea of God with the knout; we can understand Russian atheistic and materialistic nihilism, and the political struggle of nihilism against caesaropapism; we can understand why the radical thinkers and the revolutionaries for the most part cherish socialism, which aims at establishing the realm of justice in place of the realm of Christian love, and at establishing the republic in place of tsarism; and we can understand why the various forms and grades of anarchism have found adherents in Russia

Herzen abandons Christianity because in its contempt for the world and in its cult of asceticism he discovers the apotheosis of death ; he seeks the religion of life, and he finds this religion in positivist scientific disillusionment and in socialism.

The oppression exercised by the Russian theocracy is so strong and so coercive that none but the social democrats and social revolutionaries have made the separation of the church from the state a definite part of their program, for the liberals merely demand that the Russian church and the other creeds shall be freed from state tutelage. We find that it is the reforming theologians to-day who are more inclined to demand the abolition of caesaropapism in religion's own interest.

V

§ 198.

ONE of the most important tasks of the philosophy of history is to demonstrate the development and explain the significance of the three great ecclesiastical systems, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy, and to elucidate their reciprocal relationships. Important, likewise, in relation to social evolution as a whole is the peculiar relationship which, since the days when Greek influence became predominant, has existed between theology as the organon of myth and philosophy as the organon of science.

Theology is Greek metaphysics with a mythological gloss (§ 41 A), or it is the mythology of the Greco-Roman cultural syncretism elevated into a metaphysic. From the very first, the relationship between philosophy and theology (mythology) has been one of mutual hostility ; the general evolution of thought in these matters has been characterised by the increasing vigour of criticism and science, and by the corresponding decline in the strength of mythology ; the process has sometimes been spoken of as "disanthropomorphisation."

But not merely is Christian theology the issue of classical and Asiatic mythology and philosophy, the church too is the work of the pagan emperors and philosophers of Rome, as well as being the outcome of Jewish theocratic tradition. Even

before the existence of the New Testament, the first foundations of Catholicism were laid under Augustus in the religious revival he promoted. Constantine, though he remained a pagan, made Christianity the religion of the state, and only submitted to baptism on his death-bed by way of precaution. Pagan as he was, he was none the less the first emperor-pope.

Christian ritual developed in like manner out of the pagan rituals of those days. To put the matter in general terms, Catholicism is the most highly developed form of classical and Asiatic polytheism in course of transition to monotheism. Protestantism represents a higher phase of religious evolution, and is therefore more distinctively monotheistic.

Orthodox Catholicism is distinguished from western or Roman Catholicism just as Byzantium is distinguished from Rome, just as the west is distinguished from the Greco-Asiatic east. In respect of theology and philosophy, Orthodoxy owes much to Plato as well as to Jesus and the Old and New Testaments; but in the growth of Roman Catholicism the influence of Paul, of Augustine, and subsequently of Aristotle, has been predominant.

Whereas, in the Orthodox east, self-sufficient Byzantinism soon became firmly established, in the west the passivism of Catholicism weakened the power of that creed. The most notable outgrowth of western Catholicism was scholasticism with its associated development of medieval theology. Evolving from Catholicism simultaneously with the great cultural movement of the renaissance came humanism and the new science and new philosophy of Protestantism.

The Protestant reformation secured a loftier position for the moral elements of religion, and effected the abolition of the priesthood; through the growth of religious and ethical individualism and subjectivism, the new Protestant churches became something quite different from the church of Rome. The new Protestant theology was based on the teaching of Paul, and before long became so permeated with the spirit of modern philosophy that the distinction between theology and philosophy tended to disappear. From this outlook the Russian philosophers of religion (Herzen as well as the slavophiles) were perfectly right when they spoke of German philosophy as Protestant; and it was from this outlook that Kant was designated the philosopher of Protestantism. Modern philosophy is, in fact, Protestant in this sense, that it has

developed in Protestant countries and upon a Protestant foundation. Catholic lands, and France in especial, have sent forth reechoes of Protestant philosophy: but their own independent philosophy is anti-ecclesiastical; and precisely owing to its animosity to church doctrine, this philosophy is more revolutionary, and in many respects more negational, than the philosophy of Germany or England.

As we have learned, Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian church, the inheritors of Byzantinism, have remained far more stagnant than Roman Catholicism—to say nothing of Protestantism. The third Rome, therefore, had to borrow from the west, not only for its general culture, but also to promote its ecclesiastical and religious growth (§§ 4 and 5).

Since the days of Peter, Russia has been unceasingly influenced by Catholicism and Protestantism. Theology, too, was fertilised by Peter's reforms; but, as we recognised when we were considering Javorskii and Theofan Prokopovič (§ 9), the influence of Protestant and Catholic theology was comparatively superficial. The first aim at this date was the acquirement of knowledge. Theology was studied in Europe as well as other subjects, a notable figure in this respect being that of Damaskin, who subsequently became a bishop, and died in the year 1795. But it was not until the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I that the theological and religious aspirations of the Russians were rendered more intense by the spread of French and German philosophy, and as an outcome of the religious revival of European romanticism. It was typical of the new movement that Russian scholasticism was not initiated by theologians but by secular thinkers, by such men as Čadaev, the slavophiles, Dostoevskii, Solov'ev, and Leont'ev. Homjakov, the ex-soldier, became a "father of the church" (§ 55). Quite recently (just before and after the revolution of 1905), the ideas of these writers and the influence of progressive Protestant theology and of the Catholic modernists have led to the development of a comparatively independent Russian theology. Its leading representatives, Tarčev for instance, may be regarded as the founders of Russian modernism.¹

¹ Buharev was mentioned in § 29, and reference was there made to his hostility to monasticism. We must speak once more of Bishop Antonii of Volhynia, a man who has been influenced by the slavophiles and by Dostoevskii. His pupil Sergii, archbishop of Finland, is a thinker of greater note. (Among

The nature of Orthodox passivism, its backwardness in religious and ecclesiastical matters, explains why, in quarters friendly to the church, and even within the church itself, a Catholic trend is so often and so conspicuously manifest (Čadaev, Pečorin, Solov'ev, Leont'ev). This is no mere outcome of an adaptation in externals to those elements in the west that are ecclesiastically and religiously akin, for from within outwards Orthodoxy, now that the leaven of western philosophy has begun to work, tends logically towards Catholicism as the next stage upwards in ecclesiastico-religious evolution. Among the common people there is no Catholic trend, and the folk has no sympathy with the movement towards the union of the churches; but the inclination of the cultured classes and of instructed theologians towards Catholicism is thoroughly comprehensible.

In respect of ecclesiastical policy, no less than in respect of doctrine, Peter's adversary Javorskii continues to find followers; these endeavour to fortify clericalism and to further centralisation through the patriarchate. In connection with such efforts at ecclesiastical reform, it is essential to distinguish clearly between the progressive and the reactionary elements (§ 36).

Protestantism is less dangerous to Orthodoxy precisely

Sergii's writings may be mentioned, *The Orthodox Doctrine of Salvation, An Analysis of the Moral and Subjective Aspects of Salvation*. A notable work is Tarčev's *Christus, the Foundations of Christianity*, 4 vols., 1908. This writer has been influenced by Dostoevskii and Antonii. Světlov likewise deserves attention. He has written: *The Cross of Christ; The Significance of the Cross in the Work of Christ; An Attempt to Elucidate the Dogma of Redemption*, 1907. The writings of Sergii, Tarčev, and Světlov signify a revolution in Russian theology. Not merely have they endeavoured to harmonise church doctrine with life and literature, but they have attempted to dissipate religious formalism, and above all to get rid of the formalist and legalist conception of redemption as effected by the sacrificial death of Christ. Nesmělov may also be mentioned here as providing a philosophical basis for ethics (*The Doctrine of Man: I, Attempt at a psychological History and Criticism of the fundamental Problem of Life*, 3rd edition, 1906; *II, The Metaphysic of Life and the Christian Revelation*, 1907). Nesmělov goes so far as to endeavour to reconcile the ideas of Feuerbach with a partial adoption of Orthodoxy. Janyšev, a thoroughly modern writer influenced by progressive Protestant theology, opened a discussion of ethical problems (*The Orthodox-Christian Doctrine of Morality*, 1887). Zarin deals with the topic of asceticism, one of peculiar importance to Orthodoxy (*Asceticism in Relation to Orthodox-Christian Doctrine*, 1907). Sergii's work was rejected by the St. Petersburg academy. Tarčev's essay, *The Temptation of Our Lord*, 1900, had to be rewritten before it could secure acceptance as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Arts.

because the gulf between the two is so much wider. The slavophiles look upon Protestantism as a mere philosophy, and not as a religion at all. Hence Russian divinity students (and the remark applies also to the divinity students from the Greek and other branches of the Orthodox church) are officially sent to Protestant, not Catholic, theological faculties, above all in Germany. Protestant influence leads individuals (Tolstoi) and masses (the stundists) to break with the church, whilst Catholicism works an inward change. Dostoevskii was keenly aware of the Catholic peril, continually animadverting upon it in his later writings.

From this outlook we are enabled to understand the general differences between French and German influence, between Catholic and Protestant influence, upon Russia (§ 22).

In the west, modern philosophy and modern science developed as an opposition to the church and church doctrine, as an opposition to theocracy. In Russia the like opposition was implicit, and its development was accelerated and strengthened by the influence of western thought.

In contradistinction to the newest Russian scholasticism, Russian progressive philosophy early became antitheocratic and antireligious. Russian religious negation was more radical than that of Europe; the contrast between church doctrine and European philosophy was greater and more definite in Russia, owing to the absence in that country of a scholasticism and a theology competent to sustain their teachings in argument against the attacks of persons of education, and competent to render these teachings acceptable. Blind faith in authority succumbed to the unanticipated onslaught, and atheism and materialism were accepted with as much credulity as had of old been exhibited towards ecclesiastical theism.

This explains why Russian radical philosophers of history have displayed scant interest in the religious problems of Europe. Herzen makes a few casual references to Catholicism and Protestantism, both of which he consistently rejects just as he rejects Orthodoxy. Čaadaev can constrain himself to no more than passing observations on Catholicism.

To Protestantism, too, radical writers have devoted very little attention, although since the time of Peter, Protestantism

has had much influence in Russia (e.g. the Protestant movement of Tveritinov during Peter's reign, the stundist movement, and so on). Very few Russian thinkers have done justice to Protestantism as a religious no less than as a civilising force.¹

¹ Selgunov, the radical author, is extremely interesting in this connection (§ 202).

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

DEMOCRACY VERSUS THEOCRACY

I

§ 199.

DURING the great revolution the essence of democracy was accurately defined in the watchwords, liberty, equality, and fraternity, the contrast between democracy and aristocracy being thus expressed. The aristocratic organisation of society rests upon relationships of supraordination and subordination as between individuals and groups within the community, whereas the aim of democracy is that all should rank alike. Aristocracy involves the acceptance of utterly divergent estimates of human values; social inequality is regarded as natural and as historically necessary; men are divided into a minority of rulers and a majority of subjects. Aristocracy is social organisation based upon power; democratic equality implies fraternal and voluntary cooperation.

Aristocracy is not confined to the political, military, economic, and social spheres; in the realms of morals and religion there is likewise inequality; the priest, with his reputedly higher ascetic ethic, is contrasted with the layman; there is also a class contrast between the educated and the uneducated. In addition, aristocracy sometimes manifests itself in the use of a different language by the superior caste (Latin or French, for instance), and is occasionally based upon national distinctions.

Every aristocracy is rendered possible by the existence of a corresponding slavery; on the one hand are the dominant priests and rulers, on the other hand the ruled; the very nature of theocracy is found in an intimate association between rulers and priests. Emperor and pope, tsar and patriarch, do not

stand alone ; the organisation of a spiritual and secular aristocracy is necessarily and invariably hierarchical.

Medieval Christianity, the Catholic church, is essentially aristocratic. Not merely does there exist a temporal juxtaposition of political and ecclesiastical aristocracy ; the union between the two forms is intimate and organic. Divine right, whether political or priestly, is vested in but few hands ; physical and spiritual authority has in the past inevitably taken an aristocratic and hierarchical form, culminating in absolute monarchy alike in state and church. (" Legitimists need a master to enable themselves to have servants," wrote Anzengruber.) Thomas Aquinas found arguments, not only in favour of inflicting the death penalty upon heretics, but also in proof that slavery was a natural institution, the Catholic Christian being in this matter perfectly at one with the pagan Aristotle.¹

The political and social aim of democracy is to abolish a relationship of subjection and rule. The derivative meaning of the term democracy is " people's rule." Modern democracy does not aim at rule at all, but at administration, at the administration of the people, by the people, for the people. How this new conception, this new estimate, of state organisation and social organisation can be carried out in practice, is no mere question of power ; it is a difficult problem of administrative technique. Since the days of Rousseau, philosophers and statesmen have been concerned with the problem of direct and indirect government and administration.

¹ De Maistre, the exponent of postrevolutionary theocracy, writing to Count J. Potocki in 1810, formulated as follows the intimate relationship between political aristocracy and ecclesiastico-religious aristocracy : " Le patricien est un prêtre laïque ; la religion nationale est sa première propriété et la plus sacrée, puisqu'elle conserve son privilège qui tombe toujours avec elle. Il n'y a pas de plus grand crime pour un noble que d'attaquer les dogmes." Compare what James I said at the Hampton Court conference (I quote from S. R. Gardiner's *History of England*) : " At the word Presbyters James fired up. He told the Puritans that they were aiming at ' a Scottish Presbytery, which,' he said, ' agreeth as well with a monarchy as God and the devil. . . . Then Jack and Tom, and Will and Dick, shall meet, and at their pleasure censure me and my council and all our proceedings. Then Will shall stand up, and say, " it must be thus " ; then Dick shall reply, and say, " Nay, marry, but we will have it thus." ' . . . More and more the maxim, ' No Bishop, no King,' became the rule of his conduct." Compare, again, with this utterance Napoleon's concordat with the pope, which contains (§§ 6 and 7) the following oath for the bishops : " Si dans mon diocèse ou ailleurs, j'apprends qu'il se trouve quelque chose au préjudice de l'Etat, je le ferai savoir au gouvernement."

Rousseau recognised that owing to the great increase in population, owing to the greater intricacy of social relationships, and owing to the inequality of social conditions, direct popular government in the true sense of the term was impossible, and he declared that true democracy was a constitution for the gods. In practice, such equality as has hitherto been attained is but that measure of inequality which is found to be just endurable. As, in actual working, aristocratic monarchy was always an oligarchy, so also is democracy in actual working an oligarchy. The problem that has to be solved is, how to prevent democratic oligarchy from degenerating into aristocratic hierarchical rule.¹ The democratic organisation of society must in essence be a mutualist federation of social organisations (§ 172), and of the individuals who combine to form these organisations.

Anarchism as a system gives expression, in an extreme and largely distorted form, to the democratic aspiration towards liberty; socialism (social democracy) gives expression to the democratic aspiration towards equality. Anarchism and socialism originated simultaneously as soon as the philosophic and political revolution had uprooted theocratic absolutism.

Aristocracy is the rule of the non-workers over the workers. Democracy therefore demands that all should work, and refuses to admit that it is right for the product of labour to be assigned to the non-workers. The aristocrat rules, the democrat works.

Manual labour is for the most part work of a petty kind. The aristocrat, as born ruler and leader, will do nothing but work of a grand order, great deeds; he is the hero, the man who does only as he thinks fit. The theocratic aristocrat takes an indeterminist view of the universe and of mankind. Just as God is free so also is his representative an absolutely free agent. What is done or left undone is not controlled and regulated by any determinist foreknowledge; at most it is possible that the prophet and magician can at times foresee the future.

The theocratic aristocrat believes in magic; his religion is faith in miracle; and therefore he despises work, lives upon the enforced labour of slaves, lives upon the sweat of their brows. It need hardly be said that the slave, too, is averse to hard work; that is why he is coerced as a slave. Alike

¹ This problem has been considered in fuller detail in § 157, in connection with our study of the relationship of syndicalism to democracy.

morally and politically, aristocracy and slavery condition one another mutually (§ 26).

Democracy demands that all shall work; it allots and organises labour. Democracy aims, not merely at work, but at the spirit of industry. The disinclination that everyone has to labour, and especially to labour not of his own choosing, must be overcome by the sentiment of duty. The spirit of industry develops concomitantly with the abandonment of belief in a fantastic universe of mythical spirits and sorcerers, and concomitantly with the growth of a deterministic insight into nature and social life as subject to the reign of law. Men become habituated to regularity and constancy; they learn to observe more closely, to grasp the relationships of cause and effect, and to attain their ends by the deliberate choice of means. Modern science arises and is applied to the purposes of practical life; modern manufacturing industry originates, and therewith come into existence new means of communication, modern commerce, the modern economic system, and its associated mentality.

Theocratic aristocracy makes its influence felt in the domain of the new manufacturing industry, for the old feudal inequality persists; but the men of the common people, the manual workers, the proletarian masses, in conjunction with the philosophic and scientific leaders of socialism, are paving the way for the ultimate triumph of the democratic ethic of equality.

Friedrich Schlegel, who wished to safeguard Catholic romanticism epistemologically by means of a "theocratic consciousness," considered that likeness to God was to be discerned in idleness; and Nietzsche, the aristocratic camp-follower of our own day, charged the spirit of industry with being the cause of unbelief. Nietzsche had the aristocratic feeling that work was a disgrace. Aristocratic "far niente" is equally applicable in the spiritual sphere; the theocratic priest is the guardian of divine revelation; the understanding can produce nothing new, is uncreative, and its function is purely defensive—defensive "against the understanding." Scholasticism, with all its faults, incorporates the knowledge of the theocracy. The priest has adopted the highest and most fundamental truths of revelation, and has become a spiritual ruler as guardian of these truths and as mediator on their behalf. Utterly different is the intellectual work of

modern scientific specialists and philosophers. Not merely must they elaborate the individual details of knowledge by observation and reflection, but by independent mental toil they must win their way to the highest and most fundamental of their principles.

By its very nature, democracy counterposes science and philosophy to theology and scholasticism.

The democratic character of modern science consists mainly in its use of the scientific method as contrasted with the theocratic method. We have good reason for speaking of "scientific" work and the "scientific" division of labour. Consistent and energetic observation, the search for and discovery of new and ever new scientific details and systems, is utterly different from the cherishing of ready-made and reputedly superhuman items of knowledge based upon direct revelation. Theocracy has no science, but only esotericism, mysteries, and prophecies; it has no researchers, but only augurs. Consequently the social position of these augurs is something utterly distinct from that of the modern man of science; the theocratic priestly augur consummates the great theurgic mysteries and magics on behalf of the lay slave.

Antitheological philosophy is based upon the sciences, and its relationship to these scientific foundations is not aristocratic but democratic, is a relationship of equality and equivalence. Hegel continued to speak of philosophy as queen of the sciences, but this was merely the old aristocratic view of the relationship of theology to her handmaiden philosophy. The relationship of the sciences one to another and to philosophy is purely logical and methodological, being the outcome of the nature of the individual sciences, whereas theology determines its relationship to the understanding and to science in accordance with its measuring rod of absolute revealed truth.

Science, too, aims at universal agreement (of classes, peoples, humanity), but this agreement is to be secured solely by logical and educational methods; at an early date, modern philosophy became the philosophy of the enlightenment. The popularisation of science is one of the great tasks of the contemporary enlightenment, and the claims of popular education are continually enlarged. We must doubtless take with a pinch of salt Engels' proclamation of the workers as the successors of German classical philosophy; but in actual

fact the new age is characterised, not by the universities, but by the establishment of universal compulsory education. Modern philosophy and science must not be identified with polymathy. The democratic demand is that all should think and observe; and democratic catholicity is based upon reflection and observation.

Comenius already considered it possible to formulate a metaphysic which should be within the comprehension of children. Here we touch the difficult tasks which modern philosophy, as a scientific outlook upon the universe and upon life, has to effect amidst the enlarging spheres of scientific specialisation. The problem of the correct division of labour in scientific matters is but a part of the general social problem of the division of labour.

In contradistinction to theology, science is knowledge of men and for men—not the knowledge of God and for God. For science, man is the measure of all things, man is the true and ultimate object of all research. This deliberate anthropism is quite different from the naive anthropocentrism of the theological outlook.

Scientific anthropism naturally asserts its validity in the ethical and social domains. Modern philosophy, as Kant showed, is essentially ethical and humanitarian; it aims at the foundation of a new morality, at the elaboration of the new democratic political and administrative system, at democratic anthropocracy. Democracy demands a new system of politics, to be established upon scientific sociology and upon all the abstract sciences concerned with the problems of social life (the sciences of politics, jurisprudence, economics, etc.). Enlightenment and education are the chief concerns of democracy. Democracy wrestles with theocracy for the control of the school, the "*officina humanitatis*," as Comenius termed it. Comenius was one of the first educationists to propound the most conspicuous ideal of the new schooling—equality in education.

In this connection the question arises whether there is a specially democratic philosophy as a unified outlook on the universe and on life, and if so, which system is the chosen one.¹ Marx and his adherents have contended that materialism and positivism constitute the essential foundations of

¹ If the name be not liable to misinterpretation, we might speak of "*demology*," as related to democracy, just as theology is related to theocracy.

democracy. Other systems have been selected (empirio-criticism, for instance), and specific philosophers have been designated.

In like manner, particular sciences have been regarded as peculiarly democratic. Frequently, natural science is indicated as democratic and revolutionary. This latter statement is certainly erroneous, for there can be no question that history may exert an influence quite as inimical to theology as any that can be exerted by natural science; and this is equally true of some of the other abstract sciences—a point on which Mihailovskii rightly insisted. Theology possesses its own, distinctively “Christian” psychology, ethics, pedagogics, history, and so on; in every domain, every science may come into conflict with theological scholasticism.

Knowledge, critical knowledge, is democracy; aristocracy is the offspring of the mythological outlook. The practical import of the Kantian criticism is found above all in this, that criticism cuts at the root of mythological aristocracy. If the essence of myth lie in the premature drawing of conclusions from analogy (§ 41A), the anthropomorphisation characteristic of belief in myth is, ethically considered, egoism, and, politically considered, centralism and therefore absolutism. The naively egocentric human being does not conceive of God alone as ruler, but thinks of himself as likewise occupying such a position; he creates God in his own image, discerning himself in the deity he has fashioned. In his search after miracle he has created political theurgy as well as religious theurgy; typically in Byzantium and in Spain was political ceremonial elaborated into a finished system.

Just as the mythopoeist creates God in his own image, so does he personify and anthropomorphise the state and society at large; mythical monotheism and monarchy arise by parallel development and interpenetrate one another. The attempt made by Leo XIII to reconcile the republic with Catholicism on principle, was dictated by Jesuitism and not by Catholicism.

Criticism, therefore, is a determinant, not of knowledge alone, but also of democratic equality and liberty. Without criticism and without publicity, there can be neither knowledge nor democracy. Democracy has been well described as the age of discussion.

Art, too, artistic creation, becomes democratised. Doubtless the view still widely prevails that the artist as man of genius occupies an aristocratic position in society ; free creation is not labour, and the creative activity of the artist makes him godlike ; the artist's exceptional gifts are, as it were, revelation, special manifestations of God's grace.

We cannot here discuss the fundamental problems of aesthetics, or attempt to ascertain the nature of genuinely democratic art. For our purposes it will suffice to point out that art, like politics, has been modified by modern science and by modern philosophical criticism. We speak of " poet-thinkers " ; we expect the artist to grasp truth and to expound reality. Poets, in fact, are the true teachers of the people, more definitely so than are philosophers. Let me again recall Goethe's phrase concerning " exact fantasy," and point out that in artistic creation modern psychology is competent to discover elements of the spirit of industry. What Goethe said about political poesy has long ere this been refuted by the fact that literature and art are intimately related to the social and political evolution of modern society, guiding this evolution as well as preparing the ground.

Obviously, art does not become democratic merely by devoting itself to the exposition of the democratic program ; by composing anti-aristocratic lays ; by producing representations of the revolutionary struggle, of working-class life, or of artistic and literary Bohemia. Zola, for example, cannot be considered a democratic author. The artist's attitude towards the world and society must spring from the spirit of democracy—for democracy is a special way of regarding the universe and life.

In this connection the analogous question arises, which varieties of art are peculiarly democratic. We think especially of the possibility of influencing the masses, and of influencing large numbers of persons simultaneously (music, the drama, oratory, etc.), and of artistic education (the theatre, museums, inexpensive reproductions of works of art, and so on) ; but what we are really concerned with is to secure an intimate understanding of the essential nature of the particular type of artistic creation, and to decide whether it be democratic or aristocratic.

These questions have hardly as yet been seriously considered. Exponents of aesthetics have merely touched the

fringe of the matter in their accounts of the historical development of realism and naturalism vis-à-vis romanticism and classicism, and in their descriptions of the relationship of such artists as Heine to the political parties. Still, we have advanced so far at least, that democracy is understood to have an aesthetic side.

The emergence in Russian literature of the *raznočinec* (plebeian) beside and in opposition to the aristocrat has been acclaimed as a democratic achievement, but it is necessary to reiterate that the aristocratic and the democratic spirit respectively are not mere matters of birth.

It should be hardly necessary to point out that democracy does not become established all at once. The decline of aristocracy is gradual, and the replacement of aristocracy by the democratic program and democratic institutions is no simple matter. The English cry for "men not measures" is the fruit of a study from the life. Universal suffrage affords no guarantee that democratic sentiments will prevail; the true democrat will feel democratically and work democratically, not in parliament alone, but in municipal life, in his political party, in the circle of his friends, in family life, everywhere. Democracy is a new outlook and a new conduct of life.

It is a significant fact that the idea of progressive evolution was advocated, and secured general acceptance, simultaneously with the formulation of the demands of democracy. The connection is intimate and important. Aristocracy is absolutist, conservative, and traditionalistic; democracy is progressive and renovative because its trust is placed, not in revelation, but in experience of historic evolution. Democracy is the aspiration towards a new life.

§ 200.

TO many persons, democracy seems essentially antireligious, but it is in fact no more than antitheological and anti-ecclesiastical; radical materialism and atheism were political weapons against theocratic absolutism. The antecedent studies should have made this perfectly clear; the democratic struggle to promote progressive development, in religion as well as in other things, is hostile to ecclesiastical religion with its demand for faith in myth and for ethical passivism.

Democracy is not inimical to religion per se, if by religion

we understand the new religion, and not ecclesiastical religion, not ecclesiastical Christianity.

The relationship of democracy to religion is implicit in the ethical foundation of democracy. Democratic equality is based not on revelation but on ethics; and modern philosophy, which is predominantly ethical, discusses this foundation.

The social and political aspirations of democracy issue from the democratic ethic, for in ultimate analysis the foundation of justice is necessarily ethical. But theocracy bases justice and ethics upon religion.

Democracy proclaims the right of individual initiative, for this is the essence of modern individualism. How extensive is the social and political power attaching to the faculty which each one of us now possesses of publicly criticising persons and things! This power of public criticism having been acquired once for all [written in 1913], aristocracy and its occultism tend increasingly to grow feeble, to decay, and to be replaced. The referendum and the initiative demanded by the democracy already exist in substance, even though they have not yet been formally incorporated into parliamentary institutions.

Democracy consists in the unloosing of every energy, whilst the essence of aristocracy is absolutist restraint.

Democracy perforce desires to create the new; theocratic aristocracy wishes to preserve the old.

Democracy works by scientific method, and its tactics are therefore inductive, realistic, and empirical; theocratic aristocracy is deductive, unrealist, fanciful, and scholastic.

Democracy contrasts with theocratic aristocracy in respect of substance as well as in respect of form. The political and social aspirations of democracy spring from a new conception of the value of human personality. For democracy, too, the supreme moral imperative is love of one's neighbour; the socialists are continually referring to Jesus and to Christianity. It is true that theocracy likewise preached love, but it was and remained aristocratic, for it simultaneously demanded absolute faith, and its conception of love was passivist (in fact, aristocratic). Priests and rulers wished to give their believing and industrious slaves doctrine and daily bread, thereby assuring the continuance of their own dominion.

Democratic love of one's neighbour requires the legal establishment of equality, demands justice; this is the essential

meaning of socialism as contrasted with theocratic almsgiving and philanthropy. We have already shown how natural it is that the theocrats should regard their conception of love as the matter of maximum importance, while looking upon justice as a trifle in comparison.

To sum up, it may be said that the contrast between aristocracy and democracy involves a fundamental difference in the solution of the problem of authority. Aristocratic inequality is the recognition and enforcement of the authoritative principle.

Aristocracy derives its supreme authority from ecclesiastical religion, from God, from revelation ; revelation is sanctioned by tradition, is found in Holy Writ, and is safeguarded by the church ; the pope is the vicegerent of God. These and similar formulas of theocratic theology culminate in the conception of the infallibility, not merely of revelation (for this is self-evident), but of the priestly intermediary and guardian of revelation. From this follow Catholicism and messianism, and the notion that the religious unification of mankind is indispensable.

Emperor, kings, the state, share this absolute authority of church and pope. The emperor, too, holds sway by right divine ; he, too, is infallible as guardian and servant of the church (" the king can do no wrong ").

Democracy likewise appeals to authority, appeals to the people, to humanity, to the masses, to civilisation, progress, historical development, and so on. But these objective authorities must themselves be furnished with foundations. Rousseau was one of the first to refer to the cleavage between Catholicism and the real will of the people. Universality and unity, he said, do not exclude the possibility of error ; and he endeavoured to determine the characteristics of the genuine will of the people. This popular will, also, is considered infallible and absolute.

The contrast between Rousseau's teaching and theocratic doctrine is obvious. Rousseau cannot appeal to any objective revelation ; he is a subjectivist ; his religion is not revealed. Similar is the situation of every reflective person who abandons myth, and who, with Kant, explains all knowledge as derivable from the natural faculties of man. Now what is the critical, the scientific thinker forced to recognise as supreme ? What authority is for him vested in the people, in humanity, in

the parliamentary majority, and so on? What to him are state and emperor?

The critical thinker can recognise nothing but the so-called inner authority. Such is the significance of the fact that since the days of Kant and Hume modern philosophy has been predominantly ethical. In such departments as mathematics, mechanics, etc., no difficulties arise; we can readily agree with one another as to the authority of a mathematician or a natural philosopher. But in the ethical sphere, and consequently in the socio-political sphere as well, views are temporarily conflicting. Fichte said it was unconscientious to act upon authority, but the question is as to the meaning and content of conscience. This is the point upon which all reflection has been concentrated since the days of Kant.

Kant posited in his categorical imperative an absolute, infallible, ethical authority; but this authority is subjective and individual, even though it proclaim itself universal as well as necessary.

We cannot now discuss the reiterated attempts to understand rightly Kant's categorical imperative. All we need say here is that the democratic conception of the principle of authority is a purely ethical one. The sovereignty of the people must not be conceived in the sense of the monarchical sovereignty of absolutism; democratic catholicity does not repose solely upon the arithmetic of universal or preponderant opinion.

II

§ 201.

FOR the right understanding of the nature of democracy and of its contrast with theocracy it is necessary to examine the political aspects of religion in the existing ecclesiastical systems, and we shall first of all consider the political bearings of Protestantism and Catholicism.

Observation discloses that Protestant countries and nations are more favourable than Catholic to the development of democracy. Modern constitutionalism and parliamentarism first consolidated their forces in England and the United States. English public law was copied by the west, and the consequences of this were no less momentous than the consequences of the wide acceptance of Roman law. In addition to America,

England, and the British colonies, the Scandinavian countries are the most advanced in democratic development. In lands where Protestantism and Catholicism are on a more or less equal footing, such as Germany, Holland, and Hungary, the Protestants are the sustainers of parliamentarism. Protestant Finland may be classed with the Scandinavian countries.

To-day, however, many Catholic lands have a constitution, and not a few are familiar with parliamentary institutions ; France is actually a republic. But the political development of France was peculiar. During the eighteenth century, France was influenced in political matters by England and America ; and after a number of sanguinary revolutions the establishment of the democratic French republic may be regarded as now fairly secure. In like manner it was only after a revolution or a series of revolutions that a constitution was introduced into other Catholic lands. The political development of the Protestant peoples has been comparatively regular, has been less turbulent than that of Catholic countries.

Yet it must be admitted that in America, too, the republic came into being as the outcome of revolution ; and in England and all the Protestant lands revolution occurred concomitantly with the reformation. But herein lies the great difference, that the Protestants effected their political revolution simultaneously with the ecclesiastical and religious revolution, whereas in Catholic countries revolutions have remained purely political, have at most in the religious sphere brought about some loosening of the bonds between church and state, so that their influence upon religion has been indirect merely.

Protestantism has furthered democratisation from within outwards.

The subjectivism and individualism manifested in the reformation brought about a weakening of Catholic objectivism and of the authority of a wholly objective revelation. Priesthood was abolished by the reformation ; the subjective individual consciousness was raised to the rank of an authority ; in place of the pope of Rome, every layman became his own pope. Catholic passivism and conservative stagnation were replaced by Protestant progressive activism ; self-governing Protestant churches occupied the ground that had been held by priests, by their aristocratic hierarchy, and by

the ecclesiastical centralisation of the papacy. The Catholic belief in miracle, the myth-haunted realm of magic and mysticism, yielded before the Protestant disillusionment; the world was disenchanted, freed from the dominion of spooks; the rise of determinism (at first in the crude form of the doctrine of predestination) led to the acceptance of a causal view of events and brought about the spread of rationalism. The abandonment of the dogma of transubstantiation was a frank relinquishment of the magical powers of the priesthood. Finally, the disappearance of asceticism strengthened the new moral outlook by the sanctification of family life, and the same development simultaneously promoted the diffusion of a spirit of industry and favoured economic development.

Thus Protestantism is more favourable than Catholicism to the development of democracy, for Catholicism is essentially aristocratic. The intimate connection between Protestantism and democracy can be followed out in detail. The Protestant layman receives his socio-political training in the work of church government; the recognition of the importance of preaching "the word" educates him as a speaker (it must be remembered that parliament means merely the speaking-place), especially since, in the lesser sects, laymen are also preachers; the sanctification of the vernacular tongue by the translation of the Bible and by the use of the vernacular for religious services, strengthened the national consciousness and overthrew the linguistic aristocracy of Latin and French.

The connection of the reformation, especially in its Calvinist form, with the political evolution of the modern age, is indubitable; and it is obvious that democracy had developed with and out of the reformation. It need hardly be said that the evolution has been gradual, and in this matter as in all others, special circumstances must be taken into account in the application of the formula to particular countries and areas.¹

¹ Concerning the development of democracy with and from the reformation, consult Borgeaud's studies (*Annales de l'Ecole libre des Sciences Politiques*, 1890 and 1891); the copy at my disposal is the English translation by Mrs. Hill with a preface by Firth, *The Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England*. Stimulated by Borgeaud, Ellinek has dealt with this topic, but his treatment lacks clarity. In his study, *Exposition of the Rights of Man and Civil Rights*, 1895, political and individual fundamental rights are considered to have a religious origin and to be based upon the reformation. In his *Political Science*, second edition 1905, the general drift is closely akin to that of the sketch given in our text, but Ellinek has failed to understand the

In modern times economic evolution has proceeded *pari passu* with political. Just as democracy sprang from the reformation, so in Protestant lands and among Protestant peoples was economic development more rapid and more intense than in Catholic countries. Capitalist wealth and capitalist enterprise, the modern economic order, are far more characteristic of Protestant than of Catholic countries.¹

Socialism, too, is in this sense and to this extent Protestant, inasmuch as German Marxism (building upon Feuerbach) and social democracy have been the philosophical, scientific, and political foundations of socialism as a system. To a considerable extent, Marxism has replaced other socialistic systems and endeavours, and it has notably influenced these even where it has not replaced them.

Anarchism, likewise, received its philosophic foundations from the thinkers of Protestant countries. The Russian anarchists and those of the Romance lands built upon the work of Feuerbach, Stirner, and Nietzsche. Finally, modern philosophy as a whole is distinctively of Protestant origin, and Kant has quite rightly been designated the philosopher of Protestantism. The Protestant peoples in general are more highly cultured than the Catholic.²

The inferiority of Catholicism may also be proved in the domains of literature and art. For modern times, the fact is admitted by Catholic investigators, notably in the case of Germany, a country where the two creeds confront one another in comparatively equal numerical strength. We may say in

nature of medieval theocracy and of the political process of disestablishment characteristic of modern times. In these respects Laveleye has shown keener insight.

¹ In addition to Laveleye, we may refer here to M. Weber, and to his explanation of the capitalist spirit as an outcome of the reformation, and in particular of the Calvinist reformation. (It seems expedient that I should declare that I differ from Weber in that I regard the problem as more comprehensive, and in the stress that I lay upon other moral and social forces.)

² Of late, much attention has been paid to this question of the cultural inferiority of Catholics. It is well known that the modernists, F. X. Kraus, Schell, and others, have admitted the inferiority of Catholicism in this respect, Von Hertling has conceded the point as far as science is concerned. In the polemic discussions upon the subject the issues have been cleared. Certain regions of Germany have been methodically compared, and statistical proof of Catholic inferiority has been furnished. I may refer to the work by Rost, *The Catholics in the Cultural and the Economic Life of To-day*, 1908. Rost is a Catholic, and there is therefore no reason to be suspicious of his apologetic disquisitions and admissions, though suspicion may be felt regarding Yves Guyot's *Le Bilan sociale et politique de l'Eglise*, 1901, and similar books.

general that since Shakespeare the greatest imaginative writers and artists have been Protestants, have been that is to say far more distinctively Protestant than the great imaginative writers and artists among the Catholics have been Catholic. What I wish to convey is that such an artist as Michelangelo created rather in a secular and humanist than in a Catholic sense.¹

Passing now to the domain of morality, it would seem expedient that first of all this much disputed problem should be succinctly stated. I, at least, do not contend that Protestant peoples are in all respects more moral than Catholic; but I should formulate the outcome of my observations and studies by saying that the morality of Protestantism is higher than the morality of Catholicism, and this not merely in so far as a higher culture is requisite for a higher morality, but because Protestant morality and religion are per se of a loftier character. To put the matter more precisely, Protestantism is the endeavour to secure loftier religion and morality. The use of the term "endeavour" gives expression to my reserves, for the great and long-lasting epoch of transition from the middle ages is not peculiar to Catholicism. Protestantism, too, exhibits much that is inchoate and much that is defective.²

In the sense and scope thus defined, the intimate relationship between Protestantism and democracy can be historically and philosophically established and elucidated. But it is as well to point out in set terms that when I speak of Protestantism I am not thinking solely of the orthodox system of the confessions and the reformers. Protestantism developed from within in contrast to stationary Catholicism, and we can watch this development in its ecclesiastical schisms and in the evolution of theology to become philosophy. The philosophic ideals of humanitarianism and naturalness (natural religion, natural morals, natural law, natural reason, and state of nature in general (cf. §§ 42 and 43), developed in the sense of the reformation and were a continuance of its trend. Upon this basis were established the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and

¹ Cf. C. Muth (Veremundus), *Is Catholic Belletristics abreast of the Time?* (1898), and *The Literary Tasks of German Catholics* (1899).

² I do not touch upon problems of detail, such as the population question, the sexual question, and so on. But I advance the general opinion after due consideration, and after a careful examination of the relevant literature.

fraternity ; upon this, the rights of man and civil rights ; and upon this, was established social legislation.

One objection has to be met despite all our methodological reserves. Was not and is not France, we shall be asked, pre-eminently the land of civilisation and culture ; has not France become wealthy and economically progressive ; was it not France that proclaimed the ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity ; is not France republican ?

France, like all Catholic countries, adopted the new progressive ideas in opposition to its Catholicism and despite its Catholicism ; it was on the basis of such ideas that the modern development of France was upbuilt. Even during the first revolution, under the influence of these modern ideas, France cut herself completely adrift from the church, this severance being the most decisive and revolutionary expression of opposition to ecclesiastical religion. France attempted an ecclesiastical and political restoration, but revolution recurred again and again, so that France, in contradistinction to England, has become the typical land of revolution.

France is radical and revolutionary, but not democratic ; not even the French republic is democratic *per se*. In like manner, whilst French philosophy developed into radical positivism, in the very founder of French positivism, in Auguste Comte, we may note the manner in which anti-ecclesiastical and antitheological positivism relapsed into mythopoeic fetichism. Positivism was radical, but it lacked the spirit of criticism.

German philosophy and English philosophy, on the other hand, are more critical, and consequently more stable ; they are no less anti-ecclesiastical and antitheological ; but they do not encounter in their respective churches the absolute hostility which thought has to encounter in France and in other Catholic lands. We need only compare Comte with John Stuart Mill. Comte relapses into fetichism ; Mill, starting from a Comtist base, advances to nihilism. There has been an analogous political development in England and in Germany. England is nominally a monarchy, but is actually subject to an aristocratic oligarchy, whereas semicatholic Germany with its Prussian junkerdom is being steadily democratised. Germany has the most progressive and the strongest social democracy in Europe ; in Germany, Bismarck, the most

efficient and most stalwart champion of monarchy, was opposed to the absolutist and theocratic pretensions of the emperor,¹ and was in effect a rebel.

This peculiar contrast between Catholicism with its anti-ecclesiastical negation, and Protestantism with its critical superecclesiasticism, can be discerned in the two greatest French philosophers of the revolution. Voltaire, the Catholic, is the revolutionary negation of the church; Rousseau, the Calvinist, endeavours to sustain democracy by means of a civil religion.

The Catholic apologists have a clear grasp of this distinction, and they rightly regard Protestantism as the foundation of modern development. Where they are mistaken is in their appraisal alike of the development and of the foundation.²

Concurrently with the reformation was initiated the new antitheocratic development of humanity, the renaissance. Science and philosophy, all the intellectual forces of man grown self-conscious, combined to overthrow aristocratic theocracy, to cast off the spiritual oppression it exercised, and to secure a consistent application of liberty and equality on behalf of the democratic organisation of society.

§ 202.

DEMOCRACY in Russia is in its inception. We know from our study of Russian history, how theocratic aristocracy developed as caesaropapism; the history of the liberation of the peasantry in 1861 is the history of an unwilling renunciation of aristocratic privileges. Not until the nineteenth century was well under way did men who were not of noble birth, the *raznočincy*, acquire notable positions in the administration, in the army, and in the field of literature, whilst simultaneously the industrialisation of agricultural land was creating a plutocracy. Saltykov summed up the

¹ Emperor William in all seriousness proclaimed his grandfather to be a divine revelation, and declared himself to be God's chosen instrument.

² In the much discussed encyclical, *Diuturnum illud* (1881), Leo XIII derived from Protestantism, not merely modern philosophy, but modern law, the liberal aspirations of democracy, communism, socialism, and even nihilism. In a subsequent encyclical, *Militantis ecclesiae* (1897), the same pope condemned the reformation as a Lutheran rebellion. All that Leo XIII did in these encyclicals was to formulate an effective summary of the doctrines of the *Syllabus*, and to express the common opinion of Catholic ecclesiastical polemicists.

transformation in the following words: "The epoch of agrarian serfdom is closed; the epoch of the serfdom of the toil-stained operative has opened." In the radical camp, the bourgeoisie soon came to be regarded as the real enemy. Stepniak's theory that the revolution is of advantage, not to the community at large, but to the bourgeoisie, is in conformity with the German-made theory of historical materialism. "The philistine" [the bourgeois], said Marx, "is the substratum of the monarchy, and the monarch is nothing but the king of the philistines."

We have rejected as unsound the contention that the Russians and the Slavs in general are by nature peculiarly democratic. This alleged democratic tendency is negative merely, not positive (§ 1. ii). Modern democracy is a conscious and purposive opposition to theocratic aristocracy. In this sense, democracy is the new outlook, is the philosophy to which Bakunin first gave expression in his program of 1842.

The Russian theocracy is founded upon the Catholic Orthodoxy that was adopted from Byzantium. What was written above concerning the cultural inferiority of western Catholicism, applies still more forcibly to the Orthodox Catholicism of the "third Rome." The very fact that eastern Catholicism lays so much stress upon religious orthodoxy, is an indication of the spiritual absolutism which presses so heavily upon the Russians. Orthodoxy signifies stagnation, as the inevitable outcome of the mythopoeic fiction of revelation, and this is why the enlightened Russian protests so vigorously against Orthodoxy.

Count Uvarov proclaimed autocracy no less than Orthodoxy to be a typically national Russian development, and the slavophiles endeavoured to provide a philosophico-historical foundation for Uvarov's theocratic practice. In actual fact, however, a critical analysis of ideas and historical data necessarily leads us to the recognition that the Russian autocracy was a caesaropapism. It cannot be justly regarded as peculiarly national, for autocracy was established upon a similar basis in Byzantium and in the west. The church provided a religious sanction for monarchical absolutism. All attempts to discover national qualities as the foundation of autocracy, and all the conceptual idealisations of the brute facts (idealisations which official philosophy and jurisprudence is ever ready to furnish), are pure illusion. Just as the slavophiles endeavoured

to explain autocracy as the outcome of Russian or Slavic traits, so, in the west, noted jurists attempted to deduce monarchy, as contrasted with democracy, from certain reputedly Teutonic juridical characteristics. The theocratic sanction of autocracy is a deduction from the ecclesiastico-religious sanction. As far as Russia is concerned, Count Uvarov impressed this upon the tsar (§ 24); and before Uvarov, Karazin had energetically defended the divine right of the great landed proprietors (§ 15).

Emperor William is more realist than his crown jurists when he insists that his absolutism¹ is a revealed divine right, and when in his well-known letter on religion he defends revelation against liberal theology. In these matters the views of Emperor William coincide with those of Tsar Nicholas II; Metternich, voicing the sentiments of Emperor Francis of Austria, spoke in almost identical terms (§ 36); and the founders of the holy alliance all felt themselves and declared themselves to be instruments in the hands of providence (§ 15). Such differences as exist between Prussian monarchy and Russian monarchy can be accounted for by the differences between Prussia and Russia in respect of ecclesiastical and religious institutions.

Wherever it has existed, theocratic absolutism has endeavoured by coercive means to maintain the conditions whereby subjects were shut out from political activities. Isolation from human contact led to the moral and biological degeneration of aristocracies and dynasties, the universal result being revolution. But aristocracy and absolutism are not based solely upon coercion, for they are maintained in addition, as Herzen rightly insisted, by general recognition, by the opinions in the minds of men.

Since the days of Peter, philosophy, and above all European philosophy, has revolutionised thought. Peter was himself a revolutionary. The regime of Nicholas I made the philosophical revolution radical; it was from political even more than from philosophical need that atheism and materialism were counterposed to Uvarov's theocratic principles. Materialism in its radical negation was always a political weapon.

In opposition to theocracy and to its mythopoeic and

¹ "The soldier must not have a will of his own. You must all have *but* one will, and that is *my* will; there is *but one* law, and that is *my* law!"—Speech to recruits about to take the military oath, November 16, 1893.

mystical theology, realism and nihilism were preached as positivist disillusionment; this is the significance of Herzen's positivism, of Bakunin's antitheologism, and of Černyševskii's materialism. Feuerbach's philosophy was utilised above all as a solvent of ecclesiastical religion and of religion in general.¹

Russian positivism with its atheism and materialism has proved inadequate. Russian philosophical and therefore Russian political thought fails through the lack of criticism. Russian philosophy has not succeeded in uprooting myth.

In practice this defect manifests itself in the failure of the Russians to adopt the ethic of perseverance wholeheartedly and consistently. Kirěevskii pointed this out long ago, but consoled himself in aristocratic fashion by saying that the Russian could atone for his lack of perseverance by splendid bursts of labour. Here speaks the typical aristocrat, the man who despises application and the petty details of everyday work.

Since Pestel and Herzen, the Russian revolutionaries have expressed themselves as opposed to constitutionalism and parliamentarism. Herein we have a sample of the widely discussed Russian anarchism. Owing to the prolonged dominance of theocratic absolutism, Russians have been laymen in political no less than in religious matters, and they therefore incline to regard the constitutionalist beginnings of democracy as of trifling importance. Herzen, feeling as an aristocrat, declared constitutionalism, the republic, and even universal suffrage, to be nullities. Herzen, however, was thoroughgoing enough to regard the acquirements of the bourgeois revolution as manifestations of Protestantism; and against Protestantism he directed his most emphatic protests. The Russian atheist could not share in the religious disillusionment of Protestantism; also, as a matter of theory, he demanded this disillusionment in conjunction with Feuerbach the positivist and materialist.

In like manner the revolutionaries since Herzen have

¹ I reiterate Feuerbach's dictum: "I would not give a rush for political liberty if I were to remain a slave of religious fancies and prejudices. True freedom can be found there only where man is free also from the tyranny of religion." Such is the view of the contemplative philosopher. But let me quote Fouillé in addition: "There is only one way of putting an end to practical despotism, and this is to put an end to metaphysical despotism and to dogmatism in all its forms, to materialist despotism no less than to the spiritualist despotism which claims a knowledge of absolute salvation."

aimed rather at liberty than at democratic equality. Even to Kropotkin, equality seems nothing more than a means to secure uniformity and justice. Kropotkin, despite his anarchism, is an aristocrat, and his attitude towards justice closely resembles that of the pope's secretary. Mihailovskii is here more progressive and democratic, though less revolutionary.

This lack of the democratic spirit characterises the apostates of *Signposts* (§§ 182 and 183). Berdjaev, one of their spokesmen, aspires towards a mystical form of aristocracy. Aristocracy is ever mythopoeic and mystical.

Nor has Russian liberalism as yet had courage to free itself completely from the theocracy. Only the social democrats and the social revolutionaries demand the severance of state from church. The liberals content themselves with the program of freedom of conscience. In this matter, as previously explained, the progressive theologians, few in number, are further advanced, for they demand disestablishment in the interest of religion itself.

The presupposition of democracy is the new ethic of equality, not solely the Herzenian brain equality. The defenders of theocracy are perfectly aware of this. Leont'ev tells us that the state can exist without morals but not without religion. Pobédonoscev denounces unbelief as the direct negation of the state. Tihomirov tells us that if independent thought in the sphere of religion be but rendered impossible, an able police service will be competent to take care of all other essentials.

The Russians are extremely revolutionary, but not very democratic.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION

§ 203.

THESE studies might well be entitled "The Russian Revolution," for since the days of Peter, Russia has been in a chronic condition of revolution, and the problem of the revolution is one of the leading interests of all philosophers of history and statesmen in Russia. We may indeed say that the problem of revolution is preeminently the problem of Russia.

In Russia, as well as in Europe, the French revolution gave rise to the development of modern philosophy of history and modern sociology (§ 46). Since the time of the great revolution, the problem of revolution has in Russia been a standing item upon the agenda, practically no less than theoretically. The reaction under Alexander I and Nicholas I, definitely directed against the revolution, forced Russian thinkers into two opposing camps, that of the revolutionaries and that of the antirevolutionaries. The revolutionary trend began with Pestel and Radiščev; the succession was continued by Bělinskii, Herzen, Bakunin, Černyševskii, Dobroljubov, and the nihilists, the terrorists, and especially the Narodnaja Volja, Lavrov and Mihailovskii, and finally the revolutionary exponents of socialism and anarchism (the Marxists on the one hand, and Kropotkin on the other).

The right wing is represented by the official policy, which was reduced by Count Uvarov to the simple formula of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality, and which made an impression upon Puškin, and yet more markedly upon Gogol. The slavophiles did their utmost to give this formula a philosophic content, but the philosophy speedily became dissipated into

the prescriptions of the theocracy, for Katkov, Pobėdonoscev, and Leont'ev were but spokesmen of the caesaropapist reaction. Solov'ev renewed the attempt of the slavophiles, and a number of sometime revolutionaries have of late followed in his footsteps, for the interest in religion has been fortified by the writings of Dostoevskii and Tolstoi. In Ropšin, above all, we have been able to demonstrate the manifestations of the crisis in revolutionism. The first Russian mass revolution, and its conquest by the reaction, once more made the problem of revolution a matter of urgent actuality.

The concept of revolution secures graphic expression in current terminology. Everywhere when people speak of a rising, a revolt, a tumult, an insurrection, or a rebellion, they mean something quite distinct from revolution, for this last is regarded as a thorough transformation from the foundation upwards. In the last sense, people speak also of "the definitive revolution."

Civil war, again, is distinguished from revolution, and we distinguish between revolution from above and revolution from below. Reaction is a form of revolution, for reaction is the counter-revolution.

In most cases the idea of bloodshed is attached to the idea of revolution, but of course a revolution may be effected without bloodshed, though carried out by the use of force and even military force.

These terms afford a fairly accurate classification, or at any rate provide a survey, of the different varieties of revolution, and we may content ourselves with the simple enumeration of designations without attempting precise definitions.

As far as Russia is concerned we have to think especially of the difference between mass revolution and individual revolutionary acts (terrorism). Enough has been said in previous chapters to emphasise this distinction, for it is clearly explained in the history of the Russian revolution and in the doctrines of individual writers on the subject.

Ordinarily the term revolution, when used without qualification, signifies political revolution. But there are also non-political revolutions: religious, moral, and ecclesiastical; philosophic and scientific; literary and artistic. Much has been written concerning the economic and social revolution brought about by capitalism.

The distinction between the varieties of revolution previously enumerated is based upon differences in causation. In some cases a revolution may arise from a momentary and transient dissatisfaction, or even from a more enduring dissatisfaction, and may aim merely at such a change as the removal of one or two oppressive personalities, or at the transformation of individual measures or institutions. Very different is the deliberate aim at the reconstruction of an entire political regime and of all the institutions of society.

Thus the French revolution at the close of the eighteenth century is rightly distinguished as the "great" revolution. The peculiar significance of the French revolution and its sequels was that they aimed at revolution in the true sense of the word, at a fundamental transformation. There were philosophical, ethical, and religious preparations for the change; man was to be renovated, and the whole of life was to be built up anew from its very foundations. The reaction and the restoration served only to strengthen this aspiration; philosophically and historically, the revolution was represented as a necessary process of renewal, the reconstitution of society and mankind. This is the explanation of the modern faith in progress (§ 40), of the idea of the new age and of novelty in general, an idea which has now secured general recognition in theory, in practice, and in statecraft.

In our account of Marxism (§ 160) we pointed out that the idea of progress and evolution furnishes many persons with arguments against revolution. It is contended that the development of human history must be gradational, just as the world and the cosmos have evolved by infinitesimal stages.

The question arises here, whether those who argue thus have rightly understood the data of history. We learn from the history of revolutions, and above all from the history of the French revolution, that these happenings cannot be explained into non-existence by analogies drawn from the modern theories of those geologists and cosmologists who will hear nothing of catastrophe. Psychology and sociology teach us that in the spiritual or psychical sphere individual development, and therefore also the development of society, is characterised by crises, by crude contrasts, by revolutions. Struve is utterly wrong in deducing from the theory of evolution, the view that revolution is epistemologically inconceivable.

Psychologically and logically, glaring oppositions exist (the so-called contrast effects), and to this extent the Hegelian dialectic is justified. We may admit that, objectively considered, the contrasts are less glaring than they seem to those who know them subjectively. Revolution may be accounted an exceptional happening; we may wish that there were no revolutions, that development could take place without such shocks. But revolutions have occurred, and it is undeniable that since the great revolution, revolutionism, the revolutionary mood, has become widespread and enduring. Socialism and anarchism as mass moods are definitely revolutionary. In philosophy, literature, and art, and also in the moral domain, revolutionary sentiment is general. Socio-political revolutions are intimately connected with revolutions in the mind. We may recall Čaadaev's saying that in the west revolutions have at first always been mental; "interests" have followed ideas.

Modern revolutionism has developed since the reformation and the renaissance. The religious and ecclesiastical reformation was revolutionary, and led by a natural development to the social and political transformation of Europe. The peoples which accepted and carried through the reformation subsequently exhibited a socio-political trend in the direction of democracy, so that among them the manifestations of revolutionism were less radical than these proved among the Catholic peoples, those that suppressed the reformation and for that very reason again and again broke into revolution against theocratic absolutism. The French revolution was the natural outcome of theocratic absolutism, against which the enlightenment and modern philosophy, fertilised by English and American ideas, directed their shafts. Diderot gave distinctive utterance to the mood of revolutionary Frenchmen when he expressed the wish that the last king might be strangled with the entrails of the last priest. Protestantism was comparatively favourable to modern ideas, to philosophy and science. Among the Protestant peoples, therefore, the revolution was less radical, and was predominantly theoretical, literary, and philosophical.

We must refer once more to Hume and Kant, and above all to the Kantian criticism. As we have more than once had occasion to insist, the world-wide historical significance of critical philosophy, as contrasted with uncritical mythology, is that the former effectively destroys the theoretical founda-

tions of theology, and the practical foundations of theocracy. Hume and Kant have revolutionised the minds of believers once for all.

Marx and his successors are right in proclaiming philosophy and science to be essentially revolutionary; but they are wrong when they endeavour to limit the revolutionary spirit to atheism and materialism or to certain specified sciences (they speak of the natural sciences, but we may remember that F. A. Lange regarded moral statistics as the most revolutionary of all the sciences). The philosophic revolution consists in the recognition of the futility of mythology, in the growth of a critical self-consciousness. Atheistic and materialistic negation is the ephemeral and purely negative form of this revolution.

During and after the French revolution, many philosophers, jurists, and students of political science, endeavoured to define the essence of that movement. Peculiarly instructive are the writings of the adversaries of the revolution: in France, de Maistre, and the philosophers of the restoration, de Bonald, Ballanche, etc.; in England, Burke; in Germany, Baader, Görres, Stahl, such converts to Catholicism as Schlegel, and the Metternichian publicists, led by Gentz.

I am in accord with the analysis furnished by these reactionaries. From their stately series I may select the Prussian court publicist Stahl, an eye witness and analyst of the revolution of 1848. Stahl rightly recognised that the revolution was not an isolated act, but a permanent state from which the new order was to spring. "Revolt, expulsion of dynasties, overthrow of constitutions, have occurred in all ages. The revolution is the characteristic, world-wide, and historical signature of our own epoch." Stahl is right, again, when he refers the revolution to an attempt "to base the whole of public life upon the will of man instead of upon God's ordinance and disposition." Stahl is right, finally, when he proclaims rationalism in religion to be the original cause of revolution.¹

Though I agree with Stahl upon these points, I differ from him in that what he censures as "the extremity of sin in the political domain, . . . the essential defiance of God's ordinance, . . . the counter-belief in man rather than God," seems to me thoroughly justifiable.

Like Stahl and the before-mentioned philosophers and

¹ Stahl, *What is the Revolution?* (1852).

political writers, the Russian reactionaries rightly understood the nature of revolution. Whereas Stahl thought that one power only, that of Christianity, could overcome the revolution, and whereas de Maistre turned for aid to the authority of the pope, Count Uvarov and the Russian theocrats from Katkov to Leont'ev, pursuing the same end, consistently counterposed the theocracy to the revolution.

§ 204.

IT is comprehensible that the official exponents of philosophy should deny or gloss over its revolutionary effects. In this spirit, during the reign of Nicholas I, the liberal writer Polevoi took up the cudgels on behalf of French philosophy, saying that it had not been the cause of the revolution any more than Christianity had been responsible for the massacre of St. Bartholomew.

True, not every philosophy is revolutionary. Even Kant never attained to clear views upon the problem of revolution. He contended that revolution was inadmissible, and that the utmost the people might do was to refuse to pay taxes. He did not discuss the consequences of such a refusal, nor did he explain why he was sympathetic towards the French revolution, nor why he accepted the ideas of Rousseau. When the king commanded him to refrain from the public discussion of religious questions, Kant complied with the order.¹

But, in similar circumstances, Kant's successors, Fichte for instance, refused to comply. Hegel's disciples, the Hegelians of the left, had an influence in promoting the events of the year 1848, and some of them were direct participators in the revolutionary movements; but Feuerbach, the founder of the trend, held aloof, explaining that, though a republican, he desired to see a republic established only where men were ripe for republican institutions. For the same reason, the revolutionary Herzen went so far as to invoke maledictions on the year 1848; but his successors persisted in their

¹ "A revolution may perhaps lead to a decline in personal despotism and in oppression based upon desire for gain or love of power, but can never bring about a true reform in the realm of thought. The unthinking masses will speedily succumb to the sway of new prejudices." Kant is here referring merely to the effects of a transient revolt, and his remarks do not apply to the great revolution and its sequels.

endeavours to promote an intellectual and political revolution in Russia, and down to our own day they have continued to ponder the ethics of revolution.

In many cases a revolution is judged by its fruits, by the application of a utilitarian standard. Should it prove successful, its leaders and initiators are commended; should it fail, an unfavourable judgment is passed. That is the way in which the world judges wars, and most other enterprises.

Of course such judgments are apt to be unsound and unjust, and their only value is that they stress the consideration that the initiators of revolutionary undertakings must have foresight and a due sense of responsibility.

The ethical judgment of revolution is concerned with motives, for this is merely to apply to revolution the ethical standard by which all activities are to be appraised. By following such a rule we can overcome the difficulties which have troubled Ropšin and other writers.

All revolutions, including revolutions in the mental sphere, must be judged by these ethical canons. The philosophical and literary critic, and every conscientious and earnest worker, will not fail to ask himself how his words and deeds will be received. Doubtless the thinker is not responsible for the various interpretations that may be placed upon his ideas; but a conscientious man pays heed to the environment in which he has to work, and takes into account the intellectual capacity of those before whom his thoughts will be laid. Thought is social.

But the writer is responsible for the consequences of his words when he demands, incites to, or suggests action. There are numerous grades of responsibility, according to the degree to which the aim was clearly conceived. When, for example, Tailhade was sentenced for incitements to murder, his defender was right in pointing to the manner in which the antisemites and the nationalists were continually inciting to murder.

In Europe, in days that are not yet remote, difference of opinion was punishable with banishment and even death. In Russia, Nicholas I had Dostoevskii condemned to death for the public reading of Bēlinskii's writing against Gogol, the capital sentence being commuted to one of many years' Siberian exile. Nicholas might have appealed to the example of Locke, who proposed that atheism as a political crime should be punishable with death. For words are also deeds.

Since the days of Bělinskii and Herzen, for Russian thinkers the ethical problem of revolution has been the question whether crime and murder are permissible. Ropšin became aware that as a revolutionary he had not merely to sacrifice his own life, but to slay others, and he asked himself, May one kill? Such is the real problem of conscience, and the question can only be answered in the negative. Man cannot play the part of God towards his fellows. In accordance with humanitarian ethics, all human life without distinction is sacred. There are no exceptions to the humanitarian law that no man has the right to kill his fellow man. The law is, of course, equally binding on rulers.

A further canon of humanitarian ethics is that everyone may, nay must, defend himself against anything that imperils his mental or physical life, and that he ought to do so in all circumstances, and whatever the source of the menace. Everyone should resist coercion and constraint. Tolstoi's doctrine of non-resistance is false. The only element of truth it contains is that the defender must confine himself to defence; the aggressor's violence does not justify the use of active violence in return. Humanitarian ethics does not appraise slaying in accordance with the Old Testament law of retaliation. The essence of moral progress is that the psychological motivation of every action demands individual consideration, so that every act of killing must be judged according to the attendant circumstances. To-day, not every killing is punishable with death; jurists distinguish between death and manslaughter, and legally there are varying degrees of murder.

The humanitarian standard must be applied in our judgment of revolution, and of revolutionary killing. Socio-political self-defence, defence of one's own and others' lives, the defence of the general weal and above all of moral and spiritual interests against the violence of rulers, are permissible and are indeed positive duties. Experience has shown that theocratic aristocracy in its absolutist form is essentially coercive, and is prone to the use of force; hence the resistance offered by the democracy is fully justified. Revolution may be a right and necessary means of resistance, and is then ethically justified. It may even become a moral duty.

My contention is, that revolution may be the right instrument for the democracy to adopt. It may be. But some

revolutions are reactionary, undemocratic, unprogressive. A revolution may be unnecessary.

Thus the real question is, what is the guiding motive and what the ultimate aim of revolution. We have to distinguish ephemeral tumults from deliberately planned reformatory revolutions. But a revolt brought about by the stress of poverty, hunger, or despair, must not be harshly judged. Goethe, though of aristocratic temperament, blamed governments for revolutions; these were never the fault of the people.

No one should ever promote a revolution or participate in one in consequence of vengeful or angry feelings. Vera Zassulič did well to insist upon this point. A justifiable revolution will not be the outcome of romanticism and its fantasies, will not arise from tedium or from a cynical contempt for mankind; nor must we confuse the hodmen and the condottieri of revolution with the progressive-minded revolutionaries. These distinctions of motive and of type are manifest among the participators in every revolution. What we are concerned with is the dominant motive of those who initiate the movement and of those who assume its leadership with a deliberate sense of responsibility.

In appraising a revolution, therefore, we must distinguish carefully between the movement as a whole, and its individual phases, periods, and activities. Our ethical approval may be given to the revolution as a whole even while we condemn the acts of individual participators. Kropotkin prescribes a sound rule for revolutionaries when he says that bloodshed must be reduced to a minimum.

The psychologist, analysing the mass movement, will furnish the moralist with a knowledge of numerous extenuating circumstances, and will be able in particular to point to the general atmosphere of revolutionary excitement, and to show how this may at times assume morbid forms. But the moralist, like the sound tactician, will never fail to insist that excitement is a bad leader for reformers. A desirable revolution springs from the calm conviction that no other means can bring about the requisite progress, and that revolution is consequently indispensable.

True revolution is reformatory revolution, and therefore those who defend and advocate revolution, continually insist that preparatory work in the mental sphere is essential, that

only those revolutions that have been deliberately thought out in advance can possibly prove successful.

We may unhesitatingly concede that revolutionaries do not invariably possess the requisite quatum of patience. But here they do not stand alone, for men are unduly prone to appeal to force. This is manifest in the case of war, which, like revolution, may be justified as a defensive measure, but is far too often used as a means for imposing constraint on others. Speaking generally, men are still apt to squander their vital energies, and they continually sustain the realm of death. Thou shalt not kill! The commandment is universally valid, and its significance is that the reflective man must do his utmost to husband his own and his neighbours' vital forces.

From this outlook, it must be admitted that the state institutions and the administrative methods that have hitherto prevailed are characterised by grave moral defects, and that for this reason even a blood-stained revolution may be excusable. As long as the state and its "god-given" monarchy bases its power on the army, whose force is turned not only against enemies abroad but against subjects at home, and as long as the death penalty is enforced, it is natural that many malcontents should have recourse to the violent means whose use seems sanctioned by the state. Tumults and risings are often manifestations of an unreflective dissatisfaction. If the conduct of state affairs be equally unreflective, such manifestations of dissatisfaction tend to become endemic, until ultimately reforms are conceived and effected. Oxenstierna was right when he contended that every government has the revolutions it deserves. Theocratic absolutism, using force, is responsible for the use of violence by the revolutionary opposition.

A correct judgment of any particular revolution will be facilitated by insight into the nature of the social organism, and above all by an understanding of the social harmony of the various forces at work. The cultured sociologist and philosopher of history will take a very different view from the ordinary taxpayer as to the question of blame for revolution in any given state of society. To give a concrete instance, such a philosopher may wonder whether de Maistre did not do more to promote reaction than was done by Louis XVIII, Charles X, or Louis Philippe. The philosopher of history,

the man who has read and understood Kant's *Critique* and Goethe's *Faust*, will know how to discriminate between a needless popular rising and an indispensable revolution.

Moreover, our judgment of the revolution will vary according to our estimate of the significance of state organisation, of government, and of dynasties. One who does not regard the state as the most important and most valuable element of social organisation, will hardly regard a political revolution as a revelation from on high.

An insight into the nature of social harmony leads us to insist that the revolutionary, if he claims the right to be judge over others in life-and-death matters, must himself before all things think, feel, and live progressively and democratically. Democracy has its duties as well as its rights. Democracy is no mere political system of universal suffrage, but a new philosophy and a new conduct of life. It is essential that democrats should educate and train men for democracy. For the time being, the schools are in the hands of state and church, and an essential point to-day in the political struggle is therefore to liberate the school from the theocracy; political culture and education must for the nonce be secured outside the school, and in opposition to the official ideals of education. The supreme difficulty lies in the vicious circle, that the children are educated by the fathers, the young by the old, democrats by aristocrats. Hence the revolution is an uprising of the children against the fathers.

§ 205.

IN support of their opinion that revolution is justifiable, progressively minded and democratic jurists appeal to the so-called natural right which was formulated in the sense of the humanitarian ideal. Substantially, by natural right is meant that ethical rules are to be embodied in legislation, and numerous attempts have been made towards the formulation of this idea. According to Hume and Kant, however, no precise epistemological foundation has hitherto been provided for natural right.

A primary democratic claim is the right of individual initiative, and this applies in especial to revolution. The justification for a revolution is not furnished by the participation of the masses, but depends upon the motives of those

who recognise and declare that the revolution is necessary, and who initiate and guide the movement. Always, however, it is essential to adduce proof that the revolution is actually in conformity with the true interests of the people, that it represents a real progress in democratic evolution, and that it is indispensable.¹

The modern right of initiative ascribes the leading role to the individual intelligence, emotions, and will. Side by side with the legally appointed and officially recognised leaders of humanity, (men need leaders in addition to thinkers), there arise in all domains persons who are assigned leadership or directly and deliberately seize it.

The right of initiative concurrently implies individual responsibility. He who talks of liberty, who talks of the right of initiative, talks also of personal responsibility. The ego, always the ego, is responsible, not the majority, not the plenum, this is the doctrine of modern progressive individualism, whereas the man of an earlier day took shelter behind the church, the state, the nation, the party, the majority, or even mankind as a whole.

The official conservative and reactionary jurists counterposed revolution by proclaiming legitimist right and by appealing to the so-called historic right. In actual fact, the formulas of historic right are fictions, invented to support the actual and historically extant relationships of power. The same remark applies to the attempt to formulate the special rights of reigning dynasts. Rulers appeal to ecclesiastico-religious sanction, to divine right, and Stahl was perfectly logical in referring historic right to the sanction of ecclesiastical Christianity.²

¹ Bluntschli already formulated a natural right of the state to develop. Cf. *Allgemeines Staatsrecht*, 5th edition, 1876, p. 29.

² The discussion will be clarified by an example of the way in which jurists have endeavoured to master the problem of revolution. The instance I select is that of Merkel, who writes on the elements of general jurisprudence in the fifth edition of Holtzendorff's *Encyclopädie der Rechtswissenschaft*, 1890 (p. 12). From the binding force of legal prescriptions Merkel deduces the view "that a forcibly established order does not become a legally and rightfully established order (or a part of such an order) until the moment arrives when the preponderance of the moral forces of the people inclines towards its side, and condones its existence, so that a voluntary respect for the established order becomes a decisive principle of action. . . . It follows that right or justice can issue from force and injustice. This happens because through the influence of habituation and other intermediating factors the forces of the popular consciousness become favourable to that which has been brought about by force

Whilst I thus emphatically reject the doctrine of historic right, and even regard the phrase as a contradiction in terms, we must be careful to avoid appealing to historic right to justify revolution. This is the error of those who in the name of progress would acclaim the demand for innovation as the only sound principle.

Neither the old nor the new is per se right and true. A thing is not necessarily true and right because it has actually existed and continues to exist. This settles the whole problem! The democrat who contests the validity of the principle of catholicity (*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*), realises clearly that history, chronology, cannot replace logic and ethics.

This conception must be emphatically counterposed both to the doctrine of the reactionaries and to that of the radicals. The defenders of revolutionism, no less than the defenders of a particular revolution, must attain to clear ideas on the subject.

The radicalism that is always apt and eager for revolution, stricken with blindness to philosophico-historical and political realities, is often a danger owing to the way in which it plays into the hands of reaction. All well-informed political thinkers of modern times have recognised how revolution may promote reaction, and it must therefore be the aim of true democrats and scientific statesmen to get the better of radicalism. I do not mean by this that we should attempt to discover a so-called golden mean between extremes, for the paltry doctrine of the golden mean has ever been a favourite with reactionaries, and it implies the continued existence of the oppositions it pretends to conciliate. What we have to do is to remain consistently progressive in our thoughts and in our actions, so that by creative progress we may render reaction and radicalism alike impossible.¹

and injustice." Merkel is thinking of a revolution from above, of a coup d'état; but his remarks obviously apply with equal force to a revolution from below. The drift of his argument is that might precedes right and makes right, and the official jurisconsults are sufficiently ingenious to cloak these hard facts in legal terminology. What sort of "moral forces" are these, what sort of "condonation"; how can "habitation," how can "other intermediating factors," make "the forces of the popular consciousness . . . favourable" so that "right or justice can issue from force and injustice?" In face of such logic and such ethics, Engels was perfectly justified in contending that the right to revolution was the only true historic right.

¹ We recall Metternich's saying: "The sacred middle line upon which truth stands is accessible to but a few."

Radicalism is frequently unprogressive. The radicals fail to understand that earlier revolutions have provided us with other and often more effective means of democratisation, and they do not know how to turn these means to account. Once constitutionalism, and still more once parliamentarism, has been attained, constitutional channels offer scope for such effective political activities that revolution becomes needless and often futile. Ethically considered, revolution is permissible only in the last resort. Not until all other means have been tried must we have recourse to the extreme measure of revolution, and then only after the most profound searchings of conscience.

Progress does not signify a continuous and positively morbid lust for innovation. Radicals and revolutionaries, no less than conservatives and reactionaries, are affected with the malady of historism, are guided by chronology instead of by a study of the facts. The conservative regards that as good which existed yesterday; the revolutionary regards that as good which exists to-day or will exist to-morrow. The conservative succumbs to traditionalism; the revolutionary succumbs to radicalism, to philoneism, to modernism, to à-la-modism. In this sense I contrast historism with realism.

Progressive democracy desires to overcome both conservatism and radicalism, for both are utopian. Without a clearly conceived aim, and devoting all his energies to an attack upon the historically extant, the revolutionary is apt to exercise a purely negative influence. Such a revolutionary is the awful example of a politician for whom the existence of the old is a necessary presupposition, of one who could not live were it not for the existence of the old. The revolutionary becomes a reactionary, the opponent of philistinism is himself a philistine. Antiphilistinism is frequently nothing more than a form of philistinism.

§ 206.

IF I mistake not, among the participators in the French revolution Thomas Paine may be regarded as the most conspicuous example of a modern, democratically minded, deliberately progressive revolutionary. His writings supply the philosophical foundations of the democratic revolution. Precisely because his participation in the revolution was so

deliberate, he was able to estimate very accurately the errors of the revolution, and yet would not allow these errors to confuse his mind as to the general necessity of the movement. Paine, and here he stood alone, had the courage to defend Louis XVI, saying, "Kill the king, not the man," thus modifying Augustine's maxim, "Diligite homines, interficite errores." Paine, too, was valiant enough to defend the republic and democracy against his brother revolutionaries.

The Russian revolutionaries lack Paine's qualities. The errors of the revolutionary movement alarmed Herzen, and warped his judgment both of Europe and of Russia. Bakunin clung to revolution, but his revolutionism was blind; it is always Bakunin to whom Russians appeal, to Bakunin's doctrine of revolutionary instinct, when what is requisite is intelligent revolutionary conviction. Černyševskii might perchance have developed into a Russian Paine, had he not been monstrously condemned to a living death in Siberia. But the Russian, who continues to believe uncritically in myth, still expects the revolution to work miracles. What Russians need, in a word, is a Kant to apply criticism to their revolutionary doctrines. For lack of such a Kant, they have never got beyond Stepniak's Old Testament theory of a life for a life.

The Russians are apt to forget that their goal is not revolution, but democracy; and Russian revolutionism readily lapses into anarchism and nihilism. Bakunin was perfectly right in demanding a new ethic for Russia and for Europe, but he was unable to guide his own actions consistently in accordance with the doctrines of this new ethic. A democrat in theory, he was an aristocrat in practice.

The new ethic is the ethic of democratic equality, and democratic equality demands critical thought. The Russian revolutionaries (and notably Mihailovskii) recognised that as a preliminary step the old ideas and customs must be destroyed, but the Russian revolutionary is himself none the less apt to cherish the old ideas and to follow the old customs. He desires to be free, but cannot abandon the tradition and the persistent habits of serfdom. The first revolutionaries were the first of the emancipated serfs. It is not to the point to object that most of the revolutionaries were in actual fact members of the free, the aristocratic caste, for slavery was the social and spiritual condition alike of masters and of slaves.

The uncritical character of the Russian revolutionary movement is exhibited in the strong sense of personal injury (if I may use the term) by which the Russian revolutionaries are animated. We may admit that in Russia it is far from easy to avoid feeling a positive hatred towards the reactionaries. For example, Burcev's personal campaign against the tsar is not difficult to understand. But there must be a sustained endeavour to conduct the struggle without personal animus, to avoid regarding individuals as responsible for collective sins. Tsarism is no more than a part of theocratic aristocracy; the tsar is but one among many.

The inchoateness of Russian conditions explains the emergence of terrorism as a typical feature of the Russian revolutionary movement. Terrorism is per se individualist, a method by which individuals attack individuals.

The Marxists are to be commended for their rejection of terrorism and for their attempts to pave the way for the mass revolution. They do well to strive to promote the political culture and education of the masses, for a definitive revolution can unquestionably be effected only when the bulk of the population shall have attained a high level of political development. But if culture and education are competent to secure the necessary reforms, a sanguinary revolution will be superfluous.

Marxism openly proclaims its revolutionary goal, and yet in most countries it has a recognised, or at least a tolerated, status side by side with the other political parties; this signifies a great political victory for democracy. To all intents and purposes, absolutism and monarchy have already been routed; the conceptual basis of the theocracy has been overthrown. To-day monarchy must seek utilitarian grounds for its support, for no reflective persons now believe in divine right. Constitutionalism and parliamentarism are the outcome of mutual concessions; they are half-way houses which will ultimately be replaced by the indispensable newer forms of popular administration.

What applies to Europe applies also to Russia. In Russia, however, the caesaropapist theocracy is more powerful than theocracy in Europe, and Russian conditions gave rise to the terrorist guerilla revolution. But long before the publication of Ropšin's books, the Russian terrorists had recognised and admitted the danger of terrorist tactics.

First of all, the Russian terrorist cannot delude himself into believing that he is acting in the name of the Russian people. The Narodnaja Volja openly declared itself to be a mere preparative for the popular will, not that will in actual operation. Stepniak took refuge in Rousseau against the parliamentary doctrine of majority rule. In like manner Kropotkin, in his theory of the revolution, said that its success would depend upon the acceptance of its ideals by the classes against which it had been directed. The terrorists, it is true, never attained to clear views regarding their relationship to the people. The people, they contended, had independent rights as a subjective entity vis-à-vis the state, but their explanations of what they meant by this contention were exceedingly confused. Moreover, the mass revolution can only be brought about by the dictatorial leadership and the initiative of a few persons, it may be of a single individual. In the last resort, the individual must hazard the initiative in all revolutions. Kropotkin suffers from self-deception when he asserts that the sole function of leaders is to instigate, not to lead, and when he contends that the leader merely provides the theoretical forms for which the masses furnish practical expression. To these views there still clings the haziness of the narodničestvo concerning the relationship of the individual to the social whole.

The terrorists attempted to carry out terrorism systematically but practice convinced them that the method was an impossible one.

Recognising the ethical dangers of their tactics, the terrorists manifested their dubiety in various ways. First of all they explained that revolution was always waged in self-defence, and that they adopted revolutionary methods solely as a last resort and with reluctance. In 1862, even Bakunin said that it would be much better if revolution could be effected without bloodshed, and he continued to hope that the tsar would initiate the necessary revolution by granting the essential and fundamental reforms. Mihailov, one of the first victims of the revolutionary movement, says in his proclamation, "To the Younger Generation," that he and his associates desired a peaceful revolution, but would not shrink from using force, should force ultimately prove necessary. Similar was the language of the terrorists of the Narodnaja Volja and even of the adherents of the Cernyi Pereděl; to the last moment they all continued to hope for a peaceful solution of the intolerable situation

After the attempted blowing up of the Winter Palace, when many soldiers were killed, the executive committee issued a proclamation (February, 1880) deploring the deaths of the victims, but declaring that such tragic incidents would remain inevitable as long as the army continued to protect the tsar. At the same time, the proclamation insisted that terrorism was armed defence against the tyranny and the cruelty of the government, and it held the government and the tsar accountable for all that was done.

As late as March 10, 1881, the terrorists issued a proclamation to Tsar Alexander II declaring that they would instantly and unconditionally submit to a government appointed by a national assembly. The same year, after the assassination of President Garfield, the "Narodnaja Volja," the organ of the terrorists, published the following declaration (No. 6, October 23, 1881): "The executive committee, expressing its profoundest sympathy with the American people on account of the death of James Abram Garfield, feels it to be its duty to protest in the name of the Russian revolutionaries against all such deeds of violence as that which has just taken place in America. In a land where the citizens are free to express their ideas, and where the will of the people does not merely make the law but appoints the person who is to carry the law into effect, in such a country political assassination is the manifestation of a despotic tendency identical with that to whose destruction in Russia we have devoted ourselves. Despotism, whatever may be the parties or whoever may be the individuals that exercise it, is always blameworthy, and force can be justified only when employed to resist force."

The ethical perils of systematic terrorism were plainly displayed in the combination of Jesuitism and Machiavellianism characteristic of Nečâev's underground activities. We have seen that Nečâev's tactics were condemned by Lavrov, Kropotkin, and others. It is true that certain European authorities (Mazzini, for instance) have condoned and even recommended assassination as a political weapon, but an honest and straightforward revolutionary finds it difficult to adapt himself to terrorist occultism. This is why the Russian terrorists were accustomed to pass death sentences on their victims by formal resolution and to announce the sentence to the condemned.

The secret tactics of the revolutionaries and their adversaries in the state police produce, in addition to vulgar

traitors, those diplomatists of the revolution who, like Lassalle's Franz von Sickingen, wish to avail themselves of the "cunning of ideas," those who hope to bring about the great reform without shock and without arousing resistance. The attempt is vain, for the awakeners must have sufficient courage to knock loudly at the door of the theocratic bed-chamber.

Not everything is permissible in and for the revolution. Our refusal to admit that the end can always justify the means, applies to the revolution as well as to other things. Ropšin need not have allowed Dostoevskii's Ivan to influence him so powerfully. The formula "all things are permissible" originates because official absolutism sticks at nothing. Dostoevskii's Ivan wishes to give this formula a religious significance. Ivan, however, is not a revolutionist defending the people, but a self-willed man, an absolute egotist.

Many revolutionaries appraise the revolution by a purely utilitarian standard. Pestel deduced the utility of the revolution from the consideration that the Bourbon restoration had accepted the majority of the essential institutions of the revolution, and this writer declared that the recognition of the fact had marked an epoch in his political convictions and in his trend of thought. Pestel was speaking of a mass revolution, but it is another affair when we have to appraise the utility of terrorism. If we think of the great number of victims sacrificed in the cause of terrorism, and of the masses of men who have languished in Siberia or as refugees, if we throw into the scales the losses and gains, we find that even from the utilitarian standpoint which the nihilists have adopted in ethics, it is far from easy to come to a conclusion.

My own belief is that terrorism may have a revolutionary effect, but that the effect is not usually proportionate to the deed. Systematised terrorism I consider an erroneous method. The dangers of systematised terrorism have been recognised by those anarchists who have declared individual outrage useless, and on a level with ordinary crime (§ 172).

§ 207.

FOR the complete understanding of Russia revolutionism we must return to what has already been said regarding democracy in Catholic and in Protestant nations; we must return to the consideration that in political matters Catholic

nations are more radical and revolutionary than Protestant. This was shown to be a historical fact, and we saw that it was explicable from the educative influence exercised by the respective churches. Not by chance, then, was it possible for me to point to Paine, Englishman and Quaker, as exemplar of a democratic revolutionary. The French, on the other hand, produced the revolutionary type of which Blanqui was the cardinal instance, and in this matter the Russians are more akin to the French than to the Protestant English, Americans, Scandinavians, and Germans. Bakunin the Russian, is the counterpart of Blanqui the Frenchman.¹

Bakunin grew to manhood in Orthodox, absolutist Russia, whereas Marx and Engels were reared in Prussia, which though absolutist is Protestant; the distinction is conspicuous in the two great adversaries. A Protestant, qua Protestant, is positivistically "disillusioned," as Herzen and all the Russians desired to be but were not. To a German Protestant, Feuerbach and Vogt with their materialism and atheism are not so stimulating and exciting as they are to a Russian. The Protestant has the great ecclesiastical revolution behind him; he grows up in a comparatively rationalistic church and gains experience in its administration; he has become habituated to philosophising; the transition from theology to science is not so sudden and unbridged as in the Russian Orthodox church, which has still faith in revelation, is still mystically inclined, and is still so theurgical as to regard theological demonstration (and even scholastic demonstration) of its doctrines and institutions as superfluous, and is satisfied to guide the faithful by its absolute and reputedly divine authority. This is why Feuerbach, this is why philosophy and science in general, affect so differently from the Protestant the Russian who has hitherto been firm in his faith.² The effect upon Roman Catholics was somewhat similar, but Roman Catholicism has to a considerably greater extent than Orthodoxy taken to

¹ The radical lust for revolution is conspicuous in the life of Blanqui, and has given its peculiar connotation to the term Blanquism. Born in 1805, he died in 1881, when seventy-six years of age. Between 1827 and 1870, a period of forty-three years, he took part in thirteen risings, was condemned to death several times, and spent thirty-seven years in prison, although he was pardoned more than once.

² Marx was of Jewish birth. When he was six years of age the whole family was converted to Protestantism. Mosaism is even more "positivistic" than Protestantism.

itself elements from the world of science and from modern philosophy.

Feuerbach, in fact, drags the Russian down out of his Orthodox heaven, drags him down to an earth on which the Protestant and the Jew have already long ere this planted their feet. Herzen and Bakunin, like Bělinskii, were at the outset defenders of Christianity; Bakunin, like Granovskii, clung to the idea of immortality, but here too, in the end, agreed that Feuerbach was right; Bělinskii, Herzen, and Bakunin were all adverse to scepticism. In 1847, Bakunin reproached his friend Annenkov, the liberal critic, for being a sceptic; after his removal to Europe, Bakunin asked Herzen whether the latter was still a believer. Throughout life Bakunin himself remained a believer, nay, remained superstitious, remained a mystic, notwithstanding that the influence of Feuerbach and Comte had gone far to convince him that the old mythopoeic and mystical outlooks must be abandoned. The object of his faith was changed, but the old mental trend was still dominant; his belief in democracy was now a religion of whose truth he was profoundly convinced; it seemed to him that there was something inadequate in a system of political ideas untinctured by religion. He gave unambiguous expression to this opinion in his program of 1842, the philippic against the conservatives and the liberals which furnishes us with the clearest light on Bakunin's own philosophical development. Russian anarchists, socialists, liberals, even slavophiles, all draw upon the same source of Russian anarchism; to all of them it seems that life in the political field is concerned solely with "externals"; and they all insist upon the need for an "inward" spiritual life. Precisely because they are religiously inclined do they value the extant state so little, and it is only those among them who are indifferent to religious matters (including a considerable proportion of the liberals) that are satisfied with the political and administrative state in its present form.

As an Orthodox Russian, Bakunin, like Herzen, felt throughout life the burden of the theocratic authority; this is why the two men were in revolt against religion, against the church, against theocratic authority in general; hence their detestation of this authority, their hatred of tsar, church, state, of power in all its forms. The revolution against the theocracy, against the extent absolute, filled Bakunin's whole mind, and he desired to replace the false absolute by the true and definite absolute;

it seemed impossible for him to conceive of himself as ever resting quietly content with a seat in a parliament. Herzen, Bakunin, and K. Aksakov, all had a poor opinion of European constitutionalism and parliamentarism. Residing in Europe, residing in England, their estimate of the European state was identical with Pestel's. Herzen, too, had shrewdly recognised that parliamentarism and constitutionalism were Protestant products, which had never been organically incorporated into their structure by the Catholic nations. Concerning the Latin world, Herzen wrote aptly that it had sufficient energy for a movement towards liberation, but lacked the strength requisite for the enjoyment of freedom. England, on the other hand, was possessed of the latter capacity. Herzen's views on the matter were not clearly thought out, but he touched the fringe of the problem. It is striking to note how energetically he insisted that the Russians would never become merely constitutionalist, would never become merely liberal, would never become merely Protestant. For Bakunin, in like manner, Protestantism is preeminently disillusionment, is essentially characterised by its lack of enthusiasm—for Bakunin never realised the extent to which he was prone to mistake excitement for enthusiasm. In our detailed psychological analysis of the Russian revolutionary, we have already shown how the lamb grew to become a tiger.

Bakunin's whole method, his fondness for sudden leaps, his desultoriness, his rashness, were characteristic of the habitual indeterminist, of the man who expects a miracle. Whilst Fourier was ever on the look out for the millionaire who should provide him with funds for the realisation of his plans, Bakunin lived in daily expectation of the miracle of revolution. Herzen said of him very truly, that despite his demand for a positivist philosophy of history, despite Hegel, Comte, Feuerbach, and Vogt, he ever retained his mystical faith in miracle, ever remained the indeterminist, the man who has utterly failed to grasp the reign of law in nature and history. Moreover, Bakunin's outlook was that of the aristocrat who has not yet learned to work, for work is continuous attention to detail, and for this the Russian great landowner has as yet no inclination. He only can be industrious in the proper sense of the term who has thoroughly acquired the determinist constancy of purpose associated with deliberate foresight, who has recognised the importance of thinking out ways and means. In Russia, as a

member of the landowning class, he had no experience of the life of industrial towns ; in Europe he paid no attention to the effects of machine methods of production or to the effects of modern trade and commerce upon education and upon the formation of character. Bakunin was a political occultist ; as leader of a secret society, he was, in the political sphere, to play the part of the wonder-working Russian pope, hidden behind the altar-piece.

Bakunin had studied German philosophy, and he studied French philosophy as well, but never came to realise that the two philosophies do not mix well. He had a special fondness for Proudhon and the French socialists. Blanqui, rather than Marx, was congenial to him. Catholic education, in Russia and in France, has similar effects on men's minds, forming them both positively and negatively. Bakunin took his ideas from the Germans, but the French were his teachers in practical matters. His anarchism was Russian, but it was Orthodox anarchism, and it is comprehensible only as a revolt against Russian Orthodoxy. This Russian anarchism is closely akin to the French socialism of those days ; French socialism was strongly anarchist, and down to our own time anarchism has remained especially characteristic of Catholic nations. German and Marxist socialism, on the other hand, has developed chiefly in Protestant lands. Among Protestants, anarchism as a philosophical system, and anarchism as a mood, do not exist to the same extent as among the Catholic Latin races, the Catholic Germans (in Austria and South Germany), and the Slavs. It is therefore incorrect to speak of anarchism as simply a Russian manifestation, as a peculiar outcome of the Russian national character ; and we must distinguish clearly between anarchism and revolutionism (§ 176). The mental stagnation of the Russian theocracy, the absence of intellectual life and activity, the inertia of absolutism, impelled the cultured aristocracy towards anarchism ; Bakunist anarchism is the anger and the irritability of the aristocrat upon whom inactivity has been imposed by circumstances and by education. Towards the close of his life Bakunin was extremely fond of reading Schopenhauer, the philosopher of bitterness, and the fact is psychologically characteristic of this aspect of Bakunist anarchism.

Herzen might have been enlightened in this respect by his teacher Hegel. He accurately diagnosed the nature of Bakunin's

revolutionary anarchism, and rejected that doctrine ; he realised the defects of the French democracy of his day ; but he failed to grasp the essence of the matter :

Herzen declared that the revolution effected by Peter had made of the Russians the very worst that could be made of men, for it had converted them into "enlightened slaves"—the enlightened slaves of the theocracy. I may add by way of explanation that Herzen furnished a subjective analysis of this state of enlightened slavery ; so did Bělinskii, Bakunin, and others ; Mihailovskii's analysis of suicide is on the same lines. "Lapse into tormenting reflection ; distractedness of feeling and of consciousness ;" thus did Bělinskii characterise the mental state of himself and his fellow progressives. The problem of murder and suicide is discussed in the play written by Bělinskii during his student days.

This is the painful process of disillusionment whose nature

I have censured Plehanov for failing, in his polemic against the social revolutionaries, to make an adequate use of Hegel (§ 185). Here is Hegel's explanation why there had been a revolution in France, but not in Germany. The French, he said, had from the theory of enlightenment passed unhesitatingly to practice, but the Germans had confined themselves to theory. Hegel admitted that the first impetus to revolution had come from philosophy ; but in Germany theology had itself adopted the enlightenment, whereas in France the philosophic enlightenment had been directed against theology. The Protestants alone, continued Hegel, could be content with legal and moral reality, for the Protestant church had effected a reconciliation between law and religion. The reformation had brought about enormous improvements in secular matters. Poverty, sloth, unspeakable injustice, intellectual slavery, the disastrous institution of celibacy—all had been abolished. Monarchy was no longer regarded as absolutely divine, but was simply proclaimed to be based upon law.—Selgunov has a much better grasp of the situation than Herzen. In his *Sketches of Russian Life*, he compares the Russians with the Germans and the Latins, and comes to the conclusion that what the Russians condemn in the Germans as mechanical routinism, is in truth precision and definiteness of ideas and rules. Now these qualities, he says, are to be found only among Protestant peoples ; the Catholics, the French and the Italians, are disorderly, undisciplined, and do not begin to plan their actions until the time has already come to act. According to Selgunov, Protestantism has disciplined all thoughts and feelings ; Martin Luther was a thoroughly practical reformer ; Catholicism and the papacy promise wonderful things in heaven, but Protestantism gives promise of the best order on earth. Lutheranism is a school for the organisation of mundane relationships, and provides ethical instruction to fit its scholars to deal with all possible situations. Selgunov does not state in set terms that the Russian owes his peculiarities to the Orthodox faith, but this is implied. He shows a keen insight into certain traits of the Russian character and contrasts them with the traits exhibited by the Germans ; the German character, he tells us expressly, is moulded by Protestantism. Among the spiritual influences that formed prepetrine Russia, religion, according to Selgunov, occupied the first place.

Herzen grasped so accurately when he counterposed positivistic atheism and materialism, realistic nihilism, to ecclesiastical mythology and theocracy. Herzen was himself proof against this disillusionment, but he could not wholly escape the crushing influence of science. He was keenly aware of the extreme sobriety of Protestantism, in which faith his mother had brought him up ; and he emphatically rejected Protestantism for the Russians, saying that it was a bourgeois creed.

Herzen never realised the true implications of the mental revolution he had personally experienced, and the same remark applies to his philosophical successors. He rightly rejected Bakunin's revolutionism, but he failed to recognise that an appeal to Feuerbach was requisite to revolutionise Bakunin the believer. Herzen understood that Bakuninist, that Russian revolutionism was not the democracy to which he aspired. He was on the right track, but to Herzen, as to Bakunin, and to all the two men's successors, the Kantian criticism was lacking. He was right when he declared that the Latin world, though it had sufficient energy for a movement towards liberation, lacked the strength requisite for the enjoyment of freedom : but the true significance of the remark becomes apparent to those only who have grasped the nature of theocracy, and above all of Catholic theocracy ; to those who have understood how and why Catholicism, while favourable to the growth of revolutionism, is comparatively unfavourable to the growth of democracy.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

HOLY RUSSIA ; THE RUSSIAN MONK AND FEUERBACH

§ 208.

IF at the close of these studies and sketches I were to venture an attempt to summarise the present drift of Russian thought, my formula would run as follows : Russian Orthodoxy is being replaced by (German) Protestantism.

By the terms Orthodoxy and Protestantism are to be understood, not merely the theology, but the whole ecclesiastical culture, leadership, and organisation of the respective societies. Ecclesiasticism in its entirety is regarded in the sense in which Kant spoke of the philosophy of Protestantism, and in which the slavophiles looked upon German philosophy in general as Protestant philosophy. The postkantian philosophers, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Schopenhauer ; the materialists, Vogt, Büchner, and Moleschott ; finally, Marx, Darwin, and Spencer : these were the thinkers who awakened the Russians from the slumber of Orthodoxy. The part played by individuals in promoting this awakening has been sufficiently considered, and we have learned that the influence of Feuerbach was peculiarly strong and decisive.

I would ask the reader to be good enough to recall the description of my visit to the Troicko-Sergievskaja monastery ; to recall how to the eager young monk who acted as my guide I represented an embodiment of Feuerbach's philosophy of religion ; how my coming and my conduct revealed to him the great secret that his faith, that the content of his religious thoughts and aspirations, were nothing more than the naive egoistic formulation of the desires which the exigencies of Russian life had impressed upon his mentality ; how the

message I brought to him was that God was nothing more than himself, the monk who stood greatly in need of help. . . .

What I moot here as a possibility, has in truth been a reality for Russia. Since the days of Peter, German culture, German science, and German philosophy have steadily been invading Russia; and, abstractions apart, we have to consider the personal influence of the German, Swedish, and Finnish Protestants who secured official appointments at court, in the bureaucracy, in the army, and in the navy. The French, at first, were the foreign teachers of Russia; but during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I, and still more during subsequent decades, German influence greatly predominated.

This German influence acted without transitional stages; the Russian was quite suddenly awakened from Orthodox mysticism and myth. Russia and the Russian church represent the intellectual trends of the third century, and it will suffice to realise how the Russian, habituated to the passive acceptance of Christian revelation, was all in a moment confronted with the results of European progressive thought! Hitherto the Russian had lived quite objectivistically, believing the authority of church and state, the authority of the theocracy, to be supreme. All at once he found it necessary to depend upon himself and upon his natural intellectual forces. By Kant and Kant's successors he was referred to his own mental energies; he was assured that his own intellectual activities, and not divine revelation, had given birth to science, philosophy, and religion; it was made clear to him that man, not God, was the creator of social life in its entirety.

This crisis which Russia has experienced may be compared with the process of decomposition and solution affecting the so-called savage peoples that suddenly come into contact with European civilisation, though doubtless in the latter case, owing to the gulf between the two civilizations, the process of decomposition is more acute and more intense. Medieval Russia thus exposed to the decomposing influence of modern civilisation is far more spiritually akin to Europe than are the Australian blacks and other quite uncivilised peoples. Nevertheless the crude desecration of official sanctities effected in Russia by Feuerbach's influence, does bring about a process of decomposition; Russian Orthodox passivism and objectivism is revolutionised by European Protestant activism and subjectivism.

The Russian philosophers of history and of religion accurately gauged the result, though not the essential nature, of this peculiar historical process. Metaphysically, epistemologically, and ethically, they rejected German philosophy as solipsism, and they were afraid that crime would be the outcome of the philosophic revolution.

But two distinct moods prevail among those who voice such judgments. Some, like Bělinskii and Herzen, when they speak of crime, think of murder and revolution; others, like Bakunin, think of suicide.

The analysis of Dostoevskii's struggle against nihilism will convince us that Bělinskii and Bakunin did in fact both succeed in accurately diagnosing the great problem of the age. Since the eighteenth century, in Europe as well as in Russia, there has been manifest a peculiar increase in the impulse to suicide, whilst simultaneously there has occurred a growth of the revolutionary spirit.

§ 209.

SOCIOLOGISTS have not yet sufficiently analysed and elucidated the concept of historical stages. We have to ask why our own time is generally felt and proclaimed to be new. In what does its newness consist? What is the essential characteristic of the contrasted older epoch?

In these studies I have frequently expressed my dissent from historicism. More especially I have objected to the theory of Comte and of Marx that during successive stages of development man is transformed by the influence of peculiar objective historical forces, not physically alone, but psychically as well. In my view, man evolves himself, forms himself; and I consider that this self-evolution begins at the very outset of historical development. In a word, there is no epistemological warrant for the presumed coming of the superman; the modern age is distinguished solely by the fuller unfolding of forces that have previously existed in a less developed state.

As I see the matter, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mankind grew fully conscious of this fact. This is the world-wide historical significance of Humist scepticism of the philosophy of the enlightenment, and above all of the Kantian criticism and of the great revolution. Man became fully conscious of the opposition between myth and science.

Herein lies the essence of the Kantian criticism, and this explains why history and the philosophy of history were simultaneously constituted as a science.

When I refer in this manner to the supreme significance of the eighteenth century in universal history, it is necessary for me to remind the reader that the antecedent stage of evolution lasted many thousands of years. According to the conception which permeates this work, the entire antecedent period constituted antiquity in its various phases. The aspirations of the modern age began to become apparent as early as the twelfth century; but not until the eighteenth century did the new spirit begin to display itself to the full both quantitatively and qualitatively, and not until then did it become completely self-conscious in the philosophic sense.

Medieval Russia, the Russia of antiquity, was dragged without transition into the European evolutionary process of the eighteenth and subsequent centuries.

§ 210.

MY exposition furnishes little support to the fashionable explanation of historical evolution as determined by nationality and race, as the outcome of national character. No one can deny that racial and national distinctions exist, but the origin of these distinctions is itself in need of explanation, and they are not of such a kind as to render them adequate explanations of historical evolution. I have discussed the problem more than once, and especially in § 59.

Further, for the reasons previously given, I find myself unable to accept the doctrine of historical materialism.

Nor can the undeniable influence of natural environment suffice to explain history, and least of all Russian history. Obviously, the influences of natural environment are peculiarly strong in Russia. The Russian, who for almost half the year is winter-bound in his miserable wooden hut, must become different from the dweller in Central Europe and from the southerner, must work in a different way. But such influences cannot fully explain the intellectual and physical life of the nations.

Were it only on account of the enormous geographical extent of Russia, great caution is needed in assigning Russian national peculiarities to the influences of nature. Very different

is Russian life in Serbia, in Archangel or in Vologda, in Tula or in Caucasias. We must further take into consideration the differences between the Great Russians and the Little Russians ; we have to think of the mingling of races ; and we must not forget that, as time passes, changes invariably occur in modes of life and in national characteristics. We must carefully distinguish the important from the unimportant, the essential from the casual.

Let me reiterate that in the extant natural and social conditions man forms himself. In fact I share Běliniskii's belief that man is free in his historical environment. It is not chronology, it is not space and time, that constitute the essence of mankind ; man himself is that essence. Thus again and again are we brought back to the problem of subjectivism versus objectivism. My decision is in favour of a mitigated subjectivism, and these studies have been a consistent attempt to apply such a view epistemologically and methodologically.

§ 2II.

IN my attempts at philosophico-historical explanations I start from the conviction that religion constitutes the central and centralising mental force in the life of the individual and of society. The ethical ideals of mankind are formed by religion ; religion gives rise to the mental trend, to the life mood of human beings.

We are speaking here of ecclesiastical religion. The church as the organisation of society, the church as the chief pillar of the state and of state organisation, the church as the very foundation of the theocracy, has been and still remains the teacher and educator of the nations.

The effective energy is supplied, not by ecclesiastical doctrine alone, but by the living example which the church furnishes through its priest or its preachers ; in every village will be found one or several clerics to guide the inhabitants in the spirit of the church ; the church is a grandly conceived, unitary, and centralised educational institute. If it be true, as Comenius declared, that the school is the officina humanitatis, then the church is this officina, for hitherto the church has conducted the school, and has, speaking generally, provided for the entire spiritual leadership of society.

The unbeliever, the philosopher, is subject to the influence

of the church in that he fights against its doctrines and institutions; the peculiar relationship of theology to philosophy, and the content of philosophy down to our own day, afford the best proof of the strength of ecclesiastical influence. For practical purposes, the mass of indifferents simply comply with the demands of the church. On the supremely important occasions of birth, marriage, and death, even the indifferent is compelled to reflect upon the meaning of life, and there the church stands ready to help him.

Whilst those hostile to the church are fond of assuring us that the church to-day influences none but women and children, herein we see confirmation of the fact that the church influences adults as well. Not one of us can escape the impressions and influences emanating from the church, influences that have affected him during childhood, that have affected him as a member of society. We know that the influences operative during childhood are largely decisive for the rest of life.

As early as the third century, the church was a finished structure, and thenceforward exercised its educative and formative influence on society in virtue of the recognition accorded to it as supreme authority. For Russia in particular we have to remember that the Byzantine church was taken over as a ready-made theocratic organisation, and that as such it exercised its influence upon the Russian state and upon Russian society.

§ 212.

"THE profoundest theme, nay, the one theme of the history of the universe and of mankind, the theme to which all others are subordinated, is the conflict between faith and unfaith." Goethe's saying has been confirmed anew by our own philosophico-historical analysis. The content of history is the peculiar struggle of the critical understanding with myth, the struggle between critical and scientific thought on the one hand and mythology on the other.

During the eighteenth century this struggle reached a turning-point in the thought of Hume and Kant, but it still continues, and the crowning task of the present is to create the religion and the religious organisation of society that will be in conformity with the demands of the critical understanding. To

create, I say. We are not looking for a reconciliation between science and ecclesiastical religion; our aim is the creation of a new religious and spiritual content for life. Comte's idea, the view of those liberals, socialists, and anarchists who are hostile to religion, that the modern epoch constitutes a higher non-religious stage of development, is erroneous. I have already insisted that evolutionism itself demands the further development, not only of science, but also of religion and of all the forces of the mind. The Russian philosophers of history and philosophers of religion confused myth, confused uncritical credulity and mysticism, with the religious spirit; they confused theocratic ecclesiastical religion with religion itself.

§ 213.

FROM this outlook, too, I consider the problem of the independence and the originality of the Russians. It is the general view that Russians differ from Europeans; but we have to remember that the French and the Italians differ from the English; and we have to ask what precisely are the genuine and true characteristics of the Russians and of the Europeans respectively, and how much independence and originality is possessed by the other peoples.

We have examined with critical care the available explanations and estimates of Russian distinctiveness, and we have considered the ways in which Russians and Europeans have been contrasted. In many cases the judgments are extremely sketchy. Sociology and history have still much to do in this domain. It can hardly be said, for example, that Roman and Greek cultural influences affecting the Gauls, the Teutons, the southern Slavs, and so on, have as yet been precisely and critically determined. What, again, was original in the Greeks and the Romans? Has the originality of the French, the English, the Germans, etc., been objectively established?

To solve this problem it would be necessary to effect a philosophico-historical revision of history.

The influence of Europe upon Russia has incontestably been great, yet while this influence has been at work Russia has undergone a development no less independent than that of the various western nations, and we must not forget this spontaneity. Regarding the Russia of the earliest times, we

cannot to-day determine with accuracy to what degree, in cultural and political matters, the Russians shared the ideas, customs, and institutions common to the other Indo-European stocks; nor do we know how these ideas, institutions, and customs originated. The spread of Christianity subsequently laid the same or similar foundations throughout the western world, and upon these foundations a superstructure of ideas and institutions could be erected in Russia, analogous to those which were erected in Byzantium and in the west. Similar considerations apply to the recent Europeanisation of Russia and to the working of western influences in that country.

In the historical sketch, and during the description of the specific western influences, I have distinguished as precisely as possible between the effects of adoption from abroad on the one hand, and of spontaneous parallel development on the other. To give a concrete example, I referred to the parallelism between Pisarev and Stirner, for in this instance similar superstructures were erected upon an identical foundation (Feuerbach) in Russia and in Europe respectively. In great measure the development of Marxism in Russia, based upon the acceptance of Feuerbach, Comte, and materialism, may be regarded as parallel to the development of Marxism in Europe. In the case of the slavophiles we were able to demonstrate that western influences were at work, and we were able to point to the independent elaboration of German ideas. The like parallel evolutionary series can be discovered in the case of Russia and of Europe in respect of feudalism, capitalism, constitutionalism, the revolution, and so on. Side by side with adoption from abroad and the direct influence of such adoption, we can always note a comparatively independent further development of what has been adopted.

Adoption from foreign sources may vary greatly both quantitatively and qualitatively. There may occur a purely mechanical seizure (such as in literature is termed gross plagiarism), and imitation; or there may occur a more or less deliberate selection (such as was effected by Čadaev), and elaboration by a congenial spirit.

This deliberate elaboration may develop into a creative synthesis wherein the entire personality experiences the labour pains attendant on the birth of the ideal of the future. Such a synthesis is attempted by Kirěevskii, and indeed by many of the best Russian thinkers.

It is this which gives Russian philosophy its peculiar stamp ; this is why that philosophy is preeminently philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. The questions continually agitating the Russian mind are two : Whither ? and What is to be done ?

I do not believe that the critical Russian thinker will be content to-day with the answers that have been suggested by Russian philosophers of history. For example, when Homjakov, speaking of railways and of many other things, says that all the Russians need do is to harvest the ripe fruits of the labour of other lands, whilst the rule may be good enough from a purely technological outlook, it is none the less a dangerous one to follow. The thought and the energy of those who depend much on others are apt to become enfeebled. The danger is exemplified when Homjakov takes satisfaction to himself because the Russian has not had to squander his forces in experimental work, and has not exhausted his imaginative faculties through arduous toil. We must challenge the suggestions made by Caadaev and others that the backwardness of Russia has been her salvation.

Bélinkii sometimes declared that Russia often found it necessary to do in five years what the west had taken fifty years to accomplish. The truth of the assertion is questionable ; and in so far as it is true, it merely indicates a lack of steadfastness and diligence. Too often and too urgently did the slavophiles call attention to the lukewarmness of westernism and liberalism, to the lukewarmness of what Ivan Aksakov spoke of as " pothouse civilisation." It is precisely in Russia that we note a disastrous lukewarmness, a tendency to excessive reliance upon the mental work done in Europe. Detailed analysis would display the existence of several varieties of this trouble. In his biography of Granovskii, the orientalist V. V. Grigor'ev characterised one of these varieties by saying that it was a tendency " to grasp at the summits." (About this work by Grigor'ev there was much ado in its day. Kavelin took up the cudgels on behalf of Granovskii.)

Nor will it do to follow Herzen and others in the belief that it is possible for Russia to skip certain stages of historical development, to pass without transition from a low stage to a much higher one. Against the original sin of passivity it is continually necessary to guard by the encouragement of activity, steadfastness and diligence.

The task for the critical Russian thinker is, starting from what actually exists, to promote the attainment of the desirable aims by a process of organic development. These aims may in part be determined by the example of other nations, for in many respects the future of Russia is foreshadowed in the present and the past of the west. But at the same time the Russian, applying his knowledge of his own people and its history, must never fail to aspire towards an active and independent development, and must never cease from the endeavour to create the ideals for such a development.

I believe we may deduce from an analysis of Russian philosophy of history the lesson that criticism alike of Russia and of Europe may be renovated on the basis of a profounder knowledge of these two objects of comparison. Such criticism must deal with the inner life as well as with externals, must deal with moral, religious, and mental life in its entirety. Then only can the great synthesis be effected; then only can the reformatory revolution prove successful.

This philosophical criticism we expect from the Russians will have to return to Hume and to Kant; it will have to discard nihilism and the negation of all that is old; it will have to discard uncritical revolutionism; and it will have to discard an easy-going imitateness.

§ 214.

THIS critical revisionism will have to be based upon a sociological and philosophico-historical appraisement of European as well as of Russian civilisation. The question is not merely, "what elements of Old Russia are valuable, worthy of preservation and of further development?" We have likewise to ask, "what elements of Old Europe are valuable?"

In § 14 I showed that as long ago as the reign of Catherine II Boltin attempted to prove that the defects which the Europeans discovered among the Russians, existed also in Europe. In my own study of Russia I have had my attention directed to more than one instance of European happenings which, though they may not excuse what has been done in Russia, must none the less make us chary about comparisons derogatory to Russia. One who reads the reports concerning the Austrian censorship prior to the year 1848, will be little inclined to express surprise at the cruelties of the censorship under Nicholas I. Again,

when we read that the empress Josephine spent during six years no less than five and twenty million francs upon dress, the extravagance of the "Semiramis of the North" becomes more comprehensible.

These, of course, are mere details. European philosophers of history have ere this effected a thorough criticism of the development and of the present condition of the various western peoples, and have endeavoured to fashion new ideals. Nietzsche was not first in the field with his demand for the revaluation of values.

Herzen and many of his successors had little love for Europe, esteeming Europe far less highly than their predecessors and the westernisers had done; but such judgments must be accepted with caution, since they are those of refugees who never struck firm root in European soil. In some cases, and this is especially true of Herzen, these writers' vision was obscured by Russian prejudice. One becomes used in time even to hanging—the proverb applies to Russians as well as to Europeans. Our judgments concerning Europe and Russia must have a sociological, a philosophico-historical foundation.

In Europe there still exist medieval Catholicism and the papacy, whose philosophic foundations have long since been undermined; in Europe we find that ecclesiastical Protestantism still persists, though it too is philosophically outworn; Europe remains familiar with absolute monarchy, which proved competent after the revolution to convert constitutionalism and parliamentarism into its own instruments (tsarism, too, will in due course achieve the like success!); Europe knows monarchical militarism, and Europe knows capitalism—in Europe, in a word, democracy is not yet secure, and the political strength of theocracy is still considerable. It is true that in point of principle the European theocracy no longer possesses any philosophic basis, whilst politically the theocracy has been so greatly weakened that it is compelled to compromise with democracy. Speaking generally, Europe is the land of compromise, of half-measures; but they are the half-measures of transition. The philosopher of history can already regard democracy as an attainable ideal, and as the predestined heir of theocracy.

The danger in Russia is that many Russians do not feel this conviction as far as their own country is concerned.

Europe has to face the problem of the suicidal impulse; the

great problem for men and for humanity ; in Europe much attention is being paid to the problem of decadence and degeneration ; the peculiar theme of French decadence and degeneration is a standing item on the agenda, and not in France alone. Universal in Europe is a lively aspiration towards rebirth. I consider that the Russian philosopher of history has every reason to urge upon his nation that the situation is serious, the task difficult ; but he has no occasion to doubt or to despair of the future.

§ 215.

EUROPE feels a lively interest in Russia and in the destiny of that country, as we can learn, not only from the daily press, but also from the numerous books written about Russia and from the attention paid to Russian literature.

For the nonce political interest predominates. European theocracy looks upon Russia as a natural ally. The holy alliance was the issue of this conception. The conception was shared even by such a man as Bismarck, for as champion of the Prussian monarchy he found tsarism congenial. Metternich had the same feeling where Austria was concerned. Precisely for this reason, European liberals and democrats have fought tsarism as their hereditary foe, and the social democrats adopt the same attitude towards official Russia. We owe to Feuerbach, the philosophic teacher of the Russians, the saying : " We have but two hereditary enemies, spiritually the papacy, and temporally Russdom."

A philosophic interest in Russia and Russian development is however displayed in the extensive European literature concerning Russia. This interest has become so marked that it is now possible to speak of the Russification of Europe as well as of the Europeanisation of Russia. Not merely has the political influence of Russia upon Europe continually increased since the eighteenth century, but Europe has eagerly accepted Russian literature and has thus learned to participate in Russia's internal problems. We have seen how Voltaire and Herder admired Russia ; to-day we can enumerate Nietzsche Maeterlinck, and many others among those who have accepted Russian ideas and ideals.

The sociologist and the philosopher of history can learn much from Russia.

From the methodological point of view, much advantage can be derived from a comparison of Europe with Russia. Europeans will find that a study of Russian analogies makes their own problems more fully alive.

But in respect of matters of detail Russia and Russian development are likewise most instructive. The enormous extent of the country suffices to make it a world in miniature. The study of the Europeanisation of Russia, expanding as it does into a study of reciprocal cultural influences, suggests numerous and extremely interesting problems. The study of Russia will give the sociologist a clearer insight into the problem of cultural mutuality and cultural unification, a problem that is of such profound importance to human evolution.

The philosopher of history who undertakes the study of Russia must perforce acquire a clearer understanding of the outlook of the middle ages and of earlier days, and he is thereby constrained to undertake a more accurate analysis of the essential nature of the modern epoch.

As far as I myself am concerned, I have no hesitation in saying, not merely that the study of Russia and Russian literature helped me to form more accurate estimates of the philosophies of Feuerbach and of Hegel, but further that it was through Russian philosophy and literature that I came to realise the world-historical importance of Hume and of Kant.

How instructive is the study of the Russian revolution. The interest of Europe in the Russian revolution was very great, and the Russian revolution had a favourable repercussion upon Europe. In Austria, for example, manhood suffrage was introduced as an outcome of the pressure exercised by the Russian revolution. It is true that the victory of the reaction in Russia was acclaimed by the European reaction, but it cannot be said that the delight in Europe was by any means intense.

The interest in the Russian revolution does not attach solely to the political aspect of the question. The philosopher of history sees in the revolution the great religious and ethical problem of the age. This is a matter upon which we may learn something from the Russians.

The present studies will, I may hope, have made this point clear, and that is why I conclude by appealing to the reader's interest on behalf of the sequel, which will deal with Dostoevskii, the great analyst of the Russian revolution.



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

AUTHORITIES FOR THE STUDY OF RUSSIA

THE present chapter contains a list of works available in non-Russian languages from which readers can acquire a knowledge of Russia, of Russian conditions and evolution. The brief comments are penned from the general outlook of the foregoing study. Reference is made in the text to a few additional books of importance.

One who wishes to learn Russia from within, to acquire such a view as I have endeavoured to present, will find little to help him in European literature. Almost the only books are those of Herzen, the works of that author which appeared in French or German. Russians have of late years written a number of historical accounts of "social thought," the intelligentsia, etc., etc. To gain an understanding of THE RUSSIAN SPIRIT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT it is necessary to read the more notable Russian authors from Puškin to Gor'kii. The whole series can be procured in translation, and groups of especially valuable works can be selected for special subjects (for example, life in Siberia, prison life, the so-called ethnographical novels, etc.).

(a) The following are the chief works on THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE available in foreign tongues: A. von Reinholdt, *Geschichte der russischen Literatur*, 1886 (this is still the best and most complete survey of the whole field). A. Brückner, *Geschichte der russischen Literatur*, 1905 (a stimulating survey of recent literature). S. Volkonskii, *Pictures of Russian Life and History*, 1898 (brief sketches). Kropotkin, *Ideals and Realities in Russian Literature*, 1905 (stresses the sociopolitical and revolutionary aspects of recent literature). A. Wesselovsky, *Die russische Literatur*, 1908 (brief but valuable study, published in the collective work entitled "Die Kultur der Gegenwart"). De Vogüé, *Le roman russe*, 1868. Ossip-Lourié, *La psychologie des romanciers russes du dix-neuvième siècle*, 1905 (confused). Maurice Baring, *Russian Literature*, 1914. K. Waliszewski, *History of Russian Literature*, 1900. Also the articles on *Russian Language and Slavonic Lan-*

guages, by E. H. Minns, in the 11th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

THE CENSORSHIP AND JOURNALISM. W. J. Nagradov, *Moderne russische Zensur und Presse vor und hinter den Kulissen*, 1894 (facts only, without comment). Upon this subject consult in addition the data in the histories of literature and in the other historical works that have been cited, and also Kennan's *Siberia*.

There is no separate work upon THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY. Upon this subject Kolubovskii contributes a section to Ueberweg-Heinze, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des XIX^{ten} Jahrhunderts*, 10th edition, 1906, but it is bibliographical merely. Ossip-Lourié, *La philosophie russe contemporaine*, 1902 (very slight). Pilet, *La Russie en proverbes*, 1905 (by no means profound). Grusenberg, *Skizzen der Gegenwärtigen russischen Philosophie*, 1911.

From my own standpoint I have much reason to complain of the lack of a modern HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA. Among older books may be mentioned, Basarov, *Die russisch-orthodoxe Kirche*, 1873. The following are recent publications. F. Kattenbusch, "Lehrbuch der vergleichenden Konfessionskunde," vol. I, *Die orthodoxe anatolische Kirche*, 1892. E. F. K. Müller, *Symbolik: Vergleichende Darstellung der christlichen Hauptkirchen nach ihrem Grundzuge und ihren wesentlichen Lebensäusserungen*, 1896. In the before-mentioned collective work "Die Kultur der Gegenwart" there is a volume entitled *Geschichte der christlichen Religion*, of which the second edition was published in 1909; to this Bonwetsch contributes a section, "Griechisch-orthodoxes Christentum und Kirche." Reference may also be made to the appropriate articles in the *Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3rd edition (of special value is the article "Orientalische Kirche"). L. K. Götz, *Kirchenrechtliche und kirchengeschichtliche Denkmäler Altrusslands, nebst Geschichte des russischen Kirchenrechts*, 1905; *Staat und Kirche in Altrussland; Kiever Periode 988-1240*, 1908; *Das Kiever Höhlenkloster als Kulturzentrum des vormongolischen Russlands*, 1904. As to the relationship between church and state in Byzantium, consult Maassen, *Neun Kapitel über freie Kirche und Gewissensfreiheit*, 1876. See also Prugavin, *Die Inquisition der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche*, 1905, and J. Gehring, *Die Sekten der russische Kirche nach ihrem Ursprung und innerem Zusammenhange*, 1898 (covers period 1003 to 1897).

(b) RUSSIA IN GENERAL, COUNTRY, PEOPLE, AND INSTITUTIONS. A very valuable work is Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'empire des tsars*, 4th edition, 1897-8; consult also D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, 1887 (numerous editions, and a revised edition in 1905). Wallace is conservative and has no insight into the spiritual life of the country. In this respect Leroy-Beaulieu, a man of liberal

views, greatly excels him. Concerning nature and its relationships to man consult Alfred Hettner, *Das europäische Russland: Studie zur Geographie des Menschen*, 1906.

PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT DAY. Valuable matter bearing upon these problems from the progressive outlook is to be found in the eighteen essays contained in the collection by J. Mel'nik, *Russen über Russland*, 1906. Other works are the following: M. Sering, *Russlands Kultur und Volkswirtschaft*, 1913 (an excellent book). M. L. Schlesinger, *Russland in XX Jahrhundert: mit einer Uebersichtskarte*, 1908 (the author is well-informed, but his treatment of the subject is somewhat cursory). A better book by the same author is *Land und Leute in Russland*, 1909. Gregory Alexinsky, *Modern Russia*, 1912, and *Russia and Europe*, 1917. Harold W. Williams, *Russia of the Russians*, 1913. Maurice Baring, *The Mainsprings of Russia*, 1914.

POLITICAL ORGANISATION. M. von Oettingen, *Abriss des russischen Staatsrechts*, 1899 (a serviceable work, but somewhat antiquated). The topic is treated more fully in the following articles in Marquardsen's *Handbuch des öffentlichen Rechtes*: J. Engelmann, "Das Staatsrecht des russischen Reiches."

Concerning the organisation of the zemstvos consult A. von Gernet, *Die Grundzüge der russischen Landschafts verfassung*, 1897 (the account is given after the reorganisation of 1890). Palme, *Die russische Verfassung*, 1890 (analysis of the state fundamental law and of the electoral law—a good book).

In Sombart's *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. xxiii, Heft 1, Appendix, Max Weber, in "Russlands Uebergang zur Scheinkonstitutionalismus," 1906, gives a critical sketch of the development of parties after the December rising in Moscow.

The following articles should be consulted in the *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*: "Mir," "Bauernbefreiung" (in Russia), "Artelle," etc. Turning to periodicals, the "Neue Zeit," and the "Sozialistische Monatshefte" regularly publish accounts of Russian conditions and economic literature bearing upon Russia.

(c) SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY. G. von Schulze-Gävernitz, *Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Russland*, 1899. Engelmann, *Geschichte der Leibeigenschaft in Russland*, 1884. Keussler, *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des bäuerlichen Gemeindebesitzes in Russland*, 4 vols., 1876-87. Nicolai-on, *Die Volkswirtschaft in Russland nach der Bauernemanzipation*, 1899. Simkhowitsch, *Die Feldgemeinschaft in Russland*, 1898. (For criticism of Nicolai-on and the narodniki generally, consult the author's essay *Die sozialökonomischen Lehren der russischen Narodniki*, "Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik," 1897. Jas. Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols., 1914: V. de Kovalevski, *La Russie à la fin du XIX^e siècle*. Paris, 1900.

Zur Agrarbewegung in Russland, edited by B. Brande, 1907, this contains: Petrunkevich, "Agrarkrisis und die politische Lage in Russland"; Manuilov, "Agrarfrage und ihre ökonomische Lösung"; also, in an appendix by the editor, "Uebersicht der agrarischen Reformprogramme." See also the works by P. Masslow, written from the social democratic standpoint and translated into German by M. Nachimson, *Die Agrarfrage in Russland*, 1908, etc.

Semenow and Kasperow, *Russlands Landwirtschaft und Getreidehandel*, translated by M. Blumenau, 1901. L. Jurowsky, *Der russische Getreideexport, seine Entwicklung und Organisation*, 1910.

Tugan-Baranovsky, *Geschichte der russischen Fabrik*, 1900.

Witschewsky, *Russlands Handels-, Zoll- und Industriepolitik von Peter dem Grossen bis auf die Gegenwart*, 1905 (the recent period from 1894 to 1904 is treated most thoroughly).

Pažitnov, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in Russland: eine historische Darstellung an der Hand amtlicher und privater Untersuchungen und der Berichte der Fabrikinspektoren von 1861 bis in die heutige Zeit*, 1907 (German translation by Nachimson with an epilogue by that writer).

Russian finance is lucidly and in my opinion accurately treated by Helferich, *Das Geld im russisch-japanischen Kriege*, 1906. In *Die Zukunft Russlands und Japans*, 1905, and *Die Zukunft Russlands*, 1906, Martin describes Russian financial policy as fraudulent, and foretells absolute bankruptcy, but the writer's deductions are exaggerated, and despite his extensive acquaintance with ephemeral literature Martin has no true insight into Russian conditions. If I mistake not, the first book was withdrawn from circulation. No less one-sided is *Russlands Bankrott*, 1906, by Plutus (Plutus is the pseudonym of Bernhard, a social democrat). A more judicious compilation of various judgments upon Russian finance is given by Biermer, *Der Streit um die russischen Finanzen der Gegenwart, und die neue Milliardenanleihe*, 2nd edition, 1906.

A. von Bonstedt and D. Trietsch, *Das russische Reich in Europa und Asien: ein Handbuch über seine wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse*, 1910 (an official compilation, giving the chief data of importance).

(d) EXISTING CONDITIONS AND THE REVOLUTION. M. von Reusner, *Die russischen Kämpfe um Recht und Freiheit*, 1905 (the author was professor of constitutional law in Russia and his data are trustworthy): H. Ganz, *Vor der Katastrophe, ein Blick ins Zarenreich*, 1904 (a good recapitulation of Russian views). K. Ziliacus, *The Russian Revolutionary Movement*, 1905 (the work is incomplete and the data are not always accurate). Alexander Ular, *Die russische Revolution*, 1905 (a description of the principal personalities concerned in the revolution, especially those of the court; insufficiently discriminative). Bernard Pares, *Russia and Reform*, 1907.

Tscherevanin, *Das Proletariat und die russische Revolution*, 1908 (the writer is a "minority" social democrat). N. Trotzky, *Russland in der Revolution*, 1909. References to Tscherevanin and Trotzky were made in § 162.

SUFFERINGS OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS IN PRISON AND IN SIBERIA. Leo Deutsch, *Seize Ansen Sibérie*, 1904. Noworusski, *Achtzehneinhalb Jahre hinter russischen Kerkernauern, Schlüsselburger Aufzeichnungen*, 1908. Kennan, *Siberia and the Exile System*, 2 vols., 1891.

Little has been written in the languages of Europe concerning the PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN MOVEMENT TOWARDS LIBERTY. Herzen's writings are still the best. More recent works are: P. Miliukov, *Russia and its Crisis*, 1905, and his earlier *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Civilisation Russe*, Paris 1901 (Miliukov is the leader of the cadets); M. Zdziechowski, *Die Grundprobleme Russlands, literarisch-politische Skizzen*, 1907 (from the Polish, a stimulating work, the writer is Catholic and conservative).

Strongly to be recommended are the writings of the nihilist Stepniak (S. M. Kravčinskii). *The Career of a Nihilist*, 1889 (a novel). *Nihilism as it is* (undated). *The Russian Peasantry, their Agrarian Condition, Social Life, and Religion* (2 vols., 1888). *Underground Russia*, 1883. *Russia under the Tsars*, 1885. *The Russian Storm-Cloud, or Russia in her Relations to Neighbouring Countries*, 1886.

The memoirs and autobiographies of revolutionists furnish important contributions to our knowledge in this field, the works, for instance, by Věra Zasulič, Debagorii-Mokrievič, and many others. Kropotkin's *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* was published in English, 1899. This work contains the main lines of a trustworthy history of the revolutionary movement.

For the earlier periods of this movement a good book is Thun, *Geschichte der revolutionären Bewegungen in Russland*, 1883. It deals with principles as well as facts.

THE WOMAN'S MOVEMENT. H. Lange and G. Bäumer, *Handbuch der Frauenbewegung*, vol. I, 1901. This deals solely with the legal activities of women. Studies in the history of the revolutionary movement must be utilised to supplement our knowledge of the part played by women in the revolution.

(e) POLITICAL HISTORY OF RUSSIA. A survey of this subject will be found in the work of Alfred Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie* (6th edition, completed up to 1913 by E. Haumont), English translation by L. B. Lang, published in 1879. Kluchevsky, *History of Russia*, 3 vols., 1911: F. H. Skrine, *The Expansion of Russia*, 1815-1900, Cambridge, 1903.

Of works dealing with special epochs and with other special topics, the following may be recommended: T. Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nicholas I*, 3 vols. A. Brückner,

Peter der Grosse, 1879 (Oncken, "Allgemeine Geschichte"); *Katharina II*, 1883 (Oncken). J. Possoschkow, *Ideen und Zustände im Zeitalter Peters des Grossen*, 1878.; *Kulturhistorische Studien, die Russen im Ausland, die Ausländer in Russland im XVII Jahrhundert*, 1878; *Die Europäisierung Russlands, Land und Volk*, 1888. Bilbasov's work upon Catherine the Great was suppressed in Russia, but portions have appeared in German under the title *Katharina II im Urteile der Weltliteratur*, 2 vols., 1897.

HISTORY OF CIVILISATION IN RUSSIA. P. Miliukov, *Skizzen russischer Kulturgeschichte*, 1898-1901, 2 vols. E. Haumant, *La culture française en Russie*, 1910. The "Bibliothek russischer Denkwürdigkeiten" edited by Schieman contains a fine collection of documents relating to Russian civilisation. They are as follows: I, *Memoiren von J. J. de Sanglen*, 1776-1831; II, *Erinnerungen von L. de Seeland aus der polnischen Revolution*, 1830-31; III, N. J. Pirogov, *Lebensfragen*; IV, K. Kavelins und J. Turgenjevs sozialpolitischer Briefwechsel mit A. J. Herzen; V, *Erinnerungen eines Dorfgeistlichen, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Leibeigenschaft und ihrer Aufhebung*; VI, M. Bakunins sozialpolitischer Briefwechsel mit A. J. Herzen und Ogarjov, mit einer biographischen Einteilung, Beilagen und Erläuterungen von M. Dragomanov; VII, *Jugend-erinnerungen des Prof. A. J. Nikitenko*, (1826-1877).

A glance at certain MEMOIRS may be recommended. I may mention *Mémoires de l'impératrice Cathérine écrits par elle-même*, edited by Herzen. Extremely characteristic as regards eighteenth century Russia is the work of Fédor Golovkine, *La cour et le règne de Paul I, avec introduction et notes par S. Bonnet*, 1905. Cf. also *Der Briefwechsel zwischen der Kaiserin Katharina II von Russland und Johannes Georg Zimmermann*, published by Eduard Bode-mann, 1906.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. On this topic Kuropatkin's work is now available. Gädke, *Japans Krieg und Sieg*, 1907, may likewise be consulted.

EARLY WORKS ON RUSSIA. Many of these will still be found instructive. *La Russie et les russes*, by N. Turgenev, published in 1847, has already been referred to. Kustine, *La Russie en 1839* (published in 1843), may also be mentioned. Of especial value is Haxthausen, *Studien über die inneren Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands*, 3 vols., 1847-52. Haxthausen made his studies in Russia during the years 1843 and 1844, at the request of Tsar Nicholas I. His book was printed at the public expense.

Those interested in Muscovite Old Russia may be recommended to read one of the early descriptions, the most notable among which is that by Herberstein, the Austrian, *Rerum Moscovitarum Commentarii*, 1549. This was the first exhaustive study of prepetrine Russia.

Herberstein paid two visits to Moscow, and had numerous excellent documents at his disposal. A second Latin edition, amplified and improved by the author, was published in 1556. The German edition of 1557 was also Herberstein's own work. An Englishman named Fletcher, an employee of the Anglo-Muscovite Trading Company, in his work *Of the Russe Commonwealth*, described Moscow in the year 1591. Fletcher made much use of the works of Horsey, *Travels*, etc. Horsey was another servant of the same company. There are also several other descriptions of old date, by Olearius, etc.



INDEX OF NAMES

- Abramov, 306
 Achad-ha-am (Uscher Ginzberg), 240
 Adam Smith, *see* Smith
 Adler, 86
 Aggeev, 219
 Aegidius Romanus, 494
 A Kempis, *see* Kempis
 Akimov, 295
 Aksakov, Ivan, 196, 217, 219, 227, 241, 246, 561
 Aksakov, Konstantin, 198, 219, 549
 Akselrod, Ida, 295
 Akselrod, L., 296
 Akselrod, P., 326
 Alexander I, of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, 195
 Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 220, 243, 360, 416, 424, 502, 528, 554
 Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 1, 40, 41, 48, 58, 81, 82, 88, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 117, 164, 166, 194, 195, 198, 199, 206, 218, 227, 288, 292, 301, 305, 362, 426, 427, 428, 545
 Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, 2, 98, 102, 113, 195, 197, 198, 205, 206, 209, 218, 223, 244, 292, 306, 310
 Alexander the Great, 216
 Alexinsky, 569
 Alexis Aleksandrovič, Grand Duke, 207
 Amfiteatrov, 108
 Andreev, 185, 361
 Annenkov, 17, 195, 289, 290, 548
 Anselm, Saint, 257, 258
 Antonii, archbishop of Volhynia, 207, 435, 436, 499, 502, 503
 Antonii, metropolitan, 441
 Antonovič, 59, 60, 63, 68, 132
 Anzengruber, 507
 Aquinas, 494, 496, 497, 507
 Arcybašev, 448, 459
 Aristippus, 15
 Aristotle, 7, 8, 472, 490, 501, 507
 Armfeldt, 114
 Arnoldi (pseudonym), 115, 116, *see also* Lavrov
 Arsenev, 439
 Askočenskii, 59
 Augustine, Saint, 217, 226, 257, 258, 480, 488, 493, 496, 497, 501, 542
 Augustus (Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus), 501
 Avděev, 186
 Avenarius, 188, 351, 353, 358, 373
 Avsēenko, 59
 Aylmer Maude, *see* Maude
 Azev, 299, 300, 365, 366, 368, 369, 458
 Baader, 226, 257, 258, 263, 282, 532
 Babeuf, 83, 400
 Bachofen, 153
 Bagehot, 45
 Bain, 306
 Bakunin, 3, 4, 5, 23, 30, 37, 41, 49, 51, 52, 53, 58, 72, 73, 74, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 117, 124, 130, 140, 154, 191, 220, 221, 222, 269, 282, 287, 288, 290, 304, 305, 326, 336, 339, 350, 360, 362, 363, 367, 375, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 386, 390, 392, 393, 394, 397, 398, 399, 400, 405, 407, 410, 425, 434, 474, 475, 476, 481, 487, 524, 526, 528, 542, 544, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552
 Ballanche, 532
 Balmašev, 112, 295
 Balzac, 142
 Baranovskii, *see* Tugan-Baranovskii
 Baring, 567, 569
 Barjatynskii, 271
 Barth, 422
 Basarov, 568
 Basil the Great, 226

- Battenberg, Prince of, *see* Alexander
 I, Prince of Bulgaria
 Bauer, 117, 123, 133, 469
 Bäumer, 571
 Bazarov, 356
 Beaulieu, *see* Leroy-Beaulieu
 Beecher Stowe, *see* Stowe
 Beethoven, 147
 Běliniskii, 2, 3, 9, 17, 19, 20, 51, 61,
 63, 69, 74, 78, 79, 105, 127, 130,
 140, 154, 181, 183, 186, 187, 189,
 191, 220, 222, 269, 279, 280, 282,
 283, 287, 288, 289, 328, 350, 356,
 368, 411, 424, 437, 438, 458, 469,
 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 476, 481,
 487, 499, 528, 534, 535, 548, 549,
 551, 555, 557, 561
 Beltov, *see* Plehanov
 Benthams, 3, 9, 15, 57, 379, 382, 388,
 415
 Béranger, 25
 Berdjaev, 188, 435, 436, 527
 Bergeret, 244
 Berkeley, 45, 351
 Bernhard (Plutus), 570
 Bernstein, Eduard, 294, 317, 321,
 324, 331, 351
 Bernstein (Siberian exile), *see* Kogan-
 Bernstein
 Biermer, 570
 Bilbasov, 572
 Biran, 226
 Bismarck, 147, 196, 222, 255, 302,
 418, 432, 522, 564
 Blackstone, 192
 Blagosvėtlov, 68, 187
 Blanc, 3, 13, 116, 123, 139, 145, 146,
 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154
 Blanqui, 547, 550
 Blavatsky, 264
 Blumenau, 570
 Bluntschli, 539
 Boehme, 226, 257, 263, 285
 Bogdanov, 344, 345, 346
 Bogolėpov, 295, 362
 Bogoljubov, 95
 Boismont, *see* Brierre de Boismont
 Boltin, 562
 Bonald, 226, 532
 Bonč-Bruevič, 357
 Boniface VIII (Pope of Rome), 496
 Bonomi, 337
 Bonstedt, 570
 Bonwetsch, 568
 Borgeaud, 519
 Bossuet, 228
 Bouglé, 422
 Bourget, 170, 171, 174
 Brambeus, *see* Senkovskii
 Brande, 570
 Brandes, 106, 451
 Brehm, 69
 Brentano, 294, 422
 Breškovskaja, 108
 Brierre de Boismont, 174
 Brockhaus, 226
 Brückner, 567, 571
 Bruevič, *see* Bonč-Bruevič
 Bruno Bauer, *see* Bauer
 Bruno, Giordano, 247
 Bücher, 153, 553
 Buchez, 116
 Büchner, 56, 71, 72, 102, 486
 Buckle, 3, 25, 26, 46, 56, 68, 117, 118,
 150
 Buharev, 502
 Bulgakov, 293, 294, 352, 354, 357, 359,
 435, 438, 439, 442, 455
 Bulgaria, *see* Alexander I, Prince of
 Bulgaria
 Bulgarin, 220
 Burcev, 299, 365, 366, 368, 370, 543
 Burgess, 418
 Burke, 532
 Byron, 13, 21, 29, 63, 67, 79
 Čaadaev, 7, 63, 76, 84, 129, 131, 135,
 281, 424, 437, 465, 477, 479, 481,
 482, 502, 503, 504, 531, 560, 561
 Cafero, 392
 Čaikovskii and the Čaikovcy, 88, 89,
 378
 Calvin, 497
 Campanella, 226
 Carlyle, 146, 202, 206, 214, 350, 358,
 432, 475
 Čarušin, 114
 Catherine II, the Great, Tsarina of
 Russia, 85, 303, 414, 423, 424, 562
 Cato, 24
 Cavaignac, 37
 Cavour, 25, 37, 417
 Čehov, 184, 185, 186, 316, 387, 388,
 470
 Čerevjanin, 347, 571
 Čerkezov, 89, 390
 Černov, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377,
 444, 457, 458, 459
 Černyševskii, 1-19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25-58,
 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70,

- 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 84, 85,
90, 99, 103, 105, 116, 117, 124, 130,
131, 132, 136, 140, 181, 186, 187,
189, 193, 218, 220, 222, 225, 226,
272, 280, 282, 283, 288, 304, 306,
308, 326, 328, 353, 372, 387, 388,
410, 427, 428, 437, 475, 481, 484,
526, 528, 542, 555
Charles X, King of France, 537
Charoushin, *see* Čarušin
Chaumette, 385
Chrysorrhoas, *see* Joannes Damascenus
Chrysostom, 175
Chudnofski, *see* Čudnovskii
Čičerin, 27, 36, 37, 38, 227, 281, 282,
308, 426, 428, 437
Clemens Alexandrinus, 489
Cohen, 352
Comte, 3, 27, 45, 46, 56, 64, 70, 71, 92,
102, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121,
122, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132,
133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140,
141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152,
154, 155, 157, 167, 171, 176, 188,
226, 233, 245, 247, 251, 254, 282,
302, 306, 319, 322, 345, 357, 358,
359, 373, 388, 468, 469, 476, 483,
484, 522, 548, 559, 560
Comenius, 511, 557
Condorcet, 415
Constant, 417, 418, 424, 484
Constantine, the Great, Roman Em-
peror, 501
Cornelissen, 392, 401
Cousin, 116
Čudnovskii, 114
Čuprov, 291

Damascenus, *see* Joannes Damascenus
Damaskin, 502
Dančenko, *see* Nemirovič
Danielsohn, *see* Nikolai-on
Danilevskii, 212, 218, 219, 244
Dante, 21, 67, 273
Darwin, 29, 45, 102, 116, 132, 138,
146, 148, 179, 187, 217, 232, 270,
382, 388, 469, 484, 485, 553
Daškova, 14
Daudet, 452
Dawidow, 115
Debagorii-Mokrievič, 105, 571
Debidour, 492
Degaev, 365
Dejjanov, 227

Descartes, 153, 154, 251, 257, 267,
345, 354, 443
Deutsch, 571
Dickens, 67, 72
Diderot, 22, 108, 349, 423, 483, 484, 531
Diehl, 423
Dietzgen, 345, 353, 355
Dobroljubov, 1, 19-25, 29, 30, 31, 38,
49, 53, 63, 66, 67, 69, 90, 71, 74,
78, 105, 124, 220, 222, 282, 353,
388, 528
Dole, 11
Döllinger, 255
Dostoevskii, 39, 59, 63, 66, 73, 80, 84,
93, 105, 163, 167, 169, 171, 180,
185, 186, 188, 189, 193, 199, 205,
207, 213, 215, 223, 227, 234, 235,
240, 249, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273,
276, 277, 280, 281, 283, 288, 328,
352, 354, 359, 387, 392, 429, 436,
437, 438, 439, 445, 446, 447, 448,
449, 450, 451, 453, 455, 467, 470,
474, 479, 481, 487, 502, 503, 529,
534, 546, 565
Dragomanov, 86, 427
Dragomirov, 279
Družinin, 14, 17
Dudyškin, 63
Dühring, 139, 144, 162, 291, 349
Duns Scotus, 226
Durkheim, 152
Dussiaux, 66

Eliot, 72
Eliseev, 140, 187, 193
Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, 399
Ellinek, 519
Eltzbacher, 392, 393
Emerson, 206
Engelhardt, 305
Engelmann, 569
Engels, 29, 30, 68, 139, 142, 143, 148,
288, 290, 291, 294, 302, 308, 309,
319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 327, 328,
329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336,
337, 338, 340, 344, 349, 350, 351,
353, 354, 356, 358, 373, 374, 381,
382, 389, 402, 405, 406, 407, 455,
510, 540, 547
Engelssohn, 82
Epicurus, 16
Evans, *see* Eliot

Fabbri, 392, 401
Fang, *see* Tuan-Fang

- Fedorov, 59
 Ferroti, *see* Fircks
 Fet, 67, 227
 Feuerbach, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21,
 27, 42, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55,
 56, 72, 74, 83, 102, 116, 139, 144,
 167, 176, 188, 189, 217, 222, 224,
 250, 282, 288, 302, 320, 328, 332,
 333, 345, 348, 349, 350, 357, 358,
 359, 386, 399, 425, 443, 447, 452,
 468, 469, 476, 482, 483, 484, 485,
 486, 503, 520, 526, 533, 547, 548,
 553, 554, 560, 564, 565
 Fichte, 154, 192, 323, 350, 351, 402,
 468, 472, 473, 483, 517, 533, 553
 Filaret, 216
 Filippov, 219
 Filosofov, 355
 Fircks (Schédo-Ferroti), 193
 Firth, 519
 Flerovskii, 308
 Fletcher, 573
 Fourier, 3, 13, 32, 116, 484, 549
 Francis I, Emperor of Austria, 416,
 525
 Frank, 435
 Frederick II, the Great, King of
 Prussia, 414
 Frederick William III, King of Prussia,
 416
 Friedeberg, 392, 407
 Friedländer, 240
 Friedrich, 255

 Gädke, 572
 Galkin-Vraskoi, 114
 Galkine-Wrasskoy, *see* Galkin-Vraskoi
 Ganz, 570
 Gardiner, 507
 Garfield, 104, 545
 Garšin, 173, 185
 Gävernitz, *see* Schulze-Gävernitz
 Gehring, 568
 Gentz, 532
 George, 314, 315
 George Eliot, *see* Eliot
 Gernet, 569
 Geršenzon, 435
 Geršuni, 365, 368, 369
 Giacomo *see* James of Viterbo
 Giles of Rome, *see* Aegidius
 Giljarov-Platonov, 132
 Ginzberg, *see* Achad-ha-am
 Giordano Bruno, *see* Bruno
 Glinka, 220

 Gneist, 192
 Godwin, 393, 400, 410
 Goethe, 13, 21, 65, 67, 77, 172, 174,
 177, 206, 269, 421, 448, 449, 471,
 478, 513, 536, 538, 558
 Gogol, 3, 9, 19, 29, 67, 69, 70, 78,
 185, 387, 388, 425, 470, 481, 528
 Golovkine, 572
 Golovnin, 193
 Gončarov, 14, 20, 22, 23, 59, 93, 136,
 181, 272, 387
 Gor'kii, 185, 316, 328, 355, 361, 362,
 387, 388, 390, 470, 567
 Görres, 532
 Götz, 568
 Gradovskii, 410, 430
 Granovskii, 63, 124, 282, 287, 425,
 440, 471, 548, 561
 Grave, 392
 Greč, 220
 Gredeskul, 439
 Gregory VII (Pope of Rome), 494,
 496
 Griboedov, 67
 Grigor'ev, 193, 476, 561
 Grigorovič, 184
 Grimm, 66
 Grogard, *see* Mihailovskii
 Gromeka, 63
 Grote, 45
 Grusenberg, 466, 568
 Guettée, 282, 283
 Guizot, 3, 37
 Guyau, 167, 383, 384, 388
 Guyot, Yves, 520

 Haeckel, 151
 Hamann, 214
 Hardenberg, 414
 Harnack, 487, 489
 Hartmann, 46, 172, 173, 187, 225,
 226, 232, 245, 267
 Haumant, 571, 572
 Haxthausen, 31, 33, 572
 Hector, 109
 Hegel, 3, 8, 26, 27, 72, 116, 118, 122,
 124, 132, 136, 191, 226, 245, 246,
 250, 257, 269, 319, 324, 333, 348,
 402, 425, 459, 460, 468, 471, 473,
 476, 483, 484, 533, 548, 550, 551,
 553, 565
 Heine, 58, 67, 72, 196, 392, 514
 Heinze, 466, 568
 Helferich, 570
 Hellenbach, 264

Hellwald, 45, 47
 Helvetius, 328
 Henry, 399
 Henry George, *see* George
 Herbart, 10
 Herberstein, 572, 573
 Herckner, 294
 Herder, 303, 413, 564
 Herodotus, 45
 Hertling, 520
 Herzen, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 14, 17, 20,
 33, 37, 38, 39, 41, 49, 51, 52, 53,
 63, 65, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79,
 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 91, 98, 99,
 103, 105, 107, 111, 117, 124, 130,
 139, 140, 159, 181, 182, 186, 187,
 189, 193, 196, 197, 216, 218, 220,
 222, 282, 283, 287, 288, 290, 304,
 305, 306, 308, 316, 326, 327, 328,
 348, 356, 359, 361, 372, 374, 387,
 411, 423, 425, 426, 434, 437, 438,
 447, 458, 460, 469, 471, 474, 476,
 481, 482, 483, 485, 487, 488, 500,
 501, 504, 526, 528, 533, 535, 542,
 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 555,
 561, 563, 567, 571, 572
 Hettner, 569
 Hildebrand, 324
 Hill, 519
 Hoffmann, 196, 269, 270, 273
 Holbach, 328
 Holtzendorff, 539
 Holy Roman Empire, Emperor of,
see Joseph II, Rudolf II
 Homjakov, 75, 192, 198, 218, 219,
 222, 223, 226, 241, 242, 266, 273,
 281, 437, 472, 479, 488, 490, 502,
 561
 Horsey, 573
 Hugo, Victor, 67, 72
 Hugues of Saint-Victor, 226
 Hume, 9, 45, 49, 117, 138, 139, 171,
 188, 229, 350, 351, 353, 403, 414,
 442, 468, 469, 471, 472, 475, 478,
 483, 485, 517, 531, 532, 538, 558,
 562, 565
 Hung, *see* Ku-Hung-Ming
 Hutten, 351
 Hvoščinskaja, 387, 388
 Ibsen, 187, 326, 392, 410
 Isaev, 291
 Ivanov, 88
 Ivanov-Razumnik, 306, 461
 Izgoev, 435

Jacobi, 350, 418
 Jakeibovič (Melšin), 185
 James I, King of England, 507
 James of Viterbo, 494
 Janyšev, 503
 Jaroš, 244
 Javorskii, 502, 503
 Joannes Damascenus, 200, 202, 472
 Jodl, 257
 John IV, the Terrible, Tsar of Russia,
 111, 142, 169, 244, 496
 John, Saint (apostle), 235, 473
 Johnson, 17
 Joseph II, Emperor of Holy Roman
 Empire, 414
 Josephine, Empress of the French, 563
 Jurkevič, 6, 7, 9, 57, 132, 226, 284,
 468
 Jurovsky, 570
 Justinian, 497
 Južakov, 159
 Juzov, 159, 306, 308
 Kačorovskii, 306
 Kahl, 492
 Kang-Yu-Wei, 420
 Kant, 8, 9, 18, 45, 46, 49, 74, 102,
 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124,
 125, 127, 128, 132, 133, 134, 137,
 138, 170, 188, 189, 226, 228, 229,
 230, 231, 233, 250, 251, 252, 253,
 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 263, 278,
 280, 281, 284, 285, 306, 324, 349,
 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 379, 403,
 407, 414, 418, 419, 433, 442, 455,
 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 475,
 478, 479, 483, 484, 485, 486, 501,
 511, 516, 517, 520, 531, 532, 533,
 538, 553, 554, 558, 562, 565
 Karakozov, 82, 102, 116, 390
 Karamzin, 220, 424, 468
 Karazin, 525
 Karčev, 131
 Karinskii, 468
 Karonin, 328
 Karpovič, 295
 Karyšev, 308
 Kasperow, 570
 Katkov, 7, 58, 63, 191-197, 198, 200,
 202, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 227,
 244, 281, 426, 427, 430, 481, 529,
 533
 Kattenbusch, 487, 496, 497, 568
 Kautsky, 317, 334, 336, 337, 338,
 342

- Kavelin, 37, 38, 168, 227, 281, 282,
 426, 468, 561
 Kempis, à, 199, 206
 Kennan, 113, 568, 571
 Kern, 271
 Ketčer, 191
 Keussler, 569
 Kidd, 374
 Kirěevskii, 61, 63, 131, 198, 207, 210,
 219, 243, 281, 466, 471, 490, 526,
 560
 Kistjakovskii, 435
 Klements, 114
 Kljušnikov, 59, 193
 Klopstock, 192
 Kluchevsky, 571
 Kogan-Bernstein, 114
 Kojalović, 227
 Kolubovskii, 466, 568
 Komarov, 196
 Korba, 114
 Korolenko, 41, 315
 Koševlev, 192, 212
 Kostomarov, 2
 Kovalevskaja, 59
 Kovalevskii, 439, 569
 Kozlov, 437
 Kožuhov, 59
 Kraevskii, 197
 Krapotkin, *see* Kropotkin
 Kraus, 520
 Kravčinskii, *see* Stepniak
 Krestovskii, 59, 193
 Kropotkin, Alexander, 114, 386, 454
 Kropotkin, Petr, 11, 88, 89, 102, 106,
 112, 113, 136, 185, **378-389**, 390,
 391, 393, 399, 405, 408, 410, 428,
 446, 454, 475, 482, 526, 528, 536,
 544, 545, 567, 571
 Kruse, 192
 Krylov, 67
 Kudrin, *see* Rusanov
 Kudrjavcev-Platonov, 226
 Kugelmann, 291
 Ku-Hung-Ming, 419, 420
 Kulikovskii, *see* Ovsjaniko-Kulikovskii
 Kunicyn, 468
 Kuropatkin, 572
 Kustino, 572
 Kvjatkovskii, 112

 Lagardelle, 317, 392
 Lamarck, 29, 45
 Landauer, 392
 Lang, 571
 Lange, F. A., 139, 257, 352, 532
 Lange, H., 571
 Langen, 255
 Lassalle, 38, 64, 98, 143, 288, 484, 546
 Lavoisier, 142
 Laveleye, 520
 Lavrov, 51, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 98, 99,
 102, 109, **116-136**, 138, 140, 141,
 146, 152, 154, 160, 161, 163, 166,
 181, 182, 189, 220, 222, 292, 288,
 290, 305, 306, 344, 352, 353, 368,
 371, 372, 373, 374, 386, 387, 410,
 427, 437, 468, 469, 470, 473, 474,
 475, 476, 478, 482, 528, 545
 Lehmann, 169
 Lenin, 293, 296, 340, 349, 351, 353,
 354, 380
 Leo XIII (Pope of Rome), 512, 523
 Leont'ev, K. N., 197, 205, **207-220**,
 221, 222, 223, 227, 231, 266, 281,
 427, 470, 479, 480, 481, 488, 490,
 493, 502, 503, 527, 529, 533
 Leont'ev, P. M., 197
 Le Play, 204, 205
 Lermontov, 54, 61, 68, 75, 133, 186,
 271, 272
 Leroux, 67
 Leroy-Beaulieu, 568
 Lěskov, 59, 184
 Lessing, 7, 13, 22, 28, 29, 30, 413
 Lhotzky, 240
 Liebig, 62
 Liebknecht, 341, 400
 Littré, 71
 Locke, 413, 416, 418, 492, 534
 Loofs, 487
 Lopatin, 117, 286, 437
 Lopuhin, 299, 453
 Loris-Melikov, 166, 195, 198, 427
 Losskii, 437, 468
 Louis XVI, King of France, 542
 Louis XVIII, King of France, 537
 Louis Philippe, King of the French,
 37, 50, 537
 Lourié, *see* Ossip-Lourié
 Loyola, 262
 Lubbock, 167
 Lully, 226
 Lunačarskii, 355, 356, 357, 358
 Luther, 147, 154, 551
 Luxemburg, 353, 354
 L'vov, 303
 Lyell, 45

 Maassen, 255, 568

- Mably, 77, 416
 Macaulay, 37, 45, 196, 422
 Mach, 188, 344, 345, 351, 352, 353, 373
 Machajski and the Mahaevcy, 390
 Machiavelli, 498
 Mackay, 392
 Maeterlinck, 564
 Mahaev, 298
 Mahaevcy, *see* Machajski and the Mahaevcy
 Maine de Biran, *see* Biran
 Maistre, 196, 205, 206, 214, 217, 224, 226, 244, 507, 532, 533, 537
 Malcev, 138
 Malebranche, 226
 Malthus, 3, 31, 32, 35, 388
 Manuilov, 570
 Markevič, 59, 193
 Maromcev, 428
 Marquardsen, 569
 Martin, 570
 Martov, 293, 296
 Marx, 22, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 47, 50, 52, 66, 85, 90, 92, 98, 101, 102, 117, 118, 128, 130, 131, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 148, 153, 157, 159, 160, 174, 180, 189, 222, 239, 288, 289, 290, 291, 302, 304, 306, 308, 309, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 348, 349, 351, 354, 358, 372, 373, 374, 375, 379, 381, 382, 385, 389, 400, 402, 403, 405, 406, 407, 429, 454, 484, 498, 511, 524, 532, 547, 550, 553, 555
 Masoch, *see* Sacher-Masoch
 Masslov, 570
 Maude, 207
 Maudsley, 151
 Mavor, 569
 Mazzini, 545
 Mel'nik, 569
 Mehring, 337
 Melikov, *see* Louis-Melikov
 Mel'nikov, 315
 Melšin, *see* Jakeibovič
 Mendelēev, 426
 Menger, 317
 Merežkovskii, 169, 187, 316, 360, 380, 444, 458
 Merkel, 539, 540
 Meščerskii, 59
 Meslier, 416
 Methodios of Olympus, 489, 498
 Metternich, 416, 420, 540, 564
 Mezencev, 59, 95, 103, 106, 165
 Michelangelo, 521
 Michels, 341
 Mihailov, 1, 14, 84, 109, 117, 544
 Mihailovskii, 56, 77, 127, 136-190, 193, 196, 197, 217, 220, 316, 328, 344, 349, 350, 352, 362, 368, 371, 372, 373, 375, 377, 388, 410, 427, 437, 451, 473, 474, 475, 476, 479, 489, 481, 482, 486, 512, 527, 528, 542, 551
 Miliukov, *see* Miljukov
 Miljukov, 429, 430, 439, 443, 571, 572, 573
 Mill, 3, 9, 10, 15, 30, 32, 42, 46, 56, 57, 71, 73, 102, 132, 137, 139, 141, 188, 306, 308, 388, 416, 452, 484, 522
 Miller, 195
 Ming, *see* Ku-Hung-Ming
 Minns, 568
 Mirtov, *see* Lavrov
 Mirskii, *see* Svjatopolk
 Mitrovič, 206
 Mohammed, 228
 Mokrievič, *see* Debagorii
 Moleschott, 56, 71, 74, 102, 553
 Mommsen, 422
 Montaigne, 154
 Montesquieu, 483
 Morelly, 416
 Most, 394, 399, 400
 Müller, 487, 568
 Muth, 521
 Nachimson, 570
 Nadeždin, 69
 Nagradov, 568
 Napoleon I, 25, 28, 33, 39, 416, 418, 424, 507
 Napoleon III, 202
 Naumann, 422, 428
 Naumov, 328
 Nečaev, 86, 87-89, 90, 92, 96, 107, 109, 130, 272, 410, 545
 Nekrasov, 1, 59, 78, 140, 186, 328, 387, 426
 Nemirovič-Dančenko, 178
 Nesmělov, 437, 503
 Nestroev, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 376, 377
 Nettlau, 88
 Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 14, 17, 48,

- 117, 177, 197, 202, 213, 217, 265,
290, 304, 416, 424, 425, 502, 525,
528, 533, 534, 554, 562, 572
Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 205, 525
Niebuhr, 46
Nietzsche, 54, 55, 73, 81, 112, 179, 187,
216, 233, 236, 361, 374, 375, 380,
384, 388, 392, 398, 399, 410, 402,
410, 447, 448, 449, 456, 485, 498,
509, 520, 563, 564
Nieuwenhuis, 392
Nikoladze, 2
Nikolai-on, 159, 290, 291, 308, 309, 314,
569
Nikon (patriarch), 237
Nordau, 179
North, Semiramis of the, *see* Catherine
Novgorodcev, 433, 434
Novomirskii, 391
Noworusskii, 571
Nozin, 140

Octavius, *see* Augustus
Oettingen, 569
Offenbach, 179
Ogarev, 85, 88, 107, 290, 387
Omulevskii, *see* Fedorov
Olearius, 573
Oncken, 317, 572
Origen, 226, 258, 263, 480, 488, 489,
493
Orthodox, *see* Akselrod L.
Osipovskii, 468
Ossip-Lourié, 567, 568
Ostrogorskii, 341
Ostrovskii, 14, 20, 59, 193
Ovsjaniko-Kulikovskii, 439
Owen, 3, 13, 25, 333, 484
Oxenstierna, 537

Pahlen, 108
Paine, 541, 542, 547,
Palme, 569
Panaev, 185, 387
Pantcléev, 486
Paracelsus, 250
Pares, 570
Pascal, 46
Paul, Saint, 497, 498, 499, 501
Pazitnov, 570
Pečorin, 503
Pecqueur, 381
Pelagius, 226
Perovskaja, 108, 385
Pěšehonov, 314, 315, 317
Pestel, 84, 98, 106, 287, 424, 432, 465,
526, 528, 546
Peter I, the Great, Tsar of Russia, 7,
8, 131, 191, 211, 222, 237, 303,
314, 423, 426, 436, 441, 381, 485,
497, 502, 503, 504, 525, 528, 551,
554
Petraševskii and the Petraševcy group,
288, 425
Petrunkovič, 439, 570
Philo, 226, 263
Pierling, 228, 242
Pilet, 568
Pirogov, 24, 443, 572
Pisarev, 1, 53-69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,
75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 105, 107,
113, 115, 131, 132, 136, 140, 156,
161, 167, 187, 220, 222, 225, 271,
282, 305, 388, 389, 398, 429, 461,
475, 560
Pisemskii, 59, 93
Pius VII (Pope of Rome), 416
Pius IX (Pope of Rome), 255
Plato, 19, 54, 64, 226, 228, 229, 230,
241, 247, 250, 253, 254, 256, 257,
258, 260, 263, 269, 273, 281, 285,
437, 460, 471, 472, 501
Platon (metropolitan of Moscow), 254
Platonov, *see* Giljarov-Platonov, Kudr-
javcev-Platonov
Play, *see* Le Play
Plechanow, *see* Plehanov
Plehanov, 2, 97, 98, 140, 142, 189,
292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 300, 301
308, 326, 327-331, 339, 341, 343
345, 346, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352,
353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 360,
362, 363, 408, 457, 458, 459, 460,
461, 473, 474, 551
Pleve, 160, 207, 296, 299, 362, 440,
445
Plotinus, 226, 263, 269
Plutus (Bernhard) 570
Pnin, 304
Pobédonoscev, 135, 189, 194, 195,
197-207, 219, 220, 221, 222, 227,
265, 427, 435, 441, 443, 466, 467,
481, 493, 527, 529
Poerio, 52
Pogodin, 173, 191, 198, 220, 328, 431
Polenov, 206
Polevoi, 425, 533
Polonskii, 108
Pomjalovskii, 59

- Possoschkow, 572
 Potocki, 507
 Proclus, 296
 Prokopovič, 502
 Protogoras, 125
 Protopopov, 68
 Proudhon, 3, 30, 33, 36, 45, 67, 116,
 117, 139, 140, 151, 183, 290,
 335, 367, 380, 393, 396, 400,
 405, 410, 484, 550
 Prugavin, 568
 Prutkov, 272
 Pugačev, 79, 84, 94
 Puškin, 1, 13, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 54, 56,
 66, 67, 70, 75, 78, 185, 187, 196,
 219, 270, 171, 273, 290, 304, 387,
 435, 467, 470, 528, 567
 Rabinovič, 240
 Radiščev, 304, 424, 440, 528
 Radlov, 247, 286, 465, 467
 Rambaud, 571
 Ranke, 37
 Raphael, 66
 Rappoport, 115
 Rasputin, 300
 Raumer, 2
 Raymond Lully, *see* Lully
 Razin, 84, 94
 Razumnik, *see* Ivanov-Razumnik
 Reclus, 378, 389, 392, 399
 Reinholdt, 567
 Renan, 49, 130, 162, 187
 Rěšetnikov, 156, 315
 Reusner, 570
 Ricardo, 3, 32, 33, 47, 157, 291
 Rickert, 120, 352
 Riehl, 352, 373
 Ropshin, *see* Ropšin
 Ropšin, 375, 377, 444-461, 474, 486,
 529, 535, 546
 Roscher, 27
 Rost, 420
 Rothe, 495
 Rothenbücher, 480, 492
 Rousseau, 13, 95, 108, 140, 147, 199,
 233, 303, 304, 412, 413, 414, 416,
 418, 423, 440, 483, 507, 508, 516,
 523, 533
 Roux, 385
 Rozanov, 189, 222
 Rückert, 244
 Rudolf II, Emperor of Holy Roman
 Empire, 206
 Ruge, 118, 123, 133, 289, 420
 Rusanov (Kudrin), 30, 43, 44, 47, 166
 Ryl'ev, 78, 106
 Sacher-Masoch, 179
 Saint-Simon, 116, 147, 176, 484
 Saint-Victor, *see* Hugues
 Saltykov (Ščedrin), 13, 59, 63, 66,
 78, 107, 140, 162, 171, 185, 387,
 482, 523
 Samarin, 198, 219
 Sand, 13, 67, 72, 208
 Savickii, 368
 Savinkov, *see* Ropšin
 Savinkova, 453
 Sazonov, 290
 Ščedrin, *see* Saltykov
 Schédo-Ferroti, *see* Fircks
 Schell, 520
 Schelling, 191, 226, 241, 245, 247,
 250, 257, 363, 402, 468, 471, 553
 Schiemann, 571, 572
 Schiller, 19, 67, 83, 192, 414
 Schlegel, 509, 532
 Schleiermacher, 358, 495
 Schlesinger, 569
 Schlosser, 2
 Schopenhauer, 10, 46, 72, 73, 102,
 127, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232,
 245, 252, 257, 259, 263, 267, 268,
 269, 278, 374, 402, 468, 485, 550, 553
 Schulte, 255
 Schulze-Gävernitz, 294, 569
 Schuppe, 351, 352
 Scotus, *see* Duns Scotus
 Sederholm, 208
 Seeberg, 489
 Selgunov, 39, 68, 84, 140, 187, 290,
 306, 505, 551
 Šellers-Mihailov, 59
 Semiramis of the North, *see* Catherine
 Senkovskii (Brambeus), 220
 Sergii, Archbishop of Finland, 502, 503
 Sergius, Grand Duke, 296, 299, 362, 445
 Sering, 569
 Servetus, 497
 Šestov, 392
 Ševyrev, 220
 Shakespeare, 18, 21, 67, 196, 269, 52
 Sieyès, 414, 418
 Simkhowitsch, 569
 Šiškov, 102, 220, 363, 364, 444
 Sismondi, 46
 Skrine, 571
 Skabičevskii, 68
 Skovoroda, 225

- Slavinskii, 439
 Slěpcov, 59
 Smetana, 259
 Smith, 3, 32, 144, 145, 157, 176, 188,
 291, 382, 414, 415, 425
 Socrates, 277, 460
 Sokolov, 110, 369
 Sologub, 361, 392
 Solomon, 264, 448
 Solov'ev, Vladimir, 6, 75, 189, 219,
 223, 225-286, 352, 354, 357, 359,
 437, 440, 466, 468, 471, 472, 474,
 476, 477, 479, 480, 481, 487, 488,
 490, 493, 502, 503, 529
 Solov'ev, Sergĕi, 225, 227
 Sombart, 294, 569
 Sorel, 317, 392, 408
 Sorge, 291
 Spencer, 102, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
 121, 127, 132, 137, 138, 139, 141,
 144, 149, 151, 167, 169, 171, 187,
 188, 206, 306, 373, 382, 388, 469,
 484, 553
 Speranskii, 37, 424, 465
 Spielhagen, 72
 Spinoza, 6, 46, 225, 230, 231, 257, 263,
 284, 285, 345, 349, 354
 Ssemenow, 570
 Stahl, 532, 533, 539
 Stammler, 352
 Stankevič, 24, 191
 Starovĕr, 296
 Stein, Marxist writer, 349
 Stein, Heinrich Friedrich Carl, Baron
 vom, 414
 Sten'ka Razin, *see* Razin
 Stepniak, 59, 95, 96, 103, 104, 105, 106,
 111, 165, 167, 369, 371, 385, 386,
 451, 453, 455, 456, 458, 524, 542, 571
 Stirner, 53, 54, 55, 66, 72, 73, 156, 179,
 187, 336, 392, 393, 394, 399, 400,
 402, 403, 410, 452, 472, 473, 482,
 484, 485, 520, 460
 Stolypin, 299, 430, 436
 Stowe, 68
 Strahov, 80, 243
 Strauss, 167, 417, 418, 484
 Strelnikof, *see* Strelnikov
 Strelnikov, 114
 Strossmayer, 228, 242, 255, 256
 Stronin, 144
 Struve, 188, 189, 293, 294, 297, 302,
 308, 309, 329, 343, 344, 350, 352,
 354, 429, 431, 432, 435, 436, 443,
 444, 454
 Šuvalov, 362
 Suvorin, 197
 Svĕtlov, 503
 Svjatopolk-Mirskii, 204, 440
 Swedenborg, 226, 263
 Syjagin, 112, 295, 296, 362
 Tailhade, 392, 399, 534
 Taine, 56, 57, 71
 Tarde, 145
 Tarĕev, 502, 503
 Tatiščev, 443
 Tcherkesoff, *see* Čerkezov
 Tertullian, 214
 Thackeray, 67
 Thierry, 31
 Thomas of Aquino, *see* Aquinas
 Thucydides, 45
 Thun, 328, 353, 363, 371, 571
 Tihomirov, 223-224, 254, 256, 258,
 449, 481, 527
 Tjutčev, 272
 Tkačev, 68, 92, 93, 94, 98, 290, 291,
 326, 340
 Tocqueville, 196
 Tolstoi, Aleksĕi, 272
 Tolstoi, D. A. 194
 Tolstoi, I. N., 290
 Tolstoi, Lev, 59, 64, 67, 77, 93, 126,
 133, 147, 167, 169, 180, 185,
 186, 188, 189, 205, 206, 207, 208,
 216, 217, 227, 233, 271, 272, 276,
 277, 278, 280, 281, 285, 316, 357,
 387, 392, 393, 394, 397, 407, 410,
 411, 412, 443, 449, 452, 455, 457,
 459, 468, 470, 479, 481, 484, 504,
 529, 535
 Trepov, 95
 Trietsch, 570
 Trismegistus, 226
 Trockii, 348, 571
 Troeltsch, 492
 Trotzky, *see* Trockii
 Trubeckoi, 228, 286, 437
 Tscherevanin, *see* Čerevjanin
 Tscherevanin, *see* Červejanin
 Tscherkessoff, *see* Čerkezov
 Tschernischewsky, *see* Černyševskii
 Tuang-Fang, 420
 Tucker, 392, 393, 407, 408, 410
 Tugan-Baranovskii, 293, 308, 324,
 408, 439, 570
 Turgenev, Ivan, 6, 11, 12, 14, 19, 22,
 23, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 69, 70,
 72, 79, 80, 93, 97, 105, 108, 111,

- 133, 175, 186, 193, 194, 195, 196,
208, 218, 219, 272, 316, 387, 425,
426, 470
Turgenev, Nikolai, 425, 572
Tveritinov, 505
Tylor, 167, 357
- Uhtomskii, 219
Ular, 570
Ul'janov, *see* Lenin
Ulysses, 109
Uscher Ginzberg, *see* Achad-ha-am
Uspenskii, Glëb, 31, 185, 315, 328, 445
Uspenskii, N. V., 31
Ustrjalov, 59
Uvarov, 191, 220, 222, 271, 430,
432, 441, 524, 525, 528, 533
- Valentinus, 226
Varlet, 385
Vasilevskii, 412
Vengerova, 445
Vico, 3, 25, 147, 148, 152, 469
Victor, Saint-, *see* Hugues
Vidal, 381
Vincent, Saint (of Lérins), 255
Virchow, 62
Vitte, *see* Witte
Vladimir Aleksandrovič, Grand Duke,
207
Vladislavlev, 227
Vogt, 56, 71, 72, 102, 469, 484, 547,
548, 553
Vogüé, 567
Volkonskii, 567
Volkhovskiy, *see* Volhovskii
Vollmar, 294
Volhovskii, 114
Volskii, *see* Machajski
Voltaire, 108, 154, 174, 175, 176, 177,
178, 180, 187, 282, 413, 418, 423,
483, 485, 523, 564
- Volynskii, 187
Voroncov, 158, 159, 189, 234, 308,
317
Vraskoi, *see* Galkin-Vraskoi
Vvedenskii, A. I., 468
Vvedenskii, I. I., 2
- Waliszewski, 567
Wallace, 568
Ward, 373
Weber, G., 42
Weber, M., 520, 569
Wesselovsky, 567
William II, King of Prussia and
German Emperor, 265, 276, 523,
525
Williams, 569
Windelband, 120, 352
Witschewsky, 570
Witte, 207, 441, 442
Wrasskoy, *see* Galkin-Vraskoi
Wei, *see* Kang-Yu-Wei
- Xerxes, 238
- Yves Guyot, *see* Guyot
Yu-Wei, *see* Kang-Yu-Wei
- Zaicev, 60, 68
Zarin, 63, 503
Zasulič, 95, 105, 164, 293, 296, 309,
326, 342, 536, 571
Zdziechowski, 571
Željabov, 365
Žemčužnikov, 272
Zeno, 24, 350
Ziber, 291, 308
Zilliacus, 570
Zlatovratskii, 315, 316
Zola, 70, 72, 178, 187, 513
Zosimus, 215
Žukovskii, 159, 290

Russia and the Struggle for Peace

By MICHAEL FARBMAN

Crown 8vo.

5s. net.

"I would make Michael S. Farbmán's 'Russia and the Struggle for Peace' compulsory in all schools. This is a book to sweep the cobwebs away for ever. We here learn the actual truth for the first time about the Revolution."—*Evening News*.

"A singularly valuable addition to our knowledge. Nowhere could one find a clearer or more obviously truthful account of the great upheaval."—*The Herald*.

Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution

By EMILE VANDERVELDE

TRANSLATED BY JEAN E. H. FINDLAY

Crown 8vo.

5s. net. Postage 5d.

"A valuable and original series of notes on revolutionary Russia."—*Daily News*.

The Romance of the Romanoffs

By JOSEPH McCABE

Author of "The Tyranny of Shams," "The Soul of Europe," etc.

Demy 8vo.

ILLUSTRATED.

10s. 6d. net.

"The dynasty flaunts its brutal, sordid, attractive and romantic career through his pages."—*The Times*.

"He has produced a picture which is complete and admirably clear."—*Glasgow Herald*.

History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk

By L. TROTSKY

Crown 8vo.

4s. 6d. net.

This book is in no sense propaganda work, but a serious attempt to show every stage of the crisis in its historical perspective. Trotsky's argument is that "war is the method by which capitalism seeks to solve its insoluble contradictions, and to this method the proletariat must oppose its *own* method, the method of the Social Revolution." His chapters will come as a surprise to those readers who do not know how experienced and skilful a journalist he is, and there is an added surprise for those who imagine that Trotsky is, or was, a "pro-German," for they will find him to be one of the bitterest and most uncompromising opponents of the imperialism of the Central Powers.

The German Empire: 1867-1914 and the German Unity Movement

By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON

Author of "The Evolution of Modern Germany," "Germany and the Germans,"
"Municipal Life and Government in Germany," etc., etc.

Demy 8vo. In 2 vols. each of about 500 pages. About 16s. net each.

Volume I covering the period 1806 to the middle period of Bismarck's Chancellorship, and Volume II dealing in considerable detail with the twenty-five years preceding the present war.

"The German Empire," a work which has long been in preparation, represents the most important and comprehensive of this author's many contributions to German history and to the understanding of German politics and affairs. It is characteristic of Mr. Dawson's presentation of facts that he devotes special attention to Anglo-German relations and that, while rigidly eschewing controversy, he does not hesitate to give expression to his own views and opinions. As he states in the Preface, "I have not written impersonally, nor have I tried so to write." The work will be found to have a direct and important bearing upon the present international situation.

Mineral Resources of Georgia and Caucasia By D. GHAMBASHIDZE

Demy 8vo.

8s. 6d. net.

This book is the first summary in English language of the mineral resources of Georgia and Caucasia, which countries are bound to play a very important part in developing the unlimited resources of the Middle East.

It can be used very conveniently as a reference book for engineers, financiers, and the general investing public, and also by Government Departments.

War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia By M. PHILIPS PRICE

Demy 8vo.

8s. 6d. net.

"One of the best books of travel that have appeared for many years."
—*Everyman*.

From Autocracy to Bolshevism

Demy 8vo.

By BARON GRAVENITZ

5s. net.

"A deeply interesting book."—*Edinburgh Evening News*.

RECENT HISTORICAL LITERATURE

The Political History of Japan in the Meiji Era

By PROF. W. W. McLAREN. Demy 8vo, 12s. 6d. net. Postage 6d.
A valuable and suggestive book."—*Saturday Review*.

History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century

By HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE. Translated by E. and C. PAUL. With INTRODUCTIONS by WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON. Six Vols. Price 15s. net per vol. (in sets only). Postage 6d. per vol.

Poland and the Polish Question Impressions and Afterthoughts By NINIAN HILL.

Demy 8vo, with Illustrations and a Map, 10s. 6d. net. Postage 6d.

Poland's Case for Independence Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.

"An admirable summary of the country's distinguished and turbulent past."—*Pall Mall Gazette*.

History of Africa South of the Zambesi

From September 1505 to September 1795. In Three Volumes. With Maps and Plates. By DR. GEORGE MCCALL THEAL. Vol. I., THIRD EDITION, Revised and Enlarged. (Vols. II. and III., REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION, in preparation.) Demy 8vo, 8s. 6d. net.

History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872

Five Volumes. With 15 Maps and Plans. By DR. GEORGE MCCALL THEAL. Vols. I. and II., FOURTH EDITION; Vol. III., THIRD EDITION, all Enlarged and Rewritten; Vols. IV. and V. are in their SECOND EDITION. Demy 8vo, 8s. 6d. net.

SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES (1873-1881) in preparation.

History of the Renaissance, the Protestant Revolution, and the Catholic Reformation in Continental Europe By EDWARD M. HULME.

Demy 8vo, 589 pages, with 8 Maps, 10s. net. Postage 6d.

The French Renaissance By DR. CHARLES SAROLEA.

Large Crown 8vo, Cloth, with Illustrations, 5s. net. Postage 6d.

"This is the work of a philosopher, a jurist, and a keen observer."—*Globe*.

A Brief History of the French Revolution

By F. W. AVELING, M.A., B.Sc. Illustrated. Crown 8vo, 2s. net.

"A concise and clear sketch of that terrible drama."

A Short History of English Rural Life

From the Anglo-Saxon Invasion to the Present Time. By MONTAGUE FORDHAM, M.A. (Cantab.). With a PREFACE by SIR CHARLES BATHURST, M.A., M.P.

Large Crown 8vo, Cloth, 3s. 6d. net; Paper 2s. 6d. net. Postage 4d.

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LIMITED

